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ABSTRACT 
Harnack is best known as a church historian of the first rank, but a case 
can also be made for his significance as a constructive theologian. This 
thesis sets out to examine his theology using an interpretive framework 
not employed before, namely, the theme of power which runs throughout his 
work. Use is made of ·the sociological typology of power developed by 
Dennis Wrong on the basis of Weber, of Michael Mann's work on the origins 
of social power, and of Peter Berger's classification of various theological 
approaches to secularisation and religious pluralism. 
The investigation broadens the base of Harnack re:=;earch by making fuller 
use than has generally the case of publications other than Das Wesen and 
Dogmengeschichte, and pays attention to Harnack's devotional as well as his 
scholarly writing. 
The theory of power which emerges is strongly dualistic, distinguishing 
interior, ideological power from external, social power. Divine power 
empowers individuals from within, via their acceptance of the charismatic 
and competent authority of Jesus as legitimate authority, and the 
concomitant attribution of benign, nutrient power to the character of God. 
This acceptance produces markedly beneficial effects upon the individual's 
emotional and moral state, which gives rise to constructive activity in the 
external world. Inherent in this theory is a high estimate of the 
empowering possibilities of ideas and personalities. Harnack argues that 
the early church underwent a regrettable process C'transpotentiation'>, 
involving the the growth of external, coercive authority and a diminution 
in the availability of interior, divine/spiritual power. 
Harnack's work contains serious tensions related to its untenable dualism 
and its ambivalence about the possiblity of legitimate external authority 
in the church. But his explanation of divine/spiritual empowering provided 
a plausible, attractive theodicy and apologetic in its time. With 
modifications it could do so again, and is of especial value in developing 
an existential theology of the inner life. 
This thesis is dedicated to my son 
John Francis, without whose ebullient 
and delightful presence in the world 
it would have been finished sooner. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
l.a. Biography 
Carl Gustav Adolf Harnack was born on 7 May, 1851 in Dorpat <Tartu>, an 
outpost of German culture in the Livonian part of Estonia. He was the son 
of orthodox Lutheran theologian Theodosius Harnack, best known for his 
major work on Luther 1 • The bulk of Adolf's schooldays was spent in 
Erlangen, but the family eventually returned to Dorpat, where he entered 
the university to read theology, distinguishing himself in church history. 
From his uncle and professor Moritz von Engelhardt, Harnack learned his 
rigorous method of textual criticism and the investigation of source 
documents2 • In 1872 Harnack moved to Leipzig, habilitating in church 
history in 1874. It was during the Leipzig years that the theological 
position crystallised which Harnack would spend the rest of his life 
developing and defending. With friends Kaftan, SchUrer, von Gebhardt, 
Baudissin and others, he studied, corresponded with and in large measure 
came to identify with Albrecht Ritschl, which led to a painful rift with 
both his uncle and his father (AZH p.106F'. The foundation of Harnack's 
method was attention to the original documents, and during the Leipzig 
period he set to work, with von Gebhardt, assembling and editing texts. 
The pair discovered Codex Rossanensis while working in Italy, and they 
began the Texte und Untersuchungen series [ibid. pp.81 fl. With von 
Gebhardt and Zahn, Harnack began what would be a lifelong interest with 
the editing of the Patrum Apostolicum Opera. and with SchUrer he founded 
the Theologische Literaturzeitung, which became the journalistic organ of 
the Ritschlian school (ibid. p.83J. 
In 1879 Harnack accepted a call to Giessen as an ordinarius professor, and 
was a key figure in turning the tiny, ailing faculty into a going concern. 
Das M~nchtum, seine !deale und seine Geschichte was published in 1881, 
followed by Martin Luther in seiner Bedeutung fUr die Geschichte der 
Wissenschaft und Bildung in 1883, both to acclaim. But the most important 
event of the Giessen period was the publication in 1885 of the first 
volume of the Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, in which Harnack clearly 
declared his Ritschlian position and which gave rise to the first of the 
Harnackschen Fl!lle, making him a permanent outcast from orthodox 
theological circles CAZH pp.134fi Glick, Reality. p.53l. 
In 1886 Harnack accepted a call to Marburg, and after two years there he 
was called to Berlin. Despite the unanimity of the university faculty 
concerning his call, the ecclesiastical powers in the form of the 
Evangelische Oberkirchenrat, made suspicious and hostile by the 
Dogmengeshichte, strenuously opposed his appointment for nine tumultuous 
months until September 1888, when the new Kaiser Wilhelm II decided in 
Harnack's favour (AZH pp.156-172 J. 
Further controversy ensued in 1892 with the Apostolikumstreit (AZH 
pp.193f1, in which Harnack made clear some practical ramifications of his 
approach to dogma. Christoph Schrempf, a young clergyman, conducted a 
baptism without using the Apostles' Creed and as a result was disciplined 
by his superiors. Following this a delegation of students asked Harnack to 
advise them as to petitioning the Evangelishe Oberkirchenrat for an end to 
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the mandatory subscription to the Apostles° Creed by the clergy and to Hs 
use in public worship. His reply, which he published, strongly advised 
against such a course of political action U\ZH pp.200f1, but sympathised 
with the student's views. While honouring the creed for its religious 
value and venerable antiquity, he maintained that in its literal sense it 
created stumbling-blocks for many sincere Christians <the chief of which 
concerned the virgin birth>, and suggested that this creed be supplemen~ed 
or replaced by a short creed which would express more clearly the 
understanding of the gospel won through the Reformation and the 
subsequent centuries. He was challenged to provide this creed, but 
declined, saying, ,Ich bin kein Reformator" [AZH p.2121 4 • 
Harnack held the chair of church history at Berlin until 1923 [AZH p.522l. 
He served as Rektor of the university, and his academic interests and 
activities were of the widest variety. The Smend bibliography lists over 
sixteen hundred publications during his lifetime6 • By far the best known 
was Das Wesen des Christentums, which first appeared in 1900, saw sixteen 
editions before 1927, and was widely translated. The publication of Das 
Wesen greatly extended Harnack's reputation, but also incited another storm 
of controversy. Numerous books and articles appeared in reply, ranging 
from the erudite <e.g. Loisy, Cremer) to the vitriolic--one was entitled, 
'Judas, would you betray the Son of Man with a kiss?' [AZH p.2451. 
Glick lists eight theological battles in which Harnack was involved-the 
publication of Dogmengeschichte, the appointment to Berlin, the 
AQostolikumstreit, the publication of Das Wesen, the 'Babel-Bibel' issue 
(1903>, the Jatho affair <1909>, the publication of Marcion (1921>, and the 
emergence of 'dialectical theology' <1923> [Reality, p.1716 • As a result, 
the rejection of Harnack by the ecclesiastical authorities was so complete 
that they refused to allow him to examine his own students CAZH p.299l, 
and even sympathetic colleagues, when he proposed to stand for election as 
faculty representative for the Brandenburg provincial synod, held the view 
that his election would be an affront to the synod CAZH p.300J. 
His church's refusal to recognise Harnack's , ... heisser Wunsch, der Kirche zu 
dienen" CAZH p.299J caused him pain, but he found other ways to fulfil the 
responsibility he nonetheless felt to the church. He was involved at an 
early stage in the establishment of the Evangelisch-Sozial Kongress7 , in 
which he played a key role in quashing the antisemitism introduced by its 
founder, Adolf Stl:Scker [AZH p.221 1. He also took an interest in foreign 
missions, and was instrumental in the founding of the Allgemeine 
Evangelisch-Protestantische Missionsverein in 1884, for work in eastern 
Asia (ibid. pp.226fl. He had a long-standing ecumenical interest and 1::1as 
enthusiastic in his support of the post-war ecumenical movement 9 • 
German culture honoured Harnack more than his church and offered him more 
scope for activity. Von Zahn-Harnack notes that around the turn of the 
century Harnack to some extent shifted the field of his work [AZH pp.294-
3021. One positive reason for such a shift was that he felt he had a gift 
for administration and he wanted to use it, to have some impact upon 
actual conditions rather than remain exclusively in the realm of ideas. 
The university offered little further scope for this; and developments 
among the younger theologians, for which Harnack had to some extent paved 
the way, but which were foreign and repellent to him9 , were diminishing 
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his influence CAZH pp.295-2981. The church was closed to him, and yet he 
could not identify with the kirchliche Liberalismus he met in Berlin, 
encumbered as he felt it to be with the legacy of 'town-hall free-thought 0 
and the influence of communism CAZH pp.300-301l. 
But other doors had begun to open. He was elected to the Prussian 
Academy in 1890, with one exception the first theologian to have been so 
elected since Schleiermacher and Neander CAZH p.2521, and he convinced it 
to establish the Kirchenvaterkommission, continuing his work of producing 
quality editions of the earliest Christian writings. It produced 50 
volumes over the next 20 years, and took over the complementary production 
of Texte und Untersuchungen. Harnack also received the commission to 
produce a history of the Academy for the celebration of its 200th 
anniversary in 1900 [AZH p.2711. Another opportunity came in 1906 when 
Harnack was appointed director of the Royal Library (AZH pp.322 fl. 
Harnack was ennobled by the state for his contributions to the cultural 
life of Germany and, despite his ruler's personal theological conservatism, 
he enjoyed a ripening, though by no means uncritical, friendship with 
Kaiser Wilhelm II CAZH p.339-3551 1 0 • His influence at court, theologically 
and politically, has, however, probably been exaggerated (ibid]. 
Harnack became odious to the young Karl Barth as a result of his active 
and uncritical patriotism during the first World War. He was the author 
of the first half of the Kaiser's proclamation of war to the German people 
CAZH p.444J, and though he had doubts about aspects of the conduct of the 
war he largely kept them to himself [ibid. p.4451. No pacifist, he was 
happy for an institute under his control to switch into chemical warfare 
research [ibid. pp.44 7, 4511. Against these facts should be set Harnack's 
considerable efforts in the years preceding 1914 to promote good relations 
with England with a view to the prevention of a war [see AZH pp.382, 387-
391; also 08ismarck' and 'Deutschland und England' in R&A nf I pp.l91-196, 
196-203, written 19081 and his practical help during the war for enemy 
aliens trapped inside Germany [AZH pp.4 72 fl. After the war Harnack 
supported the Weimar republic, though his defence of the political 'middle' 
and his refusal to join a party led to some isolation CAZH pp.487, 4881. 
In 1921 he declined an invitation to become the German ambassador to the 
United States, preferring to engage in Germany in the reconstruction of 
academic and social life and to pursue his own theological work CAZH 
p.506-507l. 
One of Harnack's lasting contributions to Wissenschaft was the foundation, 
through his efforts, of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft zur F8rderung der 
Wissenschaften in 1911 <now the Max Planck Institute> (AZH p.420fl. It was 
designed to meet the need, filled in America by institutes sponsored by 
big business such as the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations, for pure 
research conducted apart from the the distractions of teaching and 
university life. The Gesellschaft was supported by state funds and 
private donations, and established research institutes in fields as diverse 
as psychology, iron and steel production, anthropology and aeronautics. It 
suffered badly during the war and the revolution, but through the efforts 
of Harnack and his co-workers it survived. This struggle claimed the last 
of the old man's strength, and while in Heidelberg on a journey for the 
inauguration of a new institute, Harnack died at the age of 79. 
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l.b: Methodology and selection of texts 
Harnack's frequent reply to questions about methodology was a terse and 
impatient, ,,Methode ist Mutterwitz" <common-sense!> [AZH p.72l. One is 
inclined to share his view, but some explanations of the method of this 
investigation are of course necessary. 
This thesis approaches the problem of interpret inr; Harnack's constructive 
theology by using a key which has not been tried before-that of treating 
seriously the language of power which permeates all of Harnack's work. 
The use of the word key, however, can only be as a loose metaphor. 
Harnack's work is complex and mult !-layered, and it would be facile to 
suggest that there could be only one correct principle of coherence with 
which to interpret it. Neufeld suggests one principle [see t.c. below], and 
Stephen Neill, reviewing Neufeld, offers another (Journal of Theological 
Studies, 29 (1978), pp.608-610J. Glick holds that: "Any attempt to 
interpret Harnack must resist a unilineal pattern ... The century was too rich 
in points of view, and Harnack was too much a man of his century, to 
declare of him 'Lo here, and lo, there' ... One cannot single out a sole 
feature by which to interpret Harnack" [Glick, Reality p.321 l. Yet the 
examination of the power language and themes in Harnack's works offers 
significant new vantage-points from which to assess his value. The 
question of how much store Harnack set on the problem of giving a 
coherent account of power in Christian history, though not a question he 
asked himself, is a question well worth putting to the Harnackean corpus. 
It is a question which needs to be asked in view of Harnack's consistent 
and ubiquitous use of power language, especially for the description of 
that in Christian history which was most dear to Harnack and most central 
to his constructive theology, namely 'the gospel'. 
To get to grips with this task requires time and patience and the 
performance of a good deal of what Harnack termed 'KMrrnerarbeit' CR&A 
Werk. p.188J, for Harnack never wrote a book, or even an explicit chapter, 
on his understanding of power or his intention in employing power language 
so freely. One cannot identify the significance of this language at a 
glance, and even the reading of a 'representative' book will not suffice. 
Though Harnack unarguably possessed a coherent and consistent theology 
which conditioned all his work, he never wrote a 'dogmatics'. He wrote 
church history, and his own constructive thought emerges from within the 
historical treatments. It shapes their structure, and comes into clear 
view now and then in brief evaluative sections, in asides, and in his 
famous essay-length footnotes. 
Therefore the appropriate method is an heuristic one, the interrogation of 
a whole series of these historical texts for features which the author 
does not explicitly declare. It could be termed phenomenology, or 
expressed in the sequence 'sift-collate-interpret'. One began by noting 
and recording each use of power words and phrases, and then proceeded to 
a vigorous analysis of the context and significance of each statement. 
The proceeding could not be confined to word study, however, because 
Harnack often employs power concepts where no explicit power language is 
used (see section l.e. below]. Once an entire book had been examined in 
this way, the analysis proceeded to see if the scattered 'threads' formed 
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any pattern. Clear patterns did emerge from the first book so analysed, 
which, with modifications, held good for all subsequent works. 
The fact of this consistency appears to be a matter of real significance 
rather than an artefact of the method of enquiry. Though admittedly I 
brought my own questions to the investigation--which will be dealt with in 
chapter two--I did not bring the answers. An inductive method of enquiry, 
allowing the author first to speak for himself, seemed the best method. 
The only specific preconception I brought to the work on Harnack was that 
'the essence of the gospel' and 'the power of the gospel' were in some 
form major concerns of his. The shape of those concerns was unknown, and 
I therefore assume that the pat terns which emerged from the analysis of 
the major books did indeed genuinely emerge from rather than being 
imposed upon them. The conclusions of the thesis will be the result of a 
dialogue between my questions and Harnack's pat terns. 
These patterns hold good for major works written in every period of 
Harnack's career, which indicates that Harnack's theological understanding 
maintained a high degree of uniformity and consistency through the years. 
Neufeld, in his second book on Harnack, tries to use a biographical key to 
argue that Harnack's point of view on many issues was altered and affected 
by the theological controversies through which he passed [Neufeld <1979>, 
pp.11-14l. l1hile conceding that Harnack's political and perhaps social 
views certainly developed over time-so that the friend of the Kaiser 
could, without annulling that friendship, become a supporter of the Weimar 
Republic [see F.K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: the German 
Academic Community. 1890-1933, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1969, pp.202-2031-where theology is concerned I agree with Glick that the 
evidence is in favour of substantial consistency 1 • He states: "By the 
beginning of the Giessen years Harnack's position was firmly set. 
Henceforward there were changes only in the sense of nuances" [Glick, 
Reality, p.41l. 
The point is illustrated by the letter to Stinzing, quite rightly a point 
of departure for many Harnack scholars, in which the seventeen-year-old 
Harnack out lines a theological concern, method and approach which in all 
essentials still held good when the venerable Kirchenhistoriker died in his 
eightieth year. Just before starting university in Dorpat, Harnack wrote 
to his Erlangen friend Wilhelm Stinzing to explain his choice of subject. 
He wrote: 
" ... As you will know, I am going to study theology. I do not know 
whether you also are one of those who look down on everything that 
has to do with religion and theology with scorn or indifference. But 
see Christianity as one will, yes, even as an errorj is it not of the 
greatest interest to trace the history of this error, to see for 
oneself what earth-shaking events, what revolutions this error has 
called forth, into what unfamiliar paths it has guided the spirit of 
the centuries, how it penetrated our entire present civilisation and 
culture and now is inseparable from it? But further: the longer I 
live <and how little time do we yet have behind us!> the more I af.il 
convinced that all problems and conflicts in the last analysis find 
their solution in the realm of the religious, and because of this a 
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Christian viewpoint can never become obsolete. And therefore I am an 
enthusiastic theologian, for I hope in this discipline to find the way 
to the solution of the major problems of our life; certainly not th~ 
entire solution, but at least the right direction; for well I know 
that one must begin this way anew daily. I do not desire a profusion 
of ready-made dogmas, but rather to produce and make my own every 
single strand in the fabric. Perhaps you are skipping quickly over 
these lines or perhaps you are at the least surprised at this 
peculiar way of proceeding; but here among my school-mates I am 
often compelled to bear witness to my opinion and have thus had the 
experience that I am always best understood when I have spoken most 
openly what I feel" CAZH pp.39-40: my translation]. 
The reputation of theology among the Wissenschaften at the time Harnack 
wrote the letter was so low that Harnack's election to follow this 
academic path would have left him open to scorn and disparagement (Neufeld 
<1979> p.ll-12]. Here from the outset is an affirmation of the 
significance of the individual and the exercise of individual will-power, 
and of the right to speak out one's deep convictions despite opposition. 
Here too is the conviction of the supreme significance of Christianity--for 
the understanding of history and of contemporary culture and civilisation, 
but ultimately for a more practical reason-that is, for the living of life 
itself. All things find their root and issue in religion; therefore 
Harnack's central concern with theological Wissenschaft is not academic but 
existential, that is, with the finding of a way to a solution of the chief 
problems of contemporary life. Harnack already sees Christianity as a 
power, steering the 'spirit of the centuries' into new channels, 
precipitating world-stirring events, fomenting revolutions, determining and 
resolving the problems and conflicts of life. He also knew it to be a 
power which could not be experienced second-hand through ready-made 
credal utterances, but which in each aspect had to be made one's own. 
These themes recur in writings from every period of Harnack's career2 • 
Thus one cannot easily argue for the existence of an 'early' and a 
'mature' Harnack as one can for an 'early' and a 'later' Luther. The same 
voice speaks throughout, and with the same message. 
Harnack's consistency also establishes the validity of employing texts from 
every period of his academic career with a sense of their equal 
significance and without the need to impose caveats on their 
interpretation in terms of their place in stages of the author's 
development. Das Wesen of course must hold a special claim on our 
attention because most readers~ rightly or wrongly, identify this book as 
being the quintessential Harnack, and indeed it was this book that Harnack 
himself chose when he and the author Gerhardt Hauptmann agreed to send 
each other the work which each considered his best CAZH p.434-435l. For 
many it is the only work of Harnack's that is read. Similarly in his own 
day the book had an unprecedented impact. It was widely reprinted and 
translated: a field edition was even issued to the German troops in the 
First World i1ar (Smend's bibliography lists for Das Wesen: .,12 DrUck 63 
Tsd. Ausgabe fUrs Feld in 2 Heften, 1915": Smend no.l199l. Why this set of 
lectures became a popular best-seller had much to do with its own merits, 
and also with the intellectual/historical context in which it appeared 3 • 
The book's historical impact makes it an obvious starting-place, as does 
- 7 -
the fact that it treats the theme of the essence of Christianity more 
boldly and starkly than the longer works, where this theme is woven and 
submerged into a larger and fuller historical reconstruction. 
A mistake, however, which has often been made in assessing the value of 
Harnack's work has been that of limiting the discussion to one or two 
books-usually to Das l:Jesen and Dogmengeschichte with possibly a nod in 
the direction of a few others. It is a contention of this thesis that only 
a much fuller reading of Harnack will do him justice, and such a reading 
does much to obviate many common criticisms. But with a corpus of over 
1600 works, the need to select is clear. The more technical patristic 
writings, such as contributions in the Texte und Untersuchungen series, 
have been given less attention, as have reports of such bodies as the 
Evangelish-Sozial Kongress and the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. Newspaper 
articles generally have been omitted: their existence serves, however, to 
remind us that Harnack was read outside of academic circles. · For instance, 
he produced for years an annual Christmas editorial (e.g. 
'Weihnachten',1919, Smend no.1294l: but these contributions add little that 
is new to our understanding of his thought. 
While many of Harnack's works were read in the course of the investigation 
(see bibliography], detailed analysis has been confined to Das Wesen, 
Dogmengeschichte, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den 
ersten drei Jahrhunderten, Marcion, and the collected essays, entitled Reden 
und Aufs!Hze. Attention has also been paid to a collection of Harnack's 
devotional meditations, Vom inwendigen Leben, published after his death. 
Between them, the four books cover nearly all of Harnack's career: 
Dogmengeschichte began to appear in 1885. Das Wesen was published at the 
turn of the century, Mission und Ausbreitung's first edition was dated 
1902, with a second edition <upon which the best-known English version is 
based> in 1906 and further editions in 1915 and 1924. Marcion appeared 
in 1921. A sequel, Neue Studien zu Marcion (Leipzig, Hinrichs], was 
published in 1923, and an article in Reden und AufsStze entitled 'Die 
Neuheit des Evangeliums nach Marcion' CR&A Werk pp.128-143J extends 
Harnack's treatment of the subject to 1929, the year before his death. By 
its very nature, Reden und AufsStze covers all periods. 
Each of the four books was a work of major academic stature: all in their 
time functioned as standard reference works. Most importantly for this 
investigation, each of the four books has 'the gospel' and 'the essence of 
the gospel' as a central theme. Harnack's presentation of Marcion is 
especially telling: here the faceless early heretic comes alive as a genius 
obsessed with the sheer novelty and the overwhelming power of the gospel. 
Harnack uses Marcion's famous statement about the gospel as a frontispiece 
to the book: 
''0 l:Junder Uber Wunder, VerzUckung, Macht und Staunen ist, dass man 
gar nichts Uber das Evangelium sagen, noch Uber dasselbe denken, 
noch es mit irgend etwas vergleichen kann" [prologue to Marcion's 
'Antitheses', quoted as frontispiece to Marcion and p.81 J. 
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Such a statement is clearly one which Harnack in no small measure adopts 
for himself--hence the book's importance not merely as a work of patristic 
scholarship but also as an authorial self-revelation. 
The case for using Das Wesen has already been made. The ~mengeschichte 
similarly, though less obviously, is vital to our enquiry. The first half 
of the work appeared in 1885, when Harnack was thirty-four and a rising 
ordinarius professor at Giessen. Though he had already apppeared in print, 
mainly on patristic subjects, the Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte was his 
first major work of more general theological interest. It was the book 
that made Harnack's name and notoriety, and has the significance of an 
opening move in his theological career (see Neufeld <1979>, pp.58, 82 fl. 
History of Dogma stretches to seven volumes in the English translation, 
and though its primary subject-the development of Christian dogma from 
the preaching of Jesus to the reformation-is at one remove from our 
topic for a large proportion of those seven volumes, the manner in which 
Harnack presents the preaching of Jesus and assesses the fidelity or 
departure from that standard of each dogmatic development furnishes us 
with valuable evidence. 
Mission und Ausbreitung covers a portion of the same period as 
Dogmengeschichte, i.e. the first three centuries of Christianity, but from 
the point of view of Christian missions. What interests us here is not so 
much the actual spread of Christianity as Harnack's conception of the 
message of the apostolic and missionary preaching. Also of value is his 
delineation of the social, religious and intellectual milieu of the ancient 
world into which the Christian preaching came. Such church history of 
necessity, because of the large gaps in the material and the distance in 
time, tells us as much about the author's convictions and viewpoint as 
about the historical events discussed, and thus it becomes a useful source 
for assessing Harnack's constructive theology. 
Marcion's importance has already been discussed. Its later date also 
gives it a special value, as most assessments of Harnack are based on 
materials dating from the earlier parts of his career. Harnack's work on 
Marcion, if one includes the two updates mentioned above, takes us to 
1929. Marcion appears to be the least studied of all Harnack's major 
books, a circumstance which cannot be fully explained by the fact that it 
has never been translated into English. 
The Reden und Aufslltze are useful in a different way. While many of the 
entries are church-historical vignettes, a sizeable proportion deal either 
with specific theological topics rather than historical periods or address 
present-day issues. These provide a more direct statement of Harnack's 
own theological. social and political points of view and thus constitute a 
valuable supplement to the major works4 • 
The investigation was conducted in English and German. The first book 
studied, What is Christianity?/Das Wesen des Christentums, was read 
exhaustively in both languages. Harnack's simple, elegant style renders 
him more accessible to those for whom German is a second language than 
many authors, but as the work continued, my confidence in the fidelity of 
the English translations increased to the point where I made the decision, 
in the interests of speed, to use English translations where available, 
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while checking against the original for important words, phrases and key 
passages. In the case of History of Dogma this has meant using the third, 
rather than the untranslated fourth edition: Harnack's preface to the 
fourth edition rightly asserts that little of significance for our purposes 
has been altered or added. Harnack's latest responses to critics, which 
are of significance, occur in the preface to the fourth edition, and have 
been studied. The Reden and Aufsatze as a body have never been 
translated. 
l.c: Harnack as systematic theologian: the state of the research 
Harnack was not, it is plain, a systematic theologian in the usual sense of 
the word, nor did he take the writing of systematic or dogmatic theology 
with the customary seriousness: he proposed in a lecture in 1894 the 
following outline for anyone wishing to write a dogmatic theology-Part 
One; the Teachings of Jesus and the Apostolic Interpretation of them, and 
Part Two; Mysteries (in which the author could speculate as much as he 
wished!> (Wilhelm Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch.Two Historical Theologians, 
New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968. p.36 n.58l. Harnack once 
commented to Barth that if he had to write a 'dogmatics', he would entitle 
it 'The Life of God's Children', substituting personal confession for the 
traditional kind of dogmatic theology [reported in ibid, p.36J. 
Because the idea of an ordered system of theological knowledge apparently 
has its origin not in religion but in philosophy, it would not necessarily 
appeal to Harnack. The Christian thinkers he prized most highly-Luther, 
Augustine and Marcion for instance-were not 'systematic' [Meijering <1978> 
p.53-54J. But while Harnack, in the interests of historical veracity, was 
rightly sceptical of all-embracing interpretive systems, he also recognised 
the dangers of the opposite extreme, the Fachspezialismus which denies as 
unfounded any attempt at an overall concept [ibid. p.62fJ. 
One can use the words 'systematic theologian' of Harnack only in the sense 
that he believed in the value of a Gesamtkonzeption for the narration of 
history and the illumination of what in the past is of value for the 
future. He disliked ponderous tomes of 'Dogmatik', and abhorred the 
practice of arranging them under particular 'loci' or subject-headings, with 
little attention to how dogmas arose and how they were shaped by the 
streams of time. Throughout his many historical works Harnack's 
Gesamtkonzeption is nonetheless plainly visible, and lends coherence to his 
analysis of the Christian centuries. He has indeed been criticised for 
imposing structure upon history in this way, and doubt has been cast for 
this reason upon the reliability of his history as history. But 
approaching history with a clear point of view need not be seen as a 
problem. One may agree with Meijer~ that the fact that Harnack's 
representation of the history of dogma continually expresses his own 
theological position does make his work, like that of the dogmatists 
themselves, dateable, but this datability should be seen as an asset, for 
through it Harnack takes his own place in the history of dogma [Meijering 
<1978> pp.62-631. The point is well made: both those who write dogmatics 
and those who place them in an historical context have their 
Gesamtkonzeptionen operating more or less overtly. The object of this 
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thesis is to build up an accurate portrait of Harnack's Gesamtkonzeption 
and begin to assess its value. His concern as a church historian was 
constructive rather than antiquarian. He desired to present a connected 
story for the sake of its continuing meaning in the present. Because of 
this Harnack may with justice be seen as a systematic theologian despite 
his lack of 'system', and the results of his constructive activity deserve 
attention. The survey of the literature which follows focusses primarily 
on those works which at least to some extent concern themselves with this 
aspect of Harnack's endeavour. 
Each of the controversies which Harnack's work sparked off generated a 
host of writings both critical and defensive, and some of these have 
proved to be of lasting value. The Apostolikumsstreit, for instance, 
elicited Cremer's first response, and the massive controversy which arose 
from the publication of What is Christianity? was responsible, directly or 
indirectly, for the important contributions of Leisy and Sohm. Harnack's 
contemporary critics have been well discussed: Neufeld and Sykes especially 
offer valuable treatments, and it is unnecessary to cover the same ground. 
Only the most important results for our investigation will be indicated. 
Cremer [\!!arum kljnnen wir das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis nicht 
aufgeben?,1893, A Reply to Harnack on the Essence of Christianity, 3rd ed. 
19031 puts the educated orthodox case against Harnack and is among the 
first to level the charge of reductionism. He poses the fundamental 
question: were a reduction of the total material which may be called 
Christian indeed justified, on the basis of what criteria would one make 
the reduct ion? 
Leisy, [L'Evangile et l'Eglise, Paris, 19021 while sharing Harnack's 
perspective with regard to the need for a restructuring of Christianity to 
bring it back in line with its original aims, also argues against a critical 
reduction in favour of a 'whole Christianity' approach. S.W. Sykes points 
out, in his discussion of the Harnack-Loisy debate, that the charge of 
reductionism may fit Harnack less well than is usually imagined [The 
Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from 
Schleiermacher to Barth, London, 1984, pp.l35-138l. Loisy, like most 
protagonists of a 'whole Christianity' view, ignores the fact that the 
totality of things which may be termed 'Christian' is incapable of 
expression, for in even attempting to express it the speaker consciously or 
unconsciously selects and reduces the available material according to 
predetermined criteria of selection. 
Troeltsch [The Absoluteness of Christianity. 1902; 'Was heisst .. wesen des 
Christentums't?' in Gesammelte Schriften. TUbingen, 1913; etc.] echoes Leisy's 
and Cremer's convictions about the impossibility of determining any 
legitimate criteria for the reduction of Christianity to its original 
essence, but the criticism comes out of a vastly different theological 
perspective. He treats as naive idealism Harnack's assertion that 
Christianity is not one religion among many or even the highest religion, 
but 'religion itself', and calls for an end to the dogma of Christianity's 
normativeness accredited and recognisiable on the basis of divine authority 
and miracle [Sykes, Identity, pp.152, 153]. 'The essence of Christianty' for 
Troeltsch is something which changes from age to age, for Christianity is 
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age to age, for Christianity is always changing emphases and incorporating 
new material from its interaction with culture [ibid. p.159J. t1here Harnack 
still struggles to assert the 'objectivity' of the historian while 
contending for the right of historians to exercise the 'royal judging 
function' with regard to the selection and weighting of what history to 
present, Troeltsch faces more squarely the inescapable subjectivism of any 
treatment of history [ibid. p.163J. 
Sohm [Kirchenrecht, Leipzig, 1892; Wesen und Ursprung des Katholizismus, 
2nd ed., Berlin/Leipzig 19121 is the first critic expressly to take up the 
issue of power. He argues that in original Christianity 'the Church' was a 
religious idea entirely separate from any forms of law and coercion: he 
asserts that the power of the gospel and the power of human authority are 
antithetical and mutually exclusive, and that subordination in the earliest 
church was only to the greater spiritual power manifested in recognised 
charismatic gifts. Harnack's criticism of the increasing r6le of human 
powers in the history of the church thus is thrown into relief. He will 
not go as far as Sohm, agreeing with him that the power of the gospel is 
different frolll and superior to all human powers, but also arguing for the 
necessity and even the usefulness of those human powers so long as 
spiritual power is not eclipsed. 
The most famous and influential of Harnack's critics was to be his former 
pupil, Karl Berth. Barth, beginning with his correspondence with Harnack in 
1923, argues against the anthropocentrism of Harnack's approach which is 
based on the Kantian epistemology he shared with Ritschl. With many 
elaborations, this remains the hallmark of the neo-orthodox objection to 
Harnack [see discussion of Rumscheidt below]. 
The results of careful ·exploration of Harnack's reception in this country 
were disappointing. Some of Harnack's books, and especially Pas Wesen, 
were read widely in England and received with joy by modernists in both 
the Anglican and Free churches, but one is struck, both in his orthodox 
critics and his modernist supporters, by the shallowness of acquaintance 
with Harnack's thought and the superficiality of the criticism when 
compared with his German audience. William Sanday's treatment, [An 
Examination of Harnack's 'What is Christianity?', London, 19011 is typical in 
this respect and interesting only in that it underlines the importance of 
power for Harnack's theological thought in the following way: while 
criticising Harnack for his lack of christology, Sanday at the same time 
maintains that there is a christology implicit in his work. He sees it as 
" ... an unconscious protest against the view that the Gospel can be 
adequately described either as certain new knowledge or as obedience to 
certain new commandments. There is a personal force at the centre of it, 
a force which has no parallel in any other religion. The real object of 
our Christologies is to emphasise this force, and to make sure that it 
shall not be overlooked ... " [ibid. p.15J. T.B. Saunders, who translated some 
of Harnack's works into English, offers a defensive reply to Sanday in 
Professor Harnack and his Oxford Critics [London, Williams & Norgate, 19021. 
Along with T.A. Lacey's Harnack and Loisy [London, Longman's, Green & Co., 
19041, it confirms the conclusion arrived at upon reading Sanday that 
engagement t:Iith Harnack's thought at any depth was a low priority in 
England. 
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Harnack's prestige reached its zenith around the turn of the century and 
then gradually declined. Until his death he was a revered theological 
'grand old man', but was increasingly marginal to new theological 
developments. Harnack suffered badly at the hands of popular treatments 
of his period by Barth, Tillich and others [see Sykes, Identity, p.128, 
Meijering <1978) pp.62fl. One wonders why the orthodox came down so hard 
on Harnack's work in view of the fact that he is often astonishingly 
traditional and 'orthodox'. Meijering suggests two possible reasons, the 
first being that Harnack's theology was not supranatural, as his stand on 
the virgin birth and the physical resurrection demonstrates. His second 
possibility is perhaps nearer the mark: it was the very fact that Harnack's 
.critique of traditional theology was not a radical rejection in favour of 
some exotic theory, but a nuanced relativising, which made it so hard for 
the orthodox to take, for the 'half friend' is always much more dangerous 
than the total enemy CMeijering (1978) p.60l. 
In spite of widespread and rather hackneyed criticism, there were 
throughout the years important voices in the wilderness. Bonhoeffer, one 
of the last of Harnack's students, had planned a rehabilitation of his 
teacher's work, but his early death left the plan unfulfilled CE. Bethge, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologe. Christ. Zeitgenosse, 2nd ed., MUnchen, Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1967, p.946; and see also Bonhoeffer,'Gedlichtnisrede auf 
Adolf von Harnack' in Gesammelte Schriften <MUnchen, 1960 > Bd.3 p.59-61 1. 
Bultmann also refused to so lightly dismiss his old teacher [introduction 
to a 1960 reissue of Das Wesen; see also discussion of R. Hiers below]. 
From the evaluations of his legacy at the time of his death in 1930 until 
the centenary of his birth in 1951, little of note was published about 
Harnack. Then a few short monographs appeared, including the Aland-
Elliger-Dibelius 'in memoriam' articles CBerlin, 1951), Philip Rieff's 
introduction to a reissue of Outlines of the History of Dogma CBoston, 
195 71, Erich Fascher's provocative monograph Adolf von Harnack: Grtlsse und 
Grenze CBerlin, 19621, and Trutz Rendtorff's 'Adolf von Harnack' in 
Tendenzen der Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert: eine Geschichte in Portrlits 
[Berlin/Stuttgart, 19661. None of these treatments exceeded 45 pages in 
length, but they bear witness to a stirring of interest in a half-forgotten 
name. Fascher suggests that Harnack's influence on Bonhoeffer's theology 
requires investigation-a project taken up in 1973 by Kaltenborn. Reiff 
maintains that Harnack's maligned 'neo-protestantism' stands up 
surprisingly well beside Barth's nee-orthodoxy, and that the question of to 
whom the future belongs may be more problematic than current estimates 
allow [introduction to Outlines <unnumbered) p.18J. 
The canvas changes dramatically with the appearance of G. Wayne Glick's 
359-page work in Jaroslav Pelikan's 'Makers of Modern Theology' series in 
1967. <Pelikan himself was a student of Wilhelm Pauck, who was a student 
of Harnack's [see below]). The Reality of Christianity: A study of Adolf 
von Harnack as Historian and Theologian [New York/Evanston/London, 19671 
signals the beginning of a new era in Harnack scholarship. In the 22 
years since then, at least 15 significant treatments of Harnack--8 of 




that interest2 • 
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While this can hardly be termed a flood, from Glick 
becomes a subject of significant critical interest to 
his book itself must take some of the credit for kindling 
The most important thing about the book is that it was written at all. It 
is flawed in many ways-by a style which is occasionally sarcastic and 
journalistic Cpp.240,254l, by the intrusion of Glick's overtly Barthian 
commitments, by the 'reductionism' he practises against Harnack's 
christology [see p.192-198l, and by what must be seen as at least 
sloppiness on several important points. For example, he accuses Harnack of 
adopting a 'pure essence vs. perversion' model for the history of 
Christianity,Cp.l21, which any serious aquaintance with Dogmengeschichte 
reveals to be a gross caricature of his position. Elsewhere he states 
that Harnack viewed the inner spiritual experience <the new birth> not as 
something given but as something everyone can possess as an achievement 
[p.214,286l. This again is an unjust caricature of Harnack's view, for he 
everywhere stresses that the source of the new birth is God and that God's 
fatherly love is an unmerited gift. Glick's grasp of Ritschl seems 
superficial-all the references to his thought are to secondary 
sources-and he unjustly describes Ritschl's optimistic appraisal of 
humanity as scarcely-concealed Coueism [p.52l. Glick also appears 
occasionally to ignore important evidence. For instance, he summarises 
Harnack's view of revelation as being the teaching of Jesus which pointed 
to God but contained no mention of the special relationship of Jesus to 
God [p.233l, in spite of Harnack's very frequent references, in Das Wesen 
and elsewhere, to Mat thew 11:27 and its synoptic parallels:" ... no one knows 
the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son ... ". 
Glick may not agree with Harnack as to the location of the special 
relationship between God and Christ in the sphere of deep and intimate 
knowledge, but he is mistaken when he states that the subject of the 
special relationship is not raised 3 
In spite of these limitations, Glick's book provides a useful introduction 
for a new generation to Harnack as a constructive thinker and to the 
standard criticisms levelled against him. Glick endorses Harnack's 
emphasis on an historical understanding of Christianity [p.3321, his 
identification of the controlling question for the Christian as being 
existential, i.e. 'how can I become Christ's disciple in the modern world?', 
his apologetic purpose [pp.66, 671, and his insistence that the gospel 
judges the world, rather than the reverse. He also makes the point that 
Harnack's 'mediation' to the church was in the end more successful than he 
himself was able to see, for many of his views were to be widely adopted 
after his death [p.327l. Glick's primary points of difference with Harnack 
concern (in Glick's terms> his acceptance of nature and spirit, or the 
world and the soul [p.661 rather than God and humanity, as the poles of 
our theological problem, his 'nisus to essence• procedure, his reductionism 
[p.326l, his a.nthropocentrism [but see p.304l and the identification of the 
gospel with his own HumanitMtsideal [pp.12-14,74.,3411 4 • He accuses Harnack 
unjustifiably of treating such subjects as christology, the resurrection 
and the atonement with inconsistency, vagueness and a lack of system 
[p.288, but see chapters 3-5 below). Also unwarranted is Glick's 
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assumption that any unorthodox view of a subject which Harnack evinces has 
been imposed upon the material from the outside [e.g. pp.112-118J. 
Glick's work takes our investigation further in a few significant ways. 
One is an interpretation of Harnack's historical and theological output 
which places at the centre his lifelong quest to distinguish and articulate 
the Wesen of Christianity, which Glick translates as 'reality' rather than 
'essence'. Frustratingly, when describing this 'reality' Glick quotes 
Harnack's clearest statements of power themes, but without taking them up 
[e.g. pp.198-199l. 
Another advance is Glick's recognition that for Harnack this Wesen cannot 
be identified with any set of propositional statements. He notes that 
Harnack's contemporaries complained of his vague, evanescent 'gospel' 
expressed in too many 'definitions' Cpp.l44-146J: the conclusion Glick 
reaches is that the gospel for Harnack is a dynamic principle, a living 
faith, rather than historically specifiable content or defined doctrine, and 
though one must always make the attempt, it ultimately df!fies verbal 
expression [ibid., pp. 146-14 7 J. 
A third advance is Glick's decisive resolution of the long-standing doubt 
as to whether Harnack was, as he claimed to be, doing pure, value- free 
history, or whether his own convictions and value-system---his 
axiology--coloured and perhaps distorted his presentation of the historical 
record. Glick exhaustively proves the latter case. Sadly Glick fails to 
examine at any depth Harnack's motivations for making such a claim 5 • 
Hiers and Pauck 
Two short books concerning Harnack appeared the year after Glick (both the 
poorer for not having read him>: R. Hiers' Jesus and Ethics: Four 
Interpretations CPhiladephia, Westminster Press, 19681 and W. Pauck's 
Harnack and Troeltsch: Two Historical Theologians [New York/Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 19681. Neither book is of great depth and both tend to 
portray Harnack's view on isolated subjects rather than grasping the 
underlying constructive vision of the gospel which gives unity and 
coherence to Harnack's many opinions. The greatest value of Hiers' book 
for our purpose lies in his pointing out the similarities of conclusion 
about Jesus and about the essence of Christianity between Harnack and 
Schweitzer rather than the oft-mentioned differences Cpp.72-74J, and in 
making explicit the lines of connexion and development which link Harnack 
and Bultmann Cpp.84-113, 1531. Pauck's major contributions, alongside his 
eyewitness descriptions of both Harnack and Troeltsch in the lecture-hall, 
are his assessment of Harnack as the culmination of the theological line 
of development which can be pursued on the basis of history Cpp.B, 271 and 
his affirmation that for Harnack history was an existential pursuit, with a 
personal goal of contributing to the finishing of the Reformation Cpp.18-
19, 23-25, 35-361. 
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Rumscheidt 
A study of Harnack's relationship to Barth must be of considerable 
significance for any current assessment of Harnack in view of the prest~e 
of Barth's verdict on his old teacher and how it continues to damage his 
reputation. But H. Martin Rumscheidt's strongly and openly Barthian 
reading of the Barth-Harnack correspondence [Revelation and Theology: An 
analysis of the Barth-Harnack correspondence of 1923, Cambridge University 
Press, 19721 is handicapped by his apparently limited reading. His 
bibliography makes no mention of Harnack's New Testament works, of Mission 
und Ausbreitung, or Vom inwendigen Leben. These are significant works for 
establishing Harnack's biblical views and his devotional/existential-
spiritual di.Iilensions, which are matters of major importance for a dialogue 
with nee-orthodoxy. And with the exception of von Zahn-Harnack's 
biography and the 1957 thesis which was the prototype for Glick's book, 
Rumscheidt is apparently innocent of any secondary literature on Harnack. 
The very important subject-matter of this book will need to be covered 
again. 
Rumscheidt accused Harn~.ck of positivism, by which he understood the 
conviction that what we can know of God via scripture, history, and 
personal experience <noetic ratio) corresponds exactly to God's reality as 
such <antic ratio). Barth is presented as the revolutionary figure who 
dissolves that hubris-laden misconception. But Harnack in fact did not 
hold such a view. He did believe that what was necessary for us to know 
of God was accessible to us through God's revelation in history. And he 
did hold, as Rumscheidt accurately points out, that· there is a basic 
continuity between humanity and God rather than a basic discontinuity, 
taking seriously, as Barth could not, the scriptural concept of imago dei. 
But Harnack did not assume that either the knowledge of God gained 
through apprehension of his revelation in history or the fundamental 
connectedness between the human and the divine made it possible for us to 
pronounce on the ontic ratio of God, and in this sense the charge of 
positivism is unfounded. His epistemology made such an idea completely 
impossible [see chapter 2.a. below]. 
If the charge of positivism does not stand, then the basis for Rumscheidt's 
treatment of Harnack cannot stand either. At points Rumscheidt virtually 
caricatures him as an elderly pelagian, fearful in the face of dialectical 
theology [pp.l8-19l. The justifiable criticisms of Harnack which Rumscheidt 
makes are not new [e.g. p.178l, and nothing of Harnack's constructive vision 
for the gospel or theology is in evidence. 
Rumscheidt 's opinion of Harnack appears more tempered in tone, though 
little altered in content, in his recent introduction to a very welcome 
Harnack reader in English [Adolf von Harnack: liberal theology at its 
height, London, Collins, 19891 Rumscheidt's affection for Harnack at a 
personal level also shows through more clearly. Rumscheidt persists, 
however, in allowing Barthian nee-orthodoxy both to define liberal theology 
and set the terms for any discussion. 
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Kaltenborn 
Like Rumscheidt, C-J Kaltenborn takes for his subject the relationship of 
Harnack to a major twentieth-century theological figure, but the differ~~ce 
in the manner of treatment is pronounced. Adolf von Harnack als Lehrer 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers [Berlin, Evangelische Verlaganstalt, 19731 presents 
Harnack's thought with balance and sympathy, if not with any great new 
insight, and where it repeats standard criticisms of Harnack, such as his 
eisegesis of nineteenth-century cultural values into the content of the 
gospel [see pp.50, 61, 67, 72, 881 and the unacceptable lowness of his 
christology [pp.64, 122-123, 1481, he does so with refreshing clarity and 
precision. The work is also the best book to date on Harnack's political 
allegiances and affiliations, and provides a balanced account of Harnack's 
activities during the First World War [pp.16-23J. 
In tracing the lasting influences of Harnack upon Bonhoeffer, Kaltenborn 
helps to bring to light Harnack's enduring significance for theology as a 
whole. These influences include the positive concept of Weltlichkeit and 
an abhorrence of trying to 'christianise' all non-religious spheres of 
reality [pp.69, 79-82, 103, 1211, the concept of maturity, of being-of-age 
and treating the world as 'of age' [pp.82, 1381, and of the church as the 
practical servant of the world [p.1451. Bonhoeffer shared Harnack's 
positive valuation of antiquity [pp.128fJ, his anticlericalism [p.137J, his 
position on creeds [pp.139-1401, and his admiration of fearlessly honest 
scholarship [ p.141 1. 
Kaltenborn advances our discussion in several ways. He confirms Pauck's 
view about Harnack's desire to finish the reformation, noting that what 
troubled Harnack about the reformation was what Bonhoeffer would later 
term 'cheap grace'-the false opposition of faith to works [p. 781. He also 
offers a positive explanation for the lack of 'system' in Harnack's 
constructive work in his discussion of the differences between Harnack and 
Ritschl. Where Ritschl believed in a closed system, ein streng einheitliche 
Erkenntnis of God and the world, Kaltenborn argues that Harnack wanted to 
bring to expression the concreteness and many-sidedness of the religious 
life, and therefore he did not presume to develop his thought in such a 
strongly antithetical and dialectical manner [p.14J. 
Kaltenborn is the first modern critic to take up and extend Sohm's concern 
with the themes of power and authority in Harnack. He reproduces all the 
power language which Harnack employs to express the gospel [e.g. p. 761, but 
does not expand on it as such. His concern with power focusses upon the 
question of authority, which he feels constitutes the chief dilemma of 
Harnack's theology [see chapter 6 belowJ. While Kaltenborn sees this 
attitude as a deficiency in Harnack's thought, he endorses in Harnack's 
ideas and example a new and salutary relation to human political and 
social power <Macht), rooted both in his positive attitude towards the 
world and his insistence that the church should serve and not dominate 
[Kaltenborn, pp. 16, 1491. I shall argue that Harnack's attitude to po~er 
is more complex than Kaltenborn suggests, and that there is a least a 
measure of contradiction between the attitudes to power which Harnack 
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demonstrated in his own life and those which he espoused in his writings 
[see chapters 2, 6 below]. 
Neufeld 
Swiss Jesuit Karl Neufeld offers, in his two books, Adolf von Harnack: 
Theologie als Suche nach der Kirche, [Paderborn, Verlag Bonifacius-
DrUckerei, 19771 and Adolf Harnack's Konflikt mit der Kirche: Weg-Stationen 
zum .. Wesen des Christentums", [!nnsbruck, etc., Tyrolia, 19791, the first 
comprehensive treatment of Harnack since Glick, and the first to focus 
primarily on Harnack's constructive theological concern. Where Glick made 
unclear at tempts to articulate a central principle of coherence for the 
interpretation of Harnack's work, Neufeld succeeds, not in terms of 
providing the definitive answer, but in terms of offering a helpful and 
plausible 'way in' to Harnack. 
Neufeld's work is larger and more thoroughly researched than that of 
previous Harnack scholars, and his achievements in very many respects 
require to be built upon rather than repeated-his review of the major 
F'tHle is an example, as is his work on the literature which grew up in 
response to the publication of Das Wesen [see 1979 pp.17-181 6 • Neufeld's 
considerable efforts at rehabilitation are fruitful. They augment and 
reinforce contributions to this task made by Glick, Pauck and 
Kaltenborn-after Neufeld it will never again be possible to handle 
Harnack as though he were negligable as a theologian, or to caricature him 
as crudely anti-church or anti-dogma. Methodologically one finds 
encouragement in Neufeld to make one's own attempt to articulate a 
principle of coherence for Harnack's work, and to use the method of 
'sifting' his writings on many subjects in order to find evidence of this 
principle of coherence [see 1977 p. 331. 
Neufeld insists that the organising principles for understanding Harnack's 
theology should be drawn from existential, Lebenserfahrung, categories 
rather than academic/historial or theoretical ones, and here again he 
offers a significant advance upon Glick. Despite his secondary focus on 
the 'Wesen' of Christianity, Glick remains preoccupied with Harnack's 
historiography. Neufeld's assertion is not new--Glick and Pauck mention 
it, and it can inferred from Kaltenborn-but Neufeld makes it fundamental 
to his presentation of Harnack. An awareness of the centrality of 
existential categories to Harnack's thought paves the way towards 
understanding what Harnack meant by 'the power of the gospel' [see l.e. 
belowF. 
Neufeld offers as his principle of coherence for Harnack-interpretation the 
concern with the church--not as an abstract idea but as anchored in the 
life experience of Christians, and with a view to a concrete ecclesiastical 
Neugestaltung. indeed to a tertium genus ecclesiae [see Constitution and 
Law. pp.l71-1721. While the church was of course a major concern of 
Harnack's, the question remains as to whether in making 'church' Harnack's 
central focus Neufeld is not guilty of a misidentification. e 
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Central to Neufeld's treatment of Harnack is the thesis that Harnack's own 
negative personal experiences with the church were the spurs for his 
critique of the church and for the shaping of his positive vision. He has 
a point in that, as he describes, Harnack did not just write about, but 
also experienced, the competing power claims, within the church, of official 
ecclesiastical authority, authority derived from office and tradition, and 
the authority. based on specialist competence, of the believing scholar, and 
he also shows how Harnack was willing to accept the help of the power of 
the state against the church in order to further his career and pursue his 
vocation. But I doubt whether biography played such a determining rOle in 
shaping Harnack's conclusions: had it done so, one would reasonably expect 
to find in Harnack a thorough-going defence of the directive role of the 
secular state in church affairs, where quite the reverse is true9 • 
Neufeld has not fully grasped Harnack's positive relation to the world, as 
is evidenced by the manner of his criticism of Harnack for 'spiritualising' 
Christianity, for treating revelation as a purely geistlich Ereignis in the 
inwardness of the person, sparked off by the historical encounter. This 
spiritualisation in Neufeld's view characterises both Harnack's christology 
and his idea of the church. His soteriology led to his strongly critical 
stance with regard to the doctrine of the sacraments and to a 
Kirchenordnu~ which laid too great emphasis on externals [ 1977, pp.358-
359l. Neufeld views this spiritualisation as a one-sidedness in Harnack, 
and explains it by reference to his negative . view of nature [see ch.2 
below]. I hold that the connexion is only partly true, and that an 
explanation for it is to be found in politics in the broad sense as much 
as in a doctrine of nature 10• 
Neufeld, like Kaltenborn, raises useful questions about the problem of 
legitimate religious authority for Harnack [see ch.6 below]. He also offers 
thought-provoking criticisms of Harnack beyond the usual charges of 
reductionism, unacceptably low christology, and blindness to his own Blik. 
One concerns Harnack's idea of universalism, of Christianity as religion 
itself, providing the. necessary one common foundation for the higher life 
of humanity. Through this concept, Neufeld comments, Harnack succeeded in 
distancing himself from the historical relativism of his time, but only by 
incorporating into his thought a dogmatic element <the unity of humanity>. 
Another insight concerns the extent of Harnack's Zeitgebundenheit: Glick 
focussed on Harnack's historiography in this respect, and Neufeld turns his 
attention to the related field of hermeneutics. He maintains that much of 
the rancour directed at Harnack's questioning the historicity of some 
biblical passages, for instance, the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus, 
simply would not arise today--the modern observer would feel that Harnack 
had a perfect right to see and judge the post-resurrection appearances in 
the biblical witness differently from those of Jesus' earthly life. Neufeld 
makes the point, however, that it was not only Harnack's opponents who 
were trapped in the fact/not fact, either/or mentality of the time: Harnack 
too made the distinction of viewpoints in such a way that many were led 
to believe that he denied any worth to the biblical reports [ 1977 pp.287fl. 
Neufeld is as yet unsurpassed in the world of Harnack scholarship, and, as 
indicated, he offers that world firm insights which need to be absorbed. 
But from the point of view of assessing Harnack's contribution as a 
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systematic theologian one is left with a sense of frustration. In spite of 
much time spent, especially in the second book, on the essence of 
Christianity in Harnack and on Harnack's personal Bekenntnis, Neufeld in the 
end never quite says what it is which is being confessed. His concern 
with Harnack as incipient church reformer means that he does not grapple 
at sufficient depth with Harnack's theology as constructive theology in its 
own right rather than as a possible blueprint for kirchliche Neugestaltung. 
He devotes so much energy to assessing Harnack in terms of methodology 
and hermeneutics, to rehabilitationg him from popular prejudice and 
misconception, and to justifying his theories about Harnack's concern with 
the Kirchenfragg that he never quite gets to grips with Harnack in his own 
terms. It is my conviction that with the completion of Neufeld's work the 
first and second of these tasks are virtually finished, that the third may 
be deemed a side issue, and that the fourth task--that of grappling with 
Harnack in his own terms-is the one which remains. 
Mei1ering 
Because he takes Harnack's theology as theology so seriously, E.P. 
Meijering's work sheds some light on this fourth task in his two books on 
Harnack, Theologische Urteile tiber die Dogmengeschichte: Ritschl's Einfluss 
auf von Harnack [Leiden, E.J. Brill] published in 1978, and Die 
Hellenisierung des Christentums im Urteil Adolf von Harnacks 
[Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, North-Holland Publishing Co.] published in 1985. 
Harnack would have approved of his painstaking examination of the primary 
sources, the rigorous substantiation of theses from the texts, and the 
balance and courtesy, without any compromise of convictions, of the 
conclusions [see 1978 pp. 76-86]. Meijering's tightly argued work is of 
substantial evidential value for this investigation on many points of 
detail, but the very specific focus of each book upon aspects of 
Dogmengeschichte prevents the development of a holistic perspective on 
Harnack's constructive thought. While Meijering lacks the interpretive 
unity of Neufeld, their treatments together constitute a major advance in 
the depth and discipline of Harnack scholarship. Bibliographically this 
work also shows a lack of attention to recent Harnack scholarship but does 
contribute by including the Dutch literature in the field. 
One of Meijering's most valuable contributions is his perspective on the 
nee-orthodox treatment of Harnack, which amounts to a well-substantiated 
rehabilitation 1 1 • 
Like Neufeld, Meijering also gives free expression to Harnack's power 
language, but without probing it for any particular significance. He does, 
however, take further the question of the possibility of a legitimate 
external authority for Harnack, and points out a possible contradiction in 
his thought [see ch.6 below]. 
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Berger 
Where Meijaring enriches Harnack scholarship with thoroughly-researched 
detail but lacks an overarching vision, sociologist and theologian Peter 
Berger makes, with his book The Heretical Imperative [London, Collins, 
19801, a major breakthrough in Harnack scholarship in that he focusses 
explicitly on Harnack's constructive/systematic endeavour and provides a 
persuasive interpretation of what he was trying to do overall. His 
interpretation is fundamental to the structure of our own work, and will 
receive extensive treatment in chapter 2 below. Glick began to chart the 
ground, and Neufeld made a promising beginning in the interpretation of 
Harnack's constructive theology, but no one before Berger managed to 
identify so clearly and describe so accurately the desire, intention and 
method which governed his work. Berger himself has yet to be taken 
seriously on the subject. Harnack scholars writing since Berger have not, 
with the exception of Sykes, pursued the interpretive task, and his 
treatment is too brief to be more than a beginning [see below]. The 
others either flesh out our knowledge of specific aspects of Harnack's 
work which are marginal to this task or provide further introductory, 
descriptive or critical/analytical treatments. 
Johannes Irmscher, JUrgen Dummer 
The collection of articles published by the Berlin Academy in the DDR to 
celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Harnack's death contributes to our 
knowledge of specific details of Harnack's work. The leading article is by 
Johannes Irmscher, 'Adolf Harnack und der Fortschritt in der 
Altertumswissenschaft: zu seinem 50. Todestag' [Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 
1981)1 2 , Bhile never obscuring Harnack's bourgeois allegiance or his life-
long identification with Christian theology, Irmscher offers a decidedly 
Marxist reading of Harnack, portraying him as something of a hero of 
humanistic Wissenschaft, emancipating it from the narrowness of 
contemporary theology and tearing down the artificial wall that separated 
philologia sacra and classical philology, sacred history and ancient history 
Cpp.8, 12, 14,1. 
JUrgen Dummer's 'Adolf von Harnack und das Neue Testament' indicates two 
potentially fruitful areas of future Harnack-study-an evaluation of his 
New Testament writings, and a consideration of Harnack0s publications in 
the Sitzungsberichte of the Berlin Academy, writings which to date have 
featured hardly at all in assessments of Harnack13• 
Pelikan. Frend. Schmitz 
Along with the critical treatments of Harnack which appear in these 
decades we note in passing the positive use of his work in the field of 
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early church history. Jaroslav Pelikan, who through his Doktorvater Pauck 
can claim a kind of direct link with Harnack, maintains, in his introduction 
to Glick's Reality. that "it is time for the pupils of Harnack's pupils to 
look more deeply into the work of the master himself" [Reality, p.xiiJ. 
Pelikan's own treatment of early Christian doctrine, entitled The Christian 
Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine (University of Chicago 
Press, vol.I, 1971, etc] openly acknowledges its debt to Harnack and builds 
upon foundations which he laid [vol.I, p.359l. Frend, like Pelikan, finds in 
Harnack's work a basis for his own. The inspiration for Frend's book, The 
Rise of Christianity [Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 19841 was Harnack's 
Mission und Ausbreitung (p.ll, and Frend notes that Harnack acted as a 
stimulus and example to researchers to get out of the library and into the 
fields to dig [private communication, 1979]. A third example of a 
relatively recent positive application of Harnack's knowledge and central 
method is to be found in liberal catholic historian Hermann-Josef Schmitz's 
book, FrUhkatholizismus bei Adolf von Harnack, Rudolf Sohm und Ernst 
K.!isemann (DUsseldorf, Patmos Verlag, 19771. 
S.W.Sykes 
Sykes' subject in The Identity of Christianity [19841 is not Harnack per se, 
but rather the way his entire period handled a question which was central 
to him, namely the problem of continuity. Most of what he has to say 
about Harnack is confined to one chapter, but despite its brevity Sykes' 
treatment of Harnack is important in several ways. Rehabilitation is the 
chief of these services, and is of especial relevance with regard to 
Harnack's reputation in the English-speaking world. Sykes demonstrates 
that the evaluation of Harnack in standard theological works is woefully 
inadequate, discusses the largely unjustified reasons for Harnack's 
continuing unpopularity in England, and explodes many Harnack-myths, 
especially with reference to his celebrated controversy with Loisy [pp.128-
129, 132, 134, 1421. He offers significant new rehabilitative work with 
his mature and perceptive interpretation of what was really at stake in 
the Harnack-Loisy debate and how much, despite Loisy's rhetoric, the t~;:Jo 
antagonists had in common [pp.123-147J, and again with his dismantelling of 
the too-frequent identification of Harnack solely with the metaphor of 
kernel and husk to describe the relationship of 'the gospel' to the 
phenomena of Christianity (pp.135-137J. It is curious that he makes no 
direct mention, in discussing Harnack's unpopularity, of the continuing 
antagonistic influence of Barth. 
In addition to the task of rehabilitation, when the corrections have been 
made and the caricatures which pass for Harnack have been laid to rest, 
Sykes offers us a positive portrait of Harnack. It is a somewhat sketchy 
and incomplete one, which one would expect in a brief treatment, but it is 
clear and original with regard to the rOle that the theme of power played 
in Harnack's work. The rOle of power and conflict in the life and 
development of Christianity forms an important sub-theme in Identity [see 
pp.5 I"fJ, and Sykes with justice underscores its prominence in Harnadt's 
interpretation of Christian history. This is to be seen not only in 
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Harnack's well-documented lament that the original spiritual content of 
Christianity t:ras diminished and overlaid in time by human powers of 
&uthority, tradition, and coercion, but also in the description of the very 
heart of the original spiritual content of Christianity, which he offers in 
power terms [see Identity, pp.l~0-1~21. Sykes summarises Harnack's thesis 
by saying that for him Christianity contains the power of total inner 
conviction and transformation, and quotes Harnack to the effect that the 
Kingdom, " ... is in its very nature a spiritual force <Grtssse), a power 
<Macht) which sinks into a man within, and can be understood only from 
within ... " [ibid. p.141l. This power expresses itself in personality, 
supremely in the personality of Christ. Sykes rightly focusses on this 
'power' key to Harnack's christology, locating him within the 'character of 
Christ' school of apologetic [p.141]. What he perhaps neglects is the 
teasing-out of the meaning of 'total inner conviction and 
transformation'-i.e. the power of ideas which, with the power of 
personality, constitute the two foci of the Harnackean ellipse. 
Sykes is also careful in Identity to spell out the implications of 
Harnack's approach to the theological task for the power of the theologian. 
It is, in his view, a factor uniting Loisy, Harnack and Troeltsch that they 
give the task of determining what is essential, genuine and of lasting 
value in Christianity to historians and theologians, and, Sykes notes, in 
doing so they place tremendous power in their hands [pp. 145, 146, 155-
1561. One could have wished to have this theme explored more fully. 
Sykes also does not make as clear as one would wish the fact that 
Harnack's objection to the gradual infiltration of Christianity by human 
powers of authority and tradition was not to their existence as such, 
which he acknowledges is inevitable in an imperfect world, but to their 
claim for themselves that they were religious powers and their 
interpolation of themselves into the 'things necessary for salvation'. He 
is also unsatisfactory in his handling of the question of Harnack's many 
definitions _of. the gospel._ When, in setting the terms for the Harnack~ 
Loisy debate, he answers the question of what, according to each writer, is 
the identity of Christianity, he, for Harnack's answer, uses one particular 
definition from Outlines Cp.133J, and does not include the important 
proviso that for Harnack one can identify no summary with 'the gospel' 
because the gospel is an existential experience of spiritual power, induced 
by contact with Jesus' teachings and personality and not finally to be 
identified with any form of words. Sykes hints at this by stressing the 
importance for Harnack of a living relationship with Christ [p.l35J, but it 
needs to be more firmly spelt out. 
Harnack scholars before Sykes have noted, reproduced and described in a 
less than fully conscious manner the power language which saturates his 
work, and have fastened on the transformatory experience as being central 
to his understanding of the gospel. But Sykes is the first unambiguously 
to suggest the theme of power as a coherent principle for the 
interpretation of Harnack. This thesis attempts to build on this 
suggestion and to explore its validity and implications. 
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Dtlbertin 
Sykes offers the most recent original contribution to the interpretation of 
Harnack's constructive theology. Binfried Dtlbertin's 1985 publication, 
Adolf von Harnack: Theologe. PMdegogue. Bissenschaftspolitiker [Bern, Peter 
Lang] belongs in a class with Hiers, Pauck, Irmscher and Dummer in that it 
provides valuable information on specific details but contributes little to 
overall Harnack interpretation. Dtlbertin is a lecturer in education rather 
than a theologian, and his work reflects that difference of perspective. 
His treatment is factually accurate and also sympathetic, but his 
bibliography is limited, omitting many important secondary sources 
including Glick and the first of Neufeld' books. 
The work is intended to form a basic introduction both to Harnack and to 
the theological issues of his period. Dtlbertin's contextualisation of 
Harnack takes a less usual tack in comparing his views not only with 
ecclesiastical orthodoxy but also with more radical elements-for instance, 
contrasting his biblical criticism with that of the seminal figure of 
Reimarus [pp.ll3f1 and his portrait of Jesus with those of Strauss, Bruno 
Bauer, Kalthoff and Kautsky [pp.119f1. His review of the contemporary 
state of biblical research in Harnack's time is workmanlike and valuable 
for the nonspecialist [pp.124f1, and any Harnack scholar seeking to take up 
Irmscher's challenge to produce an academic biography would do well to 
heed DB bert in's suggestion that to understand his religious upbringing one 
should not only read Agnes von Zahn Harnack's biography, but also 
investigate Theodosius Harnack's Katechetik <1882 > [p.l331. 
Dtlbertin affirms Harnack's continuing significance in the fields of 
theology, pedagogy, and politics [p.81, and he makes more effort than most 
to state explicitly what the terms of that continuing significance are. 
For our concern with Harnack as a constructive theologian, this is the 
most helpful aspect of the book. Dtlbertin summarises Harnack's lasting 
contributions in terms of establishing the validity of the quest for 
meaning [pp.159-160J, the centrality of Jesus, and the principle that 
social/political engagement is better accomplished by those who feel 
themselves responsible to Transcendence for their actions. He values 
Harnack's insistence on the relativity and alterablilty of all historical 
relations, on the importance for education of an historical method of 
thinking, and on intellectual pluralism [pp.198-204J. His portrayal of 
Harnack's theology is rather bland, with the greatest stress on his ethics 
[pp.166-167,175-176J and much less emphasis on the powerful encounter of 
personalities which makes ethical transformation possible, though this 
latter motif is not wholly absent [see pp.151-1521. 
Conclusion 
The story of Harnack-interpretation is a patchy one, spread out over a 
number of decades and conducted by scholars of several nations and very 
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different theological/ideological traditions, working for the most part in 
isolation. Yet some unifying threads connect their work. There has been 
a growing sense in the years sinca 1951 that Harnack's work has been 
wrongfully neglected. The tasks of reintroduction and rehabilitation, 
along with the delineation of the justifiable criticisms of Harnack, have 
been vigorously pursued and may be deemed virtually complete. The 
criticisms advanced by his contemporaries have not been substantially 
altered, although recent scholars have been better able to perceive both 
the ways in which his thought is zeitgebunden and also its intrinsic 
relatedness to the generation of theologians who immediately succeeded and 
forcefully rejected him. What is still embryonic is the eKamination and 
interpretation of Harnack's constructive or systematic theology. 
Glick marks the first milestone in this regard, for his is the first 
significant treatment of Harnack as a thinker. Despite flaws, he offers 
valuable introductory, rehabilitative and critical insights, and with his 
stress on the importance of the 'reality' of Christianity for Harnack as a 
dynamic principle rather than a defined doctrine, he gropes towards a view 
of Harnack's systematic theology. 
Neufeld's work is the second milestone in the interpretation of Harnack's 
constructive theology. He continues with the tasks of introduction, 
rehabilitation and criticism, and also advances insights on the 
zeitgebundenheit of Harnack's hermeneutics and on the problem of authority 
in Harnack. But most importantly, he makes a significant advance in the 
task begun by Glick, in offering a single, unifying principle of 
coherence--the idea of the church--by which to interpret Harnack's 
positive vision. The fact that his choice of a principle of coherence is 
less than satisfactory is less important than his courage in attempting to 
reach a Gesamtschau of Harnack's constructive thought. 
Berger constitutes the third milestone because his treatment of Harnack 
focusses almost eKclusively on Harnack's constructive/systematic endeavour 
and offers a holistic interpretation of what Harnack was attempting to do. 
Berger's results will be foundational to this thesis. 
Sykes further augments the tasks of rehabilitation and the 
conteKtualisation of Harnack's theology, but his originality and importance 
for Harnack-interpretation lies in his locating the issues of power at the 
centre of Harnack's systematic thought. He recognises that power themes 
in Harnack concern not just the question of authority for faith and for 
the church, but, still more significantly, the question of the meaning of 
the gospel itself. The story of the understanding of Harnack's 
constructive theology so far ends with Sykes: this thesis will start with 
his insights about Harnack and power and examine and develop them further. 
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l.d: Harnack as a~ist and reformer 
~ologist? 
Harnack claimed for himself the title of objective historian, strongly 
rejecting that of apologist, and certainly his world took him seriously as 
an historian 1 • In his preface to the 1894 English edition of History of 
Dogma Harnack maintains that in an historical work there is no room for 
enquiry as to the 'standpoint' of the author: the right questions concern 
whether he is in sympathy with the subject, whether he can distinguish 
original elements from derived, whether he knows the material thoroughly, 
whether he is truthful, and whether he understands the limits of historical 
knowledge. Answering these quest ions, says Harnack, requires tireless 
self-discipline: "Hence every historical study is an ethical task. The 
historian ought to be faithful in every sense of the word ... "[HD I preface]. 
Included 1n Harnack's conception of this task, though, as he notes a few 
pages later, is the duty of stating one's own opinion [HD I p.21J. 
The opening chapter of Das Wesen makes his identification with the task of 
'pure history' still clearer. Harnack writes that he will attempt to answer 
the question, 'what is Christianity?' solely with the methods of historical 
science and the experience of life which comes from living through history, 
thus excluding the methods of the apologist and the philosopher CWC? 
p.6/DW p.4.J. He affirms the value of apologetics, of seeking to establish 
the truth of Christianity, but insists that it must be kept completely 
separate from the purely historical task of determining the nature or 
content of Christianity, "or else historical research will be brought into 
complete discredit". Harnack goes on to criticise the current state of 
apologetics in such a way that we can readily understand, if his 
description is accurate, why he repudiated the title of apologist, and why 
no respectable scholar would have been anxious to be known as one. For 
the kind of apologetic needed today, writes Harnack, we possess no really 
high standard, and with a few exceptions, apologetics as a subject of study 
is in a deplorable state: 
" ... it is not clear as to the positions to be defended, and it is 
uncertain as to the means to be employed. It is also not 
infrequently pursued in an undignified and obtrusive fashion. 
Apologists imagine that they are doing a great work by crying up 
religion as though it were a job-lot at a sale, or a universal remedy 
for all social ills. They are perpetually snatching, too, at all sorts 
of baubles, so as to deck out religion in fine clothes. In their 
endeavour to present it as a glorious necessity, they deprive it of 
its earnest character, and at the best only prove that it is 
something which may be safely accepted because it can do no harm. 
Finally, they cannot refrain from slipping in some church programme 
of yesterday and 'demonstrating' its claims as well. The structure of 
their ideas is so loose that an idea or two more makes no difference. 
The mischief that has been thereby done already and is still being 
done is indescribable "[WC? pp. 7-8/DW pp.4-5J. 
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Yet it can be demonstrated from Das Wesen in particular and from Harnack's 
writings overall that the chief aim of his theological efforts was not 
merely to express accurately what in history has been the nature of 
Christianity, but to commend the Christian faith to his increasingly 
scientific and secular age as truth, and as truth to be lived. Eventually 
Harnack himself admitted this. Years after the publication of Das Wesen, a 
student challenged him on his claim in the book to speak purely as an 
historian and not as an apologist. Harnack replied after some thought, "I 
see now that as you say, my real interest was apologetic, but at the time 
I did not realize it" [quoted in W. Adams Brown, 'A Retrospect of Forty 
Years', Edinburgh Expository Times vo1.42, Dec.1930, p.l04J. 
Most of Harnack's contemporary critics saw his work as apologetic in 
intent [Cremer (1903>, p.xi; Lacey, p.9; Sanday, p.5l. More recently, Glick 
demonstrates that Harnack's sincere desire to write purely objective 
history was only sporadically fulfilled, and that from apologetic motives 
he imposed upon the history a set of criteria as to its value for the 
modern world [Glick, Reality, pp.65-67, 83-84, 267, 30'4, 327-3281. 
Harnack's apologetic, consciously or unconsciously, employs three main 
strategies. The first is the very claim to scientific objectivity, the 
second is the essencing procedure, and the third is the 'retranslation' of 
traditional dogmas. 
Regardless of the degree to which Harnack achieved his desired scientific 
objectivity, one cannot fail to see how extremely attractive and useful an 
apologetic tool the claim to pure objectivity must have been in Germany at 
the turn of the last century [see Glick, Reality, p.661. Harnack, in 
discussing his method of approach to the question of Christianity in Das 
Wesen, notes that had he delivered the lecture sixty years earlier, he 
would have begun with finding, by speculation, a general conception of 
religion and then have proceeded to define Christianity accordingly. He 
says that since then, however, there has grown up, and rightly, a 
scepticism about such a procedure: " ... We know today", he says, "that life 
cannot be spanned by general col!sep~~o!ls ... " [t-JC? pp.8-9/DW pp.5-6l~ __ 'We 
know todai'-how this -phrase -embodies the pride and confidence in 
Wissenschaft that was felt then! One does not wish, however, to suggest 
that Harnack self-consciously used objectivity as an apologetic tool. He 
simply devoted himself to a 'scientific' method because he believed it was 
the surest road to the truth. But by providing his critical, empirically-
minded contemporaries with a basis for their faith which was congruent 
with current epistemology Harnack rendered to his age a valuable 
apologetic service. 
The letter to Stinzing [see l.b. abovel demonstrates that from the outset 
Harnack studied history with a purpose. Both the apologetic aims and the 
historical methods about which the young Harnack wrote so hopefully appear 
to have guided his work throughout his long career. It is impossible not 
to see that Harnack brings to his work a number of unchallenged 
assumptions. Chief among them is the conviction that not all of the 
phenomena which can be termed Christian are permanent and essential, but 
that there is something in the gospel which is essential, permanent and 
still of supreme value today. Neither did Harnack question the belief that 
the permanent factor in Christianity is best discovered by a thorough and 
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critical study of its history. The idea of an essence of Christianity, of 
em irreducible kernel of truth and power which can exist underneath all or 
any external husks, constitutes the second of Harnack's apologetic 
strategies. It was by no means unique to Harnack and was employed by 
many nineteenth-century theologians2 • Many of Harnack•s opponents 
objected to the essence procedure as an unjustified reductionism, 
preferring instead to look at 'the whole' of the New Testament teaching 
[see l.c above], ignoring the fact that any theologian, simply by the 
selection and arrangement of material and by the choice of omissions, 
tacitly indicates that there is material of greater and lesser value in the 
Christian tradition, that there is in some sense a kernel and a husk. 
However unpopular the term, some notion of an essence <though not 
necessarily of an unchanging essence> must be held by any writer who 
wishes to argue for any sort of continuity among the wildly diverse 
phenomena that have in history laid claim to the name 'Christian'i by any 
missionary who seeks to recommend the faith to another culture, and by any 
reformer who wishes either to add something new to the practice of 
Christianity or to do away with something old. 
Harnack sees an essencing procedure as vital to any progress in the 
discipline of the history of dogma: 
"Every advance in the future treatment of our subject will further 
depend on the effort to comprehend the history of dogma without 
reference to the momentary opinions of the present, and also on 
keeping it in closest connection with the history of the Church ... But 
progress is finally dependent on a true perception of what the 
Christian religion originally was, for this perception alone enables 
us to distinguish that which sprang out of the inherent power of 
Christianity from that which it has assimilated in the course of its 
historya [HD I p.39J. 
Harnack considered the differentiation of original and accretion, of the 
'eternal' and the zeitgeschichtlich, to be one of the chief tasks of the 
historian. The_ ]lJ.s.t_orian's bu$iness _and __ highest~duty _is~to_ determine---What 
is of permanent value, for the 'whole Christ' and the 'whole gospel', that 
is, the external image and all its details, if set up for imitation, is as 
bad and deceptive a shibboleth as the 'whole Luther' would be [WC? p.131DW 
pp.8-9J. Harnack was convinced that no thinking historian could brand the 
task of determining the essence of Christianity as unhistorical or 
inadmissable. Historical understanding, he held, only begins when one can 
free the essential and unique elements in a great occurance from the 
trappings of the times [die zeitgeschichtlichen HUllenl. That many primitive 
features must be sacrificed, including some which in their time appeared 
essential and were so, is inevitable, but the attempt must be made. For 
where an historical event is concerned it is the historian and not the 
antiquary, the philosopher or the fanatic who must have the last word as 
to its individuality rDW, Vorwort zum 45-50 Tsd., p.Kil. 
In this aspect of Harnack's method, which may be termed 'the royal judging 
function' Cibid. pp.217, 324; also pp.83, 90, 94, 951 we find his 
methodological legitimation for a selectivity with history in terms of its 
value for the present, and for an essencing procedure. Harnadc"s 
historical approach does not stop at merely describing facts and sequences 
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of events, but rather involves a considerable amount of judging and 
interpretation. In the preface to the first edition of Das Wesen, Harnack 
insists that the historian's task includes the responsibility to 
discriminate between the essential, lasting elements in the phenomena, and, 
having so distinguished, to throw the essentials into relief and render 
them understandable (OW p.iiil. Harnack at several points seeks to 
safeguard his objectivity by insisting that these judgments are judgments 
as to fact, as to what the Christian gospel historically has been, rather 
than judgments as to the value of that gospel [WC? p.17l. The main thing, 
he notes in the first lecture, is not what positive value the individual 
who looks at religion gives it for his own life, but, "to learn what 
religion is and in whet its essential character consists" [ibid. WC? p.8/Dt1 
p.41. 
Yet elsewhere in the book Harnack takes this 'judging' process much 
further--over into the realm of true apologetic. At the beginning of a 
discussion of the death and resurrection of Christ, he notes that "it is 
not our business to defend either the view which was taken of the death, 
or the idea that he has risen again: but it is certainly the historian's 
duty to make himself so fully acquainted with both positions as to be 
sensible of the significance which they possessed and still possess ... " He 
continues by saying that the fact that these positions were of capital 
importance for the primitive community has never been doubted, and that it 
must be possible for us to get a feeling and understanding of what they 
were. But then he goes further: " ... nay, perhaps we may do more; if we 
probe the history of religion to the bottom, we shall find the truth and 
justice of ideas which on the surface seem so paradoxical and incredible 
lying at the very roots of the faith" [ibid. WC? p.8/DW p.4l. Harnack, then, 
recommends that one can and ought to try, not only to understand the 
significance of historical ideas, but also, by probing the depth of the 
history of religion, to find their truth and fustice. Determining what is 
essential and understanding its significance may be judged to be an 
historical undertaking, but when one at tempts to 'find' the truth and 
justice of what is essential, one has indeed become an apologist. 
One could easily conclude that because Harnack approached history with 
assumptions and a motive, his results were very heavily influenced by 
them. Glick comes ·close to saying that his conclusions were virtually 
predetermined [Glick, Reality pp.14, 104, 112-114, 149, 161, 170-171l, 
although his respect for Harnack's historical proficiency and integrity 
cause him to qualify the position somewhat [ibid. pp.332, 344-345; plus 
Jaroslav Pelikan's introduction, ibid. pp.xii-xiiil. Certainly Harnack's 
claims to scientific objectivity sound arrogant and naive today. But it 
may be that we have become too sceptical, put off by his overconfidence, 
and that Harnack's motives and assumptions had a much lesser degree of 
influence over the outcome of his work. Their influence lay in the 
charting of directions: his belief that there was something permanent and 
essential in Christianity indeed led him to look for it, and his commitiD.ent 
to historical investigation indicated how and where to look. But it is not 
necessary to draw from this the inference that the content of his 'essence 
of Christianity' was imposed from outside of his researches. The character 
which prized its understanding of the truth so much that it was willing to 
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bear the 'excommunication° of a beloved father and of a whole tradition 
would not easily have been induced to embrace Kant and Ritschl for any 
other reason than that their interpretations accorded more closely with 
the results of his own painstaking investigations. His well-documented 
commitment to and skill with the historical method make it at least 
possible that his results were truly results of his historical labours, 
rather than predetermined answers, as Sanday and Loisy suggest [Sanday, 
pp.15-16; and Sykes, Identity, pp.129, 142-143]. As Pelikan notes; "We may 
presume to criticise Harnack only if our dedication to the hard work of 
historical study is as single-minded as his was ... 11 [intro. to Glick, Reality. 
p.xii-xiiiJ. In addition, it needs to be remembered that the possession of 
a point of view is not a crime: objections to Harnack's history as history 
can really only be sustained where it can be demonstrated that his 
narrative scheme of church history distorts o~ contradicts the evidence. 
The apologetic task takes a prominent structural place in Das Wesen, and a 
major tool of Harnack's apologetic, linked to the essencing procedure, 
comes into play, namely the idea of the eternal validity of the gospel. 
After delineating the chief features of Jesus' message, and before 
describing the transformations of this gospel in the course of history, 
Harnack dedicates nearly one third of the book to describing 'the gospel in 
relation to certain problems', problems which turn out to be of direct 
apologetic interest to Harnack's own time. In these discussions a 
recurring pat tern emerges, one of defence against criticism from 'the 
modern world', 'people today', 'earnest men of a socialist persuasion' and 
'modern science', to which Harnack replies in various ways that one cannot 
escape the claims of the gospel by hiding behind this or that objection. 
More important than any specific answer he gives is the fact that he feels 
obliged to spend so much time on these questions in the course of an 
allegedly historical discussion. Examples of this pattern are his 
treatment of miracles [WC? p.28/DW p.19J, aceticism [WC? pp.80, 81, 841, the 
accusation that religion is the opium of the people [WC? pp.110-116J, that 
Christianity ignores progress and culture [WC? pp.119-120J, that it is too 
complicated doctrinally [WC? p.l43J, that it is inextricably tied to an 
outmoded world-view [WC? p. J 49/D'li__p.~4,_ WC? __ pp~ll_9_:- L8_Q/DW _ p. U2;_see- also 
-- - HD I p.21 r.-- Repeatedly- Harnack makes the point that the essential elements 
of the gospel are permanent and eternally valid, that it remains in force 
for us today. 
It is upon the assumption that the essential elements of the gospel are 
permanent and eternally valid that Harnack based his third apologetic 
strategy, namely the practice of reinterpreting traditional doctrines and 
formulae into concepts which were more easily intelligible to his 
contemporaries. While retaining traditional terminology, he often so 
redefined it that it sometimes appears as if he has substituted someth~ 
entirely different. His intention was always to be faithful both to the 
message of the tradition and to his Ritschlian epistemology [see 2.a. 
below]. His use of the language of tradition, while redefining it in terms 
of inner experience, along with the fact of his own deep piety, makes 
Harnack's work an alternative to the either/or of the mythological form of 
thought of protestant orthodoxy and the demythologised world of a radical 
reductionism. [see 2.b. below; also examples of his redefinition procedure 
in 3.a. belowl. 
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Harnack as reformer? 
At the famous Aarau conference of 1921 which saw the debut of Karl Barth, 
Harnack also spoke, and one of his themes was the practical purpose of 
'doing' history. He wrote: 
" ... we are not in the world to discuss it amongst ourselves or to 
contemplate it, but rather to further the whole and to serve our 
neighbour ... We study history ... to free ourselves from the past where it 
has become to us a burden, then in order to be able to do what is 
right in the present, and finally in order to prudently and 
appropriately prepare for the future' ['Was hat die Historie am fester 
Erkenntnis zur Deutung des Weltgeschehens zu bieten?' in R&A nf 2, 
pp.171 fl. 
It is reasonable to deduce from this that Harnack too had practical goals 
for his work, and it is clear that the context within which he set his own 
vocation as theologian, along with Ritschl's, was that of the completion of 
the reformation (J-ID VII p.272l. In numerous places Harnack makes it clear 
that in Luther's reformation a task was gloriously begun which did not 
then and has not yet come to fruition-the freeing of Christianity from 
the cultural baggage of antquity, and the development of a genuinely 
evangelical Lebensideal CHD VII pp.194-195, 238f, 245fJ. In Mission and 
Expansion he writes of Christianity: 
This religion was the first to cut the ground from under the feet of 
all other religions, and by means of her religious philosophy, as a 
civilizing power, to displace ancient philosophy. But the reasons for 
the triumph of Christianity in that age are no guarantee for the 
permanence of that triumph throughout the history of mankind. Such 
a triumph rather depends upon the simple elements of the religion, on 
the preaching of the living God as the Father of men, and on the 
representation of Jesus Christ. For that very reason it depends also 
on the capacity of Christianity to strip off repeatedly such a 
CQllect:ive syncretism and unite itself to fresh coefficients. _ The_ 
Reformation made a beginning in this direction" CM&E I, p.318l. 
In What is Christianity? he notes that, in its doctrine and in the view 
which it took of history, the Reformation was far from being a finished 
product: 
"It could not, like Pallas Athene, spring complete from Jupiter's head; 
as doctrine it could do no more than mark a beginning, and it had to 
reckon on future development ... " CWC? pp.290-291; see also HD VII 
p.238l. 
The need for a completion of the Reformation is set out most clearly in 
the Dogmengeschichte's evaluation of Luther. Harnack notes that the years 
1519-1523 were the springtime of the reformation, but a spring which was 
followed by no abundant summer, for after that Luther retired within his 
limits (J-ID Vll pp.170, 229-2351. He argues that Luther did not hand over 
something complete and finished to Christendom," ... but set before it a 
problem, to be developed out of many encumbering surroundings, to be 
continuously dealt with in connection with the entire life of the spirit 
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and with the social condition of mankind, but to be solved only in faith 
itself. Christendom must constantly go on to learn, that even in religion 
the simplest thing is the most difficult, and that everything that is a 
burden upon religion quenches its seriousness ... " [HO VII p.273J. 
Harnack emphasises that whatever the rhetoric about fidelity to Luther, 
modern protestantism does not stand where Luther stood in endorsing the 
harmony he perceived between his faith and the core of the ancient dogma 
and finding it necessary only to supplement it with justification by faith 
and clear away the medieval rubbish: 
"From this point of view the whole development of Protestantism from 
the end of the seventeenth century till the present day must appear 
a mistaken development, nay, an apostasy. It is a pity, only, that 
almost all thinking Protestants have apostasised, and, for the most 
part, differ from each other only according to the clearness and 
honesty with which they admit their apostasy" [HD VII p.180J. 
One of the most important aspects for Harnack of the task of finishing the 
reformation was the taking forward of Luther's beginnings at establishing 
a Lebensideal which adopted a positive attitude towards activity in the 
world. While not wishing to extinguish what he terms the 'Augustinian 
mood' in Christianity, that is, assuagement of the pain of sin, and 
mitigation of the evil of the world, Harnack held that: 
11 
... the task that is set to Christian faith today is ... to take a 
powerful part in the moulding of personality, in the productive 
development of the dominion over nature, and the interpenetrating of 
the spiritual life with the spirit, and to prove its indispensibleness 
in these direct ions, otherwise it will become the possession of a 
sect, in disregard of whom the great course of our history will pass 
on its way" [HD VII p.195J. 
Harnack's relations with the church of his time were a source of pain, yet 
he remained within the church. He knew. that the church_ would be_ glad to_ 
see the back of him, and leaving would have been much easier for him also. 
Yet several things kept him in-the duty he felt by virtue of occupying, 
in the university, a semi-ecclesiastical post, his historical conscience and 
his sense of responsibility for his students [AZH p.299J. But alongside 
the sombre motives of duty and conscience there was also hope, that is, a 
consciousness that his devoted scholarship was part of the struggle for 
change, preparing the way for the reformation of the church. Dibelius' 
contribution to the centenary Festschrift records words of Harnack's which 
convey this sense of struggle and hope: 
"We belong within our Landeskirchen; it is here that we received our 
vocation ... The conflicts are not going to disappear: they will get 
still hotter. But even the mightiest of them shall not make us 
weary, neither shall it make us joyless. Impossibile est. ut non 
laetetur qui sperat in Domino" [in Aland, ed. A.H. in memoriam, pp.34-
35, my translation]. 
His hope was not bound, however, to a particular ecclesiastical 
organisation. In describing the protestant 'doctrine of the church 0 he 
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writes that though protestants recognise that in the interest of order and 
instruction outward and visible communities are needed, " ... we do not hang 
our hearts upon them," for tomorrow new organisations might be necessary: 
'' ... our Church is not the particular Church in which we are placed, but the 
'societas fidei', which has its members everywhere, even among Greeks and 
Romans'' WC? p.276J. 
Neufeld's research confirms both Harnack's hope for and interest in the 
church, and provides a valuable corrective to the common assumption that 
Harnack's interest was in pure and somewhat abstract theology divorced 
from practical ecclesiology. Though guilty in our view of considerable 
overstatement, Neufeld makes the case that Harnack did have, if only in 
outline, a positive vision for the church. And whether or not the ultimate 
'reformatory' idea of the creation of a new kind of church really took hold 
of Harnack in the way Neufeld insists, what seems indisputable is that 
Harnack possessed a strong and positive ecclesial interest, and promoted a 
thoroughgoing and consistent finishing of the reformation. 
Of what did Harnack's positive vision for the church consist? Neufeld 
suggests the following elements, which he labels as Harnack's 
Kirchenprogramm, but in view of the vagueness of many parts, it would be 
more accurate to describe them as hopes or visions. They include: 
A positive attitude to the world: the " ... conviction that Christianity, with 
its task of salvation, is fundamentally positively related to the actual 
world. Its message is not, at least in the first instance, to judge the 
world, but to mediate to it the salvation of God." [Neufeld <1977), p.3591. 
The universal character of the gospel: modern mankind requires one common 
foundation [GrundlageJ for its higher life. The early church achieved this 
not by crushing other groups but by the possession of an active 
SelbstbewUStsein. which is missing today. Christians today would rather 
withdraw into ghettos or accommodate themselves to prevailing secular 
trends [ibid. pp.351 f1 . 
Mission as the unique and characteristic expression of the christ ian life: 
[ibid. p.358J 
The Christian as a new person, the Church as a new Volk: [ibid.] 
An emphasis on freedom and liberation: in terms of doctrine, worship, 
church order [ibid. p.3521 In What is Christianity? Harnack expressly calls 
for more freedom and individuality in utterance and doctrine, from rules 
and limits, and more confidence, not in outward forms of safeguard, but, 
" ... in the inner strength and unifying power of the Gospel, which is more 
certain to prevail in free conflict than under guardianship" [\!JC? p.2761 
To this end, though obviously with some trepidation, Harnack advocated a 
greater independence from the state, holding that the constitution of the 
church into state-churches nearly destroyed the reformation [\!JC? pp. 286, 
291, 2971. 
A critical reduction to principles: in the history of religion, every 
important reformation is first and foremost such a reduction, a stripping 
off of the accretions of time, whether foreign in origin or home-grown 
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(WC? p.270J. Neufeld notes that Harnack believed that out of the true 
centre of what is Christian the Christianity of today would develop its 
necessary and legitimate self-understanding, but wonders by what right 
such a reduction can be made, and what it would look like [Neufeld <1977> 
p.352J. 
Allied to a positive view of the world is another part of Harnack's vision 
for the church, namely an increasingly effective participation in the 
resolution of what those of his day simply called 'the social question', 
that is, the issues of social justice, inequality, and materialism raised by 
the growth of atheistic marxist social democracy [WC? p.300J. 
If we are correct, then, Harnack cherished hopes and visions for the 
completion of the reformation and the renewal of the church. But what 
action, if any, did he take to turn these ideas into deeds which would 
create new forms? 
As we have noted, when in the course of the Apostolikumsstreit Harnack was 
asked to formulate an alternative statement of faith he declined, saying 
'Ich bin kein Reformator' (AZH p.212J. His stated reasons for declining 
included a fear of agitators and an unwillingness to jeopardise many 
people's faith. Indeed this controversy seems typical of Harnack's approach 
to the challenge of actual change. He was prepared boldly to state his 
convict ions, no matter how scandalous they might appear to others and 
regardless of the cost to himself, and also to point out what should be 
done. But he made vigorous efforts to quosh what he felt was 'rash' 
action on the matter-i.e. his students' proposed petition to the 
Evangelische Oberkirchenrat-and he refused to take what would have been 
a 'political' action on his part, namely the formulation of the proposed 
new creed. He was perfectly aware of the limitations which the refusal of 
direct action imposed upon his effectiveness. In a comment on Porphyry's 
cogent refutation of Christianity, and the fact that there is no record of 
its effect except for the horror it produced among the church fathers, he 
writes: 
"Yet even a literary work of superlative excellence could hardly have 
won the day. The religion of the Church had become a world-religion 
by the time that Porphyry wrote, and no professor can wage war 
successfully against such religions, unless his hand grasps the sword 
of the reformer as well as the author's pen" CM&E I p.509J. 
But Harnack clearly refused the sword, and stuck to the pen. The decision 
at first glance looks like either excessive humility or lack of nerve, but 
it may have been neither. 
Firstly there was the matter of political outlook and temperament. Harnack 
appears in all his practical pursuits to have been a gradualist reformer, 
not a revolutionary. And temperamentally he was an 'organisation man', 
loyal to his Kaiser and to the structures of mandarin academe. 
(Contrarily, though, we find in his writings a passion for the 
revolutionaries, a compassion for, and even a championing of, the heretics. 
His treatment of Montanism and Paul of Samosata in History of Dogma and 
of course his love for Marcion provide examples of this.> He acted 
decisively for the improvement of the Royal Library during his 
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directorship, but within the system and from the top. His activity in the 
Evangelisch-Sozial Kongress comes closest to an advocacy of practical. 
reform, but its focus soon became the reform of ideas rather than actual 
social conditions, a situation which Ward attributes in no small measure ~o 
Harnack's influence. He notes that under Harnack's presidency the Kongre5s 
became increasingly abstract and taken up with the subject of personali~y 
[t-Jard pp. 81-821. Where the church was concerned, Harnack could not work 
either from the inside or from the top, which would leave him, if he 
desired practical action, only the unpalatable alternative of forming a 
sect. 
But the heart of the matter lies, as has been mentioned before, in the 
very confidence Harnack felt in his own correct place in the process of 
the reform of the church. As an old man Harnack attended a lecture of 
Otto Dibelius' and spoke at the end of it: 
"Every generation receives from God as the Lord of history a special 
task. The task of our generation was to earn respect once again for 
theology as such within German Wissenschaft. You have no idea how 
disdainfully theological science was treated in the eighteen-sixties 
and seventies. Our generation fulfilled its task ... The task of the new 
generation is the church. But you must not take it ill if as an old 
man I ask the theological youth of today; in pursuing your own 
special task, do not forget theological Wissenschaft completely~ 
[quoted in Dibelius' article, 'Adolf Harnack als akademischer Lehrer', 
in K. Aland, ed. Adolf Harnack: in memoriam, <1950, p.34, my 
trans la tionl. 
Harnack saw the task of able protestants of his generation as being the 
reformation and restoration of theology to a position of genuine quality, 
leadership and credibility; and the task of the next generation, building on 
that solid foundation, was the reformation of the church. Harnack declined 
to attempt to act in this regard because his sense of priorities led hiiil 
to regard any action on this front as premature. He was content to "do 
his bit' in his own time, and -leave the ultimate results -in- the hands of 
the Lord of history. 
Thus we see in operation Harnack's understanding of how the power of God 
works in history. He saw himself as part of the historical macroprocess 
which would eventually lead to a higher stage for the church. His 
conviction was unshakeable that God ruled history, and that, in the end, it 
was the creator spiritus which shaped the centuries. On such an 
understanding, it was both presumptuous and unnecessary to attempt to 
force the pace. This conviction also lent him a certain patience with 
movements in theology which seemed wrong to him. Of one such he writes, 
, ... also will ich mich langsam auf meine Arbeit zurUckziehen und dem 
breiteren Strom der Entwicklung seinen Lauf lassen ... Vielleicht entwickelt 
sich aus diesem Spiele doch noch etwas Erhebliches ... " [AZH p.298l. 
Harnack was also convinced that it is chiefly through great personalities 
that the power of God is active in history. As part of his answer to his 
students in the apostolikumstreit, Harnack says that the churches of the 
reformation must stand with the creeds of the past and continue to do so 
until, , ... sie die Kraft zu einer neuen reformatorischen Tat oder eine neue 
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reformatorische Perstlnlichkeit erhalten" [AZH p.l97l. Harnack knew himself 
not to be that personality, and he was content to wait. The concept of 
Beruf which he shared with Luther and attributed to Christ was very 
important to him, and he knew that his calling was, through his 
scholarship, simply to prepare the way. 
so'was Harnack a reformer, or at least a would-be reformer of the church? 
Glick's provocative article, 'Ich bin kein Reformator, aber ... ' [in J.C. Brauer, 
ed., The Impact of the Church upon its Culture: Reappraisals of the History 
of Christianity, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 19681 sheds some 
light on this question. But the tantalising 'aber' is not followed up as 
clearly as one might have hoped. The article is valuable in documenting, 
mostly from letters recorded in Zahn-Harnack's biography, Harnack's express 
intention to serve the church, but the role thus indicated is one of 
mediator more than reformer. Glick argues that the church, in rejecting 
his attempts to be a mediator within it, forced him into the role of 
mediator towards the culture; " ... and thereby he became a reformer, cum 
sensu prorsus alieno. within the church ... In effect he was forced into the 
role of prophet to the culture; and one could argue. that thereby the 
consistorial functionaries who had initially opposed him guaranteed, 
lacking the prescience to identify his genius, the effect which they had 
thought to curb" [Glick <1968>, p.354l. 
Glick states that in fulfilling the role of prophet/apologist/mediator to 
the culture Harnack succeeded to some extent in becoming a reformer of 
the church, but he offers no direct proof or explanation as to how this 
occurred. Certainly the gradual and grudging, but in the end whole-hearted 
endorsement of the historical-critical method by first the protestant 
churches and later by catholicism is one reform for which Harnack can take 
a share of the credit. And other elements of Harnack's desired 'programme' 
for church reform have indeed come to pass--the increased role of the 
laity, the freeing up of public worship, the ordination of women [see AZH 
pp.301, 5011-but it would be difficult to do more than say that the 
publicity and prestige of his pronouncements helped to create a climate of 
publ~~J:linion_ in which suc!L~~forms became possible, .. IrooJcally_it .was in 
-America rather than Germany that Harnack's ideas were embraced most 
directly within the churches [Glick, Reality, p.323l. 
It is indeed easier to see Harnack in the role of prophet rather than 
reformer, for it was his words, rather than his practical deeds, which 
urged radical change. His practical and administrative work could hardly 
be called reform, in the sense of a fundamental change of direction, but 
rather served to further all that was best in the mandarin ideal. But 
does the fact that most of his innovative and reforming energies went into 
ideas mean that Harnack had no vocation as a reformer at all? Not 
necessarily: once again it is a question of means rather than ends. Such a 
high opinion of Wissenschaft and Bildung did Harnack hold, that to him they 
appeared the obvious places for reform to begin. History for Harnack, 
after all, is always the history of ideas. As he saw his rOle in the 
eventual reform of the church to be the necessary prior reform of 
theology, so the reform of German culture would begin with the reform of 
thought and of education. 
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So in the end it is as the scholarly preparer-of-the-ground that Harnack 
makes his contribution to reform, and in that capacity that he had an 
effect. He knew that, as an historian of the very early church, his work 
could not but have an impact on the development of Christianity. He 
writes: 
,Wer hier arbeitet, decket nicht nur eine Hingst begrabene 
Vergangenheit auf, sondern arbeitet an der Aufhellung einer Geschichte, 
deren Hervorbringungen unter uns noch lebendig sind. Darin liegt der 
Reiz und die Gefahr. Der Kirchenhistoriker wird zum Kirchenpolitiker, 
er mag wollen oder nicht; denn mag er selbst auch noch so 
uninteressant sein--den Ergebnissen seiner Arbeiten kann er das 
,Aktuelle' nicht absteifen" ['0ber die jUngst Entdeckungen auf dem 
Gebiete der Altesten Kirchengeschichte\ R&A I, pp.315-316l. 
Harnack believed that one of the tasks of theological scholarship was 
indeed to have an impact on the church. He points out that protestant 
theologians used to be arbiters in church matters, but now they are in 
court themselves, and he maintained that theologians were still needed to 
guide the church [Thou~hts on the Present Position of Protestantism, tr. 
T.B. Saunders, London 1899, pp.27, 61]. 
To the sword of the practical reformer Harnack did indeed say no, but one 
could argue a case for the pen having been in his hand, in the long run, 
an equally powerful weapon. He took seriously Ritschl's legendary advice 
on how to have an impact upon theology <and also the church?>: "Trust in 
God, keep your powder dry, and write textbooks!" 
1.e: Power as a princi~le of coherence for the inter~retation of Harnack 
Even the most cursory reading of Harnack will impress the reader with the 
---frequency of such 'power' words-as-Kraft.-Macht-. -Gewalt-, -Ernst, and Energie; 
At times the words are employed as literary devices, as when he describes 
the holy energy <heili{Ie Energie) with which St. Paul laboured [WC? 188/DW 
1181-a common practice then as now. Also typical of the age are the 
'power proverbs' which appear scattered through his work, notably in Das 
Wesen. Money, he tells us, is compressed force <geronnene Gewalt> CWC'? 
p.85/DW p.54l. Of the Pharisees he complains that, "all that they did was 
weak, and because weak, harmful," and states that purity <Reinheit) and 
strength <Ernst> go together CWC'? 48/DW 311. He notes that power has its 
costs, that we get nothing in history without paying for it, and that a 
powerful stimulus <eine ~ewaltsame Bewegung> must be paid for doubly [WC? 
285/DW 1791. Of the early Christian notion of being a third race, he 
comments that though the idea might have repelled some, " ... Still it was a 
token of power, and power never fails to succeed" [M&E I, p.278J. Harnack 
often speaks of moral and emotional power, such as the power <Macht> of 
sin [WC? 134/DW 851. He says of the early Christian community that 
through the Spirit the elemental forces <elementare Kr~fte> of the 
religious temperament were once again set free CWC? 166/DW 1071. 
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Such language is merely the language of causal agency: were there no more 
to Harnack's power language, it would contribute little to the task of 
Harnack interpretation. But the power language occurs with unusual 
frequency, and at very significant points. It soon becomes clear that the 
categories of power emerge as central both to Harnack's analysis of 
history and to his articulation of the Christian message. 
In his important essay, •Ober die Sicherheit und Grenzen geschichtlicher 
Erkenntnis' [R&A nf.4 p. 3f.l, Harnack proposes that the basic questions to 
ask of history are, 1. What powers <Krl:ifte> are at work? 2. What is their 
direction <Richtung>? and 3. What is their effect <Leistung>?. Harnack 
thus expresses his historical method in terms of determining the nature, 
direction and results of the various powers at work in history. Proof 
that sensitivity to power factors habitually conditioned Harnack's 
historical analysis may be found even when no explicit 'power' words are 
used. The following well-known passage-Harnack's description of the 
Church in A.D. 200 from What is Christianity?-illustrates the point. 
Harnack's words appear in normal script, with my commentary in italics: 
10 We see a great ecclesiastical and political community, and side by 
side with it numerous 'sects' calling themselves Christian, but 
denied the name and bitterly opposed. [The Church has become a 
political power, engaging in power struggles with other groups.] 
That great ecclesiastical and political community presents itself 
as a league of individual communities spanning the Empire from end 
to end. Although independent they are all constituted essentially 
alike, interconnected by one and the same law of doctrine, and by 
fixed rules for the purposes of intercommunion. Cthe power of 
fixed, objective laws and regulations] The law of doctrine seems 
at first sight to be of small scope, but all its tenets are of the 
widest significance; and together they embrace a profusion of 
metaphysical, cosmological and historical problems, give them all 
definite answers, and supply particulars of mankind's development 
_fr:om_the __ cr:_eation __ up __ to_its-futur:e--form-of--existence.- -Jesus'- -
injunctions for the conduct of life are not included in this law of 
doctrine; as the 'rule of discipline' they were sharply 
distinguished from the 'rule of faith'. CThe power of Jesus' moral 
teachings has been superseded by the power of right belief}. 
Each church, however, also presents itself as an institution for 
public worship, where God is honoured in conformity with a solemn 
ritual. The distinction between priests and laymen is already a 
well-marked characteristic of this institution; certain acts of 
divine worship can be performed only by the priest; his mediation 
is an absolute necessity. CThe power of priesthood over laity, the 
power of consecration, the 'power of the keys'] It is only by 
mediation that a man can approach God at all, by the mediation of 
right doctrine, right ordinance and a sacred book. £The simplicity 
and directness of the original gospel had the power to bring 




"The living faith seems to be transformed into a creed to be 
believed; devotion to Christ, into Christology; the ardent hope of 
the coming of the 'Kingdom' into a doctrine of immortality and 
'deification'; fliving piety, religious power, has been transformed 
into intellectual assent, the power of right belief} prophecy into 
technical exegesis and theological learning; the ministers of the 
Spirit into clerics; [spiritual power and immediacy had been 
transformed amongst Christian leaders into office-holding) the 
brothers, into laymen in a state of tutelage; [the new 
powerlessness of the majority of the community) miracles and 
miraculous cures disappear altogether, or else are priestly devices; 
fervent prayers become solemn hymns and litanies; the 'Spirit' 
becomes law and compulsion. [outward signs of spiritual power 
disappear or are domesticated; loss of emotional power--from the 
fervent to the solemn-replacement of spiritual power-'the 
Spirit '-with temporal power-law and compulsion] At the same 
time individual Christians are in full touch with the life of the 
world, and the burning question is, 'In how much of this life may I 
take part without losing my position as a Christian?' [The power of 
the world is regaining its hold upon the Christian community] ., 
[WC? 192-1931. 
Harnack alludes to several different kinds of power in this passage, but 
his central theme is that there has been a shift of powers in the church, 
a transpotentiation, from the spiritual and immediate to the human and 
institutional. The passage is permeated with a sense of struggle and 
conflict, of loss and indignation. 
This thesis argues that the ubiquitous power language in Harnack is of 
significance, and that concepts of power form the matrix of his thought. 
The recurring themes of the dynamism of history, of the 'upward' movement 
of civilisation, of ideas as forces which can generate explosive conflict, 
-of -conflicts generating energy- and change, -ar-e all~ power- themeS.- --History 
is viewed as the clash and interplay of various powers, and in it all, and 
in religion explicitly, is seen 'the power of God'. 'The essence of the 
gospel' is the phrase most people would associate with Harnack; but it 
should be noted that it is used interchangeably with 'the power of the 
gospel' and that the latter, with its variants, is the more common phrase. 
One is justified in speaking of these motifs in Harnack in terms of power 
rather than simply of dynamism or teleology for several reasons. The 
first is that they are the terms in which he himself so frequently chose 
to speak. The second is that for Harnack, behind the dynamism of history 
stands a person: that dynamism is in fact a personal function-an exercise 
of the will of the creator spiritus. 'Veni Creator Spiritus• was the mot to 
Harnack chose for his coat of arms and for his epitaph CAZH, pp. 337, 5661. 
The conviction that behind all the 'progress• and upward movement of 
history, the energy and dynamism of life and world and culture lay a 
personal will was of great importance to him. In view of this, and 
because the exercise of will is central to most theories of power it is 
correct in this instance to speak of the dynamism of history and culture 
in power terms. The third reason why it is appropriate to describe 
Harnack's thought in terms of power is that prominent in it are the themes 
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of conflict and resistance. Harnack might not have wholeheartedly assented 
to his contemporary Max Weber's insistance that human affairs were a 
relentless struggle for power, but Weber's classic definition of power, to 
which the notion of resistance is central, would have resonated with his 
own. 1 Where one analyses history in terms of the exercise of personal 
will and in terms of conflict and resistance, it is appropriate to speak 
the language of power. 
We have attempted to demonstrate that Harnack's analysis of history 
proceeds in terms of power, and in the quotation above we offer an example 
of how Harnack handles an historical phenomenon with a view to exposing 
its power dynamics. His work abounds with similar examples. 2 Harnack's 
primary power interest was the power of God and the 
powerfulness/effectiveness of the gospel. More specifically, he celebrates 
the power of the gospel--a liberating, creative and transforming power, 
expressed in and accessible through the teachings and personality of 
Jesus--and contrasts this, as noted above, with the constraining and 
deadening effects of other ostensibly religious powers such as tradition, 
authority and dogma. He explores the gospel's superiority to and ability 
to triumph over the negative, impersonal forces of mortality and 
insignificance for which his shorthand is the term 'nature', and in 
affirming the ultimate power of God, not only in theory or as a future 
hope, but as demonstrated in God's role as 'the Lord of history', he asserts 
the superiority of the kind of power unleashed through the gospel over 
economic, military, political, social and organisational powers of every 
kind. 'The power of the gospel' for Harnack is not another general 
expression for the plausibility or effectiveness of Christianity. It 
indicates rather a particular experience of empowering, an energising 
effected by the electrifying contact of 'God and the soul; the soul and its 
God'. 
The question must arise as to why a concern with power, and with power 
understood in this specific way, should constitute a particular focus for 
Harnack's thought and work. Several factors no doubt played their part. 
-~The-first-- wou-ld-be~ -its-accordance-- with Harnack's-~-personal religious-
experience, shaped by a Lutheranism with strongly pietistic elements. 
Another factor was Harnack's commitment to understanding Christianity on 
the basis of history rather than metaphysics. His epistemological 
pragmatism and his Lutheran-pietist roots would here tend in the same 
direction; for in both views it is the demonstrable effectiveness of one's 
religion under the conditions of this world that matters, in other words, 
its ability to produce a new life. A third factor lies in the apologetic 
resonance of interpreting Christianity in terms of power. Power was a 
subject which current intellectual, political and economic developments had 
placed in the foreground of peoples' thought, and so an apologetic which 
spoke in terms of power stood a good chance of holding the attention and 
of being understood. Developments in nineteenth-century theology also 
played their part in focussing Harnack's attention on 'the power of the 
gospel'. Troeltsch points out that prior to the enlightenment the church 
established its proofs of the divine power in terms of miracle and the 
fulfillment of prophecy, but that when it departed from a strong emphasis 
on external proofs, the internal, psychological miracle of divine power 
working within the soul became much more important [The Absoluteness of 
Christianity. London, S.C.M., 1972 p.60l. Another factor which would force 
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Harnack's attention to the subject of power was his distress about the 
misuses of power which were so evident to him in Christian history and in 
the present, in the catholic church and in his own as well. Here his 
vocation as an ideological track-layer for the continuation of the 
reformation comes into play. 'We study history in order to intervene in 
history' CR&A nf.4. p.7; AZH p.57l: thus in refocussing the attention of 
theology upon the central, fundamental issue of divine power and its 
accessibility to humankind Harnack is engaged in a power task himself, on 
behalf of the power of God. 
When Harnack emphasises power as central to the Christian religion he is 
not doing anything new, but rather affirming the simplest and most basic 
message of the Christian tradition, of an almighty God, of Jesus as Lord, 
of the gospel as active and transforming. What is less common, and most 
valuable about Harnack's approach is that he attempts to probe and 
articulate what exactly is meant by the claims of power made by 
Christianity. He tries to describe what kind of power God exercises in the 
world, to explain how it was that the first Christians could look at the 
humble circumstances of Jesus' life and recognise the Son of God, and mQS_t __ 
especially to delineate how the gospel empowers and transforms 
individuals. The attempt to do this kind of unpacking is fraught with 
danger, and it is evident that Harnack made mistakes. As Sykes notes in 
his comparison of Harnack with Loisy, clarity is always vulnerable when 
compared to unclarity (Identity, p.l39J. Christian apologetics, however, 
owes its existence to those who have had the courage to make the attempt. 
One cannot get away from power language in Harnack, and the only question 
is rightly to determine its significance. The frameworks that have been 
used to interpret Harnack's theology to date have been unequal to their 
task not least because they do not let him speak clearly for himself. In 
seeking an adequate way in to the interpretation of Harnack's constructive 
theology, what better place to start could there be than to pay attention 
to the obvious, to the ubiquitous power language, and to probe it to 
ascertain whether the language of power and the concepts of power in fact 
give rise to a theology of power? 
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Notes to Chapter One <Introduction> 
l.a. CBiograpw 
1. Theodosius Harnack, Luther's Theologie mit besonderer Beziehung auf 
seine Versohnungs- und Erl5sungslehre, vol.I, 1862, vol.II, 1886, 2nd. ed. 
1927. 
2. Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, Adolf von Harnack, Berlin, Hans Bot t Verlag, 
1936, p.49 C2nd ed. 1951 >; hereinafter referred to as AZH. see also G. 
Wayne Glick, The Reality of Christianity: A Study of Adolf von Harnack as 
Historian and Theologian, New York, Harper & Row, 1967, p.29: hereinafter 
cited as Glick, Reality. 
3. Dorpat was a stronghold of Lutheran orthodoxy, and toward the end of 
his studies there Harnack began to feel rest less in an atmosphere where 
doubts were regarded as tokens of insincerity. Biographer Agnes von Zah.n-
Harnack maintains that Harnack broke with his Dorpat teachers on several 
issues. In Christology, he rejected the idea of pre-existence and held that 
the proper Bay to perceive Jesus was not via speculative categories but 
through his worth for us as his disciples [AZH pp.93-95l. With regard to 
the worth of the ecclesiastical tradition, he held that, like all other 
historical movements, the tradition had undergone a process of 
rationalisation, levelling and deterioration which meant that what we 
possess today is far different from the original [ibid p.96l. He differed 
from orthodoxy also on the nature of the sacraments, and gave only a 
qualified acceptance to the Lutheran confessional writings, and he 
expressed the forgiveness of sins as simply the negative aspect of the 
more comprehensive blessing of eternal life [ibid. pp.93-99l. Finally, 
Harnack became convinced that being a Christian is not so much a matter of 
believing the correct doctrines as of living a life in which God is trusted 
as Father [ibid. pp. 102-1051. 
4. The reaction to Harnack's answer was extreme. - The Kaiser demanded an 
immediate report, and Harnack was called to give an account of himself to 
Bosse, head of the Kultusministerium, in which the principle of 
Lehrfreiheit was upheld [AZH p.205fl. The 'orthodox' as a result of the 
Streit demanded and got the establishment of another theological chair in 
Berlin, and Harvard University offered Harnack a chair for the second time, 
assuring him of the prospect there of complete freedom of thought and 
speech. Harnack declined and notified the government of his decision, 
writing, in Bards that have an irony for us today, that hopefully the time 
would never come when a lack of academic freedom would drive a Prussian 
from his fatherland [AZH p.210l. 
5. Friedrich Smend, Adolf von Harnack: Verzeichnis seiner Schriften, Leipz~, 
1927; 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1931, with an appendix by Axel von Harnack. The 
works of greatest significance for this thesis will be indicated in section 
Lb. below. 
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6. Neufeld notes that the Flllle should not be understood as personal 
'AffMren', but as crystallisations of the conflict between the contemporary 
intellectual understanding of Christianity offered by Geistesgeschichte and 
the ecclesiatical status quo: see Karl H. Neufeld, Adolf Harnack's Konflikt 
mit der Kirche: Weg-Stationen zum .. Wesen des Christentums", InsbrUck-Wien-
MUnchen, Tyrolia, 1979, p.13-14. 
7. AZH pp.215-227; see also W.R. Ward, Theology. Sociology and Politics: the 
German Protestant Social Conscience 1890-1933, Bern, Peter Lang, 1979, pp. 
37, 55-71 et passim. Among the issues addressed by the Kongress Harnack 
was especially concerned with education, including the education of women, 
and used his influence to encourage reforms [AZH pp.221, 3181. 
8. On Harnack's ecumenical activity: relations with the Roman Catholic 
church see AZH pp.406f, 412-416, 542f; on his enthusiasm for the post-war 
ecumenical ~aovement see ibid. p.538-544; see also, 'Was wir von der 
rBmischen Kirche lernen und nicht lernen sollen' [writ ten 1891, R&A bd. II, 
p.247f.1; 'Protestantismus und Katholizismus in Deutschland' [written 1907, 
R&A nf. I, pp.228-250l; 'Uber den sogennanten ,Consensus quinque-saecularis" 
als Grundlage der Wiedervereinigung der Kirchen' [R&A Werk.J; 'Die 
Weltkonferenz fUr Glaube und Verfassung' Christliche Welt 40, pp. 722-724 
{1926)]. 
9. These developments include the move away from concern with an 
historical understanding of Christianity towards a focus upon individual 
religious experience in search of das ReligiBse Uberhaupt, and the rise of 
the religionsgeschichtliche Schule. 
10. Harnack kept in touch with him after his abdication, and sent him 
regular reports of the research foundation that, thanks to Harnack's 
efforts, continued to bear his name [AZH pp.493-494J. 
1 b: <Methodology) _ 
1. Ringer's evidence suggests that even with regard to politics any idea of 
a 'Damascus road conversion' for Harnack is inaccurate: he was a modernist 
social reformer even before the war. [ibid. pp 133,190-193). 
2. For example, see '0ber das Verhllltnis der Kirchengeschichte zur 
Universalgeschichte', R&A nf.2 pp.61, 62 <written 1904> ; also •Ober die 
Sicherheit und die Grenzen geschichtlicher Erkenntnis' R&A nf.4 pp.3f, 8 
<written 1917>; and 'on John 16;12,14' ST , pp.222-224 <written 1918>. 
3. Roberts suggests that German culture at the turn of the century was, 
" ... racked by a longing and striving for forms of self-transcendence," and 
that this, " ... forms the background to the astounding success of Harnack's 
What is Christianity?" [R. Roberts ',The Reception of the Theology of Karl 
Barth in the Anglo-Saxon World: History, Typology and Prospect', typescript, 
University of Durham, 1987, p.301. 
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4. Axel von Harnack's introduction to the final volume <Werk.) published 
with Harnack's permission but after his death, maintains that the 
collection meant a great deal to Harnack, and that he wished to be known 
as much by its contents as by that of Das Wesen. 
l.c. Harnack as systematic theologian 
1. Neufeld devotes a section of the bibliography of his second book on 
Harnack specifically to the literature engendered by the debate about Das 
Wesen. Yet even this is not a full list, the abundance of the material 
having compelled selection, but it serves to indicate the dimensions of the 
debate [Neufeld <1979), pp.17, 18]. 
2. The following year Glick supplemented his work on Harnack with an 
important article, ,Ich bin kein Reformator", aber ... ' [in J.C. Brauer, ed. The 
Impact of the Church upon its Culture: Reappraisals in the History of 
Christianity, U.Chicago Press, 1968, pp.353-382]. The content is dealt with 
extensively elsewhere in the thesis [see l.d. below]. 
3. There are times, as in his discussion of the Babel-Bibel controversy, 
when Glick wilfully misunderstands the simple grammatical sense of 
Harnack's words in order to find evidence for his theses [p.230fl. And in 
the discussion of the Barth-Harnack controversy, Glick emotively 
mistranslates the title of Harnack's Fifteen Questions, directing them to 
the 'betrayers' of scientific theology [p.223l. The word is 'Vetlichter•, 
which Rumscheidt renders more correctly as 'despisers' (H.M. Rumscheidt, 
Revelation and Theology: An analysis of the Barth-Harnack correspondence 
of 1923, Cambridge, 1972, p.29l. Glick's translation carries a sense of 
hysterical accusation: Rumscheidt's a sense of defense in the face of 
injury, and I would argue that the difference in tone makes a difference 
to how readers would reflect upon Harnack's character and motives in this 
instance. 
4. At times Glick appears to have some insight into the inevitability of 
this state of things. For instance he writes, after criticising Harnack for 
intruding his Humanitlitsideal into his interpretation of the gospel: 
"And if Harnack intruded a Humanitlitsideal in his identification of 
'the reality of Christianity' <his kerygma), controlling the historical 
materials as he did, the modern who views this intrusion as a 
mistake and substitutes his culturally efficacious 'biblical kerygma' 
would be well advised to hold the mirror to his own viewpoint. One 
cannot escape the conviction that a good deal of 'culturally relevant' 
theology is not only loaded with its own Humanitlitsideal, but lacks 
the historical sophistication which Harnack possessed" (p.344l. 
5. D.W. Lotz notes that, while delineating clearly how Harnack's axiology 
shapes his writing of history, " ... Glick himself does not sufficiently 
consider how history also determines axiology-i.e., that Harnack's specific 
understanding of the historical method necessitated an axiology as the 
solution to the critical historian's dilemma" m.w. Lotz review in Union 
Seminary Quarterly Review 23 <Spring 1968) p.288: see also l.d.J. 
6. It is a surprise to find that in his second book Neufeld reverses the 
judgment he made on Das Wesen in his first work <i.e. that it is a 'haute 
vulgarisation' of very secondary importance> and makes of it the pinnacle 
of Harnack's existential development as a theologian. What emerges is a 
view of the F~lle which sees them as stages in a theological and 
existential journey which culminates in the production of Pas Wesen. 
7. Neufeld makes frequent use of 'Kraft' in elucidating Harnack's theology 
and quotes many of Harnack's important 'power passages'. He repeatedly 
refers to the inner Dynamik of the gospel, by which he means the actually 
becoming Christ-like <Christsein) rather than the static embracing of an 
intellectual truth. Neufeld insists that for Harnack Christianity in its 
essence is not embraced in objective Gegebenheiten which can be put into 
sentences, but in the Dynamik of a new life [Neufeld <1977) p.60l. The 
constant emphasis on gelebte Evangelium, existentielle Evangelium, and the 
equally constant emphasis on the freedom of the Christian from the 
compulsion of nature and the world all allude to power themes, as does 
Neufeld's statement that Harnack imputed worth above all to the innert:m 
Kr~fte of the preaching of Jesus, but was more reserved about and critical 
of the external KrMte which cooperated in the shaping of the church 
[Neufeld <1977> p.287l. 
8. That for Harnack the church was a major interes no one would wish to 
deny, but he was interested in the church not for its own sake, but as the 
social consequence of and the missionary vehicle for the gospel, and it is 
with the transforming power of the gospel that his deepest theological and 
apologetic concerns lie [see l.e. below]. Neufeld rightly stresses the 
potentially revolutionary implications of Harnack's work for the shape of 
the church of the future, but he errs in attributing too much weight to 
Harnack's call for a third kind of church, and in order to delineate the 
positive Kirchenprogramm which he insists Harnack holds, Neufeld is forced 
to press the evidence too hard [see Neufeld <1977) p.356-357J. In any 
event, Harnack said that he considered it the task of the next generation 
to renew the church: the task of his own generation was the renewal of 
theology [see l.d.J. 
9. Neufeld's strong attribution of causality to biographical factors in 
Harnack is the more ironic as he criticises others for being too 
'biographical' in their approach to him. Neufeld forgets that Harnack's 
unorthodox views predate his ecclesiastical isolation and rejection and 
were the cause of it, rather than vice versa. It is also a mistake to 
attribute Harnack's vigorous activity in 'the world' primarily to his 
rejection by the church. Kaltenborn bears witness to the fact, which 
Neufeld himself to some extent recognises, that Harnack held a very 
Lutheran and positive concept of Christian Liebesdienst, in which the 
Christian, freed from the zwingende Pflicht of nature and the world, is 
enabled to work in the world as God's joyful Mitarbeiter. As Neufeld 
stresses, Harnack indeed desired to serve the church, but in Harnack's view 
God's business is ultimately with the world: the church is to be an 
instrument in God's hand for the service and education of the world. Thus 
for Harnack, work in the world has its own positive raison d'etre. 
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10. Harnack, in company with Ritschl, made many dark pronouncements on the 
subject of nature, but it rapidly becomes clear that when he does so he is 
using the word in a very specialised way which does not reflect upon the 
goodness of creation. Harnack's objections to catholic sacramental doctrine 
have as much to do with politics and power as with creation-with the 
pinning-down of divine grace to specific and exclusive things and places, 
with the exultation of correct ritual form over the disposition of the 
heart and the building of clerical monopolies over access to divine 
grace-all of which Harnack saw as antithetical to the directness and 
immediacy of the gospel [see Neufeld <1977> p.320; also ch.51. That 
Harnack spiritualised the sacraments and related components of 
Christianity is true, and whether this is a fault in him is debatable, but 
his reasons for doing so are not what Neufeld suggests. 
11. Of Barth and Brunner, two of Harnack's most influential critics, he 
writes; ,t11ir sind der Meinung, dass die Kritik dieser Theologen an Ritschl 
und Harnack ungerecht und unzutreffend ist, und dass eine sinnvolle Kritik 
enders sein sollte," [ibid. p.62-63, see also p.65-68J. Especially he notes 
the inconsistency in Barth's fierce criticism of Ritschl <and by extension 
Harnack) for his abjuration of metaphysics in view of the fact that the 
rejection and surmounting of all natural theology is one of the chief 
themes of his own work [p.65J, and the fact that in spite of this Barth 
can only arrive at his conception of the being of God in revelation by 
means of an extensive use of metaphysical concepts [p.67J. Meijering 
reaches the conclusion that Brunner has misunderstood Harnack from the 
outset, and demonstrates by reference to Harnack's writings how repeatedly 
the views which Brunner reccommends to him as correctives, Harnack already 
in fact holds [p. 70-71]. Brunner gives the impression that Harnack's 
theological position is entirely passe [ibid. p.72-73l. Meijering insists 
that this is not true, and that Brunner himself is the proof of it, holding 
that those who were unfamiliar with Brunner's verdict on Harnack, and who 
read Dogmatik after reading Dogmengeschichte, would conclude that Brunner 
was a MusterschUler of Harnack's (ibid. p. 73-7 41. Meijering further 
contends that the way for the renewal of reformed faith which was the 
goal of dialectical theology was prepared by Ritschl and above all by 
Harnack [ibid.J. 
12. Irmscher calls for an expansion of the Smend bibliography of 1931, 
which is incomplete [p.4J, and for the production of a 'wissenschaftliches 
Biograph}!', maintaining that Agnes von Zahn-Harnack's work, though a rich 
source of information, partakes too much of the genre of hagiography [p.51. 
Along with the barrier between sacred and profane history, Irmscher notes 
that other barriers which Harnack broke down were those between the 
'Fathers' and the heretics, and between antique (i.e. graeco-roman> culture 
and the surrounding Randkulturen-ethiopian, arabic, armenian, coptic, old-
slavic, and syrian Cp.11,13l. While not surprisingly critical of theology 
for its narrowness, Irmscher equally criticises classical studies for its 
continuing neglect of the early Christian components of antiquity [p.14-l. 
13. Dummer points out that over one quarter of all Harnack's publications 
for the Academy concerned New Testament problems [p.22-24l and that he 
wrote extensively on New Testament subjects elsewhere, yet no serious 
attempt has been made, beyond quoting him in relation to particular 
Einzelfragen. to determine Harnack's position in the history of Net:5 
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Testament scholarship [ibid.l. Dummer has also performed a valuable 
service to Harnack scholarship by rendering the Sitzungsberichte material 
more accessible, having extracted and published it in a two-volume 
Arbeitsausgabe entitled, Adolf von Harnack: Kleine Schriften zur alt~n 
Kirche (Leipzig, Zentralantiquariat der DDR, 19801. 
l.d. <Harnack as apologist and reformer) 
1. Though he held the chair of church history in Berlin, it was as an 
historical scholar that Harnack was elected to the Preussischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (AZH p.252J and as an historian that he received the 
Orden pour le Merite, an honour for which theologians were expressly 
ineligible (ibid.p 279-2801. 
2. see Sykes, Identity, chapter 9, 'Analysis of the Essence Discussion', 
especially pp.219-238; also F. Courth, Das Wesen des Christent ums in der 
liberalen Theologie: dargestellt am Werk Fr. Schleiermachers, Ferd. Chr. 
Baurs und A. Ritschls, Frankfurt, Lang, 1977, especially pp.l-6. 
l.e. <Power as a principle of coherence for the interpretation of Harnack) 
1. Weber's definition holds that power [Macht] is; " ... the probability that 
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis upon which this 
probability rests" Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth & C. Wittich, 
Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978, vol.l p.53. 
2. His discussion, in the tenth lecture of What is Christianity?, of the 
chiliastic expectations of the early church demonstrates this point. He 
maintains that these expectations were mistaken, but insists that we also 
realise how valuable they were for raising the disciples above the world, 
teaching them to value the great things over the small and to distinguish 
what is of time from what is of eternity. Harnack presents this as an 
example of a recurring phenomenon in the history of religion, in which a 
'new and powerful religious impulse', a power in its own right, is 
associated with a coefficient power <Koeffizient) which enhances and 
strengthens it. Other examples include the new piety and devotion of St. 
Francis, strengthened by the doctrine of poverty, and the thought of St. 
Augustine, in which the central power of a religious experience of sin and 
grace is strengthened by the coefficient of predestination. Similarly the 
Puritan movement was strengthened by the consciousness of adoption [WC? 
172-173/Dl:J 108]. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HARNACK AND POWER: QUESTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
2.a. Introduction 
In l.e. above we offered possible reasons for Harnack making power a 
primary interpretive category for his understanding of Christianity, and 
further reasons, arising from Harnack's historical context, will be 
discussed in 2.c. below. It is necessary now to examine the subject of 
power more closely at a theoretical level. 
There is no agreement among social scientists about how power language is 
to be used. There are no definitive experts to consult, and theologians 
must find their own way amongst the many treatments of power available. 1 
Among the works which proved to be particularly useful was Dennis Wrong's 
Power: Its forms. bases and uses (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979; 2nd. ed. 
19881, which offers a good standard treatment of power at a theoretical 
level, to which we shall return. As a working definition of power with 
which to begin, however, Max Weber's is still adequate, i.e. that power is: 
" ... the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis upon which this probability rests". With this definition a penumbra 
of qualifying terms begins to develop around the bare word 'power': social 
relationship, will, resistance. More will follow. The inference that there 
may be many different bases for the probability of one actor's supremacy 
points to the truth that power comes in many and varied forms. It is in 
the differentiation of these forms that we find Wrong's book of use. 
While many social scientists have laid out typologies of power, Wrong's is 
among the best for its comprehensiveness and clarity. 
For most people the notion of power is inextricably connected with force: 
power means the ability to coerce. Wrong reminds us that many types of 
power--competent authority and charismatic authority, for example-involve 
little coercion. He also impresses upon us that power occurs within 
relationships and involves some degree of cooperation and reciprocity. 
This emphasis suggests that power can also mean the ability to accomplish. 
Wrong arranges his types of power along a continuum for which the degree 
of coercion and the degree of relationship form the variables. 
Social scientists and political theorists deal with social, interpersonal 
types of power. This perspective is emphasised by Michael Mann's 
definition of power in terms of different means of organisation to promote 
goal-attainment CThe Sources of Social Power: A history of power from the 
peg inning to A.D. 1 760, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 19861. This 
approach, however, neglects those powers which are generated and operative 
in the first instance within the individual rather than between persons 
and groups. Psychology makes a contribution in this area, and 
psychotherapist Rollo May's work on the connexions between personal 
powerlessness and violence, Power and Innocence: A search for the sources 
of violence, [New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 19721 proved instructive. In 
addition, the high profile which Mann gives to ideological power begins to 
broaden the usual sociological perspective, though while he touches on the 
importance for this kind of power of the quest for meaning, he mainly 
stresses the functions of ideological power in promoting group solidarity 
and adherence to social norms. For theologians a discussion of power will 
include the intrapersonal as well as the interpersonal frame of reference, 
and in a way different from that of psychology, for it includes the 
possibility of transcendence and entertains the idea of sources of power 
other than the natural or human. 
Harnack understood social, political and organisational powers: he used 
them himself and chronicled their effects upon the history of Christianity. 
But in developing his constructive theology it is the interior dimensions 
of power which concern him most and where he is most original. 
2.b. Perspectives from the social sciences: Wrong, Mann. Berger 
While a survey of contemporary social science literature on the subject of 
power is beyond the scope of this thesis, the work of Wrong, Mann and 
Berger has helped to provide a context for understanding Harnack's 
strategies with regard to power. As noted above, Wrong's typology proves 
instructive, as does his understanding of the interrelations of power. For 
Mann, Harnack is a major source of information about the history of 
Christianity, and Berger writes with direct reference to Harnack. 
Wrong's opening definition of power is, " ... the capacity of some persons to 
produce intended and foreseen effects on others' [Wrong, p.2.J. He 
specifically excludes from his study the areas of power in the natural 
sciences or the power over the self which is the realm of psychology 
[ibid., but cf. the introduction to the 2nd edition). Wrong uses and 
expands Weberian insights, with an emphasis on resistance [pp.2, 21J, 
intentionality [p.3J, and a particular interest in authority [pp.35fl. His 
typology of power-force, manipulation, persuasion-moves from that 
employing the greatest degree of coercion to the least, and the least 
amount of cooperation and reciprocity to the greatest, and the pattern is 
repeated for authority-coercive, induced, legitimate, competent, personal. 
Despite the differences in discipline and in the methodological standpoint 
with regard to transcendence, Wrong illuminates Harnack in several ways. 
This is perhaps to be expected given the proximity of Harnack to Weber. 
Harnack and Weber were contemporaries and co-nationals, were active in the 
same political causes, and had a mutual friend and colleague in Troeltsch 1 • 
Harnack refers his readers to Weber's Protestant Ethics and the 'Spirit' of 
Capitalism for an answer to the question of the share which should be 
assigned to Christianity in the protracted changes which in the course of 
history have revolutionised social class, labour and social organisation 
[M&E II p. 336 n.ll. Citation indicates that Harnack possessed at least a 
basic knowledge of Weber's thought. Though Weber's work was the more 
sophisticated and explicit on the subject of power, there is considerable 
common ground in their approaches. Both make resistance an important 
component in their power definitions, and emphasise the rOle of conflict in 
history. Both also have a special interest in authority, as Wrong 
translates Weber's Herrschaft, which was also a word Harnack used to 
describe the power of God. 
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We shall find Wrong useful at many points in the investigation. His 
categories of authority help to illuminate and contextualise the types of 
power in Christianity which most concerned Harnack. They particularly 
serve to illustrate Harnack's view of what happenned over time to the 
kinds of social power exercised in the church. A further contribution is 
the light they shed on Harnack's own tacit claim to power as an historical 
theologian 'authorised' to interpret the past [see ch.6, 71. 
In discussing the 'zero-sum' debate Wrong helps to throw Harnack's general 
attitude towards power into relief [Wrong, pp.237fl. The debate is between 
'conflict' theoreticians, such as C. Wright Mills, who hold that power is 
essentially power over others, and the 'consensus' theoreticians, 
represented classically by Talcott Parsons, who maintain that power is 
essentially power to do, with power over others being secondary and 
derivative. ~arnack's inclination was to the latter theory, not only 
because of his optimistic mandarin assessment· of society as a social 
contract, but also because such a definition of power accords more exactly 
with the internal, psychological powers which interested him most. Yet, as 
we shall see, in both the political and the interior worlds he was not 
blind to the existence of conflict, and inner power, while primarily 'power 
to', is also, with regard to the negatives of sin and mortality, 'power 
over'. 
Wrong has less to offer us regarding the question of power within the 
individual. Wrong insists on the relational character of po~1er. Harnack 
well understood the relational dimension of spiritual power, for everything 
in his theological scheme depends on the interchange between God and the 
soul, conditioned by the personality of Christ. It is the character of God 
and God's relation to the soul as rather which is the source of spiritual 
power. But without denying the relational character of power, Harnack 
would also insist that ultimately the power-event occurs within, not 
between individuals. To adapt a favourite Harnackean metaphor in the case 
of charismatic authority, the power of one personality 'kindles' another: a 
spark indeed passes between the individuals, but the fires burn separately. 
Michael Mann 
Historical sociologist Michael Mann, in the first volume of The Sources of 
Social Power: A history of power from the beginning to AD 1760 [Cambridge 
University Press, 1986] follows the Weberian line in insisting that power 
should not be treated as a self-existent entity. He defines it as a word 
used to describe various means of organisation for goal-attainment which 
have developed and changed over time. Mann argues that social power of 
any intensity arose only with the development of civilisation. He makes a 
strong case for a Marxist theory of the first origins of power and 
civilisation-i.e. that the 'original' form of power was economic, and that 
the other main types of power-military, political, and 
ideological--developed from this. Mann in no way, however, underestimates 
the powerfulness of the 'later' forms of power. Of especial interest to 
us, he chronicles the rise of ideological power in the period beginning 
600 BC, concentrating on the emergence of Christianity as the example for 
which we have the best documentation [see ch. 10, pp. 364f.J. F'or his 
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information on Christian history he chooses to draw in great measure upon 
Harnack's Mission and Expansion and Troeltsch's Social Teachings. 
Mann's theory of the rise of ideological power is as follows: ideological 
power could not, 1n his view, become a force capable of influencing the 
shape of history until certain organisational and infrastructural 
preconditions were met. These included a well-developed system of 
communications and a relatively high level of literacy such as came into 
being in the wake of the mature empires of domination <e.g. Assyria, 
Persia, Rome>. Another precondition was also a by-product of empire and 
the enforced mixing of cultures which it entailed, that is, a growing sense 
of the oneness and basic similarity of all human beings. A third 
precondition was the existence of individuals and groups who were 
marginal, or interstitial, to the traditional groupings of society, such as 
the artisans and traders in the Roman Empire who were largely denied 
meaningful communal association and who were thirsty for belonging and 
identity. Where such conditions are present, Mann argues, the way is clear 
for articulate individuals to supply new explanations of the meaning of 
individual and social existence, and ideological power is born. Though 
chronologically a late-comer on the scene, ideological power is indeed 
power: individuals and groups become willing to sacrifice economic, 
military and political advantages in order to meet its demands. 
Mann's theory throws into relief what shall soon be evident as Harnack's 
unquestioning assumption of the priority and supremacy of ideological 
power with regard to any other kind of power. In suggesting rather 
humbler human origins for ideological power, it indicates a way of 
overcoming the dichotomy which makes itself apparent in Harnack's works 
between divine/spiritual and human/worldly power. What Mann does not do 
is to offer an explanation of the rise of the charismatic individual whose 
articulacy creates the new ideology. How do such individuals come into 
being and develop perspectives and explanations for existence quite 
different from those traditionally available? The fact of marginality 
alone is not sufficient to explain them. In short, what is the nature of 
their inspiration? This is a question which because of its methodological 
constraints social science is not equipped to answer. 
This omission points once again to the issue of transcendence. Mann 
indeed uses the term in his interpretation of ideological power, but it 
gradually becomes clear that for him transcendence means sociospatial 
transcendence only, that is, the pointing of humanity to a real or imagined 
fundamental unity which disregards limitations of space, time and culture. 
This kind of transcendence in Mann's view is the very power of ideological 
power, but while noting its attractiveness and plausibility he never asks 
why it should be so. Mann maintains that in the period under discussion 
this transcendence took a religious form, with the 'divine' as the 
imaginative projection of social realities [p.20l. Harnack would wish to 
argue that the human feeling of transcendence has a real referent-the 
common relatedness of all human beings to the spirit of God at work in 
history. 
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The two are agreed that an analysis of history in which the concept of 
power- plays the central rOle is the correct way to proceed, but their 
understandings of what power is and how it operates diverge sharply. For 
Harnack, power is something which arises within individuals and moves 
outwards to influence society and the natural world. For Mann, restlessness 
and the desire for goal-attainment may be inherent in and arise from 
within individuals, but power arises among individuals as they organise and 
cooperate in the reshaping of both human society and the natural world to 
attain common goals. Even the most inward of powers, the religious 
experience, he would trace ultimately back to this form of social 
cooperation for the purposes of material goal-attainment. The movement of 
power in Harnack is from 'within' to 'outside': in Mann from 'among' to 
'outside' and 'within'. 
Peter Berger: theological strategies for addressing the nature of divine 
power 
When theologians write about divine or spiritual power they usually do so 
with hesitancy and imprecision. The heated and detailed discussions about 
power among theologians usually concern themselves with the power of the 
church as institution or with questions of appropriate human authority and 
leadership within the church. Even those who have become critical and 
urbane about social and political power continue to handle spritual power 
in a simplisic manner. By radicals it is 'debunked' and declared only to be 
a mythic legitimation of the altogether human power of the church. By 
fundamentalists and the unsophisticated orthodox, it is celebrated as a 
kind of magical electricity, offering deus ex machina solutions, and though 
phrases like 'the power of God' and 'the power of the Spirit' are scattered 
liberally through their works, actual discussion of the nature and method 
of operation of divine power tends to be sparse and stereotyped. 
Theologians who are at neither of these extremes wrestle, often 
inarticulately, with the possibility that spiritual power exists, but that 
our notions of it require reassessment after Kant and Freud. They seek 
not only, with the fundamentalists, to affirm the fact that spiritual power 
exists and is available to us and to show how we can avail ourselves of 
it, but also to describe what spiritual power can and cannot effect, and to 
explain how it does what it does. 
The attempt to examine and explain spiritual power is often viewed with 
suspicion as evidence of 'liberalism' if not of blasphemy. But because 
the subject is of vital importance apologetically, theologians of all 
persuasions are impelled at some point to address the problem. 
Sociologist/theologian Peter Berger maintains that when they make the 
at tempt to deal with the phenomenon of the power of God and of the 
spiritual power active in and available to believers, theologians adopt 
varying strategies, and his book, The Heretical Imperative [London, Collins, 
19801, makes a valuable attempt to systematise the chaos. Though having a 
slightly wider frame of reference than that of divine/spiritual power, his 
work is fully applicable to this area. He suggests that there are three 
main aproaches to the problem, and in studying these we can reach a 
better appreciation of the context and method of Harnack's attempt. 
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Berger takes a phenomenological starting-point. Experiences of the 
supernatural and the sacred create ruptures in mundane reality and give 
rise to new perceptions of the self and others. Echoing Weber's 
'routinisation of charisma', he notes that religious experience, which is 
initially self-authenticating, inevitably over. time becomes embodied in 
religious tradition which becomes an authority, supported by social 
institutions, consensus and control [Berger,ibid., pp.46-48l. But, he notes, 
our situation, the religious situation of modernity, is one of pluralism, of 
a choice to be made from among competing traditions. This poses a threat 
to the realness, security and objectivity of each and all traditions [see 
ibid., ch.ll. 
Berger's emphasis on the challenge of pluralism fits Harnack's situation 
well. While religious pluralism had been to some extent a feature of 
German life since the Reformation, first the enlightenment, and then the 
ideological ramifications of industrial capitalism and the concomitant rise 
of an unchurched marxist social democratic movement had increased the 
number of alternative explanations and the sharpness of their divergence. 
Theologians of all persuasions felt the need to 'defend the faith' in this 
situation [Ward, p.40J. 
In the face of the threat of pluralism Berger outlines three possible 
strategies. The first is the deductive possibility, in which, " ... the 
tradition is affirmed anew, after an interval when it was not affirmed. 
The problem is, quite simply, that it is very difficult to forget the 
interval ... This is why neotradit ional and nee-orthodox movements come on 
with particular vehemence ... " (Berger, p.68J. The example of this 
possibility which Berger uses is that of Karl Barth's protestant nee-
orthodoxy, in which the Word of God is the datum of Christian theology. 
Faith in the Word is the starting-point: there is no way there, no method 
of knowing God, no natural human capacity to know God. Only the Word 
gives one the capacity to affirm it [ibid., p. 74fl. Christianity's 
uniqueness and validity are simply given, a priori (ibid., pp.83-84l. 
Because it has been questioned in liberal protestantism, the authority of 
the tradition must now be reasserted with great force. If one can 
accomplish this, the gain is cognitive certainty and one can once again 
deduce propositions from the old tradition (ibid., p. 79]. 
The second response is the reductive possibility, that of modernising 
tradition. Starting from the assumption that modern consciousness cannot 
accept the supernatural (and the assumption that this constitutes an 
epistemological advance), but desiring to salvage at least the core of the 
tradition, this strategy engages in 'cognitive bargaining' and effects a 
'translation' of the supernatural elements of the tradition, sometimes into 
ethics or mystical experience <e.g. classical liberalism>, existential 
categories <e.g. Bultmann), psychology <e.g. Norman Vincent Peale and other 
Americans in the nineteen fifties>, or politics <e.g. liberation theology> 
[ibid. pp.lll-1171. Here the ~·s are the cognitive superiority of 
modern consciousness (ibid. p.119fl and the convict ion that if 'the gods' 
are indeed discovered to be symbols of human realities, then this implies 
that they are nothing but symbols [ibid. p.121-123J. 
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The third response is the inductive possibility-a moving from tradition 
to experience. When the tradition comes to be questioned, this strategy 
seeks to trace back to the experiences which began it. Thus history and 
the analysis of religious consciousness become important. It takes human 
experience as the appropriate and only available starting-point for 
religious reflection and uses the methods of the historian to uncover 
those human experiences which have become embodied in the various 
religious traditions [ibid., p.l25-126l. Schleiermacher and the liberal 
protestantism which drew from him are the paradigmatic examples of this 
strategy [ibid., pp.127fl. Berger cites Harnack as the single most 
representative figure of the (inductive) historical impulse in nineteenth-
century protestant theology [ibid., pp.137fJ, searching for the essence of 
Christianity, that is, the core experiences of Christianity. <Harnack's 
Erlebnis equals Schleiermacher's GefUhl [ibid. p.l38, n.24D. 
Berger's three strategies prove to be a reasonable 'fit' with the ways 
theologians approach the task of affirming the divine power in a milieu 
where acceptance of its reality can no longer be taken for granted. Barth 
and nee-orthodoxy generally follow the deductive strategy, using the 
language of power about God easily and unashamedly, with few at tempts to 
explain what is meant or how divine power impinges on this world. In this 
they offer us no advance, vis-a-vis the new intellectual milieu, beyond 
orthodox tradition. 
A few adopt a reductive approach: in addition to Bultmann, Feuerbach and 
Overbeck offer the most obvious examples. More recently, Walter Wink 
takes a primarily reductive approach to the subject of 'principalities and 
powers' [Namin~ the Powers, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 19861. Berger 
offers Norman Vincent Peale [The Power of Positive Thinking. New York, 
Prentice-Hall, 1952 et.al.J as an example of reduction, saying that he 
'translates' the divine story into psychology, into principles of growth and 
wholeness for the individual. This is not in my view fair to Peale2 • 
When the subject is spiritual power the inductive strategy appears to be 
practised in two different ways. The first is intellectual and analytical, 
and fits easily into Berger's description: i.e. through history and 
reflection on the historically-given religious experiences of humanity, 
seeking to describe the core-experiences of divine power. But there is a 
second variant which also deserves the adjective inductive. It is more 
active, and emphasises the possiblity-indeed the necessity--of confirming 
and supplementing historical analysis by seeking direct religious 
experience at first hand. Such an approach, characteristic of many 
mystical, fundamentalist and charismatic writers, attempts to authenticate 
the traditional truth-claims about the power of God by demonstrating that 
power in the present 3 • 
As shall be established in chapter three, Harnack's approach to the subject 
of the power of God has been rightly labelled by Berger as primarily 
inductive, and should be bracketed within the first variant. While 
containing some elements of the reductive strategy, notably in his attitude 
to miracles and eschatology [see ch.5 below], it will be seen that 
Harnack's continued allegiance to the reality of the divine referent 
places him in the inductive camp, as does his continual striving to discern 
the core-experiences which lay at the root of various facets of the 
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tradition as religious experiences and not experiences finally of some 
other sort. 
Summary 
How do these social-science perspectives illuminate Harnack's approach to 
power? We are enabled to 'place' Harnack overall within the camp of the 
consensus theoreticians, but Wrong's work enables us to discern the 
considerable common ground between Harnack and Weber in emphasising the 
role of conflict and resistance, and especially in the focus upon authority. 
Harnack's description of the power exercised by Jesus is recognisiable as a 
type of charismatic authority, whose truth-claims are authenticated in 
terms of a transcendent referent. Because Harnack is convinced by this 
referent, he handles charismatic authority differently from a social 
scientist. He can attribute this kind of power to God, and it is, as we 
shall demonstrate, the primary type of power which Harnack does attribute 
to God. Yet perhaps titles like 'Lord of history' imply in Harnack's 
thought a more traditonal, directly causal role in the events of the 
cosmos, a role not dependent upon the cooperation of other wills. 
Wrong's raising of the 'zero-sum' question, then, helps to locate Harnack on 
this important continuum. Harnack essentially is a 'consensus' man, not in 
the sense of downplaying the role of conflict but certainly in seeing 
power as primarily power-to-do, prior to and independent of any necessity 
for power over others. Wrong's considerable interpretive value for the 
assessment of Harnack's view of authority and of the transformation of 
power in the church will become apparent in the course of this work. 
Mann's explanation of the rise of ideological power dramatically conflicts 
with Harnack's, and shows to what extent Harnack is an idealist. But while 
unquestioningly contending for its independent origin and superiority to 
all other types of power, Harnack is not unaware of the importance of what 
Mann terms infrastructure for ideological power. The clearest evidence for 
this is his section near the beginning of Mission und Ausbreitung on the 
world which the first Christian missionaries addressed, which is concerned 
with political and social as well as religious and philosophical factors. 
Mann's cohesive approach, which explains the rise of ideological power in 
purely human terms, points us to the issue of transcendence which divides 
him from Harnack. It also suggests a problem in Harnack's thought: if one 
posits the existence of a divine power, what is its relation to human 
power, and how does it operate in the human world? As we shall see, 
Harnack makes considerable efforts to address this question, but in the 
end it may be that he still remains with a fissure between sacred and 
secular, human and divine. Mann and Wrong both raise the question whether 
power is a property or a relation. They both take the latter view, where 
in Harnack there is, at least in his use of language, an ambivalence which 
needs investigating. 
Berger has articulated and understood Harnack's apologetic role as a 
strategist attempting to affirm the Christian tradition in the face of the 
modern pluralistic situation by the inductive approach of tracing the 
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tradition back to the core-experiences which gave it birth. Unlike 
Harnack's early critics, Berger correctly describes Harnack's aproach as 
inductive, though it will be argued that some reductive elements are also 
present. We shall also see that Berger is useful in pointing out the 
vulnerability of the inductive strategy-the dangers of the middle ground. 
We shall argue that Harnack suffered for his mediatorial efforts, and that 
his work was not immune from these dangers, but that his christocentrism, 
saves him from sliding into reductionism and helps to solve, in the case 
of Christianity, the inductive strategy's perennial problem of certainty. 
2.c. Historical context to Harnack's concern with power 
The question must be hazarded as to why the idea of power would appeal to 
Harnack as an organising principle for his interpretation of Christianity. 
Any answer must remain speculative, but it is worth examining his 
historical context for clues. Mention has already been made of the idea's 
apologetic appeal. The concept works equally well within traditional 
supernatural religion and within inner-subjective 'demythologised' religion, 
and could provide a bridge of understanding between them. According to 
Glick, it was Harnack's early ambition to create just such a 
Vermittlungstheologie ['Ich bin kein Reformator', p.354l. But its apologetic 
appeal, too, begs the question-if Harnack used power terms in his 
description of the gospel because they would be readily grasped by those 
who heard, what was it in their life-experience which led them to a strong 
concern with power and also to at least a willingness to entertain the 
idea of an ideological inner power which 'worked' by transforming 
individuals? 
Given, of course, that all human situations involve power and that power 
accordingly cannot fail to be of some interest at all times, I would argue 
that the German people, and especially the intellectuals, of Harnack's time 
were particularly sensitised to the issues of power because of the rapid 
and conflictual pace of change to which they were subjected in the realms 
of politics, the economy and social relations, and that the idealism and 
romanticism which characterised the thought of the time predisposed them 
to identify with an apologetic of inner power. 
Politically Harnack's time was extremely turbulent, and in such a climate a 
sharp concern with power would be no surprise. His birth was immediately 
preceded by the Napoleonic wars, the French revolution of 1848 and the 
accompanying surge of liberal democratic movements, including the abortive 
attempt to establish a German National Assembly. Harnack's youth coincided 
with the developments of a pan-German nationalism and movements towards 
the unification of the German Uinder under the domination of Bismarck's 
Prussia, culminating, when Harnack was twenty, in the acclamation of 
Wilhelm of Prussia as the first Kaiser of Germany. Then followed the time 
of power, prosperity and increasing international tension under Wilhem II, 
coupled with the eruption of a new force in politics, the marxist social 
democrats. Then came the first World War, the ignominious peace and the 
ruinous inflation which accompanied it, the revolution and the French 
occupation of the Ruhr. Harnack's last years were spent in doing what he 
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could to stabilise the Weimar republic, and he died in the midst of 
economic depression, mass unemployment, and the first stirrings of naziism. 
In addition, Harnack lived through Germany's industrial revolution and the 
migrations and population explosion which accompanied it, with its cut-
throat capitalism, new monied classes, and decline in the relative status 
and influence of the classically-trained senior bureaucrats and the 
mandarin intellectuals, like Harnack, who taught them. 
The church too experienced many organisational upheavals during Harnack's 
lifetime. Political nationalism was paralleled by attempts at Protestant 
church union. Many reorganisations were necessitated by the shifting 
boundaries of the Ulnder, and there was also a move in many places to 
institute a synodical system and achieve a greater independence of the 
church from the state. Conflict, reaction and church parties were rife. 
The situation became acute after the revolution, when the Weimar 
government instituted a massive reorganisation of church government. 
The climate of conflict and the pace of economic, social and political 
change is no doubt sufficient to explain the congruence of discussions 
about power with the living interests of the hearers. But further 
explanation is necessary in order to locate Harnack's particular 
understanding of the different types of power and their interrelations 
against its intellectual background. 
First there is the fairly sharp distinction in Harnack's thought between 
political and religious power which is no doubt attributable to his 
Lutheran upbringing, and may account for his ability simultaneously to 
deplore the politicisation of of the early church and stoutly defend the 
political aspirations of Kaiser Wilhelm's government. It also, perhaps, 
underlies the 'sacred/secular' split in Harnack's thought [see 2.e. below]. 
Mann criticises Christianity for lacking a social cosmology, bllt to Harnack 
this was a virtue. In contrast to, and perhaps in reaction against, 
contemporary Catholic translations of the gospel into the Centre Party, 
Catholic trades unions and the ultramontane power of the papacy, Harnack 
held that Jesus offered no social policy, but laid down principles to be 
worked out in relation to the needs of different times. 
Then co!'les the influence of several ideological 'isms', of which idealism is 
perhaps the most important. Harnack and his university contemporaries 
were deeply convinced of the powerfulness and moral impact of ideological 
power, and with good reason, given the fact of the political power enjoyed 
by the university-trained bureaucracy: a powerful idea this year could 
become next year's govenment policy. They traced the dynamic element in 
history to the realm of mind. Geist was a very important concept, and 
some thinkers held it to be a transcendent cause of the evolution of 
civilisation [Ringer, p.99l. <Harnack re-christianised this idea with his 
conception of the creator spiritus.> The notion of individuality was also 
of great importance, and the German historical tradition, under this 
influence, placed an unusually strong emphasis on 'historic' individuals 
[ibid.]. Harnack shared the idealist notion of knowledge as not only the 
cognition of facts, but something with which one has a relationship and in 
which vital experience <Erleben) and value play a part [ibid. p.334l. On 
the basis of such idealism, senior academics were able to offer convincing, 
and sincere, legitimations of Germany's new status as a world power [ibid., 
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(ibid., p.115]. They were convinced that Germany's political power was the 
outward reflection of its moral worth, and equally that with the ability to 
exercise power came the moral right to do so, though any Machtpragrna was 
also accompanied by an ideal of justice. Also at work, and very openly in 
Harnack, was an idea of the missionary and educative destiny of German 
culture both within and outside the nation (ibid. p.268]. 
Ward offers an analysis of Harnack's attitudes to political and ideological 
power which illustrates the ambiguities and contradictions imposed by his 
position as a reforming mandarin idealist. He writes: 
"No one more fully embodied the political and social ambiguities of 
the alliance of religion and learning in the Germany of that day than 
did Harnack. As Baumgarten, his successor as president of the 
Evangelish-Sozial Kongress put it, he embodied, 'a prudent balance of 
social sympathy with the individualism of the aristocracy of 
education, religious neutrality with altruistic championship of 
distress, a feeling of social responsibility for everyone in the 
nation with protection for the hierarchically stratified world of 
civilisation, protestant feeling for the state with the rejection of 
all attempts to institutionalise the impulses of love' ... (Ward, p. 781. 
Ward concludes that Harnack's own handling of power as a would-be social 
reformer exemplifies his high estimate of ideological power and 
demonstrates the weaknesses of that approach. Under Harnack's leadership 
the Evangelisch-Sozial Kongress, designed to provide a Christian response 
to 'the social question', took an increasingly theoretical rather than a 
practical direction. Ward also notes that Harnack shared Ritschl's vast 
overestimate of the service Christianity could render to society through 
the educational system. Ward insists that because of his too exclusive 
reliance on ideological power Harnack in the end failed to have much 
effect: "If Harnack was underestimated by the champions of dialectical 
theology in the twenties, he had succeeded neither in excogitating policy, 
nor in acquiring the institutional backing by which policy might be 
implemented" Cp.82l. 
The influence of the current idealism was in several ways reinforced by 
romanticism, as represented by Schleiermacher, Goethe and Fichte, with its 
protest against form and structure in favour of life-energy, freedom and 
dynamism, and its love of the individual (C.Welch, Protestant Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century, val. I, Yale University Press, 1972, pp.51-52l. 
In addition to the influence of idealism, the pietist revival of the 
eighteenth century played its part in helping to frame a power idiom for 
Harnack's descriptions of the inner life. It reached him in several 
ways-through its influence on Kant, Herder, Schleiermacher and Ritschl, 
and through the Erlangen theology in which he was raised. It emphasised 
new life, transformation, sanctification, and the moral imperatives of 
Christianity. Erlangen theology in particular was orientated toward 
religious experience and history as well as scripture [ibid. pp. 22f, 2071, 
and one notes in Harnack's choice of language a mood of warm religious 
devotion which may have had its origins in Erlangen. 
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The epistemological influence of Kant upon Harnack, via Ritschl, will be 
discussed in greater detail below [see chapter 3, p.71 fl. F'or our purposes 
now it is enough to establish that after Kant, all religious explanations 
turn to the role of the subject in faith and knowledge [Welch, p.47f1. 
Harnack's favourite philosopher, however, was Lessing, with his emphasis on 
history as a thing of dynamism, a teleological development in which the 
infinite is :Jade manifest [ibid., p.51J. Harnack also shares common ground 
with Herder, who insisted on the discovery of God within living human 
experience and saw religion as 'the highest humanity of man' [ibid., p.54fl. 
One also finds similarities with Hoffman, who attempted to work from 
religious experience to all the necessary truths of orthodoxy, and who 
pioneered the nineteenth-century preoccupation with 'certainty' [ibid., 
p.223]. 
To summarise, Harnack's historical circumstances were enough to sensit ise 
him to the subject of power, and his idealism would incline him to locate 
power ultimately in the realm of inwardness, in the dynamism and 
creativity of ideas and personality. As a theologian this sensitivity to 
power issues would naturally shape for Harnack questions about divine and 
spiritual po~:~er. The influences of Kant, of pietism and romanticism would 
in their different ways focus him upon the role of the subject in the 
religious po~:~er relation and stress the centrality of the living experience 
of spiritual power. 
2.d. Harnack's hesitancies in addressing the nature of divine power 
As we established in 2.b. above, if we measure Harnack by his intentions 
and characteristic manner of proceeding we may locate his theological 
method generally, and his approach to the explanation of spiritual power 
specifically, within the inductive strategy. Therefore we expect him to 
trace dogmatic beliefs back to actual experiences of divine/spiritual power 
and to examine them closely. Yet we also find evident in Harnack a 
hesitancy about such an undertaking. He is only willing to explore the 
subject so far. Harnack resisted what he described as the immodest and 
indelicate attempt by the new theological scholarship to explore the 
secrets of the personality and the inner life. When describing the nature 
of spiritual power, of how the power of the gospel works upon the inner 
life of the personality, he felt he was treading on holy-and 
dangerous--ground. In his view Christianity must be studied on the basis 
of historical facts, which study may reveal the Geheimnisse <secrets) of 
the religion, but in the end, Christianity remains an inner experience, the 
Heimlichkeiten <mysteries> of which cannot finally be represented by any 
historical form. These remain accessible only to the feelings of the 
heart. This sense of mystery at the heart of the gospel and the 
conviction that there are barriers beyond which the investigator cannot 
and ought not to pass (e.g. HD III p.306J balances Harnack's apologetic 
desire to make Christianity clear and comprehensible. Both drives are 
demonstrated in his treatment of spiritual power: he goes further than 
most theologians in his attempt to explain the nature of spiritual power 
and how it operates in the individual, but the sense of reverence and 
mystery with which he approaches the task may explain why, as we shall 
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see, he often appears to stop tantalisingly short of completing it [see HD 
III p.306; also Glick, Reality pp.370-374J. 
This reverence for mystery is most pronounced with regard to Jesus. For 
instance, Harnack notes of Jesus that, " ... how he came to the consciousness 
of his power and to consciousness of the obligations and mission which 
this power carries with it, is his secret, and no psychology will ever 
fathom it" CBC?, p.l281. His handling of the atonement also partakes of 
this reverence [see chapter 4 below]. 
Harnack was certainly sincere in his conviction that in dealing with this 
subject one reached a point where one ought to go no further, but it may 
be, however, that 'cannot' rather than 'ought not' is the appropriate word. 
And, without implying any disrespect to Harnack's conscious motivations, it 
is rather convenient, if one gets stuck, to be able to invoke this reverent 
principle of closure. 
Harnack's apologetic attempts to explain divine/spiritual power and his 
hesitancies in doing so should be set against the background of similar, 
and frequently more pronounced, hesitancies by the majority of nineteenth 
and twentieth century theological thinkers. Reasons for the taboo in 
Harnack and the others are doubtless complex. There is certainly no doubt 
that in asking the questions of spiritual power one is searching the very 
heart of religion, and that the consequences of the questioning could be 
far-reaching. Reverence indeed, for believers, has been a factor in the 
hesitation: how dare mere humans plumb the depths of the divine, asking 
not only what God does but how is it done? Widespread discomfort with 
the subject of power in general also plays a part. Fear holds many back 
from investigating too closely, fear that they might become convinced that 
'the power of God' is explainable purely in terms of human psychological 
traits such as projection and autosuggestion. 'The power of God' is then 
called into question, and if God has no power, then there is no God, and 
humanity is indeed alone in the universe. What theologian wants to face 
that possibility? 
Something else which restrains many from asking the question is the 
uncomfortable intuition that the question itself stems from at least 
partial unbelief. <As Troeltsch observed, invisible psychological miracles 
are something of a last bastion for transcendence [Troeltsch, The 
Absoluteness of Christianity, p.60J.) Only those who are unsure that God's 
power is at work in the world are likely to press for reassurance by 
enquiring as to precisely how it is at work. If the world were 
experienced as a place where God's sovereign creative and redemptive power 
was the obvious, natural backcloth to existence, such a question would 
probably be unnecessary or of only the mildest academic interest. The 
question has existential interest for us because we inhabit a world where 
divine power seems weak, erratic or absent, and other powers hold sway. 
The believer or would-be believer confronts the tradition's proclamation of 
the sovereign power of God with, 'I want to believe this, and I have an 
instinct that this is true, but in the face of all the evidence to the 
contrary, how can this be so?' 
Harnack's work had, and perhaps still has, much to offer such a person 
because his own faith and thought appear to have been formed by such 
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questions. His own spiritual pilgrimage, as it appears in Vom inwendi~ 
Leben, was not characterised by any frequent immediate sense of divine 
presence and power. He did. not stand on the mountaintop instructing 
lesser mortals. He shared the world which seems to offer so much evidence 
of the divine absence. Yet he found a faith, an explanation of divine 
power so satisfying as to enable a lifetime of cheerfulness, immense 
productivity and resilience in the face of massive change and considerable 
suffering. He could not be classed as a Christian existentialist, for his 
writings, the solutions to the problems he raises, still carry about them 
the tone of a nineteenth-century assured optimism, but behind the 
confident answers one senses the questions themselves to which he 
dedicated his apologetic--about the apparent absence of God, the brutality 
of nature, about finitude and mortality--to be approaching the questions 
of existentialism. Non-Christians were of course already asking the 
questions openly, but most Christians were still hiding from them. 
Harnack's value lies in the fact that he made an attempt at an answer from 
within a comparatively orthodox Christianity. 
2.e. Power terms in Harnack's usage 
Harnack did not develop any particularly specialised or arcane vocabulary 
for discussing power, and neither did he lay out in any formal way a 
typology of the different kinds of power, but in the interests of clarity 
some attention needs to be paid both to his terminology and to the 
unarticulated typology of power which undergirds his thought. 
Inner power: external power 
When Harnack writes of 'spiritual power' or 'the power of the gospel', the 
words he uses are not normally Macht or Herrschaft, but Kraft or Ernst. 
This in itself is an indicator that the kind of power under discussion is 
something other than what is usually discussed in sociology or politics. 
Mention has already been made of a fissure in Harnack's thought about 
power between the divine and the human, the sacred and the secular, but 
this divide must be seen in the context of Harnack's larger categorisations 
of power. The primary dichotomy in Harnack 0s thought about power lies 
between inner and external power. Inner power refers to power originating 
in and operating in the first instance within the individual consciousness. 
This is what Harnack terms spiritual power, and the term carries the full 
wealth of meanings which the adjective geistlich suggests. In its broadest 
usage, it refers to all of the 'higher' powers which can be generated 
within the human consciousness, intellectual, aesthetic and ethical as well 
as religious. Often it appears to carry a more specifically religious 
meaning, as in the oft-repeated phrase, die ~eistliche Kraft dP.s 
Evangeliums. though we should always bear in mind that Harnack did not on 
the whole compartmentalise human consciousness and felt there to be the 
closest relation between the geistig and the geistlich. 
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Harnack locates the operation of divine power, though not the subject of 
divine power, firmly within the category of inwardness. God for Harnack is 
still 'out there', a concrete external referent for the cosmos and the Lord 
of history, but as shall be demonstrated in chapter five, God's activity in 
the world does not break in from outside in miracles and supernatural 
occurences. Rather it works from within the consciousness of inspired 
individuals. Thus the term geistliche Kraft also carries the sense of an 
inner power of divine origin or inspiration. The Holy Spirit was of much 
concern to Harnack, though not at a dogmatic level. The term refers to 
the divine power as active in the world. He identifies the Holy Spirit 
with the idealist Geist which is shaping history. For Harnack the dual 
meaning of spirit and Spirit suggests a guiding principle of his 
anthropology, which stresses the affinity of the human to the divine 
rather than its separation. Kaltenborn, while fully acknowledging that 
Harnack always means to speak of 'Holy Spirit', holds that in the end, in a 
parallel to his Jesuanismus [see ch. 4 below], he identifies the divine and 
the human spirit [Kaltenborn, p.64l. This is of course a problem if one 
ascribes to Harnack the belief that the Spirit of God is nothing but a 
projection from or collective symbol of the human spirit. However, that is 
not Harnack's perspective. Rather than bring God down, he raises humanity 
up in holding that the human spirit is akin to the divine and is a 
channel-· -perhaps the channel-for the divine. In his work geistliche 
Kraft and gtlttliche Kraft shade into one another, and in both cases the 
sphere of operations lies initially within the consciousness of the 
individual. Often in this thesis the duality implied in these terms will 
be articulated in the expression 'divine/spiritual power'. 
Contrasted to inner power is external power, powers operative upon or 
between individuals. In this category would come the actual physical 
forces of nature and the more conceptual 'laws' of Harnack's observation 
concerning decay, entropy, and the survival of the fittest. Also in this 
category, though Harnack but dimly perceived, at least at a theoretical 
level what Weber would make so clear, is the non-personal organisational 
power of institutions. But the most important and most problematic of the 
powers Harnack delineates as external are the human social powers, the 
interpersonal and inter-group relations which make up the field of study 
of sociology and politics. They are the most important to Harnack because 
they are the powers which, next to inner power, most directly concern 
religion. They are the most problematic of the external powers because 
while the others in this grouping may arguably be said to originate 
outside of the consciousness of the individual, the relation between 
intrapersonal and interpersonal power in the church is more complex. But 
as we shall see, particularly in chapter six, he makes the distinction 
between these two types of power-the inner power of the gospel and the 
external powers of tradition, authority and dogma-fundamental to his 
analysis of Christian history. 
Of the external social powers, Harnack, to employ Wrong's typology, while 
dealing competently with the social relations characterised by coercion, 
manipulation and inducement <like the military and secular politics of the 
Roman empire), is primarily concerned with the types of power by which the 
early church initially spread and then became an institution, namely the 
powers of persuasion and authority. Mission und Ausbreitung especially 
makes the attempt to explain why the Christian message was so persuasive, 
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where Do_gmengeschichte focusses more on the evolution within the church 
of increasingly powerful forms of authority. 
Power as 'power over': 'Nature' 
In the 'zero-sum' debate, the question is raised as to whether conflict is 
intrinsic to the concept of power. Harnack would not identify power over 
others as being essential to a definition of divine/spiritual power, but 
his doctrine of the liberating power of the gospel includes as an intrinsic 
part the power over the dark forces of created existence itself, which he, 
with Ritschl, terms the power of nature. It stands in contrast to the 
Wordsworthian view of the natural world of the English tradition. The 
Judaeo-Christian teaching of the essential goodness of creation, however, 
is not in dispute. 'Nature', rather, is Harnack's shorthand for futility, 
corruption, inexorable necessity, sin, selfishness and death. He speaks of 
nature as something to be faced, endured and in some sense overcome by 
the strength of the inner spirit. He opposes to the apparent chaos, 
meaninglessness and mortality of. existence a gospel of order, transcendent 
meaning and hope [see 'Christus als ErHSser' in R&A nf.2, pp.Bl-93; WC? 
p.62/DW p.41, WC? pp. 26-301. Glick suggests that the nature/spirit 
dichotomy was important to Ritschl and Harnack because of "the flourishing 
materialism of the time" which had eroded the sense of the uniqueness and 
worth of humanity [Reality, p.51l. 
Harnack's conception of 'nature' and 'the world' is at its starkest and 
clearest in Marcion. Towards the end of the book he offers a 
demythologised interpretation of Marcion's fundamental outlook [Marcion 
pp.257-261 l, which he expressly endorses as being valid, both in Marcion's 
time and now, though he also appends important qualifying criticisms to it 
[ibid. pp. 261, 264-2651. The reason for Harnack's negativity towards 
'nature' and 'the world' also appears with unusual clarity in Marcion. It 
is rooted in the problem of theodicy, which in this case is framed in 
terms of the question of how one can face the world as it really is and at 
the same time affirm the goodness of the God who is the creator of this 
world [ibid. p.261J. Harnack's answer, which he shares with Marcion, is 
that one can't. Marcion resolves the problem of theodicy by postulating 
two Gods, which Harnack has no desire to do. Harnack's route towards a 
solution is to make very clear the separation of God from the world, and 
to emphasise the Fremdheit and Neuheit of the gospel. 
Two meditations written during the war years which appear in A Scholar's 
Testament <Vom inwendigen Leben>, suffice to illustrate his position. The 
first opens with Harnack's definition of evil: 
" 'Evil' means the habit of regarding oneself and other people simply 
as part of nature, or of the material world which will pass away and 
perish, and the habit of arranging one's life in accordance with these 
ideas. 'Good', on the other hand, means regarding oneself and other 
people as the children of God, and living our lives in accordance with 
this belief. Those who follow after evil use everything-even 
people, both those whom they love most and those for whom they have 
a passing attraction, only as a means to increase their earthly 
pleasure: exactly in the same way as all other forms of life ... The 
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followers of the good, on the other hand, transmute all their 
experiences of life into spiritual nourishment; that is, in whatever 
circumstances they may be placed by the providence of God, they try 
to make themselves at home in them, knowing that these also are 'the 
Father's House' ... A child of God, or a part of the process of 
Nature?--those who do not feel the pain of this contrast, and feel it 
constantly, can never be set free from it. But once we have felt 
this in the depths of our soul, it is impossible to take either a 
superficial or a despairing view of life again-to feel ourselves 
simply part of that which is doomed to perish-no, we now possess a 
stimulus which spurs us on, driving us ever forward and upward. And 
this stililulus ... leads finally to this result: the soul becomes 
stronger, the conscience more tender, the mind purer, the whole 
person happier. Finally-and this is the most beautiful thing of 
all--gradually a kind of reconciliation is effected between the soul 
and Nature, and the very soul which has thus been strengthened can 
rejoice like a child-and indeed like a child of God--in Nature-both 
in the beauty of all created things and in the use of his own natural 
faculties-because now he knows how to control them aright and 
because he knows he is stronger than they are" [ST pp.6fJ. 
The second meditation addresses more directly the question of 
meaninglessness: 
"Some tell us that reality must be identified with nature, glorious 
but non-moral, nature, with its outward and inward power over us; all 
else is deceptive illusion; hence the one thing we have to do is 
simply to bow and serve: even though finally we wither away like a 
leaf, still we shall have lived and loved, and this is wisdom and the 
ultimate wisdom. Others, however, say; reality is pain and death; for, 
they say, these forces are always stronger than life ... Each individual 
life is still dedicated to death, which throws its shadow ahead of us 
in pain and sorrow from birth onwards; -to admit this is wisdom and 
the final wisdom. But then we hear a voice from above saying, "I am 
that I am; I am the Real, thy Lord and thy Redeemer; thou belongest 
to Me! I live and thou shalt live also: for both are Mine, Nature and 
Death" [sr pp.68fJ. 
In Harnack's view it is Jesus who makes it possible for us to hear and 
believe this voice from above, to be liberated from the grasp of nature. 
Harnack writes that without Jesus, " ... We would have remained plunged in 
weakness and darkness, unconscious like a sick butterfly in the chrysalis, 
if He had not shown us the power and the love of the Father, and if He 
had not Himself broken through from death unto life" [ibid.]. 
Power as 'power to': power eQuals ener~y 
Harnack once described the history of human development as the progressive 
objectification <Ob1ektivierung> of the spirit <Geist) and the progressive 
domination <Baherrschun~> of matter ['Die Sicherheit und Grenzen 
geschichtlicher Erkenntnis' in R&A nf.4, p.3l. The latter negative, 
conflictual side of Harnack's understanding of spiritual power is, as we 
have seen, the power to overcome 'nature'. Its positive, constructive side 
is the power to effect this Ob1ektivierun~ des Geistes. Divine/spiritual 
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power for Harnack is primarily creative, the power-to-do: even its 
conflictual overcoming of 'nature' is accomplished by creating hope, trust, 
certainty and joy. Kraft and Energie are often used synonymously to 
describe this creative power. In a meditation on John 16: 12,14 Harnack 
notes that John knows that he, " ... possesses the Spirit of Truth as the 
legacy of Jesus, as a mighty, living and inexhaustible source of energy and 
power, from which he can draw all he needs to meet his difficulties and 
necessities in thought and in life" [ST p.179J. In an essay on Goethe 0s 
famous remark that the Christian religion has nothing to do with 
philosophy, is high above all philosophy and needs no support from it, 
Harnack develops the energy theme further. He says that Goethe's words 
mean: 
" ... first of all, that we ought not to measure the Christian religion 
by knowledge at all, but that we ought to regard it as an energy, and 
secondly, that-just because it is an independent entity-it 
possesses an independent energy of its own ... As an energy philosophy 
cannot compare with the Christian religion, says Goethe in his old 
age, that is, in its influence on character and will. Character and 
will, however, determine life, for they are the fundamental forms of 
life" [ST pp.222f1. 
Goethe sees the revelation of the 'peculiar energy of Christianity' in the 
fact that: 
" ... through its aid, times without number, fallen and suffering 
humanity has been raised to a higher level... The nature and the 
power of the Christian religion is not fully defined when it is thus 
described as the support of those who need to be lifted and set on 
their feet; for it is far more than a support, even a living and 
active support, and it is not merely a message for the lost and 
suffering, for it remains their light and their strength when they 
have been lifted out of the depths into the higher places of faith ... " 
[ibid. pp.223-224; see also Phillip Rieff's introduction to Outlines, 
<uru1umbered) p.19]. 
Die Kraft des Evangeliums could perhaps be equally well translated as 'the 
energy of the gospel'. Divine energy captures Harnack's sense of the 
activity and purposiveness of God in the world and leaves aside what 
Harnack most clearly wanted left aside, namely an idea of God's power as 
that of a despot 1 • For, as we shall see, the character of God is the 
central issue in Harnack's theology-when that is rightly understood, all 
else flows from it. The purpose of the cross and, in Harnack's view, the 
method of the atonement was to change the mind of sinners about the 
character of God. Their radical mistrust decrees that they can only 
imagine a God of terror: the cross instead reveals to them a loving, 
forgiving Father and the power paradox of divinity in humility and 
suffering [see chapter 4 below]. Instead of a coercive God, exercising 
power upon us, Harnack's gospel reveals the empowering God, liberating and 
filling us with creative energy. 
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2.f. Selecting the appropriate questions 
Having looked at Harnack's terminology for the discussion of power, t:Je 
must now fraiDe more precisely the questions about power which form the 
nucleus of our investigation. The question which initially led to the 
pursuit of this study, and which has been narrowed down in order to focus 
specifically on Harnack, could be phrased: 'What evidence is there in the 
work of Christian thinkers down the ages for the hypothesis that there is 
an unchanging essence of Christianity, and that it is concerned with the 
inner empowering of individuals?' Inherent in this question are a number 
of related power questions, some of which have already formed a part of 
our discussion. The religious interest which motivates the investigation 
also limits and defines the questions to be addressed. Chief among these 
related questions are: 
1. Why have nineteenth and twentieth-century social scientists and 
theologians been strongly concerned with the subject of power? What is it 
in these centuries which makes power such a compelling subject? 
2. Is the very use of the word 'power' a case of reification? Is power a 
thing-in-itself, a property, or is the word merely a conventional shorthand 
denoting social relations directed towards goal-attainment? 
3. Assuming the existence of the God of Judea-Christian understanding-i.e. 
one of unlimited power <the Lord God Almighty)-is this divine power 
similar to or different from the power we see exercised in human 
societies? Are they related as superior to inferior, as antitheses, as 
points on a continuum, as basically similar, or even indistinguishable? 
4. Part of the Judea-Christian understanding of divine power is that it 
effects and empowers human beings. How does one categorise the power in 
human beings thus derived? Is it now human, or still divine? What is 
spirit and what is Spirit? 
5. By what process is the individual empowered by this divine power? What 
is the effect upon the individual's experience? 
6. What is it in the human psyche which makes the exercise of power of 
whatever kind such a heady, joyful and even addictive experience? Why is 
there apparently a bias, at least in western civilisation, towards seeking 
power, even for its own sake, making the means of goal-attainment an end 
in itself? 
7. If it is similar enough to human power to be termed power, how comes it 
that this allegedly divine and unlimited power is so little in evidence in 
our world? Is it a matter of point of view only? Is modern 
secularisation alone responsible for the fact that, as Berger puts it, 8e 
are living in a situation in which the 'gods have receded' [Berger, p.96J, or 
is the conundrum of the affirmation of divine power in the face of 
frequent 'absences' of that power a more universal problem, and not only a 
product of our particular Weltanschauung? 
8. Have the power elements of individual human psychology and human 
groups always been the same or have they altered with time? Are we in a 
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position to mean the same thing by 'the power of God' as Moses or Jesus or 
Luther did? 
Given Harnack's interest in particular kinds of power and his historical 
and ideological location, only some of these questions can appropriately be 
put to him. · Some of the questions formed part of Harnack's own agenda, 
while others have emerged from the 'dialogue' between my concerns and 
those which are inherent in the Harnackean corpus. 
Some suggestions for an answer to question one have been made in 2.c. 
above. We may ask the question directly to Harnack to the extent of 
enquiring why he chose to make power a chief, if not the chief, explicatory 
device for describing his understanding of the essence of Christianity. 
One would expect no clear answer to question two from Harnack, as the 
social science which could challenge the notion of 'power' as a property or 
as an idea in the idealist sense was only just gaining momentum and 
Harnack was largely untouched by it. 
The third question is certainly within his province. And if the clarity of 
his answer at a theoretical level is not all that we might hope for, the 
value of his historical documentation of one particular aspect of the 
question-namely that of the types of power operative in the church-is 
ample compensation. A very central question for Harnack is to what extent 
the church is a human community governed by and explicable in terms of 
ordinary historical, psychological and sociological 'laws• and to what 
extent it is the creation and vehicle of divine power for divine purposes. 
Questions four and five are also fundamental to Harnack's power concerns 
and most of this investigation is taken up with establishing and 
evaluating his answers. With regard to Harnack we need to phrase question 
five as, 'Given the reality of the iron ring [see below], how does spiritual 
power, the empowering energy rooted in the divine, break through into 
individual human existence, and what is its effect upon that existence?' 
Question six does not appear to be directly addressed by Harnack. He 
simply accepts the proneness to misuse power as being part of the human 
condition, afflicted as it is by 'nature', and from which the church is in 
no way exempt. The question of why this is so comes rather later than 
Harnack and is predicated upon at least a partial rejection of the rather 
undifferentiated answer of Christian tradition, namely sin, to which 
Harnack would still give allegiance. 
Question seven provides one of the chief motivations for Harnack's 
apologetic. In the Germany of his day the Christian faithful, conservative 
and liberal alike, were appalled by the falling away from the faith both of 
the masses and of the cultured in the grip of a new-found secularism and 
an atheistic socialism. Whether or not the problem of the perceived 
absence of the power of God is older than secularisation, it was a burning 
issue in Harnack's time. Harnack accepts many of the prime tenets of 
modern consciousness, including its disbelief in the incursions of 
transcendent power into mundane reality in the form of miracles or 
ecschatology (see ch. 5 below]. The question, 'Given the improbability of 
the mythological view of Christian tradition, how can a fully modern 
individual also affirm the power of the Father of Jesus Christ?' is the 
question underlying all his apologetic work. 
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Question eight is not one which Harnack possessed the theoretical tools to 
easily address, and what is perhaps a central concern for a later 
generation must not expect to find an answer here. Harnack, as most 
thinkers of his time, assumed a fairly direct continuity of the human 
condition, t:-.~hich would allow Moses, Jesus and Luther to speak to modern 
individuals with a clarity nearing that with which they addressed those of 
their own time. Schweitzer's stirring words at the end of The Quest of 
the Historical Jesus [London, A.& C. Black, 19101 about the alienness of 
Christ may be prophetic of the opening up of this problem. 
Using the letter to Stinzing and 'Die Sicherheit und Grenzen 
geschichtlicher Erkenntnis', already referred to, as typical, we may also 
frame Harnack's power questions as from his own mouth. What he proposes 
is this: 'Despite the contempt and indifference of many, it is my conviction 
that all the problems and conflicts of life eventually find their issue in 
the realm of religion. Given that Christianity is not one religion among 
many, but religion itself, and given that all phenomena of history should 
be analysed in terms of the powers operative in them, the direct ion of 
these powers and their effect, what is the power CKraft) of Christianity? 
In what direction does it move, and what does it achieve?' Since for 
Harnack religion ultimately concerns "God and the soul; the soul and its 
God", one may expect Harnack's answers to address themselves primarily to 
the level of the individual. But as a church historian Harnack carries the 
question further, asking how did the divine/spiritual power of the gospel 
fare within the history of the church? Did it triumph? Was it 
extinguished or so badly corrupted as to be of no effect? What has been 
its relationship with official dogma? Has it been accessible to the 
ordinary believer in every age? And what is the state of things today? 
Out of this dialogue emerge the questions about power which are addressed 
in this thesis. Briefly they are: 
1. How does one affirm the divine J;>OWer while acknowledging the frequent 
if not habitual absence of clear evidence of that power? Assuming the 
improbability of the mythological view of power traditionally held in 
Christianity, how can the fully modern individual affirm the tradition of 
the power of God? 
2. Given the fact of the iron ring (i.e. Harnack's epistemological 
conviction that "Man cannot transcend his psychological endowment: an iron 
ring incloses him" [HD I, p.340)), how does divine power energise the human, 
as it so clearly has done throughout the Christian centuries? 
3. If the iron ring is a fact and the mythological view of divine/spiritual 
power is improbable, how does one account for miracles, for supernatural 
events and eschatological hopes. and understand the meaning of sacraments? 
4. How have divine and human power interacted in the history of the 
church? To what extent has the church proved itself to be a human 
community whose powers are governed by and explicable in terms of 
historical, psychological and sociological laws and to what extent is it a 
creation and vehicle of divine power for divine purposes? 
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2. In Peale's writings the supernatural referent is neither absent 
from his writings nor is it reduced to a formalistic acknowledgement. 
His focus certainly is on the way the power of God affects the li~es 
of individuals and he deliberately couches his books in non-religious, 
non-theological language, but he never reduces 'the power of God' to 
being nothing but 'the power of positive thinking'. On the contrary, 
the reason Peale's methods of positive thinking <which have clear 
antecedents in classical Christian spirituality> are effective is 
because they are methods of thinking about and immersing oneself in 
the power of God. The focus on religious experience and the retention 
of the supernatural/true-transcendent referent in Peale make it more 
reasonable to bracket him among practitioners of the third, inductive 
strategy. 
3. Berger repeatedly reminds us that religious experience is sel {-
authenticating at the time, but the authentication fades over time and 
when the experience is known only at second hand. This variant of the 
inductive strategy posits the repeated availability of that kind of 
authentication, and not just for a few spiritual virtuosi, but 
potentially for all Christians. Because there is less emphasis on 
argument and interpretation in such writers and more on biography, and 
because of the aberrations to which the quest for direct experience 
has frequently given rise, such an approach is often not accepted as a 
serious theological option: yet the existence and widespread influence 
in the churches of this approach to spiritual power should render it 
worthy of serious study. 
2. e. Power terms in Harnack's usa~e 
1. There are some similarities of emphasis between Harnack's view and 
the Eastern Orthodox doctrine of the 'uncreated energies' of God. 
This resolves the paradox of the inaccessibility and accessibility of 
God by stating that while God's essence or nature is unknowable and 
incommunicable, God is knowable and communicating through the energies 
<ouva~£t~), divine powers and operations which proceed forth from the 
divine essence. Other metaphors for it are 'uncreated light', 
'glory', and 'grace'. It is the way in which God communicates with, 
indwells and deifies us, a nat ural procession from the essence of the 
Trinity, larger than the western conception of grace which focusses 
upon causality and will. God's will created all things by the 
energies in order that created being may accede freely to union with 
God in the same energies [Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of 
the Eastern Church, London, James Clarke & Co., 1957, pp.67-69J. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE POWER OF GOD AT WORK IN THE WORLD 
3.a. Affirming the power of God in the modern situation 
i. Evidence of Harnack's inductive approach 
It has been suggested above (ch. 2.bJ that Harnack's strategy for the 
affirmation of the Christian tradition in the face of modern religious 
pluralism was an inductive one, one of tracing the elements of the 
tradition back to the core experiences which gave rise to them [see e.g. 
Marcion, p.136; 'Die Neuheit des Evangeliums nach Marcion', R&A Werk. p.134J. 
An examination of particular instances of this will help to substantiate 
the claim. 
Harnack's discussion of Jesus as the Messiah aptly demonstrates this 
approach. He begins by establishing that the concept in question is indeed 
an historical one, arguing that, contrary to the view of Wellhausen and 
others, Jesus did indeed consider himself to be the Messiah £WC? p.l30J. 
He then notes that the· concept is strange to us, but not entirely 
impossible to understand (WC? p.140J. Then he describes what the concept 
'messiah' had meant in Jewish religious history, how it had developed, and 
what it signified in the time of Jesus, i.e., to the early, simpler hopes of 
a glorious future for Israel through a great king empowered by God had 
been added ideas of Messiah as a supernatural figure, judging Israel as 
well as the nations, the perfectly just man who fulfils all the 
commandments. In Jesus' time, " ... there was a surging chaos of disparate 
feeling, as well as of contradictory theory ... " [WC? p.135J. The concept of 
Messiah was flexible, and where moral and religious elements were strong, 
the image of a warlike ruler was replaced by that of a prophet. 
Harnack goes on to explain what the concept achieved, and why it was 
'necessary'-the fact that it gained for Jesus absolute recognition within 
Jewish religious history, which, as the future was to show, is the true 
religious history of all mankind. He then states that once it had achieved 
this end, its work was done; that Jesus left the concept far behind, 
putting a meaning on it which was too much for it to bear (WC? p.141/DW 
p.88l. 
Harnack then describes what in the concept is useful and meaningful in our 
own day. We see in the concept of Messiah the hope for a golden age, 
which, when moralised, is the goal of every vigorous movement in human 
life. The idea of a personal Messiah shows that it is persons who form 
the saving element in history, and the idea of Messiah as a kingly ruler 
shows that, " ... if a union of mankind is ever to come about by their 
deepest forces and highest aims being brought into accord, this same 
mankind must agree to acknowledge one lord and master" [WC? p.142/DW 
p.90l. 
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Finally, having declared what, in his opinion, the concept 'messiah' can 
signify for us, Harnack shuts the door on any more literal or supernatural 
interpretation, saying that over and above what he has described no othef" 
meaning or value can any longer be attached to it ["Aber darUber hinaus 
vermBgen wir der messianischen Idee einen Sinn und eine Geltung nicht mehr 
zu geben; Jesus Selbst hat ihr genommen", WC? p.l42/DW p.90J. 
This pat tern of reinterpretation-uncovering the historical roots of 6l 
concept and the core emotion and experience which it embodies, describing 
the ideas's contextual meaning and its development, determining what it 
achieved or why it was necessary, discussing what it can still mean for us 
today-is one that Harnack uses, with some variation and abridgement, for 
many concepts. Other examples are: 
a. He understands Jesus' claim to be the Son of God as having to do with 
knowledge of God. Jesus was convinced that he knew God in a way no one 
ever knew him before, and that his vocation was to communicate this 
knowledge CWC? p.124-129J. 
b. He explains the phenomenon of demon possession as a form of mental 
illness, rare but not extinct today, which is best dealt with by the 
influence of a strong personality [WC? p.58; see also ch.5.J. 
c. In describing the eschatological pronouncements of John the Baptist, 
Harnack explains them inductively. History shows, he says, that whenever a 
man earnestly and out of . his own experience points others to God, it 
always takes the form of announcing that the end is at hand. This happens 
for two reasons: because the prophet knows that without religion the 
search for meaning is bound to go hopelessly astray and he sees with 
dismay the irrevocable end for the indifferent many; and because the 
prophet is so horrified by evil that he is astonished that God's wrath has 
not yet fallen, and so feels the time to be very near (WC? p.41/DW p.26J. 
d. As shall be demonstrated in chapter four, Harnack's sections in What is 
Christianity? on the death of Christ for sin and on the resurrection offer 
further examples of his practice of reinterpreting traditional concepts 
according to the underlying experience [WC? p.155/DW p.98J. 
One of the strongest pieces of evidence for the fact that Harnack's gospel 
was in the end conceived not in propositions but in terms of experiences 
can be derived from the fact that the verbal definitions of the essence of 
Christianity which appear in his many works are extremely varied. Glick 
complains that Harnack offers too many, that the definitions vary too much, 
and that none of them is really adequate to express what Harnack seems to 
mean by 'the gospel' [Reality, pp.l44-14 71. Bearing in mind, however, that 
Harnack was an articulate scholar capable of exact expression, and that the 
subject of the gospel was of the keenest importance to him, we must seek 
an explanation for this variety and alleged inadequacy in something other 
than wooliness or carelessness. The conclusion which suggests itself is 
that to atteropt to answer the question, 'what does Harnack mean by the 
gospel?' by adopting or 'boiling down' any of his many definitions is to 
miss the point. For Harnack, the gospel resided in no creed but in an 
inner experience, the experience of being a child of God. The 'articles' of 
the gospel message such as the Fatherhood of God, the forgiveness of sins, 
- 72-
and the eternal worth of the human soul ere 'gospel' precisely because 
they have the power to induce this experience, to overcome the forces of 
'the world' and bring trapped and burdened humanity into the glorious 
liberty of the children of God . 
The language of 'experience' <Erfahrung. Erlebnis. Lebenserfarhung> contains 
perhaps almost as many pit falls as the language of power. The most 
serious one is the danger of imprecision, but, like power-language, 
experience-language can still be of service provided its sense is carefully 
determined. Instead of 'the experience of divine/spiritual power', one 
could speak of existential encounter or receptivity, or of the individual 
being capacitated by the divine. One needs to overcome the rather static 
quality of the word 'experience' in English. What is meant by an 
'experience of divine/spiritual power' is not a mere sense of the numinous 
or a warm bath of sentiment, but an empowering and a transformation: one 
does not encounter the divine and remain unchanged. 
11. The iron ringi limitations on the sources for evidence of divine power 
The first of the four questions proposed in chapter two is that of how to 
affirm the divine power while ackowledging the widespread absence of clear 
evidence of that power. The question· is put within the assumption which 
Harnack, in line with modern consciousness, makes that the traditional 
Christian mythological view of power is unlikely to be true, and that it is 
at the least, for us, inadmissable. Harnack makes . this assumption on the 
basis of his epistemology, encapsulated in the metaphor of the iron ring. 
This conviction about the limitations of the human ability to know governs 
Harnack's treatment of all religious phenomena. His theology indeed may be 
read as an attempt to work out the significance of the gospel from 
strictly within the iron ring. 
Following Ritschl, who reintroduced Kant as the paramount philosopher for 
protestants 1 , Harnack stands with Luther and Kant in accepting rather than 
challenging the limitedness of the human capacity for knowledge of the 
divine [see Ward, p.34l. Luther would know God only as revealed in Christ: 
Kant secularised this and made it an epistemological principle governing 
human access to the knowledge of ultimate reality, inculcating a radical 
scepticism about our ability to know things-in-themselves. Harnack 
embraced this conviction, and conducted his theology accordingly. This 
conviction undergirds his abhorrence of metaphysical speculation as a 
dangerous delusion and distraction. Any theology rooted in the notion of 
'being' earns his scorn: he writes with distaste of " ... that hollow figment, 
-ro 6v," UID III p.l37J, and the two-nature christology based upon it which 
led generations astray from the real Jesus. This conviction also lies 
behind his writing-off of all mysticism as baseless CHD I p.140J, and is 
the reason why Harnack's theology proceeds von unten: for human history is 
the only possible source for a knowledge, and a mediated knowledge at 
that, of the divine. 
How strictly does Harnack intend his proposition that 'man cannot transcend 
his psychological endowment • to be taken? Clearly the religious core-
experiences to which he seeks to trace religious dogmas occur within the 
iron ring of human psychology: but unless divine reality is to be 
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identified as a world-soul, in order to be religious experiences they must 
have a referent outside it. If they do not, then Harnack's inductive 
approach to the tradition becomes in fact reduction. How does Harnack 
hold together his commitment to remain within the iron ring and his need 
for a transcendent referent? His approach is to infer the reality of the 
divine referent, which he cannot prove, on the basis of the many pointers 
to it which he finds in history and human experience. 
Rumscheidt objects to Harnack's commitment to the principle of the iron 
ring, repeating Barth's accusation that Harnack turns 'thus saith the Lord' 
into 'thus hears man' (Rumscheidt, p.l89l. The concern, no doubt, is that 
such an attitude means that Harnack cannot treat the divine partner in the 
communication with due seriousness, but this is in no way a necessary 
implication from Harnack's recognition of the ineluctable fact that the 
voice of God reaches us only through human ears (see ibid. p. 71 J. The 
image Rumscheidt uses to describe Harnack's view, that of the positivist's 
confident assumption of final knowledge, is further contradicted by his 
reverence for divine mystery [see 2.d. above]. Harnack's commitment to the 
iron ring led him to refrain on the whole from talking in Ist-sMtze. He 
maintained a dogged loyalty to his view of epistemological truth, and, in 
spite of his personal piety, accepted the 'agnosticism' which it implied 
[ ibid.J. What we can and do possess, Harnack maintains, are references and 
pointers to God's reality throughout the course of history which is, after 
all, under the control of the Spirit of God, and we have supremely the 
revelation of God in Jesus: but this is of God pro nobis, not God in sich2 • 
The iron ring has the most profound consequences for Harnack's treatment 
of Jesus. It led him to abandon the ideas of pre-existence and the 
classical formulations of the Trinity and of the Logos: 
"The life of Jesus contains tensions for which we do not possess 
historical analogies. A scientific person can and should not use any 
other formulation. It was a solely human life, and yet the faith 
learned from him divine power and divine wisdom. That is the only 
possible formulation. One falls helplessly into Docetism or into the 
two-nature doctrine if one formulates the question in any other way. 
If Jesus had the consciousness as no other <and no other after him 
was able to or could have it>, that he was the Son of God, then he 
had this within a completely human consciousness" CAZH p.247; Glick's 
translation: Reality. p.184J. 
The consequences of acceptance of the limitations of the iron ring for a 
study of divine/spiritual power are that the existence of that power 
cannot be deduced from speculative principles or the unsupported authority 
of tradition, but must be inferred from the evidence of human religious 
experience in history. 
iii. The evidence for divine power is there. in history and in personality 
Despite his at.tareness of living in a time in which 'the gods have receded', 
Harnack was confident that history and present experience furnished ample 
evidence for the inference of divine power. 
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In order adequately to grasp the significance of Harnack's statements 
about divine/spritual power in history, one needs to be aware of how 
deeply rooted in his historical thinking was the idea of conflicting and 
interacting powers. Evidence is to be found in 'Uber die ,Vorzeichen" der 
in der Geschichte wirksamen Kr1:ifte', written in 1905 [R&A nf.l, pp.165-167J. 
Vorzeichen is used in the mathematical sense, indicating 'plus' or 'minus' 
value. Harnack's point is that the active forces of history-his examples 
include socialism and individualism, cosmopolitanism and naturalism, free 
trade and protectionism, population explosion and 'malthusianism', humanism 
and realism-are themselves characterless: they acquire positive or 
negative value from the momentary situation of the historical whole on and 
in which they work. All these things he describes as Krlifte whose value-
signs are determined by the whole system of shifting, moving forces, and 
argues that anyone who wants to affect the future must first of all be 
aware of all the elements of the current relationships of change 
<Wechselverh/Htnisse>. Thus we see that Harnack expresses the dynamism of 
history in terms of varieties of power, stressing their complex and 
constantly shifting patterns of interaction and their moral neutrality. 
The one except ion he makes is for the clearly spiritual powers of goodwill 
and humanity, which always carry a positive value [ibid.l. 
As one would expect, spiritual power themes come to the fore in Harnack's 
treatment of Christian history. In the summary sketch with which he 
concludes History of Dogma the theme of the gospel as divine/spiritual 
power evident and operating in history is unmistakable. The entire 
summary has been reproduced, in order to not to distort the frequency with 
which power themes appear, and I have underlined words connected with 
divine/spiritual power: 
'~he Gospel entered into the world, not as a doctrine, but as a 1oyful 
message and as a power of the Spirit of God, originally in the forms 
of Judaism. It stripped off these forms with amazing rapidity, and 
united and amalgamated itself with Greek science, the Roman Empire 
and ancient culture, developing, as a counterpoise to this, 
renunciation of the world and the striving after supernatural life, 
after deification. All this was summed up in the old dogma and in 
dogmatic Christianity. Augustine reduced the value of this dogmatic 
structure, made it subservient to a purer and more living conception 
of religion, but yet finally left it standing so far as its 
foundations and aim were concerned. Under his direction there began 
in the Middle Ages, from the 11th century, an astonishing course of 
labour; the retrograde steps are to a large extent only apparent, or 
are ·at least counter-balanced by great steps of progress. But no 
satisfying goal is reached; side by side with dogma. and partly in 
opposition to it, exists a practical piety and religious self-
criticism. which points at the same time forwards and backwards-to 
the Gospel. but ever the more threatens to vanish amid unrest and 
languor. An §J>pallingly powerful ecclesiasticism is taking shape, 
which has already long held in its possession the stolid and 
indifferent, and takes control of the means whereby the restless may 
be soothed and the weary gathered in. Dogma assumes a r~id aspect; 
it is elastic only in the hand of political priests; and it is seen to 
have degenerated into sophistry; faith takes its flight from it, and 
leaves the old structure to the guardians of the Church. Then 
- 75-
appeared Luther, to restore the 'doctrine', on which no one any longer 
had an inward reliance. But the doctrine which he restored was the 
Gospel as a glad message and as a power of God. 
That this was what it was, he also pronounced to be the chief, nay 
the only, principle of theology. What the Gospel is must be 
ascertained from Holy Scripture; ih§_power of God cannot be construed 
by thought, it must be experienced: the faith in God as the Father of 
Jesus Christ, which answers to this power, cannot be enticed forth by 
reason or authority; it must become a part of one's life; all that is 
not born of faith is alien to the Christ ian religion and therefore 
also to Christian theology-all philosophy, as well as all asceticism. 
Matthew XI:27 is the basis of faith and of theology. In giving 
effect to these thoughts, Luther, the most conservative of men, 
shattered the ancient church and set a goal to the history of dogma. 
That history has found its goal in a return to the Gospel. He did 
not in this way hand over something complete and finished to 
Christendom, but set before it a problem, to be developed out of many 
encumbering surroundings, to be continuously dealt with in 
connnection with the entire life of the spirit and with the social 
condition of mankind, but to be solved only in faith itself. 
Christendom must constantly go on to learn, that even in religion the 
simplest thing is the most difficult. and that everything that is a 
burden upon religion quenches its seriousness <'a Christian man's 
business is not to talk grandly about dogmas, but to be always doing 
arduous and great things in fellowship with God'-Zwingli>. 
Therefore the goal of all Christian work, even of all theological 
work, can only be this-to discern even more distinctly the 
simplicity and the seriousness of the Gospel, in order to become ever 
purer and stronger in spirit. and ever more loving and brotherly in 
acttorf' [HD VII pp.272fJ. 
Divine power, then, has manifested itself in history supremely in the 
gospel, which Harnack describes as a joyful message and a power of the 
Spirit, thus expressing his view of divine/spiritual power as both 
intellectual and personal. But in dogmatic Christianity and in the early 
Middle Ages, despite the positive influences of Augustine, of world-
renunciation and the striving after supernatural life and later of 
practical piety and religious self-criticism, the divine/spiritual power 
inherent in the gospel was more and more controlled by 'an appallingly 
powerful ecclesiasticism'. Dogma, itself once a force for good though 
never in Harnack's view an unmixed blessing, became rigid and degenerate, 
and faith moved elsewhere. Luther's restored 'doctrine' was the gospel as 
glad message and a power of God. Harnack has these last words in italics. 
Under Luther, doctrine was gospel and gospel was divine power, a power not 
to be thought about but to be experienced, a faith not drawn forth by 
reason or authority but made part of one's life. 
In this view the history of dogma has reached its goal in a return to the 
gospel. This return in Luther had powerful consequences: it shattered the 
ancient church, and set future generations a continuing task. This task is 
the goal of all Christian and all theological work and it is couched in 
power language: first to discern the simplicity and seriousness <Ernst> of 
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the gospel, in order then to be purer and stronger in spirit and more 
loving and brotherly in action. The gospel is simple and serious, its task 
is to give us purity and spiritual strength in order to do--to act in 
love. The quotation from Zwingli sums it up in insisting that the 
business of the gospel, and therefore our business, is not primarily 
intellectual: it is to do arduous and great things in partnership with God. 
The History of Dogma charts in great detail the struggles of this gospel, 
the struggles of divine/spiritual power, against opposition of all kinds, 
through the centuries of Christian history. It thus forms the most 
important piece of evidence for the assertion that in Harnack's view the 
reality of divine/spiritual power can be reliably inferred from history. 
Without denying the possibility that his portaits of the major figures may 
be coloured-and whose are not?-the fact that Harnack can with a fair 
degree of legitimacy find his major themes concerning this kind of power 
present in the work of paramount Christian thinkers of post-apostolic 
history such as Athanasius, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Luther lends 
them a credence and rootedness which a summary like Das Wesen or a 
monograph on divine power never could. 
iv. Jesus the supreme evidence of divine/spritual power at work in the 
world 
A description of the gospel which occurs early in History of Dogma 
demonstrates clearly the grounds of Harnack's conviction that tne 
experience of divine/spiritual power, with transforming personal 
consequences, is available within the iron ring. Harnack writes that the 
gospel presents itself as an apocalyptic message on the soil of the Old 
Testament and as the fulfilment of the law and the prophets, and yet is a 
new thing-the creation of a universal religion on the basis of the Old 
Testament religion. Usually, Harnack declares, when the traditional 
religion is narrow, the new religion appears very abstract, and religion 
withdraws from social life, becoming a private affair. But here: 
" ... an overpowering personality has appeared-the Son of God. Word 
and deed coincide in that personality, and as it leads men into a new 
communion with God, it unites them at the same time inseparably with 
itself, enables them to act on the world as light and leaven, and 
joins them together in a spiritual unity and an active confederacy .. 
[HO I p.411. 
It is in Jesus that Harnack finds the ultimate evidence for the reality and 
accessibility of divine/spiritual power. He is presented as the powerful 
personality par excellence who can take hold of and transform the inner 
life of others. He taught 'as one having authority', and that authoritative 
personality is not only a past historical example: ,Hinter jeder Spruche 
steht er selbst" CWC? p.51/DW p.331. Veiled behind the saying is the living 
Christ, and in encountering his message today we meet not his memory but 
himself. For Harnack, the essence of Christianity is the experience of 
divine/spiritual empowering through contact with Jesus Christ. The many 
definitions of the gospel serve their purpose primarily in evoking the 
feeling of this experience and the sense of this power [see 3.b.iii and ch.4 
below]. 
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v. The opposition to divine/spiritual power 
Divine/spiritual power is affirmed, despite appearances, to be at work in 
our world. It is also affirmed by Harnack to be engaged in active conflict 
with other kinds of power. Redemption forms the primary category for 
Harnack's understanding of the activity of divine/spiritual power in the 
world [e.g. HD I p.65, HD II pp.203f, 225, 236f, 287J, and redemption implies 
conflict-it is always redemption from. Harnack's understanding of 'the 
opposition' furnishes by its contrast a clearer picture of divine/spiritual 
power. A primary category of opposition is that of 'nature', used in the 
specialised sense described earlier [see 2.e. aboveJ. In addition to 
'nature', that is, the meaninglessness and futility of natural existence, 
Harnack lists as opposing forces to the power inherent in the gospel that 
of 'the world', including mammon, worry and selfishness CWC? pp.84-871, sin, 
weakness and disease [WC? pp.59-60J. In History of Dogma the opposition 
of 'nature' features in the passage on the resurrection, which became the 
mightiest power through which the gospel won humanity because it 
convinced believers that God would release them from death [HD I p.84l. 
With regard to 'the world', where Das Wesen concentrates more upon 
personal experience, Dogmengeschichte applies itself to the experience of 
the church, in which the inner, divine/spiritual power of the gospel was 
opposed by the external social powers of authority and organisation, along 
with the ideological power of secular philosophy and scientific learning, 
and the entropy of waning moral standards [see ch.6 belowl. In most of 
his discussion of the opposition to spiritual power, Harnack stresses that 
power's ability successfully to overcome opposition, but the story of the 
church's transpotentiation is to a considerable extent the story of its 
defeat, though Harnack insists that that defeat was neither complete nor 
final. 
The passages in Das Wesen and those scattered throughout the 
Dogmengeschichte on sin and the experience of forgiveness adopt a 
personal, existential and psychological perspective, and are of considerable 
depth and lyriGism. But Harnack also stresses that the early church did 
not always put sin and universal sinfulness in the foreground of its 
preaching. He holds that Jesus sought the different points in individuals 
upon which he could lay hold in order to lead them to the kingdom of God. 
The more common early themes were the antitheses of night, error, dominion 
of demons, and death versus light, truth, deliverance and life. The 
consciousness of universal sinfulness was first made the fundamental 
negative frame of mind of Christendom by Augustine [HD I pp.60-61J. 
Harnack, like Ritschl, in using the word Schuld, appears not to make a 
distinction between sin and the guilt which sin engenders. In Harnack's 
view, our fundamental guilt before God is not any particular sin, but the 
lack of trust, of child-like fear and love. The root of sin is turning 
from God in distrust, in placing not God but self at the centre of one's 
life. All 'sins' grow out of this disposition of the heart: "What do you 
love? What is the most precious thing in life to you? That is the 
decisive factor" [ST p.631. Perhaps where Harnack differs from others who 
psychologise the concepts of sin and guilt is that he does not wish 
thereby to minimise their significance. He emphasises that this guilt is 
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not a personal, interior-moral matter only, for it destroys God's world, and 
therefore, one way or another, it must be wiped out, whether in wrath or 
love, in judgment or forgiveness CHD VI pp.70, 79, 80 n.1; see also ch.4 
below). 
By and large, Harnack has little to say directly on the subject of evil. 
The idea of a supernatural source of evil is but little discussed, though 
he does mention that one of the early understandings of redemption was in 
terms of deliverance from bondage to the demonic (HD II pp.220f, HD VI 
p.56J, and he notes that Jesus accomplished mighty deeds in opposition to 
the devil and his kingdom [HD I p.65-66J, but without comment which would 
reveal his own attitude. This may be because the passage is intended to 
be historical narrative rather than evaluation, but it may also be that, 
once again, the iron ring is in evidence, for such matters are outside the 
possibility of our knowing. Just as he remains neutral about the 
Fall--how it was that sin became dominant and endemic in humanity he says 
we do not know [WC? p.151; see HD V pp.204, 205 n.2, 211 n.5, 2201-he 
wishes to remain silent on the subject of the causation or promotion of 
evil outside of human possibilities. As is his conviction with sacred 
truths, so with the 'mystery of evil': some things are none of our 
business. There is, in Harnack's view, quite enough to concern us within 
the iron ring, and, in any event, his deep assurance of God's victory and 
supremacy over all opposition diminishes the urgency of the question. 
We can see, then, that Harnack locates much of the opposition to 
divine/spiritual power in internal events and dispositions. 'Nature' and 
'the world' are certainly external phenomena, but what is really 
destructive about 'nature' is the sense of meaninglessness and futility to 
which it gives rise, and what is destructive about 'the world' is 
worldliness. Without explicitly dismissing it, he plays down the concept 
of an evil external to humanity, and offers a relational, psychological 
understanding of sin. And to the irreducibly external sources of 
opposition, the disease, suffering and death inherent in 'nature' and the 
social powers of authority and organisation, Harnack proposes, without 
wishing to render illegitimate efforts to amend these external situations, 
an internal solution, the solution of divine/spiritual power, through which 
the blind and brutal course of these external oppositions can be so 
encountered that all things must necessarily work for good. 
vi. The inwardness of divine/spiritual power 
This power is primarily an internal event, though it has profound 
consequences also for the external world. In a speech to the academic 
World Congress in St. Louis, Missouri in 1904 Harnack described the 
personal experience of divine/spiritual empowering, the new birth, as: 
" ... that inner, moral, new creation which transmutes all values, and of 
the slaves of compulsion makes the children of freedom. Not even in 
the history of the Church can anyone get a direct vision of this 
inner evolution accomplished in the individual, nor by any external 
facts whatever can anyone be convinced of its possibility and reality. 
But the light which shines from it throws its rays on what happens 
on the stage, and lets the spectator feel in his heart that the 
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forces of history are not exhausted in the natural forces of the 
world, or in the powers of head and hand" ('The Relationship between 
Ecclesiastical and General History', Contemporary Review 86, 1904, 
p.859]. 
The most important kinds of power are not external, natural or socio-
political, but inner powers of which divine/spiritual power is the chief. 
The kingdom of God is an inner kingdom of healing and forgiveness, 'eine 
stille, machtige Got teskraft in den Herzen' COW p.39/WC? p.61 l. The effect 
of the gospel within the individual is to combat the forces of 'nature' and 
'the world'. The gospel, to Harnack, is the finding by individuals of the 
living God as their God and as the source of strength, joy and peace, in 
order, negatively, to overcome these opposing forces, and, positively, to 
fulfill Christ's commands. This fulfilling of his commands is made 
possible by increased moral power, which in Harnack is distinguishable froiD 
but intimately connected to divine/spiritual power as its product and test 
[WC? p.75/DW p.48, WC? p.8/DW p.5J. 
We are reminded, in delineating Harnack's concept of divine/spiritual power 
or energy, of the sociological insistence that power is not a property but 
a relation. In making divine/spiritual power an inner power, and in 
separating it so clearly from external powers, it becomes clear that 
Harnack has not abandoned the reified idea of power as a property inherent 
in, and conceptually distinct from, the persons or groups who exercise it. 
This is an expression of his idealism, which he was motivated to assert 
vigorously in the face of the vigorous materialism and ontological 
reductionism by which he was surrounded. As part of his dualism, it could 
be said to constitute a prime tenet of the metaphysic which Harnack, 
however unwittingly, imposed upon his work. 
Reification is a constant problem for anyone wishing to discuss power. 
The matter is complicated, as Wrong points out, by the fact that at least 
in English there is no transitive verbal form of the word. Therefore to 
talk of power at all, one must use it as a noun, and to use a substantive 
word suggests that there is in fact a 'substance'. In Harnack's time a 
reified use of the word power was commonplace, especially in theological 
works. It is unarguable that Harnack's power language is reified, but when 
we look closely at his explanations of how inner power functions, it 
appears that he was in the process of working his way out of reification. 
The explanations emphasise not 'the power' itself, but the dynamic quality 
of what 'it' accomplishes. The very fact that Harnack took such pains to 
explain what inner power was and what it accomplishes, that is, to unpack 
the substantive language and emphasise this power's dynamic and relational 
qualities, is proof of the steps he had begun to take away from a reified 
conception of power. Harnack's description of power is the description of 
processes, the processes of transformation and reordering within the 
individual consciousness and between individuals and groups. His language 
still chains him to a reified, idealist view, but the content has begun to 
move forward. 
The inwardness of the divine/spiritual power appears most clearly, 1n 
Harnack's view, in Jesus' conduct of his ministry: 
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" ... He sought to found no sect or school. He laid down no rules for 
outward adhesion to himself. His aim was to bring men to God and to 
prepare them for God's Kingdom. He chose disciples, indeed, giving 
them special instructions and a share in his work; but even here 
there were no regulations ... Wherever he went, he wakened or found 
children of God ... No rule or regulation bound them together. They 
simply sought and shared the supreme boon which came home to each 
and all, viz., the Kingdom of their Father and of the individual 
soul. .. " CM&E I p.37J. 
In Mission and Expansion Harnack goes on to describe how in the early 
missionary preaching the words of Jesus and the historical picture of him 
furnished by the gospels continued to make available this inner power: 
" ... Rightly and wisely, people no longer noticed the local and temporal 
traits either in this historical sketch or in these sayings. They 
found there a vital love of God and men, which may be described as 
implicit universalism; a discounting of everything external <position, 
personality, sex, outward worship, etc.> which made irresistably for 
inwardness of character; ... Jesus ... shattered Judaism, and brought out 
the kernel of the religion of Israel. Thereby-i.e., by his preaching 
of God as the Father, and by his own death--he founded the universal 
religion, which at the same time was the religion of the Son" CM&E I 
pp.42 f). 
In Harnack's view, a new power of the inner life was something for which 
the ancient hellenic world was crying out. The history of religion had, at 
this time, reached the stage in no one could be a god any more without 
also being a Saviour CHeiland) [Marcion, p.17l. Harnack writes: 
"The cheerful, naive spirit of the old religion, so far as it still 
survived, lay a-dying, and its place was occupied by fresh religious 
needs ... The refinements of material civilization and mental culture 
made people more sensitive to the element of p§in in life, and this 
increase of sensitivity showed itself also in the sphere of 
morals ... There was a real demand for purity, consolation, expiation and 
healing, and as these could not be found elsewhere, they began to be 
sought in religion" CM&E I p.105J. 
Thus the Christ ian preaching met a new and deeply- felt need which was, in 
Mann's terms, interstitial to existing ideological structures. The 
divine/spiritual power released through the new faith engendered many 
marvels--prophecies, dreams, raptures, tongues, healings, exorcisms-and, 
Harnack notes; " ... it is no less effective in heightening the religious and 
the moral powers, which operate with such purity and power in certain 
individuals that they bear palpably the stamp of their divine origin" CM&E 
I pp.20 1 fJ. Heroic faith is demonstrated, and charitable services are 
rendered which are far more moving and stirring than any miracle. Harnack 
maintains that " ... if the early Christians always looked out for the proofs 
of the Spirit and -of power, they did so from the standpoint of their moral 
and religious energy, since it was for the sake of the latter object that 
these {charismatic] gifts had been bestowed upon the earth" {ibid. p.205J. 
He makes the point that the early popular Christian literature differed 
from that of other contemporary cults: 
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" ... moreover, and this is of supreme importance, the fact that their 
Christian range included the exploits of moral heroism, stamped them 
in this field with a character which was all their own and lent them 
a very telling power. What existed elsewhere merely in ce.rtain 
stereotyped and fragmentary forms appeared within Christianity in a 
wealth of expression where every function of the spiritual, the 
mental, and the moral life seemed actually to be raised above itself" 
[ibid.P. 
The radical difference of this inner power from worldly forms of authority 
and coercion is made clear in Harnack's theme of 'strength made perfect in 
weakness' [e.g. WC? p.138/DW p.88l. This theme proves to be of great 
importance for Harnack's understanding of the atonement [see ch.4 below). 
The gospel in Harnack's terms is characterised by a quiet peaceful element, 
a disposition ardently and humbly devoted to God and to the brethren. The 
gospel's one aim, is that man may find God and have him as his own God, 1n 
order to gain in him humility, patience, peace, joy and love. His 
description of 'the gospel in the gospel' makes this clear: 
" ... The preaching of Jesus contains three great main sections. Firstly 
the message of the approaching kingdom of God or of the future 
salvation; secondly, the proclamation of the actual state of things 
and of thoughts, such as are given in Matthew VI:25-34; VII:7-11; 
IX:2, X:28-33 etc. Thirdly, the new righteousness <the new law). The 
middle section connected with Mat thew XI:25-30, and therefore also 
combined with the primitive Christian testimony regarding Jesus as 
Lord and Saviour, I hold, from strictly historical and objective 
grounds, to be the true main sect ion, the gospel in the gospel, and 
to it I subordinate the other portions. That Christ himself 
expressed it under cover of Eschatology I know as well as the 
antiquarians who have so keen an eye for the everlasting yesterday .. !' 
[HD v_ p.]Ci: s~~ !'!lSQ_fiD l pp,5B, 74fl. 
Harnack praises Augustine for seeing that the gospel is 
different from everything called doctrine, i.e. a vital spiritual 
The law is doctrine: the gospel is power [HD V pp.138-139J. 
however, concerned with powerful feelings and dispositions only: 
has any value which heightens the power to be and to do good; 
else is a poisonous fog" [HD V p. 76]. 
ultimately 
experience. 
It is not, 
"That only 
everything 
This inner power can be identified, in Mann's terms, with ideological power, 
so long as this is not taken to mean that it affects the mind only and has 
no impact on behaviour or the external world, and so long as one bears in 
mind that for Harnack this ideological power is predicated on a true 
transcendence rather than a social transcendence. What we will look at 
below is how, in Harnack's understanding, this power becomes operative 
within individuals. 
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3.b. How divine energy energises the human 
i. Introduction 
Having, in response to the first quest ion, examined Harnack's convict ion 
that despite evidence to the contrary, divine/spiritual power is active and 
accessible within the iron ring, we must now begin to address the second 
question and discover the means by which, within the iron ring, this power 
empowers receptive individuals. In order to do this it is profitable to 
begin with the examination of a number of his descriptions of 'the gospel'. 
I have underlined words and phrases which point to how the gospel 
empowers humanity: 
a. Early in History of Dogma he describes the gospel as the glad message 
of the government of the world and every individual soul by God the Father 
and Judge. This dominion of God frees us from the power of the devil, 
makes us rulers in the heavenly kingdom <as opposed to the kingdoms of 
the world>, which will be sensibly realised in a near-aproaching future 
aeon. It secures life for all who yield themselves to God, though they 
should lose the world and earthly life itself. This dominion of God 
imposes the old/new law of undivided love for God and neighbour: the way 
to it is through a change of mind, self-denial, humility and trust in God. 
There is in this a continued recognition of one's own unworthiness, but 
God calls into the kingdom just these sinners, by promising the forgiveness 
of sins which hitherto have separated them from God. And this gospel is 
inseparably connected with Jesus Christ; in him it is word and deed and 
becomes his personal life into which he draws all others [HD I pp.58-59J. 
b. He notes in the first lecture of What is Christianity? that the 
Christian religiont'' ... is something simple and sublime ... one thing 
only ... eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes 
of God" [WC? p.8/DW p.5J. 
c. Later he writes: " ... It is a glad messa~e assurin! us of life eternal, and 
telling us what the things and the forces with which we have to do are 
worth. By treating of life eternal it teaches us how to lead our lives 
aright. It tells us of the value of the human soul, of humility, of mercy, 
of purity, of the cross, and the worthlessness of worldly goods and 
anxiety for the things of which earthly life consists. And it gives the 
assurance that in spite of every struggle, peace, certainty, and a quality 
within that can never be destroyed [eine innere UnzersttjrbarkeitJ will be 
the crown of a life rightly led" [WC? pp.146-147/DW p.92J. 
d. In discussing Paul, Harnack notes that he transferred the gospel out of 
Judaism into the realm of universal religion without hurting the inner and 
essential features of the gospel, that is, " ... unconditional trust in God as 
the Father of Jesus Christ, confidence in the Lord, forgiveness of sins, 
certainty of eternal life, purity and brotherly fellowship ... " [WC? p.180J. 
e. He adds that, " ... as a Gospel, it has only one aim--the finding of the 
livin~ God. the finding of Him by every individual as his God, and as the 
source of stre~th and 1oy and peace ... " [WC? p.190/DW p.120l. 
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f. In responding to the question whether the gospel 'survived' the 
transformation of the primitive community into early catholicism, Harnack's 
affirmative answer shows what he considered to demonstrate the active 
presence of the gospel: " ... The way to God is found with certainty, and the 
simplicity of the life within does not appear to be disturbed or 
encumbered ... ". Harnack takes Clement of Alexandria as an example. A Greek 
to his fingertips, Clement still; " ... won peace and joy from the Gospel, and 
he can also express what he won and testify of the power of the living 
God" [WC? pp.215-216l. 
g. Even amid what Harnack sees as the religious perversion of Greek 
Orthodoxy, the gospel has survived, for here too; " ... are men who have come 
to know God as the Father of mercy and the leader of their lives and who 
love Jesus Christ, not because they know him as the person with two 
natures, but because a ray of his being has shone from the Gospel into 
their hearts. and its ray has become light and warmth to their own lives". 
Here too, the fatherly providence of God endues men with strength and 
energy, unselfishness and love CWC? p.243l. 
h. Of Roman Catholicism, Harnack says that," ... Ecclesiasticism has not 
availed to suppress the power of the Gospel...", the proof of this being 
that" ... In all ages it has produced saints, so far as men can be so called, 
and it still produces them today" [WC? p.266l. 
1. Harnack says that in Protestantism's four leading points, inwardness and 
spirituality, the fundamental thought of the God of grace, God's worship in 
spirit and in truth, and the idea of the church as a community of faith, 
the gospel was re-won CWC? p.284J. 
The empowering begins with a message, a message about who God is, about 
God's loving rule of and care for the world and the individual regardless 
of outward circumstances, about one's own unworthiness and the fact of 
God's forgiveness. These ideas come to be believed: certainty of their 
truth is awakened and confidence is aroused, as a result of seeing the 
propositions enfleshed in the attractive, magnetic, personal life of Jesus. 
Assurance and confidence give rise to certain acts of will, the first of 
which is the decision to trust God and to accept the offered forgiveness. 
This confidence and trust bring a sense of joyful release to the 
individual, who is thus empowered emotionally and motivated to act morally 
and fulfil the old/new law of love. 
Working backwards, the effect of divine/spritual empowering is an emotional 
state of joyful freedom and a moral state of loving activity. This effect 
is made possible by an act of will by which one decides to trust God and 
accept forgiveness. What makes this act of will possible, almost 
inevitable? What empowers this alteration of direction and increase in 
personal power? The answer of course is divine power at work in the 
human spirit, but this still begs the question of how that power affects 
the will. Harnack's answer, to borrow Ritschl's metaphor, is an ellipse 
with two foci. In his view divine energy energises the human through the 
interaction of idea and personality. We find a rough parallel in Mann's 
two concepts of the importance of the idea of transcendence, and the 
indispensability of the articulate individual who arises to offer the new 
explanation of the social situation. 
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In Christianity and History Harnack attests to the synergistic force of 
ideas and personality: 
'
0Whence comes the strength of the strong, and the deed of the doer? 
Whence comes it that the knowledge that might advance us, the 
thought that might save us, is transmitted from one generation to 
another as barren and worthless and dead as a stone, until some one 
seizes it and strikes it into fire? Whence comes that higher order 
of marriage, where a thought so unites with a soul that each is 
merged in the other, and belongs to the. other, and masters the will? 
Whence comes the courage that conquers the resistance of a dull and 
unfeeling world? Whence comes the living power that begets a living 
conviction? It is a very limited psychology which fails to see that 
these are the real levers of history ... " [Christianity and History, 
London, A.C. Black, l896, p.32l. 
ii. The power of ideas 
The ability of certain ideas to empower, energise and transform individual 
and social life was one of Harnack's root assumptions, shared with the 
idealist philosophers and constituting one side of the idealism versus 
materialism debate in the social sciences to this day. Harnack makes a 
distinction between two kinds of knowledge, and hence, two ways of 
processing ideas. The first sort of knowledge is that which is intimately 
tied to feeling and active life and is allied with the simple content of 
the gospel, and which ought to control and determine religious feeling [HO 
I p.l8J. The second kind of knowledge is that which is detached, 
speculative and explanatory, part of the theory of religion rather than of 
religion itself. 
Both kinds of knowledge have a role to play in religion: the first is 
virtually identical with Harnack's concept of idea. But the second is also 
needed. It can endanger the spiritual life, as witnessed by the effects of 
dogma upon the progress of the gospel [HO I p.20l. Harnack notes that 
" ... men are ever prone to compound with religion itself by a religious 
theory" UID I p.43l, and that the philosophy of Philo's time had come to 
recognise the need for revelation because; " ... knowledge resting on itself 
had learnt by experience its inability to attain to the truth in which 
blessedness consists" [HD I p.l12J. Knowledge as speculation becomes one 
of Harnack's chief enemies because it so often acts as a fetter to or a 
substitute for genuinely spiritual life. But dangerous though it may be, 
Christianity cannot do without Harnack's second type of knowledge. It is 
necessary apologetically, and, according to Harnack, the spiritual character 
of the Christian religion will at all times feel the need for a scientific 
apologetic mo I p.l8J. Thus there is a place for the second kind of 
knowledge within Christianity, for faith is not just undefined, rootless 
religious feeling, but does and must have reference to objective rea lit les 
such as God and the life of Jesus Christ. These two 'kinds' of knowledge 
might better be represented as two ways or levels of knowing, of 
processing ideas. The second way selects what ideas shall be deemed 
significant for the individual. The first way admits these ideas into the 
life, habitual thought, feeling and action of the individual. Only when 
this latter action occurs does an idea have power. 
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Harnack's writings are full of examples of powerful ideas having direct 
practical consequences-for better and for worse-in the church [e.g. M&E 
I pp.153-161, 222, 393; HD II p.318, HD III pp.llO, 113, 117, 141; HD IV p.~6; 
HD V pp.9, 52, 72, 1041. Even Mann, who ultimately espouses the 
materialist view of first origins for all human powers, emphasises the 
'tracklaying' capacity of ideological power once a certain level of 
civilisation has been reached, indicating that conditions do arise when 
persons and societies will sacrifice their economic, political and military 
power interests in order to fulfil ideological objectives. As we have 
seen, an idea for Harnack represented not a cold unit of thought but 
something full of life and potentiality [WC? p.l36/DW p.99J. Its activity, 
however, was not always necessarily beneficial. For instance, the idea of 
the Logos bore, in his view, much bitter fruit in power terms, increasing 
the mystery, prestige and authority of priests and theologians and placing 
the laity in perpetual tutelage [HD III pp.137f; see ch. 6 below]. Dogmatic 
Christianity, he maintains, though it can combine with the living religion 
of the gospel, always remains intellectual Christianity and therefore 
always in danger of supplanting religious faith with knowledge, of having 
faith in a doctrine of religion instead of in God [HD I p.16J. In such a 
case the power of ideas, which with regard to the gospel is meant to lead 
to personal, living experience of the divine, becomes an end in itself, and 
in Harnack's view, a dead end. 
The ideas of the gospel are profound rather than complex, and Harnack 
maintains that their power is linked to their purity and simplicity [WC? 
p.51/DW p.33, WC? pp.47-48, 180, 212, 275; HD I p.94, HD II p.318; M&E I 
pp.84-851. The 'gospel in the gospel' is easy to distinguish: it speaks to 
us with so much power that it cannot eaily be mistaken [WC? p.14/DW p.9J. 
Always Harnack insists that it is the simplest ideas which are the most 
profound, carry the most truth and evoke the strongest conviction in 
individual lives. Why this should be so appears to have been something 
which he felt no need to explain. 
With regard to the gospel, ideas are a vehicle for divine/spiritual power 
in that they evoke confidence and certainty in the believer. - Chief among 
those ideas is that of God as the loving Father upon whom, regardless of 
the outward circumstances of life, one can rely. This powerful idea 
awakens the response of assurance or confidence <ultimately, cert itudo 
salutis>, which in turn transforms the emotional and moral life of the 
individual. In describing Jesus' preaching of the Kingdom, Harnack 
maintains that Jesus broke through the national-political and sensuous 
expectations which had surrounded Jewish eschatology for the previous two 
hundred years and spoke of a spiritual kingdom which was both future and 
yet present. Even now, Jesus taught, every individual who is called into 
the Kingdom may call on God as Father, and be sure of the gracious will of 
God, the hearing of his prayers, the forgiveness of his sins, and of the 
protection of God [HD I p.62L 
The theme of confidence and certainty emerges again when Harnack 
discusses the inestimable value of the individual human soul as 
demonstrated in the preaching of Jesus and in his proclamation of the sure 
hope of the resurrection. The passage also illustrates the subtle and 
intimate relationship which Harnack posits for the power of ideas and the 
power of personality. The discussion concludes of Jesus: 
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"He himself therefore is Christianity, for the 'impression of his 
person convinced the disciples of the facts of forgiveness of sin and 
the second birth, and gave them the courage to believe in and to lead 
a new life'. We cannot therefore state the 'doctrine' of Jesus: for it 
apprears as a supramundane life which must be felt in the person of 
Jesus, and its truth is guaranteed by the fact that such a life can 
be lived" [HD I pp.70-71J. 
Thus the disciples received, from observing and interacting with Jesus, a 
guarantee of the truth of what he taught, and the conviction and courage 
to follow in his footsteps. What is transformed is not the conditions of 
our existence but our attitude: we can come so to encounter nature's blind 
and brutal course that all things of necessity work together for good. 
The radical mistrust which is both the guilt and the punishment of sin is 
replaced by radical trust in the Father of Jesus Christ, in whom we have 
forgiveness of sins and adoption as beloved children. The result is joy, 
victory over selfishness and futility, 'the glorious liberty of the children 
of God', and a new ability to practise love. 
In Harnack's discussion of the resurrection we again find the power of 
ideas, in terms of the importance of the conviction which an idea can 
arouse, presented as a central power of the gospel. The resurrection of 
Christ, he notes, became the assurance for believers that they too would 
be raised from death. "This conviction, whose reverse side is the fear of 
that God who casts into hell, has become the mightiest power through which 
the gospel has won humanity" [HO I p.84J. 
Harnack's account of Luther underscores the theme of the power released 
when one is certain of the truth of a great idea. In Harnack's view 
Luther's- message to Christendom was " ... the living faith in the God who in 
Christ addresses to the poor soul the words: 'I am thy sal vat ion', ... the 
firm assurance that God is the Being on whom one can place reliance" CHD 
VII p.l72J. Harnack says of Luther's Christianity that: 
"OuL of- a complex system of-expiations, good-deeds and cotnfoflfugs, 
of strict statutes and uncertain apportionments of grace, out of 
magic and of blind obedience, he led religion forth and gave it a 
strenuously concentrated form. The Christian religion is the living 
assurance of the living God, who has revealed Himself and opened his 
heart in Christ-nothing else ... " [HD VII pp.183-184J. 
Harnack continues and points out the psychological consequences of this 
confidence in God: 
"For Luther, the whole of religion was contained within this circle. 
The living God-not a philosophical or mystical abstraction-the God 
manifest, certain, the God of grace, accessible to every Christian. 
Unwavering trust of the heart in Him who has given himself to us in 
Christ as our Father, personal assurance of faith, because Christ with 
His work undertakes our cause-this became for him the entire sum of 
religion. Rising above all anxieties and terrors, above all ascetic 
devices, above all directions of theology, above all interventions of 
hierarchy and Sacraments, he ventured to lay hold of God Himself in 
Christ, and in this act of his faith, which he recognised as God's 
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work, his whole being obtained stability and firmness, nay, even a 
personal certainty and joy, such as no medieval man had ever 
possessed. From perceiving that 'with force of arms we nothing can' 
he derived the utmost freedom and force; for he now knew the power 
which imparts to the life steadfastness and peace; he knew it, and 
called it by its name. Faith ... it was the certainty of forgiveness of 
sins, and therefore also the personal and continuous surrender to God 
as the Father of Jesus Christ, which transforms and renews the whole 
man ... ; faith is a living, busy, active thing, a sure confidence, which 
makes a man joyful and happy towards God and all creatures" CHD VII 
pp.184-185; see also l-ID VII pp.l71-174, 210-2121. 
The power released through faith in the gospel produces courage and joy. 
This courage is 'a resolute and iron energy of will'. In a 1917 meditation 
on 2 Timothy 1:7 he writes: 
" ... The Gospel speaks not only of humility <Demut> but, if we read it 
aright it speaks quite as often of courage <Mut ). Jesus Christ was a 
Hero, and His disciples should be heroes too. His whole career was a 
heroic fight against the evil, ignorance, stupidity and hostility which 
surrounded Him. But He became neither weary nor dull nor impatient; 
on the contrary, to the very end He preserved a spirit of power and 
endurance. But power also means joy, and all sense of power, whether 
of mind or body, is also a feeling of joy ... God gives us the spirit of 
power, that is of courage and joyfulness" CST p.44l. 
In Harnack's understanding, as noted earlier, the absolutely pivotal idea 
upon which all else in Christianity stands or falls is that of the 
character of God. Becoming convinced of the truth of the idea of a God 
who loves and who is reliable is the first and indispensable step in the 
process of the new birth, and the beginning of the empowering of the 
human spirit by the divine: 
" ... While Jesus himself was exhibiting this love, and making it a life 
and power, his disciples were learning the highest and holiest thing 
that can be learned in all religion, namely, to believe in the love of 
God ... " CM&E I p.148l. 
For all his christocentrism, in the end for Harnack it is one's view of the 
character of God which makes the difference. 'The fatherhood of God' has 
become such a cliche that it is only with difficulty that we can discern 
the possiblity of the impact-the surprise and joyous relief, that a deep 
comprehension of the news that the mysterious, lofty, inscrutable creator 
and source of the universe desires to relate to human beings as loving 
parent to precious child, and is, in the face of a changing, dubious and 
apparently futile world, the person on whom one can rely-which Harnack, 
in using this phrase, sought to communicate. It is this joyful 
astonishment which is the fundamental spiritual experience to which 
Harnack ceaselessly points us, and the good news which Jesus both preached 
and en fleshed. 
Rightly to comprehend the character of God is to have access to all the 
blessings of the gospel. Equally, misapprehensions of the divine character 
lead to mistakes in religion which distort and impair the work of 
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divine/spiritual power. For example, the reason Harnack offers for what he 
sees as Aquinas' defective concept of grace lies in his defective concep~ 
of God, a God who is " ... inscrutable self-will, and who, just on tha~ 
account, has set up an inscrutable arbitrary institution of grace as an 
establishment for the insurance of life" [HD VI p.2811. If this one idea is 
correctly understood, all else flows from it, and as we shall see, the 
character of God forms the focal point for Harnack's explanation of the 
effectiveness of the atonement [see ch. 4 belowl. 
iii. The power of personality 
According to Harnack, an idea empowers by creating conviction and 
confidence, leading to beneficial activity in the external world, because, 
and only because, it is embodied in and guaranteed by a powerful 
personality. All revelation comes through persons, and truth must be 
embodied in an actual life if it is to be credible [R&A nf.2 p.69; see 
Kaltenborn, pp.103-104J. Harnack describes neoplatonism as deficient in 
that it lacked a founder, which meant that it developed no elemental force 
and never lost the character of being an artificial creation [HD III p.317J. 
Historically, the ideas of the gospel find their guarantee in the 
personality of Jesus. It is because the gospel is not a question of 
creeds and definitions but of a personal power-encounter that Harnack sees 
Jesus as inextricably bound up with it. No one could have believed more 
in the power of ideas than Harnack, but he just as clearly knew that on 
their own, " ... words effect nothing; it is the power of the personality that 
stands behind them" [WC? p.48/DW pp.30-31 J. No idea survives and grows 
unless exemplified in a personality. Jesus, then, is synonymous with the 
divine/spiritual power of the gospel, for he embodied it in his life, 
teachings and death; furthermore, he had, and still has, the capacity to 
awaken the joyous and empowering experience of Got teskindschaft in all 
those who trust him [WC? p.51 /DW p.33J. Jesus very quickly came to be 
seen as the strength <Kraft) of a new existence, the active principle of 
individual life-'not I but Christ living in me' [WC? pp.154-155/DW p.97J. 
The 'strength' here referred to seems to be more than the power of an 
idea: it is that of a living and singularly powerful personality. It was 
the power of this personality, rather than the empty tomb, which Harnack 
sees as the earliest disciples' ultimate foundation for their belief in the 
resurrection [WC? p.163/DW pp.102-103; HD I p.86 n.U. 
Sykes places Harnack's emphasis on personality in its apologetic context. 
He writes: 
" ... In every way it suited Harnack to emphasize Jesus' personality or 
character. For a post-Kantian era which had given up proving Jesus' 
divinity by prophecy or miracle, the personality of Christ was still a 
potent argument, personality being, for a certain type of idealism, 
the highest category of created reality. In presenting the power of 
Christianity, therefore, as the agent par excellence in the formation 
or moulding of personality Harnack was performing a double apologetic 
service" [Identity, p.145; see also p.l41J. 
In Wrong's terms the power of the personality of Jesus fits closely into 
the type of charismatic authority, with the proviso that whereas Wrong 
describes the power of charismatic leaders as accorded to them and 
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authenticated by their followers, Harnack would argue that the authority 
of Jesus was accorded to him and authenticated by God. Another difference 
is the manner in which the problem of succession, perennial for charismatic 
authority, is solved: the resurrection means that Jesus as charismatic 
leader does not need to be replaced, for the living Christ continues to be 
present and active. <The debate about who should exercise the right to 
interpret that presence is another question.> In addition to charismatic 
authority, the power of Jesus can also be described as competent authority: 
Jesus' unique knowledge of the Father gives him a special claim on our 
attention and obedience. 
Many historical personalities are noted as powerful by Harnack--Paul, 
Athanasius and Augustine, Luther and Fichte, for examples. We see in his 
treatment of major historical figures the intimate connexion between a 
powerful idea and its embodiment in a powerful personality CHD IV p.26; HD 
V p.64l. Harnack testifies to the ability of such persons to take hold of 
the inner life of others [WC? p.lO/DW p.6; HD I p.92J, and Harnack affirms 
that Jesus possessed this ability to an unparalleled degree CWC? p.49/DW 
p.31l. He uses the fire image for the ability of personality to lead 
personality to a higher level: the fire is kindled from outside, but once 
the blaze is lit, it burns independently and can in turn kindle others [WC? 
p.ll/DW p.7; ibid. pp.l45-146/pp.91-92l. Harnack holds that in the great 
majority of cases in the early years, it was example and the personal 
manifestation of the Christian life which led to imitation and conversion 
£M&E I p.87J. 
The significance of Jesus is that he kindles the fire of divine/spiritual 
power in the individual by standing as the guarantor, within the iron ring, 
of the personality, or character, of God which is supremely powerful and in 
which we are invited to have confidence. Harnack praises Luther for 
restoring 'the religious way of understanding the gospel' CHD VII p.172J, 
i.e. as a sure confidence in a person, the Father of Jesus Christ. Luther 
shows us the power of simplicity in the realm of ideas, for he reduced and 
simplified the overburdened tradition into a strenuously concentrated_form. 
This form was ~centred on- sure~confidence-~(assurance) in th-e~ ldea ~-that the 
God revealed in Jesus Christ is the person upon whom one can rely. It is 
the source of all transformation, renewal, power, joy and freedom for the 
Christian soul and the foundation of its dominion over the world. This, as 
noted above, is the great idea of the gospel, an idea which if true points 
to a great Personality whose love and reliability is the source of the 
believer's empowering. Thus idea and personality are inseparable, both for 
the personality of God and the personality of Jesus, without whom we would 
not have the confidence to trust the great idea. 
Harnack was frequently accused of excluding Jesus from his definition of 
the gospel on the basis of his historical distinction between the gospel 
Jesus preached and the gospel which the early church preached about Jesus 
<das doppelte Evangelium>. On one occasion in Das Wesen, and the only one 
I have been able to discover in the Harnackean corpus, Harnack says that 
it was Jesus0 "... peculiar greatness to have led men to God, so that they 
may thenceforth live their own life with Him,'0 £WC? p.ll/DW p. 71. But taken 
as a whole, anything other than a superficial reading of his work, and even 
of. Das Wesen. where the stones of stumbling most blatantly appear, shows 
that this is not the case. He repeatedly insists that Jesus is inseparable 
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from his gospel [e.g. WC? pp.l45-146l. The power of personality and the 
power of ideas mutually reinforce each other. The two are expressed in 
Harnack's phrase, 'the image of Jesus and the power which proceeded from 
it I [HD I p.80]. 
Thus in Harnack's teaching on personality it appears that even great 
ideas-the Fatherhood of God, the infinite value of the human soul, the 
Kingdom of God, forgiveness and love-only engender divine/spiritual power 
when they are experienced in the contact with a personality which embodies 
the ideas. Such a statement could be construed as an encouragement to 
the pursuit of mystical experience of the risen Christ, but it is unlikely 
that that was Harnack's meaning. For him the risen Christ speaks still 
through the words of the gospels, and through the lives of historical and 
contemporary Christians. In chapter four we will look in more detail at 
the significance of personality for Harnack's christological thought, and in 
chapter five the mutual reinforcement of idea and personality will become 
evident in Harnack's treatment of grace. 
iv. Evaluation 
Divine/spiritual power empowers human beings, in Wrong's terms, via the 
operation of charismatic and competent authority predicated upon what 
Rollo May terms nutrient power, attributed to <Feuerbach and Durkheim 
would say, projected upon) the character of God. The operation of these 
powers produces predictable and beneficial effects upon the emotional and 
ethical states of individuals who become convinced of the truth of the 
gospel ideas of the divine character and who allow themselves to be 
influenced by the charismatic and competent authority of the personality 
of Jesus. While the categories of charismatic and competent authority 
'fit'-the case of the powerful personality of Jesus, Wrong has no category 
in his typology which fits the empowering rOle of ideas. This can most 
probably be explained by his indicated intention of dealing with 
interpersonal power only and leaving out the realm of psychology, for 
ideas, if they generate power at all, do so within the psychology of 
individuals. 
As noted above, the power of personality finally has the ascendancy 
because only through demonstration in a personal life can an idea, however 
potentially compelling, become convincing and contagious. Harnack also 
believed that the great individual, acting under the conviction of a great 
idea, was the primary causal agent in history ["History is but the 
elongated shadows of great men"; R&A nf.4 p.ll l. What must perhaps be 
questioned is whether ideas, and personalities shaped by ideas, actually 
have that primary causal rOle, or whether they are not as much effects as 
causes. We are also left unsure whether in Harnack's view divine/spiritual 
power could ever be 'pure', i.e., experienced directly, or whether 
intermingling with ordinary human powers was inevitable. The ambivalence 
is represented by Harnack's two metaphors for divine/spiritual power, the 
'purist' husk and kernel metaphor, and the 'integrationist' metaphor of the 
bark and the sap. This ambiguity is symptomatic of the dualistic 
distinction Harnack draws between internal and external powers, and, as we 
explore his work in greater detail, we must ask ourselves how adequate, 
and indeed workable, such a dualism can be [see ch. 7 pp.162 fl. 
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!;.!QtfEs to chapter three <The power of God at work in the world) 
3.a. Affirming the power of God in the modern situation 
1. However, as Glick points out, while Ritschl accepted Kant's limitation of 
pure reason, he differed from him in that where Kant's religion is 
practically an annex to morals, Ritschl's has an independent basis in 
history [Glick, Reality, p.51l. 
2. Rumscheidt holds that such a theology becomes either stagnant or 
impossible, and sees Barth's line as the only way out [Rumscheidt p.1951. 
The positivist epistemology with which Rumscheidt erroneously credits 
Harnack was, he asserts, the epistemology which has characterised western 
thought, and especially western science, for a very long time. It includes 
the sharp distinction between subject and object, the clear divisions 
between being, action and cognition, and the possibility of the direct 
cognition of the object via the suppression of any particularities in the 
subject [ibid. pp.177-178J. This epistemology, Rumscheidt points out, has 
been defunct in the realm of physics since Planck, Einstein and Heisenberg. 
"Modern physics has called a halt to that kind of epistemology and 
ontology in the realm of science. It appears to me that the theology of 
Karl Barth does the same for theology for which reason I call it a 
reformatory theology, "[ibid. p.179J. It seems odd that Harnack is 
criticised for being in thrall to the scientific Weltanchauung of his time, 
but Barth is praised for paralleling the progress of science. 
3. The tragedy of Christianity in Harnack's view is the rapidity with which 
the church, the promulgator of the gospel preaching and thus of this inner 
divine/spiritual power, became a primary suppressor of it. In its struggle 
to continue and expand its work of creating free children of God, the 
gospel soon was in conflict not only with 'nature' and the 'world', but also 
with the church [see ch.6 below]. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DIVINE POWER ENERGISES THE HUMAN THROUGH JESUS CHRIST 
4.a. Introduction 
In section 3.b., we examined how Harnack answered the second question in 
general terms, but, as the centre and ground of Harnack's theological 
thought was Jesus, a more detailed examination of his christological 
thought is required in order to fully establish his answer to the question 
of how it is that divine/spiritual power empowers human beings. We see in 
his work the attempt, not always successful, to develop a christology which 
is not reductionist but which operates entirely within the iron ring. In 
order to do this, Harnack parts company with chalcedonian understandings 
of the person of Christ and uses instead his paired concepts of the po~er 
of ideas and the power of personality. In Jesus supremely the two means 
of divine empowering coalesce. 
Harnack objected to the separation in theology of the person of Christ 
from his work. The personality, teaching, work, death and resurrection of 
Jesus constitute a unity which may not without injury to true religion be 
divided, and Harnack criticises traditional dogma for dividing person Sllld 
work and subordinating the latter to the former. The work of Christ, 
wrongfully neglected in favour of speculations concerning the mystery of 
Christ's person, forms the major interest in Harnack's christology: 
christology for him is solely about redemption. Harnack's objection to 
compartmentalisation is valid, and should be borne in mind throughout the 
following discussion, which will continue to use the two categories of 
person and work only for convenience of expression. 
Special attention will be given in this discussion to a monograph which 
appeared in the same year as Das Wesen. entitled 'Christus als ErUSser' 
CR&A nf.2 pp.Sl-931. Its concentrated focus on the subject of redemption 
makes it valuable for our objective of understanding Harnac~'s 
christological thought in the same way that Das Wesen's specific focus is 
valuable for our understanding of the essence of Christianity. Another 
similarity to Das Wesen is the article's strongly apologetic flavour: it 
addresses itself less to the believing church than to the sceptical, 
searching modern world. This focus is corroborated, supplemented Sllld 
balanced by the treatments in the longer historical works, most notably in 
Dogme~eschichte, where the tone is less apologetic and more doctrinal. 
4.b. The person of Christ: who is Jesus? 
It is Harnack's handling of what traditional theology terms christology 
which has earned him the fiercest criticism. <Neufeld's handling of 
Harnack's christology contributes much to its rehabilitation, . although in 
his admirable concern to refute the prejudice and misunderstanding which 
has surrounded this area he perhaps makes Harnack more orthodox than he 
really was [see Neufeld <1977) pp.316fl>. What is frequently misconstrued 
as a rejection of the divinity of Christ is in fact Harnack's rejection of 
two-nature christology: Harnack would argue that to reject the chalcedonian 
formulae for the expression of Christ's divinity is not the same thing as 
rejecting his divinity altogether. 
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Harnack maintains that the adoption of the Logos doctrine as the central 
dogma of the church was obtained in the first place through the 
disreputable manipulations of ecclesiastical and political power UID III 
p.58, HD IV p.196J, and that its adoption had far-reaching consequences 
both in terms of the accessibility of divine/spiritual power to individuals 
and in terms of ecclesiastical power relations. Along with being 
unhistorical, unbiblical and untrue, it contradicted and obscured the Jesus 
of the gospels, who is the source of our spiritual power, and could render 
those who followed it wholly incapable of understanding or applying the 
tradition that God redeemed humanity through Jesus [HD III p.l37J. The 
adoption of the Logos doctrine had the effect of depotentiating and 
alienating ordinary believers: only theologians and priests could 
understand its complicated speculations, and all others were left with a 
faith which was a holy mystery to be accepted in obedience. This 
mystification led believers ever deeper into reliance upon and submission 
to the authority of church and clergy [HD II p.300, III p.3; see also ch.6 
below]. Yet, Harnack insists, under cover of the official dogmatic 
formulae, quite a different christology developed in the west which 
emphasised Christ's humanity in that its doctrine of redemption hinged on 
a man whose mediation was a voluntary achievement. We find the vividness 
and thrilling power of 'Ecce homo', and the church christology becoming 
nothing but a formula. Harnack holds that the western view-in which 
Christ was the object of the Father's grace, carried out what the Father 
entrusted to him, and by him was exalted-corresponded to the clearest 
passages of the New Testament [HD V pp.53-55J. It is with this view. that 
Harnack wishes to identify himself. 
Harnack's estimate of the person of Christ is similar in very many respects 
to Ritschl's. Following Melanchthon <'to know Christ is to know his 
benefits'), they both locate Christ's divinity in ·the grace and truth 
<Treue> and the lordship over the world which is visible in his life Sllld 
death. Jesus' divinity is a value- judgment <Werturteil>, as, according to 
Ritschl, it was for Luther. Ritschl and Harnack honour Jesus as God 
because of the salvation <Heil> which he brings, which is very different 
~from uthe ~ disinterested,~ academic Erkenntnis of the cliarcedonian~ formula 
[Meijering <1978> p.47J. Harnack's intention was to reject all metaphysical 
speculation <though it may be argued that he in fact imports another 
metaphysic> and put into its place historical reflection and ethical 
judgments of value. It is not Christ's nature, but his Gesinnung and 
Willensrichtung which are unique and divine. Harnack recognises his own 
christology in that of Paul of Samosata, and regrets that after Paul's 
rejection a belief in the pre-existence of Christ became mandatory. 
Harnack considered this to be a victory of platonism within Christ ian 
doctrine, which displaced the historical, that is the real, Christ. Harnack 
did not, however, completely dismiss the idea of pre-existence, but taught 
an ideal forn of it, i.e., that the life of Christ was hidden within the 
eternal loving will of God [ibid. p.49; see R&A bd.I, pp.294f; HD I p.331l. 
Harnack held, with Ritschl, that Christian faith has to do primarily 1;;1ith 
the work of Christ, and that expressions concerning his nature are in fact 
value- judgments concerning his workings upon believers. This leads in 
Harnack to a sharp critique of 'metaphysical christology' in the ancient 
and medieval church [ibid. p.50J. 
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In order to indicate the shape of Harnack's christology it is necessary to 
take issue with the conclusions reached by that most charitable of critics, 
Kaltenborn. He maintains that while H was always Harnack's intention not 
to e>tclude the divine from his strong emphasis on the humanity of Jesus 
{l(sltenborn, pp.122-123l, it was an intention which failed, and which was 
more perfectly fulfilled by Bonhoeffer. He holds that where Bonhoeffer•s 
emphasis on the humanity of Jesus and affection for the subordinationiat 
christology of Paul of Samosata was a Jesuanismus within a chalcedonian 
christology, Harnack's was a Jesuanismus in which the humanity of Jesus 
and the divine are in isolation from one another (ibid. pp.122-123l. God in 
the end is not revealed as God in sich. but remains the deus absconditus 
{ibid. p.64l. Kaltenborn is sketchy as to the reasons for his conclusion 
that Harnack's clear and acknowledged intention does not work. It may be 
that in his view the rejection of the chalcedonian formula in itself makes 
this inevitable. But if Harnack declined to pronounce upon the nature of 
God in sich. confining his attention to God pro nobis as revealed in 
Christ, he has not only the epistemology of Kant as an impetus, but also 
the example of Luther. 
Kaltenborn also is mistaken in ascribing a positive place in Harnadt's 
theology to the Logos, identifying it in Harnack's terminology with the 
Spirit of God, and it is significant that he must draw upon Nachlass 
material to lilake the point (ibid. pp.50f, 611. After his painstaking and 
clearly negative delineation of the origins of Logos christology which form 
the central theme of Dogmengeschichte it seems very improbable that 
Harnack could have adopted the term for himself in a positive way. 
Harnack's impatience with the false particularities of two-nature 
christology is evident in Das Wesen. though at its clearest in 
Dogmengeschichte. As noted above, he emphasises the need to take 
historical events as the reference-points and to measure Christ's 
importance in terms of his moral qualities and the impact of his 
personality. Harnack has often been, on the basis of his concern for the 
historical Jesus, lumped with the 'life of Jesus' writers of the nineteenth 
century, though he expressly-denied-the possibility -of writing- such a 'life' 
as early as 1874 CKaltenborn, p.30J. He clearly distances himself from 
such an approach: 
tlThe 'historical Christ' that, to be sure, is not the powerless Christ 
of contemporary history shewn to us through a coloured biographical 
medium, or dissipated in all sorts of controversies, but Christ as a 
power and as a life which towers above our own life and enters into 
our life as God's Spirit and God's Word" CHD I p. 721. 
Harnack again and again insists that even a portrait of Jesus arrived at 
by means of the best historical method is not the real Jesus. Kaltenborn 
reminds us of the counterpoise in Harnack to his confident insistence on 
the importance of history, which was his conviction that the flow of 
history always rationalises, levels and corrupts, and that tradition is 
therefore always far away from true remembrance. For Harnack this means 
that every certitude of salvation remains out of the question which is to 
be believed simply because of the agency of the stream of history. One 
cannot apprehend Jesus through mere historical knowledge CKaltenborn p.301. 
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Harnack's o~:m experiential view of Christ's divinity is that: 
co ... no one who accepts the Gospel, and tries to understand him Hho 
gave it to us, can fail to affirm that here the divine appeared in as 
pure a form as it can appear on earth, and to feel that for those 
who followed him Jesus was himself the strength <Kraft> of the 
Gospel. What they experienced they have told the world; and their 
message is still a living force" [WC? p.146l. 
The experience of the earliest disciples confirms this impression, for 
those who had eaten and drunk with their Master were prepared to glorify 
him: " ... not only as the revealer of God, but as the Prince of life, as the 
Redeemer and Judge of the world, as the living power of its existence" nm 
I p.76l. 
The discussion of the title 'Son of God' in Das Wesen illustrates how the 
significance of Jesus is described in Harnack in terms of the interaction 
of powerful ideas <the knowledge of the Father) with Jesus' powerful 
personality. Harnack equates Christ's power with his knowledge of the 
Father: 
co ... Rightly understood the name of Son means nothing but the 
knowledge of God ... how he came to the consciousness of his power and 
to the consciousness of the obligation and mission which this po1:;1er 
carries with it is his secret, and no psychology will ever fathom 
it ... " Cl1C? p.128l. 
The personality forged in this secret process was assured of its mission: 
Jesus was to communicate his knowledge of God to others, and he Has 
equally assured that in God's strength. he could accomplish the task. It 
was, says Harnack, out of this feeling of power <KraftgefUhl> and in the 
prospect of victory that he uttered the words, 'the Father hath committed 
all things unto me' [ibid]. Complete belief in the great ideas concerning 
the Father empowered Jesus to communicate them to others, and the vigour 
of his personal life gave further credence to the ideas themselves. His 
powerful personality acted upon the personalities of others, creating life 
and strength CWC? p.lO/DW p.Sl, empowering their own struggles with 
'nature' and ensuring them of victory. From the personality of Jesus a 
chain-reaction went forth: 
e~ ... ein Christ erzieht den anderen, an einem GemUt entzUndet sich das 
andere, und die Kraft, das zu wollen, was man billigt, entspringt 61US 
der geheimnisvollen Macht, durch die ein Leben das andere erweclct. 
Am Ende dieser Reihe von Boten und Kr~ften Gottes steht Jesus 
Christus ... " ['Das Christentum und die Geschichte', R&A bd.II, p.12l. 
As mentioned in 3.b. above, Harnack's expressions concerning das doppelte 
Evangelium. earned him much criticism, as he was understood to be 
identifying as the true gospel the gospel of Jesus' preaching only and 
subordinating Jesus to that gospel. It is clear, however, f~rom 
Dogmengeschichte that this was never his intention: 11 ... for in preachmg 
this gospel Jesus Christ everywhere calls men to himself. In him tha 
Gospel is word and deed; it has become his food, and therefore his 
personal lifa, and into this life of his he draws all others" CHD I p.591. 
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Harnack insists, however, that Jesus did not thrust this conne:ldon of ~ha 
gospel with himself into the foreground because: 10 ... No words could have 
certified it unless his life, the overpowering impression of his Personp 
had created it'0 Ubid.J. Certainly 0the gospel' is the one which Jesus 
preached, and it has only fulfilled its mission when the Father has be~m 
declared to humanity and where life is swayed by the realities tillld 
principles which ruled Jesus 1 life. But: e' ... it is in accordance with the 
mind of Jesus and at the same time a fact of history, that this Gospel can 
only be appropriated and adhered to in connection with a believing 
surrender to the person of Jesus Christ" rHO I p. 71 l. In declaring himself 
to be the Messiah Jesus gave an intelligible expression of his abiding 
significance for the disciples and his people; and also at the end of his 
life, and earlier on special occasions, he indicated that the surrender to 
his person was no passing element in their relationship to God: rather it 
corresponds to the service Jesus will perform for them and for the 
many-to give his life as a sacrifice for the sins of the world: 
<l,,He who in his preaching of the kingdom of God raised the strictest 
self-examination and humility to a law, and exhibited them to his 
followers in his own life, has described with clear consciousness his 
life crowned by death as the imperishable service by which men in all 
ages will be cleansed from their sin and made joyful in their God. 
By doing so he put himself far above all others, although they were 
to become his brethren; and claimed a unique and permanent 
importance as Redeemer and Judge. This permanent importance as the 
Lord he secured, not by disclosures about the mystery of his Person, 
but by the impression of his life and the interpretation of his 
death. He interprets it, like all his sufferings, as a victory, as the 
passing over to his glory, and in spite of the cry of Goo-
forsakenness upon the cross, he has proved himself able to awaken in 
his followers the real conviction that he lives and is Lord and Judge 
of the living and the dead ... ,. CHD I p.60l. 
Jesus makes it clear that he is not just a prophet but Lord, and proves it 
on earth by the accomplishment of mighty deeds, especially in opposition to 
the devil and his kingdom, and by his death as a AU~pov for the redemption 
of humanity UID I pp.65-66l. The question of how Harnack interprets these 
mighty deeds will be explored in· chapter five, and the redemptive 
significance of Jesus' death in 4.c below. 
In summary we may say that Harnack's thought about the person of Christ 
is chara.cterised by the following points: 
1. He was unwilling to go beyond the evidence of Jesus' own words, a.s 
recorded in the synoptic gospels, with regard to his pre-existence and to 
the precise nature of his relationship with the Fa.ther £HD I pp.318fJ. 
Harnack maintains a clear distinction between, and the complete 
subordination of, the Son to the Father CHD I pp.64f, n.3l, and he is at 
odds not only with the full-blown Logos doctrine, but with its antecedents 
in Pauline and Johannine christology. The idea of the Logos secularised 
the idea of the power of Christ, which previously had been experienced as 
the power of a new life lived in union with him, of simple, personal moral 
ernestness. Through the importation and development of the idea of the 
Logos within Christia.nity, the power of Christ became seen as a cosmic 
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force, non-~rsonal, prior to and independent of relationship CHD I pp.328-
3301. 
2. Jesus is seen e.s the mediator of true knowledge of the Father to 
others, such lmowledge being not mere information but the possibility of e. 
deep interaction of personalities. Christ is to be evaluated according to 
his spiritual and moral effectiveness. 
3. Jesus is the supremely powerful personality who takes hold of and 
transforms the inner life of others. The authority of his teaching springs 
from the personality which stands behind it <'hinter jeder Spruche steht er 
selbst'> CWC? p.48/DW pp.30-31; ibid. p.163/pp.102-103; HD I pp.41,133J. 
4. The kingdom of God which Jesus preached had already begun to arrive in 
his saving and healing activity, in the forgiveness of sins in which lllll 
other blessings were comprehended. This came through the service of his 
life crowned with death CWC? p.122l. 
5. Though not the conquering hero of contemporary expectation, Jesus may 
rightly be called Messiah: there is a paradox in his power-a divine 
strength and glory which needs no earthly power and splendour, and indeed 
which excludes them [ WC? p.138 J. 
6. Jesus' divinity is confirmed in experiential terms: for those 1:::1ho 
followed hili:lo and for those who follow him now, Jesus himself is the 
stength/power <Kraft> of the gospel. The experience and message of these 
followers is still a living force [!:JC? p.1461. 
7. The gospel empowers believers by convincing them of the true character 
of God: by looking to the historical person of Jesus, one becomes certain 
that God the powerful Judge is also Father and Redeemer CHD I p.60l. 
4.c. The work of Christ: redemption 
1. Introduction 
Harnack was convinced that the question as to what Jesus is in himself 
was not the principal question, and was one which, on epistemological 
grounds, he ~auld have been happy to set aside. The right way to evaluate 
Jesus is firstly to consider what we as individuals and the world as a 
whole would be without this person, and secondly to try to live after his 
example and suffer with him, to carry our own crosses and be confident of 
God as our Father. Mitleben with Christ is the important thing, and all 
expressions concerning the worth of Jesus only have worth themselves to 
the extent that they spring out of and are evoked by this life with hilil 
CAZH pp.93-94l. To use the traditional distinctions, for Harnack Jesus' 
significance is determined by his work rather than his person: Christ JU:Q 
~ is Christ the redeemer. 
The work olf' Christ was conceived more broadly by Harnack than was 
traditional, and as a result he was accused of ignoring or denying the 
concept centll""Sll to orthdox Lutheranism, namely the death of Christ as e. 
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vicarious atonement for sin. Harnack replied to this accusation in his 
preface to the printing of the 45-50,000th copies of Das Wesen, once agS~in 
taking his stancl on ths basis of history. This interpretation of 
ChriGUanity, he said, based on ths thought of Paul, Augustine and Luther, 
was a valid one, but to identify it with Christianity itself is to mista!.t~a 
the part for the whole and to narrow the foundation of the religion which 
Jesus himself had laid. Historical integrity impelled him to examine the 
preaching of Jesus and §11 of its outworkings. One could, he notes, ag~ee 
with Paul, Augustine or Luther without onesidedly seeing them as the whole 
[Ol:J pp.iv-vl. As we shall see, despite Harnack's insistence on a broader 
perspective for understanding the work of Christ and despite a 
reinterpretation of traditional categories, he continued to share 
substantial common ground with Paul, Augustine and Luther. Meijering 
convincingly argues that he remained much nearer than Ritschl to the 
Augustinian-Reformed tradition in the doctrines of sin and grace, and made 
them the standard for every doctrine of redemption [Meijering <1978) p.461. 
Harnack criticises traditional doctrines of redemption for ignoring the 
basics and for that reason falling into a double error. He writes in 
~o~mengeschichte: 
Q ... l:Jo das Einfachste und Schwerste nicht getroffen wird, die 
Kindschaft und der Glaube gegenUber der Schuld der SUnde, da 1st die 
FrBmmigkeit und die Spekulation dazu verurteilt, die Physis und die 
Moral <die natura divina und das bonum esse> in unendlichen 
Spekulationen zu behandeln" [quoted ibid. p.39l. 
A recalling of the most simple and most serious aspects of 
redemption-the recognition of one's position as a child of God while 
simultaneously recognising the radical seriousness of sin--and a recasting 
of soteriology in this light forms the basis of 'Christ us als ErlBser'. 
ii. 'Christus als ErlBser' 
The- argument or this important essay [R&A nf.2 pp.81-93l is in three parts. 
The first attempts to define redemption and deal with the objections to 
the concept raised by the modern world-view. The second examines the idea 
that redemption can come through human channels, and the third explains 
how redemption can be connected specifically with Jesus Christ. Quotations 
throughout are from my translation. 
Harnack begins the first part with the statement that Christianity is the 
religion of redemption because it is the religion of forgiveness, and has 
been since the 'forgive us our trespasses' of the Lord's Prayer and 'that 
paradigm of the Gospel', the parable of the prodigal son [p.81l. He notes, 
however, that for a variety of reasons, the certainty of redemption is gone 
from the modern world and, more importantly, the longing for it is almost 
extinguished. He offers several suggestions as to why this is so: some 
feel no need of redemption, others see no possibility of it. Some see the 
notion as weak and having no place in a strong, virile morality. Others 
cannot accept the conne:Kion of a present redemption with an historical 
figure who died many centuries ago. The major difficulty, however, Harnack 
describes as the modern Weltanschauung.. Psychology has given us a net:J 
picture of humanity, research into the origins of morality yields a 
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different point of view with regard to evil end sin, historical science has 
given us an historical Christ instead of a heavenly one, and critical 
philosophy has firmly delineated the boundaries of what is perceivable and 
real. The result of these labours seems to be that the concept of 
redemption can no longer be held. 
Harnack responds to this challenge in a familiar way, using the essencing 
procedure. He admits that the form in which previous generations 
experienced and expressed the concepts of 'redemption' end 'redeemer' is 
invalidated in part for those today who think critically, but maintains 
that the kernel of the matter is still viable and contains a primary 
article of religious faith which does not lose its power. To support this 
claim, he reminds us of one tenet of his anthropology, which is the 
constancy and continuity of humankind. He quotes Goethe's famous ,.Die 
Menschheit schreitet immer fort, und der Mensch bleibt immer derselbe", and 
insists that Augustine's words ''Thou, Lord, hast made us for thyself, and 
our heart is restless until it finds its rest in Thee" will find its echo 
in humanity as long as the race dwells on earth--and that the joyful 
message of redemption will survive just as long. 
Furthermore, he argues, everyone does feel the longing for redemption, not 
just the ordinary desire to better one's situation or escape certain 
limitations and burdens, but rather that deeper emotion, the longing to 
become free from the ordinary Lauf des Lebens and win a higher and deeper 
existence. Unless one is practising deliberate self-deception, he 
maintains, this noble longing, "to raise oneself above the stream of 
ordinary doing and suffering", "to become free from the service of 
transitory things'", is in everyone, though often weak and choked. The 
modern world is full of 'redeemers' promising to fulfil the longing: 
demonic ones such as drugs and debauchery, but also academic pursuits and 
art. And, Harnack adds, this modern longing for redemption still possesses 
a moral side, for anywhere that Christianity has had any influence, the 
recognition takes root that innocence and purity are the greatest good and 
guilt <Schuld> the greatest evil. Harnack maintains that it is not true 
that the majority of humanity is so sunk in the commonplace, sensual, self~ 
centred struggle that it has lost the sense of the holy and pure and the 
longing for them. To be pure and to have inner peace, he says, is still 
the longing of all longings. Only speak the right word and you will find 
it in everyone. 
Harnack further maintains that the modern Weltanschauung, with its 
emphasis on evolutionary development, runs the risk of denigrating the 
inner life and through learning the origin of moral perceptions seems at 
present to have lost the sense of their yalue. But, he argues, no 
Wissenschaft or Welterkenntnis can ultimately kill the longing for purity 
and inner peace, which is the longing for redemption. The fact that 
morality has developed from more primitive forms to higher ones will not 
always be seen as a limitation on its value: how we got here does not 
matter so much as the fact that we did. The beginnings of this moral 
development are lost in prehistory, but the latest stage began in the time 
of Socrates, Plato and the Israelite prophets and reached its fulfillment, 
within the Graeco-Roman world, through Christ and his disciples [ibid. 
p.851. 
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Harnack then describes this highest stage of moral development and asserts 
its intililate conne:don with the idea of redemption. This stage brought 
humanity a new sense and life which is e~perienced not only as an e~tern~l 
'ought 0 but also as the revelation of our true nature and as an attainable 
goal. Harnack challenges the modern historians who try to say thai the 
theme of world history is always simply the struggle for survival. ldhile 
externally history, with its secret and open war and its struggle for 
earthly possessions, has not changed much, in this stage something new has 
been added. The deepest theme of personal life and world history is now 
the struggle between belief and unbelief, that is, the struggle over God 
and redemption. Supported by the power <Macht) of the ethical and holy, 
humanity struggles to be free from the service of transitory things and to 
build a kingdom of love-the Kingdom of God. The materialist historians 
are proved wrong by the thousands who still give up everything, even their 
lives, for the sake of ethical ideals. These sacrifices are made in the 
confidence that mere life is not the highest good, and the conviction is 
not one which has to be reasoned out: the ethical, the life with God, works 
with the gentle force <Gewalt) of a natural law. 
With this idea in mind, says Harnack, we are now in the realm of 
redemption, which in the highest sense can only be the power <Macht> which 
helps us to lead a pure and holy life with God, and which fills us with 
the conviction that it is not an illusion to believe that we really do gain 
life when we lay it down. 
Part two looks at how redemption could come through human beings. The 
problem is that if redemption is to make a supernatural kingdom possible, 
then redemption cannot come from an earthly source. Only God is the 
redeemer, so it appears that a human redeemer is an impossibility. 
Harnack's response to this problem is to discuss the redemptive role of 
the prophet. He says that it was the most important step 1n the history 
of religion when people stopped looking for God in sun or storm or strange 
natural event and began to seek the divine in the words of holy 
individuals. It was then that religion was bound together with the inner 
life and with morality. God was revealed in the spirit and the words of 
the prophets, and was regarded not with less awe than when seen in nature, 
but with more: 11Then they learned that the real revelation of God can only 
happen in humanity, for God is holy, and holiness cannot reveal itself in 
nature" [ibid. p.88l. Prophets, says Harnack, are persons whose religious 
talent or capacity is so great that they can, almost without help, find and 
live in God, and they are inwardly compelled to share their experience. In 
a sense, the prophets were already redeemers, because people found God, 
the redeemer, through their preaching. It was not their own fire with 
which they burned: they were torches ignited by God, which could set 
alight the glimmering embers in others [ibid. p.89l. 
Having established that redemption in some sense can come via human 
beings, Harnack goes on to discuss why Christianity understands Jesus 
Christ to be not just a redeemer, but the Redeemer. Jesus was, says 
Harnack, a prophet, but he was also unique. Harnack then presents a series 
of 'historical facts' to substantiate this claim: 
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1. Christianity differentiates between Jesus and all prophets, recognising 
him alone· as Saviour, on the basis of his own claim to uniqueness, which 
was supported by the evidence of his life. 
2. Jesus was the last prophet: all 'prophets0 since him have either been 
false, or else dependent upon him. <For this reason Harnack feels it is 
wrong to call great Christians like Paul, Francis or Luther prophets.> 
3. Jesus is a prophet not for a small group, as the others were, but for 
many peoples and for an endless epoch: his universal appeal differs from 
that of the earlier prophets, which was limited in time and space. 
4. Jesus brought the perfect consciousness of God as holy and almighty 
Father and oerciful Love, in contrast to the earlier prophets, whose 
perception of God was imperfect and whose ideas corrected one another. 
5. In previous prophets there was a contradiction between their perception 
and their actions, where in Jesus even the sharpest eye of hate could not 
find such a contradiction. 
On the basis of these assertions Harnack concludes that it is right to 
make a distinction between Jesus and all other prophets. Jesus called 
himself the Son of God and had the right to do so. He taught his 
disciples to recognise God and he led them to God, and still today his 
gospel leads believers out of selfishness and sin and into life with God 
the redeemer. 
In the third part of the essay, it becomes clear that Harnack has other 
grounds for his belief in Jesus' uniqueness, and that the redemption which 
he brings is more than the final prophetic revelation of God the Father. 
As a 'super-prophet' Jesus is already a 'super-redeemer' by virtue of 
bringing the perfect consciousness of God to humanity, but the oldest 
Christianity, Harnack notes, said still more of Christ than this: it 
maintains that Jesus was the reconciler-dying for our sins, and that he 
·remains alive and -dwells in believers. - That Jesus takes-poss-e-ss-ion- of the-
inner life of his own, that Christians can say 'Christ lives in me', is not 
a paradox, but a fact, "a mystery of faith which mocks explanation" 
['Christus als ErH:Sser' p.90l. The question which Harnack wishes to pursue 
is whether Jesus can be said to have died 'for our sins'. He first states 
the usual objactions to such an idea: isn't God love? God didn't require 
'satisfaction' in the story of the prodigal son. Did God change from anger 
to love as a result of Christ's death? 
Harnack answers that it is an unbreakable law that the godless and those 
without peace must either deny God's existence or fear and flee God as the 
angry Judge. This alienation from God is sin itself, and the hardest 
punishment of sin. The picture of God as angry and unforgiving is a false 
one, but it is the natural outcome of the perverse course of action. How 
can this alienation be overcome; how can the 0buried-alive' sinner be freed 
from guilt, fear and despair? There is no self-redemption. Redemption 
always comes through a power <KDU.i> that comes from outside, and which 
brings life to the sinner's 'higher motive-power', the striving after higher 
goals, which 1ls never completely rooted out. The change, in Harnack's view, 
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is affected through a change of conviction and a change of experience in 
which Christ plays the central role: 
~Bhen the Holy One condescends to sinners, when He lives end travels 
with them, when He doesn't count them too trivial to be called his 
brothers, when He asks nothing of them except that they tolerate his 
presence among them, when He serves them and dies for them-then 
they believe again in the Holy because they actually experience it 
and it melts away, at the same time, their fear of its judgemental 
strength. They experience that the Holy is mercy, and that there is 
something more powerful Cmtkhtigeres) than righteousness--almighty 
Love <allm!khtiges Liebe) [ibid. p.92l. 
It is in this connexion, says Harnack, that we must set the life, word and 
death of Jesus. This is how it worked and how it still works. He created 
the conviction that forgiving love is a fact, and that it is the highest 
revelation of all higher life. This love is greater than punitive 
righteousness, and this righteousness no longer appears as the last word 
of the higher life. Whoever believes this, maintains Harnack, is reconciled 
with God. It is not God who requires reconciliation, but the individuel 
person who must be led back to God. The reconciler is Christ, for he 
saved humanity from the law of sin by which is it compelled to deny God 
or fear judgment. 
This is not, however, all that Harnack wishes to say about the meaning of 
Christ's suffering, for history teaches us, he says, that the deepest and 
most mature Christians held that reconciliation was effected not just 
through Jesus' word and life's work, but also in his suffering and death. 
When sinners understand the verdict which righteousness passes, and also 
see the Holy One suffer and die, how can they not recognise that Jesus 
suffered what they should have suffered? Before the cross, no other 
feeling or conviction is possible. Once again Harnack interposes the idea 
of mystery. He warns that with regard to the cross, the above 
observations are as far as one ought to go. Any reckoning calculation 
upon the subject must lead to uncertainty and groundless ideas [see 
Kaltenborn pp.43, 44]. Awe would fly if we at tempted to prove out the 
laws and means of almighty love. It is simply revealed as fact, and lies 
on the very edge of what can be grasped with the reason. The cross of 
Christ, he says, , ... ist wie alles Kreuz, das im Dienst der BrUder steht", 
and like merciful love itself, it is a holy mystery, hidden from the wise 
and clever, but still the power and the wisdom of God ['Christus als 
Erl8ser' p.931. 
Power themes in 'Christus als Erl8ser' 
Harnack's description of the process of redemption fits smoothly into his 
understanding of Christian teaching in terms of power. Though a few other 
themes emerge in his treatment of redemption elsewhere, basically he 
conceptualises it in terms of conflict, of bondage and liberation. 
Underneath the constant struggles in history over social, political and 
economic power-the wars and the scramble for survival-lies an inner 
power struggle between belief and unbelief, between spiritual power and 
its opposition in 'nature' and sin. Humanity fights to be free from the 
service of transitory things and to build a kingdom of love, and humanity 
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finds its support for the fight in the Ma~ht of the ethical and holy, that 
is, in the power of God. Redemption means freedom, the Macht which helps 
us to l~ad a pure and holy life and which fills us with the convicUon 
that the struggle, even to the death, is worthwhile. Redemption is 
presented as an inner power-event. The powerful idea, that the ethical 
life is not an external 'ought' but the revelation of our true nature &nd 
an attainable goal, leads to an empowering of the emotions and will which 
makes possible the attainment of the ethical life, the life with God. Yet 
this power is not the product of the individuals within whom it works, but 
comes in some sense from outside: Harnack insists, despite his description 
of spiritual power as a support to human endeavour, that there is no self-
redemption. 
Parts two and three of the argument maintain that, like all divine/spritual 
power, this power of redemption comes only from God, but reaches humanity 
through human beings, in some measure through the prophets, but uniquely 
and primarily through Jesus Christ. Harnack's discussion of the nature and 
development of the prophet is illustrative of his thinking on 
divine/spiritual power. The most important step in religious history was 
taken, he maintains, when people stopped looking for divine power in 
natural or supra-natural phenomena and sought it in the words and spirit 
of prophetic individuals. Divine/spiritual power is to be found not in 
external forces, in nature or in magic, but within personality, and it is 
not less but more powerful there than when located in sun or storm. 
Jesus' uniqueness in comparison with all other prophets is conceived 
largely, though not exclusively, in terms of a difference in power, that is, 
in effectiveness. He is the final prophet, the last and most authoritative 
word, the communicator of the most powerful ideas. His consciousness of 
God was perfect and complete, and therefore the ideas which made up his 
message were of greater authority <competent authority> than the partial 
revelations of his predecessors. His personality and message <charismatic 
authority> influenced not a small number of people, but many nations and 
an endless number of generations. And the perfect consistency with which 
his personality and activity mirrored his ideas lends him unique authority. 
But Harnack stresses that Jesus' power as redeemer was not limited to the 
perfection and purity of his revelation of the Father: he died 'for our 
sins', breaking the power of the 'law of sin', and he still lives and rules, 
an active power working within the personalities of believers. His life 
among sinners as the revelation of God creates in them a conviction, born 
of experience, of God as mercy and forgiving love so emotionally powerful 
that it breaks through their guilt, fear and despair, frees them and 
reconciles them to their heavenly Father. His suffering and death are 
involved in the power struggle: to know one's own guilt and to see the 
Holy One suffer and die is ineluctably to feel that he died in our place, 
but beyond this the place of the cross in the power struggle of redemption 
is a mystery, but still the power and the wisdom of God. 
The themes of conflict and liberation in Harnack's understanding of the 
work of Christ bear resemblances to Gustav Aul~n's interpretation of the 
'classic' or 'victory' theory of the atonement [in Christus Victor. London, 
S.P.C.K., 1970: first published 19311. Aul~n describes the 'classic' theory 
thus: 
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tl, .. the idea of the Atonement as a Divine conflict and victory; 
Christ--christus Victor-fights against and triumphs over ths svil 
powers of the world, the 'tyrants' under which mankind is in bondagG 
and suffering, and in Him God reconciles the world to Himself ... In a 
measure the hostile powers are regarded as in the service of the 
will of God the Judge of all, and the executants of his judgement. 
Seen from this side, the triumph over the opposing powers is regarded 
as a reconciling of God Himself; He is reconciled by the very act in 
which He reconciles the world to Himself" [ibid. pp. 4-5]. 
Aulen was himself attempting to develop a form of the classic theory which 
would be acceptable to modern thought. He complained that the liberals, 
including Ritschl, unjustly wrote off the theory because of its 'grotesque' 
and mythological language. Sounding very like Harnack, he complains that 
this is a criticism merely of the outward form without any attempt to get 
at the underlying idea [ibid. p.lOJ. The essentials of this idea he 
expresses in the concluding paragraphs of the book: 
tJLet it be added, in conclusion, that if the classic idea of the 
Atonement ever again resumes a leading place in Christian theology, 
it is not likely that it will revert to precisely the same forms of 
expression that it has used in the past ... It is the idea itself that 
will be essentially the same: the fundamental idea of the Atonement 
as, above all, the movement of God to man, not in the first place of 
man to God. We shall hear again its tremendous paradoxes: that God, 
the all-ruler, the Infinite, yet accepts the lowliness of the 
Incarnation; we shall hear again the old realistic message of the 
conflict of God with the dark, hostile forces of evil and His victory 
over them by the Divine self-sacrifice; above all, we shall hear again 
the note of triumph" [ibid. p.l58l. 
Aulen clearly did not recognise the similarities between the 'classic' 
theory, when stripped of its mythological language, and Harnack's ideas of 
redemption, but they are not inconsiderable [see HD I pp.92-941. Harnack 
too presents redemption as the victory of Christ over the powers of 
darkness and evil-those powers interpreted as being bondage to the 
'natural' and the finite, sin, guilt, fear and despair. Harnack's ideas 
represent the conflict not in external, mythological terms but as an 
existential struggle within the personality. Aulen apparently classed 
Harnack as another proponent of the 'subjective' theory of the atonement, 
but the truth is not that simple. Aulen represents the 'subjective' view 
of the atonement as making atonement dependent upon the individual: it is 
what the person does which determines salvation. In contrast he writes of 
the 'classic' theory: 
t3t1fherever there is such ·a view of the Divine Love, as not called 
forth by the worthiness or goodness of men, but as bestowing value 
on men by the very fact that they are loved by God, the work of the 
Divine forgiveness always appears as prior to ethical regeneration, 
not dependent upon or proportioned to human repentance or any other 
conditions on man's side. It is this primacy of the Divine Love which 
is the basis of the classic idea of the Atonement as God's own work00 
[Aulen, pp.139-1401. 
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Harnack's view can be recognised not in what Aulen here rejects, but in 
what he endorses. He maintains, in spite of his insistence that the arena 
of redemption is the individual consciousness, just this emphasis upon 
rc;~demption being the work of God and not of humanity, the reaching out of 
God to sinners and bestowing value upon them by loving them. AuMn's 
quotation accords in tone very closely with the passage from 'Christus als 
ErH:Sser' quoted above describing Christ as the Holy One condescending to 
sinners, living and travelling with them and leading them to believe once 
again in the Holy ['Christus als Erltlser' p.92l. 
Aulen describes as standard features of the classic theory, 1 > primary and 
continuous divine activity, 2> a close connexion between the atonement and 
the incarnation, 3) emphasis on Christ's deity, that is, no idea of Christ 
offering God a sacrifice as a man only, 4> a dualistic and dramatic 
presentation, 5 > the 'note of triumph' [Aulen, pp.107fl. Harnack's ideas 
have considerable points of contact: 
1. The initiative and effective power in redemption is God's: Harnack 
insists repeatedly that there is no self-redemption. 
2-3. The atonement and the incarnation are intimately connected in Harnack. 
Jesus' suffering and death are not seen as having redemptive value to the 
exclusion of his life and teaching-all of Christ's work on earth, and his 
resurrection as well, are presented as part of his redemptive work. Jesus' 
humanity is absolutely essential to his redemptive activity, for it is only 
from one personality to another that, within the iron ring, the 
divine/spiritual power can be spread. As we have seen, Harnack rejects the 
traditional two-nature Christology and so the act of incarnation itself 
receives little emphasis, but the fact of incarnation, the assertion that in 
Christ the divine appeared in as pure a form as it can on earth [~C'? 
p.146/DI:J p.921, is fundamental to Harnack's soteriology. 
4-5. The dualistic and dramatic element, and the note of triumph, are 
characteristic of Harnack's presentation of redemption----the struggle with 
the dark forces of sin and finitude and the victory of Christ which makes 
us joyful children of God. 
A further, perhaps less satisfactory, similarity lies in the inability of 
either scholar to attain rational clarity for the presentation of the 
theory. Every attempt, says Aulen, to force the classic theory into a 
rational scheme is bound to fail [Aulen, p.155l, and he criticises the idea 
that the Christian faith must be expressed in rational doctrine [ibid. p.9]. 
This accords with Harnack's use of the category of 'holy mystery•. 
Where Harnack and the classic theory part company is over the idea of the 
wrath of God. According to Aulen, the classic theory holds that God's 
wrath is a 'tyrant•, like death and the devil, and there is conflict within 
God between love and wrath, though love is affirmed to be God's inmost 
nature [ibid. p.l UJ. The hostile powers are seen as being in part in the 
service of God, executing judgment, and Christ's victory is a reconciliation 
of God with God, while at the same time effecting God's reconciliation with 
the world [ibid. pp.4-5l. Harnack will not allow that God needs to be 
reconciled or that God's attitude to humanity changes because of the work 
of Christ. Bith Ritschl he sees the concept of God as wrathful judge as a 
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false one which it is the work of Christ's redemption to overcome [ibid. 
p.138l. l:Jhere the classic idea has the alienation being on God•s 
part--God's anger at sin-Harnack sees the alienation as being solely on 
our part. Yet even here there is a parallel between the two theories, fo~ 
where the classic theory talks of the evil powers as being in part the 
executants of God's judgment, Harnack speaks of a 'law of sin', 'tha~ 
unnatural law of nature', whereby a sinner is forced to either deny God or 
flee God in fear and guilt. The sinner indeed experiences evil cmd 
suffering, and Harnack speaks in Dogmengeschichte of •wrath' and 'penalty• 
being real, but they are the result, it appears, not of the character or 
emotions of God, but of the impersonal, quasi-natural 'law' whereby the 
subjective experience of guilt and judgment are a direct consequence of 
the act of sin itself. Thus Harnack attempts to safeguard the wholly 
loving character of God while at the same time doing justice to subjective 
experience of guilt and judgment. 
It is possible to view Harnack's ideas of redemption as a psychologised and 
demythologised version of the classic theory of the atonement. Aull!n, in 
attempting to describe the difference between the subjective and the 
classic theories of the atonement, maintains that the classical, unlike the 
subjective theory, is not set forth as only or mainly a change taking place 
in humanity, but " ... describes a complete change in the situation, a change 
in the relation between God and the world, and a change also in God's own 
attitude" [ibid. p.6l. Harnack would hold, with the subjective theory, that 
the change is not in God's attitude, and that redemption is a change which 
takes place within the personality, but that this constitutes a real and 
complete change in the situation, and one which is effected from outside 
the individual. Redemption happens through the loving power of almighty 
God mediated through Jesus Christ. 
iii. Ins~hts from Dogmengeschichte 
The topical treatment of redemption in 'Christus als Erl8ser' requires 
verification and some supplementation from Harnack's longer historical 
works. One of the most detailed discussions of the atonement occurs in 
division two of Dogmengeschichte, developing through Harnack's description 
of Logos christology after Chalcedon, and of Augustine, Anselm and the 
Reformation. The key section is that devoted to Anselm. As the story 
unfolds, one becomes aware of a tension in Harnack's thought between his 
emphasis on the personal, relational natue of divine/spiritual power and 
his radical, 'realistic' conception of the power of sin. 
Augustine 
Harnack praises Athanasius for correcting Logos christology in the 
direction of a concern for redemption, while noting that atonement was not 
in fact central to his conception of redemption [HD III pp.140-141, 164-
165, 271-272; IV p.29 n.3l. Redemption also forms the central theme in 
Harnack's treatfilent of Augustine, and at a psychological, existential level. 
but there are in Harnack's opinion still problems, for Augustine's better 
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insights were confused and restrained by his adherence to official church 
dogma, and by his allegiance to neoplatonism. 
Augustine's great contribution according to Harnack concerned God and the 
soul, '' ... to show what God is, and what salvation the soul requires" CHD V 
p.lOJ. He could not, however, connect, at a theoretical level, God, the work 
of Christ, and salvation. His system of doctrine and his impassioned love 
for God were not clearly connected in theory with Christ's work and death 
Cibid.l. It was not until the time of Bernard and Francis that 
Augustinianism was able to grasp that: " ... impassioned love to the Eternal 
and Holy One found its object in the Crucified ... " and that " ... the most 
profound of thoughts had dawned upon it, that the suffering of the 
innocent was salvation in history," (ibid.J. 
Harnack identifies a parallel lack of connexion in Augustine, between the 
christological emphases of Augustine the church dogmatist and Augustine 
the man of living piety. The latter, Harnack holds, is the man at his 
truest and best. Through his piety Augustine knew the true nature of 
Jesus--strength made perfect in weakness, what is great and good always 
appearing in a lowly state and by the power of the contrast triumphing 
over pride [fiD V pp.132-133l. He was unable, however, to reduce this 
christology to a dogmatic formula [HD V pp.133-134l. Augustine held by 
the old formulae because they were part of tradition and expressed the 
uniqueness of Christ, but his true foundation, insists Harnack, was the 
Christ who co ... has broken down his own pride, and had given him the power 
to find God in lowliness and apprehend him in humility ... " [ibid.]. 
Christ's expiatory work did, however, come to the fore via the development 
of the system of penance, both in Ambrose and Augustine and afterwards, 
and there not the incarnation but the death of Christ was the main issue. 
The accent was on Christ's human nature: Jesus the mediator was looked on 
as the man whose voluntary achievement possessed an infinite value by the 
special dispensation of God DID V p.54l. 
A further colilplication with regard to Augustine concerned grace. Harnack 
held that Augustine was the first to establish the mistaken idea that 
grace had an objective character. Such a view diverted believers from 
Christ himself to his merit, i.e. what he had gained for them. His doctrine 
of grace was relatively independent of the historical Christ, and he ran 
the risk of neutralising Jesus' general significance by teaching that his 
work referred to and exhausted itself in the forgiveness of sins, which 
did not indeed yield all that a Christian needs for salvation. This 
independence of grace from Christ persisted in the church. Luther, sett~ 
out from Augustinianism, did overcome it, to think of God, and grace, only 
as he knew them in Christ [HD V p.86; see also ch. 5 pp. 127fl. 
Anselm 
Harnack's discussion of Anselm, and the short following section on Abelard, 
forms the heart of his treatment of redemption. One must of course 
question whether Harnack's understanding of Anselm was correct, and there 
is evidence to suggest that it contains distortions. But ultimately our 
concern is with Harnack's own theology, and the view of Anselm which he 
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presents becomes at many points a foil against which to present his own 
convictions. 
Anselm was, according to Harnack, the first theologian to formulate a clear 
doctrine of the saving work of Christ, and he did this by employing the 
principles of the practice of penance [HO VI p.56J. His work was a 
reconstruction of the whole of dogma from the viewpoint of sin Cillld 
redemption, a viewpoint which, Harnack notes, theologians today, including 
evangelicals, still consider valid [HO VI p.67J. Harnack praises Anselm for 
at last effecting the separation of grace from nature and its relocation 
in history, with redemption coming through the historical person of Christ, 
through his life and death, as opposed to the Logos [HO VI pp.69-70, 73-
7~1. Praise is also due for his emphasis on the humanity of Christ and on 
the moral necessity of Christ's death, with guilt rather than the 
consequences of sin <i.e. death> being at the heart of the matter ribid.J. 
Harnack frames four major criticisms of Anselm's theory, which reflect his 
own positive convictions: 
1. The humanity of Christ is still not taken seriously enough: his death, 
as a sacrificial act, obscures his life and personality [HO VI p.78 l. 
2. The theory provides for only the possibility of salvation: only "the 
feeble thought of example' remains, which does not have the power to 
'incite earnest imitation'. There is here no assurance, and no real 
redemption for the individual. To get to a real redemption, Anselm had to 
go beyond his own theory [HO VI pp.68-72, 76-781. 
3. No 'penalty' is involved, and thus the gravity of sin is not taken 
seriously enough in spite of Anselm's attempts to do so: 
11l:Jith every effort to express it as strongly as possible, the gravity 
of sin <pondus peccati> is not treated with sufficient earnestness if 
the __ thought_ of penalty,_ __ and ___ ~her_efor:~ __ also of _vicarious __ penal 
suffering, is entirely eliminated. In the idea that sin can be 
compensated for by something else than penalty there lies an 
underestimate of its gravity that is extremely objectionable. A 
recognition of the deep proposition that the innocent suffers for the 
guilty, that the penalty lies upon him, that we might have peace, is 
not to be found in the Anselmic theory ... •• [H[) VI p. 701. 
Harnack insists that while Anselm rightly apprehends that sin is primarily 
guift before God, he wrongly equates this guilt not with a lack of trust, 
but with personal injury. He comments: ''How anyone pleases to deal with 
personal injuries is a matter for himself; on the other hand, the guilt 
which is want of child-like fear and love, and which destroys God's world, 
must be w1.ged out, whether it be in wrath or in love. Anselm fails .to see 
that'' HID VI p.74l. Thus, while describing the nature of sin in 
psychological rather than juridical terms, Harnack has no wish to min~ise 
its seriousness. It is not a personal, interior-moral matter only, for it 
destroys God's world. In What is Christianity?, Harnack similarly reminds 
us that Jesus, 11 ... knows of a power which he thinks still worse than want 
and misery, namely sin; and he knows of a force still more emancipating 
than mercy, namely, forgiveness" HJC? p.94l. 
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4. The theory outrages the character of God 0 as to God's justice, goodness 
and unity: 
'\ .. the mythological conception of God as the mighty private man, !:!ho 
is incensed at the injury done to His honour and does not forego His 
wrath Ull He has received an at least adequately great equivalent; 
the quite Gnostic antagonism between justice and goodness, the Father 
being the just one, and the Son the good; the frightful idea ... that 
mankind are delivered from the wrathful God ... the dreadful thought 
that God is superior to man, as having the prerogative of not being 
able to forgive from love, a payment always being needed by Him ... 0 
[HD VI pp.76-78; see also pp.60f, 72, 731. 
Harnack adds in a footnote that such conclusions about God can only be 
explained by the fact that the thought of God as the Father who is nigh 
us had fallen into the background in the Middle Ages, and the old view of 
the Trinity as unity was no longer held CHD VI p.76 n.ll. The paragraph 
quoted above, which insists that Anselm erred in removing the idea of 
penalty for sin, seems to be at variance with Harnack's horror of the idea 
of a God who could not forgive from love but required payment. The key 
to understanding this as something other than a contradiction lies in the 
words 'a payment demanded by Him'. In Harnack's view 'penalty' is not a 
payment to God for God's sake: it arises rather out of sin as an inevitable 
consequence similar to a natural law. Harnack notes with interest the 
thought, occasionally present in Anselm, that God cannot simply pardon 
humanity for humanity's own sake-because those polluted by sin would not 
be as they !:!ere before the Fall even if admit ted to paradise. Harnack 
sees this as an important turn of thought in Anselm, and regrets that it 
was not further developed [HD VI p. 721. He also insists that Anselm's 
theory is not a doctrine of reconciliation, for it does not explain how the 
opposition of will between God and sinful humanity is removed CHD VI 
p.68fl. 
Abelard 
Harnack's treatment of Abelard is much briefer than that of Anselm, but it 
is clear that in many ways he feels that Abelard offers an advance. While 
criticising him for not taking penalty and the gravity of sin more 
seriously <he " ... did not perceive that the sinner cannot be otherwise 
delivered from guilt than by experiencing and seeing the penalty of guilt"' 
[HD VI p.80l> , and thus not adequately appreciating the cost of love [see 
Meijering <1978> p.45l, Harnack praises him for his love-centredness with 
regard to the atonement, and his use of relational and psychological rather 
than objective concepts to express it. Christ's merit is his service of 
love, which characterised his whole life and not only his death: love calls 
forth responsive love in us, and in this interchange of love is found the 
forgiveness of sins CHD VI pp.78-79l. Harnack defends both Abelard and 
himself from criticisms about a 'psychological' approach, and in the process 
sheds much light on what he means by penalty: 
N,, the T:!ord 'psychological' is here meant to create an impression of 
the profane, but we have surely only the choice between this and the 
physico-chemical ... Is it not the penalty for man that as a sinner he 
must think of a God of terror, and can anything greater take place in 
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heaven or earth than when a men's feelings are revolutionised, i.e., 
when his fear of a God of terror is trensformed into trust and love? 
If it were possible to bring home to the sinner the thought of the 
loving God, in whom he can have confidence, while he feels himself 
guilty, then certainly Christ would have died in vainj but that is e 
contrad!ctio in adjecto" [l-ID VI p.80 n.l.l. 
The Reformation 
Harnack's treatment of the reformation is problematic in several ways. The 
first concerns the accuracy of the image of catholic piety which serves as 
the foil for Luther. The second concerns Harnack's choice to present 
Luther and only Luther as the exemplar of the reformation CHD VII p.25 n.2, 
p.268 n.l ], The third concerns the accuracy of his portrait of Luther, 
given Harnack's conscious choice, for his evaluation, of that which in 
Luther was unique to the exclusion of that in him which was characteristic 
of his time. For our purposes, however, these questions are of secondary 
interest: we look at Harnack's Luther in order to know Harnack. Here his 
major christological themes find clear expression, if not the denouement 
one might have expected after the eloquence and passion of his discussion 
of Anselm. 
In Harnack's view the pre-reformation upsurge in individualism and piety 
forced the question of the certitude salutis to the centre of 
ecclesiastical life and politics [HD VI pp.84f, 99). Related to the question 
of assurance was the question of knowledge, i.e. where true knowledge of 
God was to ba found. Both questions find their answer in the histories! 
_Christ. God can be known only from personal life, and in a way that 
awakens conviction, only from the personal life of Christ. To know him is 
to know his redemptive activity [HO VI p.181, VII pp.195, 197, 199, 210fl. 
Harnack maintains that in Luther the objective categories of sin and 
holiness are transformed into the relational ones of guilt and forgiveness. 
Jesus, by his life and death, suffered wrath and penalty for us, 
reconciling us with the Father. In this we come to understand the 
humility of God, who is so little and lowly that we can lay hold of him 
and enclose him in our hearts CHD VII pp.198-200l. It is also possible to 
conceive of Luther's difference with the ancient church over assurance of 
salvation in power terms: for the latter, the revelation in Christ was the 
precondition of actual salvationj for the former, Harnack says, it was 'the 
sole efficient factor'. The question here is, 'where does the power come 
from to effect actual redemption in personal life?' Luther's answer is 
that the power is all God's from beginning to end [HD VII p.229l. 
iv. Strength oade perfect in weakness: Harnack's theologia crucis 
Kaltenborn presents Harnack as a representative of theologia ~loriae with 
no theologia crucis CKaltenborn, pp.42, 451. He portrays his thought as a 
kind of optioistic triumphalism: religion is a super-concept which finally 
subsumes everything-there is no possibility of atheism. There is one 
reality for the world, and it is an optimistic one: 'Humanity works in 
history as if God existed' [ibid. pp.125-126l. With this Kaltenborn 
contrasts the sharp theologia crucis to which Bonhoeffer came in prison: 
'We live in ~he world, and God indeed so leads us to live, as if God did 
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not exist'. The God who is with us is also the God who forsakes us. God 
went to the cross, and is weak in the world, and only so is he by us and 
helps us. Kaltenborn notes that Bonhoeffer's thaologia crucis did not lead 
him to a pessimistic world-view, and that this is probably the result of 
Harnack's influence [ibid]. What he seems unable to recognise is the 
theolo~ia crucis theme which is clearly present in Harnack in spite of his 
wholehearted optimism, and which forms a central theme in his teaching 
with regard to the atonement. For Harnack also, God is a humble God, 'so 
little and lowly that we can lay hold of him and enclose him in our 
hearts'. Sykes refers to Harnack's theme of strength in weakness, of the 
humility and suffering of God in Christ, as a 'hidden theologia crucis' 
[private communication, 19881; I would describe it as the perennial minor 
key in Harnack which balances and gives depth to his optimism. Strength 
made perfect in weakness is the power paradox which Harnack sees as 
central to the Christian message. In explicit terms it is largely absent 
from 'Christus als Erl8ser', but we find it repeatedly in the major books. 
In describing Jesus in Das Wesen Harnack contrasts two kinds of power: 
" ... 'strength is made perfect in weakness'. That there is a divine 
strength <gBttliche Kraft> and glory which stands in no need of 
earthly power <Macht) and earthly splendour, nay excludes them; that 
there is a majesty of holiness and love which saves and blesses 
those upon whom it lays hold, was what he knew who in spite of his 
lowliness called himself the messiah, and the same must have been 
felt by those who recognised him as the king of Israel anointed by 
God10 [~C? p.l38/DW p.88l. 
Harnack's discussion of the manner in which Christ's death was conceived as 
an expiatory sacrifice also illustrates the value in his eyes of lowly 
suffering. Of the various interpretations suggested by Jesus' death, says 
Harnack, the idea that injustice and sin deserve to be punished, and that 
the suffering of a just man makes atonement for and purifies us was the 
most powerful [WC? p.159l. The concept of blood-sacrifice is a deep-seated 
-religious -idea,---common- to- many nations, and Christ •s-death- clearly: " ... had 
the value of an expiatory sacrifice, for otherwise it would not have had 
strength to penetrate into that inner world in which blood-sacrifices 
originated, but it was not a sacrifice in the same sense as the others, or 
else it could not have put an end to them" £WC? pp.157-158l. 
In Dogmengeschichte Harnack describes how the monastic revival and the 
crusades reawakened a keen interest in the historical Jesus, the Christ of 
the gospels, who took his place alongside the Christ of dogma and 
sacrament. Christ-mysticism flourished, with a deep veneration for his 
sufferings, for his majesty in humility, innocence in penal suffering, life 
in death, the combined spectacle of suffering and glory in 'Ecce homo'. 
Harnack comments that this piety at its best: 01 ... is the simple 
expression ... of the Christian religion itself'; for in reverence for the 
suffering Christ, and in the power which proceeds from his image, all the 
forces of religion are embraced" [HD VI p.91. This is a liberating message: 
" ... that the divine is to be found in humility and in patient suffering, 
and that the innocent suffers that the guilty may have peace" [ibidl. 
This is the paradox of power through powerlessness which forms a repested 
theme in Harnack's christologicsl writing. A key phrase for understanding 
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Harnack's view of the atonement is: " ... the most profound of thoughts ... that 
the suffering of the innocent was salvation in history" [HD V p.lOJ. 
In Mission and Ex~ansion Harnack describes the impact of Jesus upon the 
lives of the first Christians under the metaphor of the 'wounded healer'. 
He first of all says that Jesus appeared among his people as a physician, 
healing illness of body end soul, both of which are expressive of the 
supreme ailment of humanity which is sin: 
~ ... In this way he won men and women to be his disciples ... They t;rere 
healed because they had believed on him, i.e. because they had gained 
health from his character and words. To know God meant a sound 
soul. This was the rock on which Jesus had rescued them from the 
shipwreck of their life. They knew they were healed, just because 
they had recognised God as the Father in his Son10 [M&E I p.101J. 
Yet, Harnack continues, the physician it seems could not help himself. 
Persecuted, he went to the cross: 
tl ... But even the cross only displayed for the first time the full 
depth and energy of his saving power. It put the copestone on his 
mission, by showing men that the sufferings of the just are the 
saving force in human history. 'Surely he hath borne our sickness 
and carried our sorrow; by his stripes we are healed'. This was the 
new truth that issued from the cross of Jesus. It flowed out, like a 
stream of fresh water, on the arid souls of men and on their dry 
morality. The morality of outward acts and regulations gave way to 
the conception of a life which was personal, pure, and divine, which 
spent itself in the service of the brethren, and gave itself up 
ungrudgingly to death. This conception was the new principle of life. 
It uprooted the old life swaying to and fro between sin and 
virtue ... The disciples went forth to preach the tidings of 'God the 
Saviour', of that Saviour and physician whose person, deeds and 
sufferings were man's salvation ... " [M&E I pp.102-103; see also ibid. 
pp.104f, 109 n.4,1. · · 
In another passage from Mission and Expansion we see how Harnack combined 
his 'victory' and 'strength in weakness' themes. He says that an important 
element in Christianity as the religion of the Spirit and power was its 
regard for the lowly, for sorrow, suffering and death, and its triumphant 
victory over these contradictions of human life, exemplified in the 
Redeemer's life and cross: 
" ... Blent with patience and hope, this reverence overcame any external 
hindrance; it recognised in suffering the path to deity, and thus 
triumphed in the midst of all its foes ... Here lies the root of the 
most profound factor contributed by Christianity to the development 
of the moral sense, and contributed with perfect strength and 
delicacy ... "· [M&E I pp.217-2181. 
Harnack notes that this mood had its negative side, being corrupted into 
an aesthetic of death, agony and raptures over suffering, or trivialised by 
custom and common talk. But, he holds, however much we may deplore its 
corruption: '0 ... we should never forget that it represented the shadow 
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thrown by the most profound and at the same time most heroic mood of the 
human soul in its spiritual exaltation; it is, in fact, religion itself, 
fully ripe" [ibid. p.218l. 
Harnack appaars to present 'strength made perfect in weakness' as 
something of a universal law of the spirit. He describes the cross as 
presenting this 'new truth', perhaps moving humanity to a higher plane of 
moral development, but often it appears that rather than creating a new 
situation, the cross is the supreme revelation and example of an eternal 
truth. This would be on a par with his insistence that redemption comes 
when sinful alienated human beings can accept the eternal truth of God's 
fatherly love. However, the themes of penalty and Harnack's insistence 
that reconciliation of the opposed wills of God and humanity is needed 
suggest that redemption comes not only through revelation and acceptance 
of the eternal status quo, but also through the specific action of Jesus. 
There is more than a little ambivalence on this subject in Harnack's 
writing. 
4-.d. Summary and further observations 
What understanding of Jesus Christ emerges from Harnack's historical 
analysis? t:lhen he expresses his own opinion on this subject, what does he 
say? To the speculative christology of the Logos Harnack opposes the 
figure of the historical Jesus, i.e. the Christ of the gospels. The 
authentic western form, which eventually rendered the official church 
christology a mere formula, corresponds to the clearest passages of the 
New Testament and is simply this, that Christ was the object of the 
Father's grace, carried out the work which the Father entrusted to him, and 
by the Father wes exalted. To the question 'was Jesus divine?' Harnack 
would answer in the affirmative but on his own terms: in Jesus the divine 
appeared in as pure a form as it can on earth. This revelation of God in 
humanity is the human individuality of Jesus in its simple loftiness, its 
heart-winning love, and its holy earnestness. Harnack is happy to note 
that via the monastic revival and the crusades the historical Christ took 
his place baside the Christ of dogma and sacrament-the Christ Bho 
embodied majesty in humility, innocence in penal suffering, life in death, 
suffering in glory. This piety at its best 'is the simple expression of 
the Christian religion itself: for in reverence for the suffering Christ, 
and in the power which proceeds from his image, all the forces of rel~ion 
are embraced'. Jesus teaches us that 'the divine is to be found in 
humility and in patient suffering' and we see the truth that 'the suffering 
of the innocent was salvation in history'. 
Through his 'editorial comment' as Harnack reviews the centuries of 
soteriological thought we learn much about his own view. In Athanasius 
and Augustine he observes redemption becoming the centre of theological 
thought. Augustine's warm piety represents that redemption in 
psychological, existential terms, and recognises the true Jesus, whose 
divine strength and glory appear in lowliness and weakness. Harnack 
welcomes Augustine's emphasis on the humanity of Jesus the mediator, and, 
in contrast to Augustine, asserts the personal rather than objective nature 
of grace. Anselm is praised for integrating the redemptive significance of 
Jesus' life and death, for stressing Jesus 0 humanity and the moral 
necessity of his death. Partly in agreement with and partly in contras~ to 
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Anselm, Harnack develops his idea of the gravity of sin and the importance 
of penalty, noting that penalty is necessary, but not as a payment to God. 
The idea in suggested that H is necessary for humanity'~ own sake. 
Abelard's contribution is seen as his psychological, relational approach and 
his understanding of Christ's death as showing us the cost of love. !:11th 
the reformation comes a further understanding of the relational rather 
than objective nature of redemption, the important category of assurance 
of salvation, and a vivid psychological description, in the experience of 
Luther, of the redemptive process from the point of view of the believer, 
along with an insistence on salvation being entirely initiated and 
sustained by God. 
Harnack expresses Luther's spiritual experience in power terms which by 
now are familiar to us. Faith is 'living assurance of the living God', 
unwavering trust in the God of grace: we have confidence, certainty and 
assurance of salvation because in his redemptive work Christ 'undertakes 
our cause'. Faith is a vigorous laying hold, by the individual, of God in 
Christ, which creates stability, firmness, joy, transformation and renewal, 
and gives the individual dominion over the world. It is in this context, 
the triumph of divine/spiritual power over nature/necessity/the world, that 
Harnack places Luther's doctrine of 'the freedom of a Christian man'. This 
freedom was no empty emancipation or licence for every kind of 
subjectivity: " ... for him freedom was dominion over the world, in the 
assurance that if God be for us, no one can be against us, "[HD VII pp.l85-
186l. It was a freedom inwardly bound by the duty of trusting God 
courageously and of serving one's neighbour [ibid.]. Luther in his 'unfree 
will' found the freedom and courage to defy the entire world, and Harnack 
asserts that the freedom of the individual which protestantism champions 
has its root here: " ... The Christian is through his God an independent 
being, who is in need of nothing, and neither stands under bondage to laws 
nor is in dependence on men" CHD VII p.212l. He is under no priest, and is 
a king over the world [ibid]. By admitting his powerlessness ('with force 
of arms we nothing can'> Luther found power ('freedom and force'). Here is 
divine/spiritual power-rooted in the historical Christ and in the ability 
of his personal life to transform life, rooted in certainty and in one 
strong, simple, profound concept of God. 
We have seen that Harnack's christology is overwhelmingly a redemption-
centred christology, and is dominated by the following insights: 
-The redemption Christ brings is not an abrogation of being human, i.e. 
not, as in Greek ideas, an ontological transformation from created nature 
to divinity. 
-Redemption as the supreme good cannot be separated from the morally 
good: the chasm which separates God and humanity is not fundamentally of 
nature but of will. 
-Redemption/salvation is for this present life and not just in a 
preliminary way-i.e. the concern is not solely with the hereafter. 
-Atonement, via penal suffering, is central to redemption. The redemption 
in Christ provides more than a precondition and an example, for we do not 
have the power in ourselves for obedience and imitation. It is, rather, e 
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real redemption, through vicarious penal suffering; this innocent suffering 
is an act of power, with the effect of wiping out the guilt <radical 
mistrust> which is destroying God's world. The action is all God's: but our 
acceptance of it brings assurance, comfort to the distressed conscienc€l, 
and empowers us to lead the life of love in imitation of Christ for which 
we longed but were powerless to attain [JID VI pp.70, 71 fl. Sin and its 
guilt must be dealt with, not for God's sake but for ours: they are 
powerful destructive forces, which can only be neutralised by the strange 
majestic law of the power of innocent suffering. 
Harnack's christology, for all its merits, raises several serious questions. 
In the first place, how does he reconcile his insistence on the uniqueness 
and particularity of the historical Jesus with his presentation of 
Christianity as the universal, absolute religion which has been true from 
all eternity? This would pose no particularly great problem if Harnack 
believed in Jesus' pre-existence, but in rejecting this route he is left 
with something of a problem. The second question arises from the first, 
and asks whether Jesus is definitive of truth in a causal sense, or 
whether he is simply the supreme illustration of universal truth. A third 
question which remains is to what extent Harnack actually manages to find 
a place for the cross in his understanding of redemption. The fourth 
question asks whether Harnack's employment of the category of 'holy 
mystery' does not blunt his apologetic effectiveness and theological 
clarity. 
What is clear in spite of these tensions and ambiguities is that, in 
Harnack's christology, atonement and redemption are power terms. Whether 
convincingly to reveal an eternal condition, or to effect a change in 
condition, power was required. Why was a death needed, and the death of 
this man? To release power: 'the suffering of the innocent is salvation in 
history'. How is power, the power to live as a new creation, released by 
his death? 'What is great and good always appears in a lowly state and by 
the power of the contrast triumphs over pride'. Pride is another manner 
of conceiving the problem-. the pride which _cannot trust_ in a child-like 
way. The power of God becomes accessible to us when we find the courage 
to trust. Our resources of courage and conviction lie in the powerful 
personality of Christ. Is it just awakening conviction in us which is the 
power-event which shifts us from the kingdom of sin and futility to the 
kingdom of God? It seems not. There is penalty inherent in our lack of 
trust, which Christ by his 'imperishable service', his suffering and death, 
'pays'. Yet Anselmic categories do not hold, for the wrath and terror and 
the judgment are ultimately within me: 'is it not the penalty for man that 
as a sinner he must think of a God of terror ... ?' Christ lived, suffered 
and died because there was no other way 'to bring home to the sinner the 
thought of a loving God'. In this bringing-home, a redemptive inner power-
event of incalculable proportions takes place, and thus Christ in his 
weakness becomes the power of God. The fatherhood of God as revealed in 
Christ also partakes of the power paradox of strength through weakness. 
Instead of a domineering God exercising power upon us, Harnack's view of 
the gospel reveals the empowering God who liberates us at great cost. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MISUNDERSTANDING DIVINE POWER: MIRACLES, ESCHATOLOGY, 
SACRAMENTS 
5.a. Introduction 
The third quest ion which is to be put to Harnack is, 'Given the iron ring 
and the improbability of the mythological view of divine/spiritual power, 
how does one account for miracles, for supernatural events, and for 
millenarian enthusiasm, and how does one understand the meaning of 
sacrament?' Miracles and prophecy were the traditional proofs of divine 
power in the Christian revelation, and therefore they form a subject which 
any reinterpretation of that power must address. Sacraments may not at 
first glance appear to fit in the same category as miracles and 
eschatology, but Harnack's treatment, which focusses on the catholic idea 
of the sacraments as vehicles of a miraculous, objective grace, makes it 
appropriate to group the subjects together. As one might expect from his 
epistemology of the iron ring, there can be little room in Harnack's system 
for these very external expressions of divine activity. He does not, 
however, make categorical pronouncements or consign all miracle-stories to 
the realm of mythology, and by various routes manages to allow the 
integrity of at least some of the historical sources which include reports 
of supernatural occurances. Harnack's dilemma here is that his 
epistemology precludes the miraculous, but as an early church historian he 
finds that his texts are full of it, and in order to respect their 
integrity he must take it seriously. In order to satisfy the claims of 
both history and epistemology it is necessary for Harnack to explain the 
phenomena without explaining them away, and in order to do so he adopts 
several strategies. The chief of these is to represent miracles, 
eschatological convictions, and sacraments understood as a means of 
objective grace as misunderstandings, as erroneous externalisations of 
internal, di_vine/spiritual power, or occasionally as the effects in the 
natural world caused by internal divine/spiritual power [t-JC? p.28/DW p.19l. 
At points, as we shall see, Harnack's treatment is plainly reductionist, but 
more often his approach is inductive, tracing back the unlikely tale of the 
supernatural to the fresh, vivid, spiritual experience which came to be 
expressed in a miraculous or supernatural form. 
There is ambivalence in Harnack's examination of ecstasy and enthusiasm, 
miracles and eschatology, for while he wishes to explain these 
manifestations of 'the Spirit' in the early church as either natural events 
rooted in human psychology or as mistaken externalisations of inner 
experience, he desires strongly to endorse the spiritual force, freshness 
and power which were demonstrated by the early church under the power of 
'the Spirit'. He wishes to deny that miracles, in the sense of mighty 
external power-events intervening in the order of nature, take place, yet 
he wants to affirm the 'miraculousness' of the corresponding inner 
experience of Christians, the sense of divine empowering which enables 
them to meet life serenely and courageously: 
C3 ... We are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time is 
subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as an 
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:Interruption of the order of Nature, there can be no such things as 
'miracles'. But t.~e also recognise that the religious man-if religion 
really permeates him and is something more than a belief in the 
religion of others-is certain that he is not shut up within a blind 
and brutal course of Nature, but that this course of Nature serves 
higher ends, or, as it may be, that some inner and divine pot.~er can 
help us so to encounter it as that 'everything must necessarily be 
for the ~st 0 • This experience, which I might express in one word 6\S 
the ability to escape from the power and service of transitory 
things, is always felt afresh to be a miracle each time that it 
occurs ... Hot:J clearly and logically, then, must a religious man think, 
if, in spite of this experience, he holds firmly to the inviolable 
character of what happens in space and time. Bho can wonder that 
even great minds fail to keep the two spheres quite separate? And 
as we all live, first and foremost, in the domain not of ideas but of 
perceptions, and in a language of methaphor, how can we avoid 
conceiving that which is divine and makes us free as a mighty power 
working upon the order of Nature, and breaking through or arresting 
it? This notion, though it belong only to the realm of fantasy and 
metaphor, will, it seems, last as long as religion itself" [t1C? pp.26-
271. 
Harnack closes his discussion on miracles by insisting that the question of 
miracles is of relative indifference in comparison to everything else which 
is to be found in the gospels: 
c; ... It is not miracles that matter; the question on which everything 
turns is whether we are helplessly yoked to an inexorable necessity, 
or whether a God exists who rules and governs, and whose power to 
compel Nature we can move by prayer and make a part of our 
experience" (BC? p.30l. 
There appears to be a contradiction bett.~een the two- statements.- God 
possesses the power to compel nature, which power we can move by prayer, 
and yet the order of nature is not and cannot be broken. The cause of the 
contradiction may lie simply in carelessness of speech in the lecture-hall, 
or it may be that the resolution may be found in the expression 'move by 
prayer and make a part of our experience', i.e. that the power which is 
moved by prayer is not directly over nature, but over how we encounter it. 
Harnack himself appears to be tripping over the language of metaphor. In 
any event, the opinion expressed in the first quotation may be safely 
taken to be Harnack's characteristic position, though the contradiction 
hints at a persistent ambivalence in Harnack, perhaps an unwillingness, in 
spite of his epistemological convictions, to quite let go of the 
supernatural interpretation of Christianity. 
This opinion, and the ambivalence, is confirmed by reference to a lengthy 
footnote on the subject in Dogmengeschichte. The historian cannot, he 
says, regard a miracle as a sure, given, historical event because to do so 
destroys the aode of consideration on which all historical investigation 
rests. He adds: 
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Cl ... But should the historian, notwithstanding, be convinced that Jesus 
Christ did extraordinary things, in the strict sense miraculous 
things, then, from the unique impression he has obtained of this 
parson, h® infers the possession by him of supernatural power. This 
conclusion itself belongs to the province of religious faith: though 
there has seldom been a strong faith which has not drawn it oo (}ID I 
p.65 n.3J. 
As noted above, Harnack is careful to place the whole question of miracles 
in a position of secondary importance. While insisting that the healing 
miracles at any rate cannot be cut from the historical accounts without 
destroying the accounts themselves [ibid.J, he insists that Jesus himself 
downplayed the significance of these things £WC? pp.28-29l. He refuses to 
base the importance of Jesus upon these 'signs and wonders', holding them 
to be unfit, after 1800 years, to secure any special status for Jesus 
unless it were already established by other means. The other, and correct, 
means for establishing Jesus' importance he expresses thus: 
" ... That he could do with himself what he would, that he created a new 
thing without overturning the old, that he won men to himself ·by 
announcing the Father, that he inspired without fanaticism, set up a 
kingdom without politics, set men free from the world without 
asceticism, was a teacher without theology, at a time of fanaticis& 
and politics, asceticism and theology, is the great miracle of his 
person, and that he who preached the Sermon on the Mount declared 
himself, in respect of his life and death, to be the redeemer and 
Judge of the world, is the offence and foolishness which mock all 
reason"' [HD I p.65 n.3.J. 
Jesus' significance lies not in his wonder-working, but in the 'inner 
miracle' of his personality and achievements. Similarly Christian character 
was to show itself less in signs and wonders than in the ordinary 
circumstances of human life [WC? p.171 J. Harnack insists that one cannot 
escape the claims of the gospel with the excuse that miracles are 
impossible, for the underlying truth to which they point remains: "In spite 
of these stories, nay in part even in them, we are presented with a 
reality which has claims upon our participation [WC? p.28/DW p.19J. 
5.b. Ecstasy. enthusiasm and miracles in the early church 
In Das Wesen. Harnack explains the religious enthusiasm of the early 
church in natural rather than supernatural terms, as an explosion of the 
elementary forces of the religious temperament which had been long held in 
check by rigid dogma and ritual, and which were set free through the 
Christian preaching. These forces: '' ... showed themselves in ecstatic 
phenomena, in signs and wonders, in an enhancement of all the functions of 
life, down to conditions of a pathological and suspicious character" CWC? 
p.166l. Fortunately Christianity demonstrated its goodness and greatness 
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by subordinating all states of ecstasy to the spiritual purport and moral 
discipline <Zucht) of the faith (T:JC? pp.166-167l. There were plenty of 
marvels, but the gospel: " ... was no less effective in heightening the 
religious and moral powers, which operate with such purity and power in 
certain individuals that they bear palpably the stamp of their divine 
origin'' [M&E I p.201J. It was a proof of the inwardness and moral po1::1er 
of the new message that in spite of the enthusiasm generated by the 
personal experience of religion, there were relatively few extravagant or 
violent movements to be combatted, and that Paul, who in no way sought to 
quench 'the Spirit', could be stern in his correction when the situation got 
out of hand (WC? pp.170-171 l. "Where," Harnack asks, "have we another 
example in history of a religion intervening with such a robust 
supernatural consciousness, and at the same time laying the moral 
foundations of the earthly life of the community so firmly as this 
message?" me? p.171J. 
The treatment in Dogmengeschichte brings to expression somewhat more 
clearly Harnack's positive attitudes towards enthusiastic phenomena. One 
may see the whole transpotentiation theme which governs Dogmengeschichte 
as a lament for the passing of vital, enthusiatic faith. In a passage on 
the alteration in the church by the year 200 which was clearly the 
prototype for the famous version in Das Wesen quoted in l.c. above [HD I 
pp.45-461, Harnack favours the original, enthusiastic form. What is 
commended is 'enthusiastic, independent Christians', 'the living faith', 
'surrender to Christ', 'the Holy Church', "the glowing hope of the kingdom of 
heaven', 'prophecy', 'the bearers of the Spirit', 'miracles and healings', 
'fervent prayers', 'renunciation of the world', 'the Spirit' Ubidl. Harnack 
also indicates the positive value of the eschatological element, saying 
that it continues to surface and guard Christianity against secularisation 
UID I pp.129-130l. Indeed he virtually champions Montanism as a 'last 
stand' of the old enthusiasm against the corrosive forces of advancing 
catholicism with its secondary, derivative, 'reflective piety' [HD II pp.94fl. 
These positive statements must t>~- ~eL beslge ___ ijarna~~~s; _ _firm comriction_ 
that--miracles~ as-such-;-Cio noT happen and are largely the result of a 
mistaken externalising of inner spiritual events. He clearly longs, at a 
constructive-theological level, to recapture and retain the freshness of 
early Christianity while separating it from and leaving aside its 
miraculous and enthusiastic forms. He is enabled to do this by his 
assumption that, in rather the same way there is a double gospel in early 
Christianity, so there is operative in the New Testament a dual conception 
of the Spirit. On the one hand it comes upon the believer fitfully, is 
expressed in visible signs, deprives people of self-consciousness and puts 
them beside themselves. It is the spirit of ecstasy and miracle. On the 
other hand 'the Spirit' is the constant possession of the believer, which 
operates by enlightening the conscience and strengthening the character, 
whose fruits are love, joy, peace, etc. It is the spirit of sonship. Paul, 
according to Harnack, taught Christians to value the second conception 
more, but he was not perfectly clear. As yet, 'Spirit' lay within 'Spirit': 
the spirit of ecstasy and miracle appeared identical with the spirit of 
sonship £HD I p.50 n.l 1. 
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Miracles 
Harnack will not allow the easy explanation of miracles as late and 
unreliable interpolations into the original sources, for, he notes, " ... ~e 
now !mow that it is not after they have been long dead ... that miracles have 
been reported of eminent persons, but at once, often the very next day ... c' 
n-JC? p.25/DW p.l7l. Along with the explanation mentioned above of miracles 
as a common confusion of thought between the inner spiritual realm and 
the external physical world, Harnack also notes our incomplete knowledge of 
the forces pertaining to matter and our far less complete knowledge of 
psychic forces, which means that we cannot in fact set a sure boundary 
between the possible and the impossible: 
c:~ ... We see that a strong will and a firm faith exert an influence upon 
the life of the body, and produce phenomena which strike us as 
marvellous ... Who can say how far the influence of soul upon soul and 
of soul upon body reaches? No one. Who can still maintain that any 
extraordinary phenomenon that may appear in this domain is entirely 
based on error and delusion? Miracles, it is true, do not happen; but 
of the marvellous and inexplicable there is plenty. In our present 
state of !mowledge we have become more careful, more hesitating in 
our judgment, in regard to the stories of the miraculous which ~e 
have received from antiquity. That the earth in its course stood 
still; that a she-ass spoke; that a storm was quieted by a word, we 
do not believe, and we shall never again believe; but that the lame 
walked, the blind saw, and the deaf heard, will not be so summarily 
dismissed as an illusion" [WC? pp. 27-28/DW p.18l. 
The most important 'miracle', of course, for Christianity is the 
resurrection of Jesus, and here we see Harnack's position at its clearest. 
He tactfully leaves open the question of the empty tomb, but makes a clear 
distinction between and a subordination of the Easter message <of the 
empty tomb> to the Easter faith <that Christ still lives>. He notes the 
inconsistencies in the accounts of the resurrection and the post-
. - resurrection appearances, and locates the evidence --for- the resurrection 
rather in the consciousness of the first disciples: 
''Either we must decide to rest our belief on a foundation unstable 
and always exposed to fresh doubts, or else we must abandon this 
foundation altogether, and with it the miraculous appeal to our 
senses. But here, too, the images of the faith have their roots in 
truth and reality. Whatever may have happened at the grave and in 
the matter of the appearances, one thing is certain: This grave rms 
the birthplace of the indestructible belief that death J.s vanquished, 
that there J.s a life eternal. It is useless to cite Plato; it is 
useless to point to the Persian religion, and the ideas and the 
literature of later Judaism. All that would have perished and has 
perished; but the certainty of the resurrection and of a life eternal 
which is bound up with the grave in Joseph's garden has not perished, 
and on the conviction that Jesus lives we still base those hopes of 
citizenship in an Eternal City which make our earthly life worth 
living and tolerable" [WC? pp.162-163l. 
-121-
Harnack does not at tempt to explain how the first disciples reached this 
consciousness0 but simply records it as historical fact and argues for ~he 
truth of their conviction on the basis of its continuing influence. 
Harnack's elucidation of the early church's conflict with the demonic 
affords a very straight forward example of his approach to the 
supernatural. For Harnack, demon-possession is a form of insanity, 
occurring sporadically throughout history and in the present, but 
particularly prevalent in the early Christian centuries. The factors which 
were responsible for the rapid growth of the belief in demons and in 
demon-possession in the second century included the dwindling of faith in 
the old religions which characterised the imperial age, together with the 
rise of individualism which led individuals to feel responsibility for 
themselves and to feel flung upon their own inner resources. Free now 
from any control or restraint of tradition, individuals wandered here and 
there amid the lifeless, fragmentary and chaotic debris of traditions 
belonging to a world in the process of dissolution. Now they would pick 
up this or that, only to at last be driven, often by fear and hope, to find 
a deceptive support or a new disease in the absurdest of them all [M&E I 
p.l29l. Harnack does not comment on the parallel, but one cannot help 
thinking that he is quietly drawing an analogy here to the spiritual 
anomie which characterised his own time. In any event, this, he holds, was 
the situation which the gospel encountered. He also agrees in part with 
those 'scoffers' who insist that Christianity produced the very diseases it 
professed to cure, claiming that the gospel did indeed bring the psychical 
diseases, which it found prevalent already, to a head. But it also cured 
them: " ... and no flight of the imagination can form any idea of what would 
have come over the ancient world or the Roman empire during the third 
century, had it not been for the church ... " [ibid. pp.129-130l. 
Harnack notes that in demonic possession the most astounding phenomena 
occur, many of whose details are still inexplicable [M&E I pp.125-126l. In 
Das Wesen Harnack notes that where possession is met the best means of 
encountering it is the influence of a strong personality. Jesus saw in 
'demoniacs' the forces of evil and mischief, and by his marvellous power 
over the souls of those who trusted him he banished the disease [l'JC? 
p.59J. In Mission and Expansion he offers a fuller description of how it 
is that a God-centred personality is able to effect a cure: 
QWhenever an empty or a sinful life, which has almost parted with its 
vitality, is suddenly aroused by the preaching of the Christian 
religion, so that dread of evil and its bondage passes into the idea 
of actual 'possession', the soul again is freed from the latter 
bondage by the message of the grace of God which has appeared in 
Jesus Christ. Evidence of this lies on the pages of church history, 
from the very beginning down to the present day ... The mere message or 
preaching of Christianity was not of course enough to cure the sick. 
It had to be backed by a convinced belief or by some person who was 
sustained by this belief. The cure was wrought by the praying man 
and not by prayer, by the Spirit and not by the formula, by the 
exorcis~ and not by exorcism ... wherever a strong individuality t;ras 
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victimized by the demon of fear, wherever the soul was literally 
convulsed by the grip of that power of darkness from which it was 
now fain to flee 0 the will could only be fr(9ed from its bondage by 
some strong, holy, outside will ... " (l'Jl8JE I pp.l26-127l. 
Harnack reminds us that exorcism played a major part in the early 
Christian mission, and became one very powerful method of legitimation and 
propaganda [ibid. p.131l. Harnack manages to find even in this strange and 
repellent set of ideas a kernel of spiritual truth: 
11ln the belief in demons, as that belief dominated the Christian world 
in the second and third centuries, it is easy to detect features 
which stamp it as a reactionary movement hostile to contempory 
culture. Yet it must not be forgotten that the heart of it enshrined 
a moral and consequently a spiritual advance, viz., in a quickened 
sense of evil, as well as in a recognition of the power of sin and of 
its dominion in the world" [ibid. p.136l. 
From the treatments of enthusiasm and miracle, the resurrection and the 
demonic, the outlines of Harnack's response to supernatural power are 
clear. We see a pattern of psychological explanation, the attempt to 
pinpoint the spiritual truth within the phenomenon, and the leaving of 
some space, in view of the incompleteness of our knowledge, for the 
inexplicable. We shall see that treatments of the themes of eschatology 
and mysticism confirm this general approach. 
5.c. Eschatol~y and mysticism 
Eschatology 
Harnack was well aware that the Christian message W!iS first preached in. 
an eschatological form [ HD V p.xil, but saw this as the context of the 
preaching rather than as intrinsic to its content. In keeping with his 
conviction that such ideas lie outside of our possible experience or 
knowledge, he focusses on that in Christianity which is applicable in the 
here and no1;1, reminding us that even in the apostolic age, when intense 
eschatological hopes prevailed, the task of making earthly life holy was 
not neglected [WC? p.173l. He can even concede that eschatology has some 
value in terns of the macroprocesses of history, in that it served as a 
highly efficacious lever for raising the earliest Christians above the 
world, teaching them what was of great and what of little worth and how 
to distinguish between what is of time and what is of eternity [WC'? p.172l, 
and holds that its breaking out here and there in history has served to 
guard Christianity against the threat of secularisation [HD I pp.129-130l. 
But regardless of its utility in the larger scheme of things, Harnack can 
also characterise it as an 'evil inheritance' from late Judaism, drawing 
Christians into restless activity, politics, abhorrence of the state and a 
devaluing of the most important gifts and duties of the gospel [HD I 
pp.101 fl. 
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He also sees eschatological beliefs as psychologically nearly inevitable 
from the point of view of the prophet. When discussing John the Baptist 
in What is Christianity? he notes that: 
"~ ... every time that a man earnestly, and out of the depths of his own 
personal experience, points others to God and to what is good and 
holy, whether it be deliverance or judgment that he preaches, it has 
always, so far as history tells us, taken the form of announcing that 
the end is at hand" [laC? p.41 l. 
Harnack's most characteristic position is that expressed at the outset of 
his discussion of 'The Gospel of Jesus Christ according to his testimony 
about himself' in Dogmen~eschichte. He says that the gospel, as it entered 
the world, was apocalyptic and eschatological in form and content, but that 
Jesus insisted that the kingdom of God had already begun with his own 
work, in his saving and healing activity [see laC? pp.59-60l and those who 
received him in faith became sensible of this beginning: 
tl ••• for the 'apocalyptical' was not merely the unveiling of the future, 
but above all the revelation of God as the Father, and the 
'eschatological' received its counterpoise in the view of Jesus' work 
as Saviour, in the assurance of being certainly called to the kingdom, 
and in the conclusion that life and future dominion is hid with God 
the Lord and preserved for believers by him" [HD I p. 581. 
We see here in Harnack's interpretation of Jesus' message the translation 
of the external-eschatological into the inner-spiritual. Harnack believed 
such a transformation of the received chiliastic categories was justified 
and that it was Jesus himself who began it [~C? p.54l. Therefore he is 
convinced that we are following not only the indices of the succeeding 
history but also the requirements of the gospel itself when we place in 
the foreground: " ... not that which unites it with the contemporary 
disposition of Judaism, but that which raises it above it" [HD I p.58l. 
Like all epoch-making personalities, Jesus should be judged not by what he 
shared with his cont-emporaries, but by what was special and individual to 
himself [laC? p.54]. His uniqueness in this context lay in the fact that he 
discarded all of Israel's traditional eschatological expectations which were 
selfish and nationalistic, but abandoned nothing in which there remained a 
spark of moral force [~C? p.56l. Harnack attributes to Jesus the 
transformation of earthly chiliastic hopes into individual and spiritual 
ones: 
tl ... Instead of the hope of inheriting the kingdom, Jesus had also 
spoken simply of preserving the soul, or the life. In this 
substitution lies already a transformation of universal significance, 
of political religion into a religion that is individual and therefore 
holy ... c:~ (HD I p.58l. 
Harnack accepts that Jesus: " ... lived and spoke within the circle of 
eschatological ideas which Judaism had developed more than 200 years 
before", but he insists that: "he controlled them by giving them a new 
content and forcing them into a new direction" [HD I p.62l. Jesus declared 
that even now in this present life everyone who is called into the kingdom 
may be sure of God's love, guidance and protection, and the forgiveness of 
~12L.l--
sins. But it remains that everything in Jesus 0 proclamation is directed to 
the eschatological life beyond: •o ... and the certainty of that life is the 
power and earnestness of the gaspe!~' [ibid.]. 
Harnack reminds us that no one can say in detail what, of the early 
Christian eschatological teaching, proceeds from Jesus and what from the 
disciples, and he underlines the central issue: 
" ... What has been said in the text does not claim to be certain, but 
only probable. The most important, and at the same time the most 
certain point, is that Jesus made the definitive fate of the 
individual depend on faith, humility and love. There are no passages 
in the gospel which conflict with the impression that Jesus reserved 
day and hour to God, and wrought in faith and patience as long as 
for him it was day" £HD I p.67 n.l.l. 
Harnack further claims that the gospel is not inseparably connected with 
the eschatological, world-renouncing element with which it entered the 
world, and in this we see his essencing procedure at its clearest. The 
gospel, he maintains, possesses properties which oppose every positive 
religion and ~hich are the kernel of the gospel-the disposition devoted 
to God, humble, ardent, sincere in its love for God and the brethren. This 
quiet, peaceful element was strong and vigorous from the outset, even amid 
chilisatic fervour. The gospel lies above the antagonisms between this 
world and the next, work and retirement from the world, reason and 
ecstasy, Judaism and Hellenism. It can therefore be united with either, 
and indeed must be if it is to be a living religion. Many 'incrustations' 
have in history defended the kernel, and doubtless more will do so. The 
gospel did not enter the world as a positive statutory religion, and cannot 
therefore have its classic manifestation in any form of its intellectual or 
social types, not even in the first £HD I pp. 73-751. 
While Harnack cannot regret the decline of chiliasm as such, he notes that 
the loss of the eschatological world-view was accompanied by a loss of 
spiritual vitality for the masses. Cultured theologians could unite 
chiliasm with religious philosophy, but the ordinary people could only 
understand chiliasm, and for them its waning was a definite loss: 
" ... the old faith and the old hopes decayed of themselves and the 
authority of a mysterious faith took their place. In this sense the 
extirpation or decay of chiliasm is perhaps the most momentous fact 
in the history of Christianity in the East. With chiliasm men also 
lost the living faith in the nearly impending return of Christ and 
the consciousness that the prophetic spirit with its gifts is a real 
possession of Christendom" (HD II p.299l. 
Mysticism 
Characteristic of post-chiliastic Christianity was the growth of mysticism. 
While it is clear that Harnack's epistemology would preclude his seeing the 
primary operation of divine/spiritual power in any phenomena as external 
as miracles or chiliasm, one might have expected that Harnack would be 
more sympathetic to mysticism because of the inwardness of its approach 
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to the spiritual life. In fact it earns some of his strongest criticism. 
This is because he views mysticism as attempting to objectify 6lncl 
Gensualisc inner npiritual experience. H is in the context of an attack 
on mysticism that Harnack makes his pivotal st6ltement about the iron ring. 
That passage, quoted above, continues: 
" ... He who does not allow his thought to be determined by experience 
falls a prey to fancy, that is, thought which cannot be suppressed, 
assumes a mythological aspect: superstition takes the place of 
reason, dull gazing at something incomprehensible is regarded as the 
highest goal of the spirit's efforts, and every conscious activity of 
the spirit is subordinated to visionary conditions artificially 
brought about" [HD I p.340l. 
Harnack describes how the idea of redemption in the Greek church began 
with an eschatological character, a looking forward to deliverance through 
Christ from perishableness and death, but how it also always included an 
awareness of possessing salvation through Christ in the present. 
Originally this present means of salvation had a spiritual 
character-knowledge of God, the world, the conditions for future 
salvation, plus the power to do good works and the power over demons. But 
under the influence of the surrounding pagan philosophies of religion this 
knowledge came to be seen not as clear and historically-based but as 
mysterious wisdom, only half comprehensible, coming directly from God and 
communicated by sacred initiation. A natural theology which had never 
been given up <neoplatonic ideas of orders of spirits and gnostic ideas of 
hierarchies of aeons passed into orders of angels, etc.) was combined with 
mysticism, the magical and sacramental; less and less attention was paid to 
the positive moral element, and the downfall of pure science <sic) allowed 
the theologians to embrace all manner of superstition [HD IV pp.253, 270-
271 l. There follows a typical passage in which Harnack simultaneously 
describes and criticises the mystical mentality: 
" ... they endeavoured in ever increasing measure to reach a 
transcendental knowledge which could be enjoyed, as it were, in a 
sensuous way. Like their blood-relations the Neo-Platonists, they 
were originally over-excited, and their minds became dulled, and thus 
they required a stronger and stronger stimulation. The most refined 
longing for the enjoyment of faith and knowledge was finally changed 
into barbarity. They wished to fill themselves with the holy and the 
divine as one fills oneself with some particular kind of food. In 
accordance with this the dogma, the p.a9t'}CH<;, was embodied in material 
forms and changed into a means of enjoyment-the end of this was 
the magic of mysteries, which swallows up everything ... '' [HD IV 
pp.271-272l. 
The mystical impulse to Harnack is a mistaken form of inwardness--a folifi\ 
of hubris which seeks to experience the things of divinity in tangible 
form in the here and now, and to escape from the limits of the iron ring 
[HD IV p.268l. Harnack's criticism is based on the premise that 
divine/spiritual power is truly, firstly and lastly inner, non-magical, non-
sensual, non-objective: it issues from the confident assurance through 
faith that one is saved and results in moral empowerment, i.e. the ability 
to will and to do good to God and the neighbour. 
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In view of the fact that certainly the great mystical writers have also 
exhibited a great concern for moral and spiritual regeneration, Harnack 
rather unfairly criticises "the impulse to mystagogy, and the misguided 
craving to feel the proximity of the deity without being or becoming a new 
man" UID IV pp.310-311J. He speaks of the 'intoxicating cup' of mysticism, 
and the difficulty of recalling the 'dreamer' to life [HD IV pp.290-291l. 
But as always, Harnack can see the positive side even of what appeared to 
him to be negative developments. He notes that <western) Catholic 
mystical piety eventually developed in the direction of rightly discerning 
the inherent responsibility of the individual soul, from which no authority 
can absolve it, and raised the vital question of the assurance of 
salvation, though it was incapable of giving it Ill satisfying answer. At 
this point, he maintains, mysticism points beyond itself. Catholic mystical 
piety rightly discerned that the Christian must always be growing, but did 
not recognise that this growth must have its basis in firm confidence in 
the God of grace, i.e. in the assurance of salvation. The one paradox the 
mystics could not understand, he says, was that in the spiritual life one 
can only become what one already is in faith [HD VI p.98J. 
Concomitant with the growth of mysticism in Harnack's view was the growth 
of 'superstition'. He held that as theology became more and more the 
domain of experts, the cultus received more and more importance, until for 
the ordinary believer a ritual system took the place of Christ [HD III 
p.158l. A Christianity of the second order developed, which was the 
heritage of a moribund antiquity and really a relapse into paganism, which 
included the worship of saints, relics and images, amulets, fetishes and 
magic CHD III p.160 n.2.J. From this sort of Christianity, Harnack insists, 
Islam, for all its defects, came as a real deliverer CHD IV p.2691. Yet 
even in the midst of rank superstition Harnack affirms the continuing 
possiblities of divine/spiritual power. Not even superstition can 
ultimately ~hwart the spirit which truly seeks God. As the heart which in 
humility and trust seeks to rise to God cannot be restrained by doctrinal · 
formulae, so it cannot be quenched by idols, but changes them into 
gracious signs of God, revealing his renewing grace [HD VII p.l 0 1 n.l J. 
5.d. Sacraments and the concept of grace 
The developaent of the doctrine of the sacraments and of the grace they 
impart is for Harnack a most serious example of the materialising and 
objectifying of divine/spiritual power which characterised the church until 
the time of the reformation. As always, it is the personality of God which 
is the focal-point for Harnack's treatment. Grace for Harnack is 
synonymous ~::Jith the divine/spiritual power which arises from relationship 
with God. Grace is personal: there is no such thing as 'objective' grace. 
In the 'development' of the doctrines of grace and of the sacraments, the 
simple, inner-spiritual power of the gospel, enacted in a fellowship aeal 
or symbolic washing, was transformed into a mysterious magical power, 
which in tUJl'll concentrated substantial coercive authority in the hands of 
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those who were indispensible to mediate the 'magic'. This transformation 
made the ordinary believer inescapably dependent on the clergy, end 
diminished the individual's sense of personal responsibility [HD III p. 12LJ., 
HD IV pp.276-277; see ch.6l. 
Harnack is convinced that it was the influence of paganism which brought 
these transformations about CM&E I pp.lll-1121. One of the reasons 
Christianity was intelligible and impressive to pagans was because it 
offered sacraments, that is, symbols inwardly connected to the things they 
represented and conveying grace to the participant's soul: 'Every hand that 
was stretched out for religion, tried to grasp it in sacramental form'. 
Paul was the first and almost the last theologian of the early church with 
whom sacramental theology was really held in check by clear ideas and 
strictly spiritual considerations. After him the flood-gates were opened 
CM&E I pp.230fJ. Harnack charitably reminds us, however, that these 
developments should not be judged from the standpoint of. puritanism, for 
every age has to conceive and assimilate religion as it alone can, arid that 
while the development may have been unfortunate, it was by no means 
irreparable CM&E I p.234l. 
This religious materialism was, in Harnack's view, substantially advanced by 
the doctrine of the Incarnation being brought into connexion with the 
Lord's Supper. The Incarnation was not thought to be repeated in the 
Lord's Supper but continued, and the sacrament was seen as the real means 
of deification CHD IV p.286l. In addition the nature of the sacrifical 
element in the Lord's Supper altered: the idea crept in that the body and 
blood of Christ were constantly offered to God afresh in propitiation. 
Thus, says Harnack, what seemed not to have been surely accomplished in 
the -original offering was to be accomplished by- a repetition of it CHD IV-
p.287l. 
Since this time, Harnack maintains, most churches, east and west, have been 
fettered by a doctrine and ritual of the Lord's Supper which are among the 
most serious hindrances the gospel has ever experienced (HD IV p.288J. The 
doctrine of~tne -L-ord's-supper-- now -s-erves-fa -sarictlori the dogma of the 
Incarnation and to include and summarise the entire system of doctrine and 
the conception of the church. Never in the history of religions, he says, 
has there been such a transformation, extension, demoralising and narrowing 
of a simple and sacred institution [ibid]. 
Augustine, as we have seen, is in Harnack's view the pivotal figure in the 
development of the theology of grace and sacrament. He holds that while 
Augustine knew in his own experience that religion is a personal 
relationship between the soul and God and that grace is this relationship, 
he was unable to give this idea the central place in his dogmatic theory. 
Grace for Augustine is not always grace through Christ-it is more the 
secret operation of God. This element in Augustine, which Harnack labels 
'acosmic Nee-Platonic', imperils word and sacrament, and indeed redempUon 
through Christ as such [HD V p.217l. In spite of his personal experience, 
Augustine hu·gely left the old dogmatic scheme as it was, teaching that 
God operates by a mysterious and omnipotent impartation of grace; i.e. by 
powers of grace. Grace thus in Augustine's teaching preserved an 
objective character [HD V p.84l. The idea of the objective validity of the 
sacraments and of the church, however melancholy the actual moral state of 
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its members, was further entrenched in Augustine's teaching by the 
Donat:l.st controversy [HD V pp.41-42 l. Grace in this view could be had in 
porUons or installments, and computations of sin and grace were 
introduced. In Augustine the religious, the personal relationship to GOO, 
receives a sequel, i.e. the moral: the will, once freed from sinfulness, 
becomes an effective cause of righteousness, and so the value of the 
forgiveness brought by grace becomes iniatory only. This strand, the idea 
that in the end, God crowns our merits, conflicts with Augustine's idea of 
predestinating grace and leads to a refined form of righteousness by works 
[HD V pp.218-219l. On the whole Harnack concludes that the living God and 
the personality of Christ lost ground in the consciousness of the church 
which Augustine influenced: 
CJ ... He poured the new wine into old bottles, and was thus partly to 
blame for the rise of that Catholic doctrine of grace, which is 
perhaps the most dreadful part of Catholic dogmatics; for 'the 
corruption of the best is the worst' <corruptio op~imi pessima) HID V 
p.85l. 
These errors were exacerbated in the medieval period, when the religious 
desire was less for God than for divine forces which could become human 
virtues CHD VI pp.278-2791. At the root of this defective concept of 
grace, Harnack insists, lay a defective concept of God, that is, no 
recognition of God's personality or even of human beings as personalities. 
One cannot, Harnack maintains, be raised to a higher stage other than by 
attaching oneself by reverence, love and trust to a person who is superior, 
more mature and greater: this is true on a human plane, and incomparably 
more so with regard to the raising of human beings from the sphere of sin 
and guilt irlto. the sphere of God. No. communication o{ objective .beneHts 
can avail-the human spirit is too free and lofty for this--but only the 
fellowship of person with person, the disclosure to the soul that the holy 
God who rules heaven and earth is its Father and that it can and may live 
in trustful confidence as a child in its father's house, certain that the 
-separatirlg-~guilt---has been- swept away. This confidence, . this personal 
fellowship with God, alone is grace [.HD VI pp.279-281 l. 
Neither Augustine nor Thomas saw this: neither, insists Harnack, did the 
medieval mystics who emphasised knowing Christ as a friend, for they had 
in mind the man Jesus. When they thought of God it was as an inscrutable 
being, producing inexhaustible forces that yield knowledge and the 
transformation of essence. Grace for them inhabited the realm of 
impersonal forces. Though in theory only a little separated from God, in 
the course of time grace became further and further removed from 
God-first to the merit of Christ and then to the sacraments [ibid.J. 
In Thomism, Harnack tells us, the idea that God in the end treats us 
according to our merits came increasingly to the fore, and weakened {the 
earnest, truly religious spirit which characterised Thomas himself. Grace 
appeared as •a physical, mysterious act, and a communication of objective 
benefits' CHD VI p.2751. Harnack describes in detail how Aquinas 
distinguished between different types of grace, and indicates some of tthe 
problems with this. The ultimate cause of grace in Aquinas• system is GOO. 
The effects of grace are justification and meritorious good works. But 
actual justification does not take place with the original forgiveness of 
-129-
sins-it only creates the impulse snd beginning of it. And even in 
justification the will must cooperate. Thus Thomas left confused and 
obscure the question of what we owe to prevenient grace [HD VI pp.288, 
290f1. He emphasised merit at the expense of trust (fiducia) [HD VI 
pp.291-292l. I:Jhile he admits that Aquinas' sacramental doctrine does much 
good in a relative way, in Harnack's view, when one considers that it is 
Christianity that is under discussion, that religion of earnest spirit and 
comforting power: " ... this structure of opus operatum, attritio and meritum 
is seen to ~ a mockery of all that is sacred" [HD VI p.2261. 
Luther of course made a significant breakthrough in this area. He opposed 
the notion that something can have .value for God other than God, and hence 
opposed everything that savoured of merit, including monasticism and 
ascetism [HO VII pp.215-216l. He emphasised the faith that finds comfort 
in the forgiveness of sins-this, and not mystical experience, not the 
fitful enjoyment now of sanctified senses and knowledge which will only be 
fulfilled in heaven [ibid.l, is Christian perfection. 
Harnack expresses Luther's contribution thus: 
tl ... Luther abolished in principle the error originating in the earliest 
times, that what the Christian religion concerns itself with is a good, 
which, however lofty it may be, is still ob1ective. That doctrine had 
its root in the fundamental notion that religion is the remedy for 
man's finitude-in the sense that it deifies his nature ... According to 
the Catholic view, grace is the power that is applied and infused 
through the sacraments, which, on condition of the cooperation of free 
will, enables man to fulfill the law of God and to acquire the merits 
that are requisite for salvation. But according to Luther grace is the 
Fatherly disposition of God, calling guilty man for Christ's sake to 
Himself and receiving him by winning his trust through the 
presentation to him of the picture of Christ. I:Jhat has Sacrament to 
mean here? ... " (HD VII pp 216-2171. 
The sacraments in- Luther1s view are for forgiveness of sins only, are 
efficacious not by being celebrated but by being believed in, and are a 
special form of the saving Word of God. Grace clearly is once again 
relational, not objective. God as Father receives us by winning our trust: 
divine empowering comes through our confidence in God as the beloved 
Father of Jesus. Harnack notes that while Luther made the crucial first 
step in restoring this view of grace, he still allowed many catholic 
elements to remain, including infant baptism as a means of grace, and the 
centrality of the real presence to the eucharist. He thus hindered the 
church of the reformation for many generations from expressing the earnest 
spiritual character of Christianity [HD VII pp.250-251l. 
5.e. Summary and further observations 
Harnack's position on enthusiasm, miracles, eschatology, mysticism and 
sacraments is entirely consistent with his convictions about what is 
knowable as mtcapsulated in the metaphor of the iron ring. They all 
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~~ar to be calfpressions of div:l.ne pot-Jer and all earn his criticisoo. for-
tho sahlo fundaoo.entBJ. reason--that thoy at tempt to oxtontaliso, oo.aior:l.aU.so 
and objectify <m ei1<:lif~Y which operates t-J:U:hin ~:-md t,..rhose nffectr, G<r() 
splr:ttual. fb :l*> ~)V<Jil pruparod to Oll:'Gonci thiG judgment to Uw 
rGtiutTectlon, ar-guing that tho stor-ies of the empty tomb and the pos~-­
rasurred:l.on s1.ght:l.ngs Bi'"fl uncm·tain as a basis for· tho conviction thRt 
Jesus still lives and that the certainty of that truth rests instead upon 
the spiritual experience of the first disciples. His analysis of the 
phenomena is based on his belief that divine/spiritual power is completely 
inner in its sphere of operation, non-magical, non-sensual and non-
objective, that it issues from the assurance, through faith, that one is 
saved, enjoying a firm, peaceful confidence in the God of grace, and that 
it results in moral empowerment, i.e. the ability to will and do good to 
God and neighbour. 
In a characteristic manner, however, Harnack does not merely dismiss the 
'supernatural' phenomena as impossible legends or misguided fantasy, but 
rather seeks to penetrate to the inner experiences for which the phenomena 
are mythological metaphors. One of the clearest examples of this is his 
explanation of how the intense realisation of the radicality of sin end 
evil and the significance of the choice to be made has 'always', 
historically, taken the form of eschetology, of the announcement that tho 
end was nigh. Similarly with miracles Harnack emphasises the 'miraculous' 
nature of the spiritual discovery that despite eppearances God is in 
charge and can help one so to encounter the 'blind and brutal course of 
nature' that life has meaning and all is ultimately well. And he is 
prepared to go still further, to see at least some miracles, notably those 
of healing and e:~~:orcism, as genuine cures, the effects in the external 
world of an inner empowering effected, vi& nat ural laws of which we are 
not yet aware, by the strong and holy personality of Jesus. This 
perception exactly parallels his conception of grace, which is relational, a 
matter of being raised to a higher level by one's attachment in love to a 
person of greater holiness and maturity, ultimately to the person of God. 
We observe that Harnack's response to the miraculous is something of a 
half-way posiUon between total rejection and unqualified acceptance, and 
we need to ask whether this is really satisfactory. We must also question 
whether the basis on which he rejects the supernatural in its own terms, 
i.e. his firm delineation of the boundary of what is knowable, and the 
basis upon which he allows the reality of miracles in some form, i.e. the 
incompleteness of our knowledge of the forces governing matter and the 
psyche, can really sit happily side by side. l:Je must also question 
Harnack's perhaps conflicting desire for Christianity to possess once again 
the spiritual freshness and moral vigour of the early church, but to heve 
it without the 'excesses' of enthusiasm, chiliasm and miracle by which :H 
was then accompanied. We also wonder whether Harnack's treatment of the 
miraculous and supernatural has actually crossed the border from induction 
to reduction. One also feels his handling of mysticism and of sacraments, 
for whatever laudable reasons, to be uncharacteristically unsympathetic and 
perhaps questionably one-sided [see ch.7l. 
If, however, there have been any doubts in the mind about whether in ~he 
end for H&Tiar.k divino/spiritual pm·J<-lr w<w, to usc Wr·ong's terruo, s 
property or- &\ r-elation, they are settled def:tni t:l.vely by Harnflr.:{'fl 
pronouncements on the subject of grace, which como into focus trtost shou--vl:lf 
in his treat!flents of Aquinas and Luther. Grace can stand as a synonym ffor 
what is meant by divina/spiritual power, for it carrioc the same kind of 
duality-the ultimate source is God, but the word is also used to denote 
processes and activities within the human being which have been engenden')d 
by contact ""ith the divine. It can also, like divine power, be used by 
many spiritual writers to indicate something 'magical'. Harnack says 
clearly and unequivocally that grace is not 'objective' but relational, and 
this, despite his often reified language, must act as our standard for any 
evaluation of his theology of the inner life. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DIVINE AND HUMAN POWERS AT WORK IN THE CHURCH 
6.a. Introduction 
This investigation of Harnack's constructive theology has so far been 
centred upon his conception of divine/spiritual power, an empowering whose 
sphere of activity is the interior of the human consciousness. Having 
thus largely confined ourselves to an exploration of 'inner space', we now 
turn to examine what happens when this inner power acquires a social 
dimension, when it confronts the external world, and especially that part 
of the external world which through its advocacy of the gospel lies in 
closest proximity to divine/spiritual power, namely the church. The fourth 
of the questions we are addressing to Harnack is, 'How have divine and 
human powers interacted in the history of the church?' 
We begin to understand Harnack's reply when we look at the central thesis 
of Dogmengeschichte. which remained a fundamental presupposition 
throughout Harnack's career. This was that the central dogmas of 
historical Christianity, the trinity and two-nature christology, together 
with its central institutions, the three-fold 'apostolic' ministry, the 
'apostolic' tradition, the cultus and the doctrine of the sacraments, were 
not in fact original or apostolic at all but had grown up gradually in the 
Christian communities in response to internal and external pressures. 
Harnack portrays these phenomena as a kind of coating or overlay-his 
term is 'incrustation'-which built up gradually around the central and 
original things of Christianity, around 'the gospel'. But Harnack's analysis 
suggests something more, for he interprets this process as a power 
struggle. In chapter three Harnack's view of divine/spiritual power as an 
inner event was discussed, and it was made clear that this power was a 
power in conflict, its primary opposition being to 'nature', to sin and to 
worldliness. The opposition to 'the world' is made clear in Harnack's 
statement in Das Wesen, quoted above, that there is a divine strength and 
glory, a majesty of holiness and love, which does not need and indeed 
excludes earthly power and splendour [WC? p.138/DW p.88l. We shall 
demonstrate in this chapter that Harnack equally opposes divine/spiritual 
power to the church, whenever that church becomes coercive toward inner 
freedom in any way, and when it arrogates to itself earthly powers and 
splendour. 
6.b. The theme of transpotentiation 
i. The theory in general terms 
History, according to Harnack, is to be analysed in terms of the powers 
which shaped it. As we have suggested, even where explicit power language 
is absent from Harnack's account, power concepts are intrinsic to his most 
important ideas-the nature of dogma, the gospel itself as distinct lfrom 
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Hs historical forms, the spiritual dilemma of humanity and ~ho 
significance of Chrh;t. Inte<woven with and inxtricable from the wain 
narrative of P~~eschichte_. tcJhich concerns the transformation of dOt{!M1 
throughout the hiGtory of the church, is another story, that of tho 
transformation of power within Christianity. The church, at first a body 
of believerG Hho were characterised by e high degree of inner, soH-
authenticating and immediate sp:t.rHuaJ. powerr and el{ercising little socio-
political potcier either within or outside their fellowship, became a quasi-
political union which achieved order, unity, influence and popularity at the 
price of the suppression of spiritual power under an authority which 
demanded absolute obedience on the basis of the highest legitimation 
<apostolicity and the power of the keys) [HD I pp. 45-46, 141-142, 215f; HD 
II pp.4-6, 72-77, 122-1251. This second story is also told within the 
medium of the history of early Christian missions in Mission und 
Ausbreitung. Harnack argues that dogma and this transformation of power 
were closely connected. Dogma arose partly as a response to the ebbing of 
spiritual power in the early communities and their subsequent need for a 
more stable and tangible authority as a focus for unity; yet its very 
appearance on the scene was a cause of further decline. Acceptance of a 
highly intellect ualised theology replaced living faith, and the laity fell 
increasingly from spiritual self-reliance into tutelage under clerical 
gnostics [HD II pp.5-6, 831, with the church imposing itself as an 'empiric 
power' between the individual and salvation [l-ID II pp.76-77l. 
The church which once had been 'variance and the sword' <Mat t.lO: 34-35 > to 
all earthly orders became, as the result of these changes, the conservative 
prop for the crumbling Roman state and civil society [HD II pp.122fl. 
Harnack minces no words in expressing hb sense of the loss, in terms of 
the gospel, uhich this entailed. "No doubt", he writes: 
" ... the old Christianity had found its place in the new Church, but it 
was covered over and concealed ... Catholicism was now complete; the 
Church had suppressed all utterahces of individual piety, in the 
sense of their being binding on Christians, and freed herself from 
every feature of exclusiveness. In order to be a Christian a m~n no 
longer required in any sense to be a saint. What made the Christian 
a Christian was no longer the possession of charisms, but obedience 
to ecclesiastical authority, a share in the gifts of the Church, and 
the performance of penance and good works. The Church by her edicts 
legitimised average morality, after average morality had created the 
authority of the Church. The dispensations of grace, that is, 
absolution and the Lord's Supper, abolished the charismatic gifts. 
The Holy Scriptures, the apostolic episcopate, the priests, the 
sacraments, average morality in accordance with which the whole world 
could live, were mutually conditioned ... And with all that the self-
righteousness of proud ascetics was not excluded--quite the contrary. 
Alongside of a code of morals, to which anyone in case of need could 
adapt himself, the Church began to legitimise a morality of self-
chosen, refined sanctity, which really required no Redeemer. It was 
as in possession of this constitution that the government statesmen 
found and admired her, and recognised in her the strongest support of 
the Empire" [l-ID II pp.124-125l. 
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From the sense of freedom and divine/spiritual empowering of the early 
communittes, the transformation into catholicism saw the dwindling and 
tr1.vialising of this inner power and the vigorous moraHty whkh was Us 
externfl.J. r-mpresston. It wi.tnessed also the gr·owth of an ecclesiastical 
organisation t-Jhose power was clearly that of ordinary, and increasingly 
coercive, authority, but which bolstered and legitimated that authority by 
claiming the sole possession of divine/spiritual power. This organisation 
was prepared to use its authority to augment the secular, coercive power· 
of the state in return for privilege emd security. These three 
powers--the divine/spiritual power released through the gospel, th8 
coercive power of the secular political state, and the authority of the 
church, in reality also external, secular and coercive but claiming to be 
spiritual--are the actors who will hold the stage throughout Harnack's 
analysis. Of the three, the power of the church is for him the most 
problematic. On the one hand he condemns its secularity and pious 
masquerading with all the fervour of a good Lutheran, but on the other he 
recognises the historical necessity for the rise of catholicism and does 
not deny the benefits which it brought both to religion and to 
civilisation, the chief of which being that within it, in however confused 
or obscure a form, the fundamental Christian message, the essence of the 
gospel, was enabled to survive and bear fruit to some extent. 
This then is Harnack's basic theory of early church history, and everyone 
who writes on Harnack notes his judgment that in the rise of early 
catholicism, culminating in the constantiniem settlement, there was a 'fall' 
for Christianity. Church historians of other persuasions would disagree, 
but all would accept that Christianity underwent a transformation during 
this period. One may ask, however, why this investigation has coined the 
term 'transpotentiation' to describe it? The word is used in the first 
instance as a reminder that the issue of power was central to the 
transformation which came upon Christianity. It is used in the second 
place because the tendency of 'fall' theories of the early church is to 
stress only the loss of its unique power: the word trans-potentiation is 
used to indicate that the church did not lose power in the move towards 
catholicism, but rather changed the type of power it exercised. It is used 
in the third instance to infer a possible causal connexion between the 
loss of the one kind of power and the gain of the other: this, though in a 
nuanced form, is part of Harnack's theory. 
Often in Harnack's writing, human powers appear in a negative light, but he 
is far from m-iting from an anarchistic perspective. Harnack views human 
powers such as tradition, nationality and authority, embodied in such 
institutions as the law and the state, as legitimate in their own sphere. 
From a moral or religious point of view, however, because they deal largely 
with transitory and material goods, they are of limited value and 
secondary importance (I:JC? pp.l0~-106/DW pp.66-67l. It is when they 
encroach upon the free territory of the spirit and make claims for 
themselves as religious powers that they earn Harnack's hostility. 
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i!. Factors in the transpot(mt:lat:l,_o_n __ c~J. ~hr:Lsj;j..!Jl.n:Lt..JL 
Just as, in Harnack's vim~, the early Christian preaching from tho 
beginning Has a complex:to _Qp_[.)os)Js>..rura. [M&E I p.8tJ.l, so th8 
transpotentiation of Christianity had not one cause but many. They wHl 
be discussed in the order of impoctance which Htwnack gives them. 
a. The conflict with gnosticism: The important thing about gnosticism, 
according to Harnack, was not the Asiatic mythologoumena which were 
attached to it but the Greek spirit and religious interests which lay 
behind it. The interest in oriental religions was part of the Graeco-Roman 
attempt to find a revelation to serve as the assurance and basis for the 
philosophy of religion which it already possessed [HD I pp.228-231 l. The 
theory was amply developed: what was lacking was the practice. They 
sought not simply gnosis, but gnosis soterias. The attraction to 
gnosticism of Christianity lay in its demonstrated spiritual and morBl 
power. In the Christian communities they saw a cheerful asceticism and 
vigorous morality-the actual practice of the philosophical life: 
" ... That the Hellenistic spirit in Gnosticism turned with such 
eagerness to the Christian communities and was ready even to believe 
in Christ in order to appropriate the moral power which it saw 
operative in them, is a convincing proof of the extraordinary 
impression which these communities made" [HD I pp. 236-2371. 
Yet the influence of gnosticism on Christianity would ultimately be to 
ennervate the very vigour which had attracted it. Gnostic teachers could 
quite easily gain a hearing in the Christian communities because of tho 
fluidity of doctrinal notions, the respect paid to teachers clai~ing 
inspiration, and the lack of any final authority [HD I p.251 J. This made 
crucial the need for resistance and unity among the Christian communities, 
and in time this was achieved. But the price of victory was the adoption 
of many of the enemy's weapons, notably intellectualism in the attempts to 
create a cooopeting Christian philosophy, legitimation by means of external 
authorities such as correct doctrine, an authoritative canon, an 'apostolic' 
creed, and an appeal to unwritten 'apostolic' traditions [HD I pp. 170f, 228, 
231f, 251, 253f; HD II pp.75, 294-296]. Indeed, Harnack maintains that 
gnosticism won in catholicism half a victory. Gnosticism represented the 
acute secularising of Christianity, where catholicism represented a gradual 
process of the same kind. Christianity was vigorous enough to reject the 
first, but had little awareness of or resistance to the second [HD I pp. 
228, 242-243]. 
b. The rise of the concept of apostolicity: The concept developed gradually. 
It predates gnosticism, for the gnostics shared it [HD I p.216J, and while 
the gnostic crisis intensified its importance in the church, it also 
reflected the altered constitution of the church itself and the 
authoritative position now actually held by bishops [HD II p.68fJ. <It was 
a principle Hith Harnack that the theoretical conception of the church 
always folloHs the actual changes in its history, and that throughout the 
history of dogma it remained a stage behind the condition reached in 
practice [HD II p.72]) Harnack was sceptical of the assertion that the 
source of the fundamental doctrine and practice of the church is to be 
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found in the teaching of the Twelve which has been reliably preserved, and 
offers as a telling proof the fact that in the controversy with Marcion, no 
assured and watertight apostolic tradition was put forward to oppose his 
pauline reduction: had it existed, it most assuredly would have been used 
[HD I p.284l. 
As the concept took hold, spiritual immediacy came to be undervalued in 
favour of the veneration of an idealised past, embodied in the authority of 
the 'apostolic' creed, canon and church constitution UID I pp. 214-217, 28~; 
HD II pp. 1-10, 53f, 62-65, 68f, 70,74, 83-89, 93, 232, 356f; HD III p.114l. 
The creation of a classical period for Christianity which was on principle 
incapable of emulation demotivated and thus disempowered the post-
classical church [HD II pp. 53-54, 356f1. The 'apostolic' canon encouraged 
what Harnack termed 'the fatal identification of the words of the Lord 
with the words of the apostles', leading to the inclusion as Christian of 
much material which did not proceed from Jesus CHD II p.65J. The Old 
Testament provided legitimations for a Christian priesthood, the 
monarchical episcopate and the cultus CM&E I p. 2841. The claim of the 
'apostolic' church to sole possession of the Holy Spirit and, on the basis 
of its possession of the 'apostolic' doctrine, to be indispensible for 
salvation was a power claim of incalculable proportions [HD II p.76J. Thus 
we can see that persuasion, charismatic and competent authority in the 
church were now supplemented by manipulative and coercive forces of the 
ultimate magnitude. While these may all be termed negative consequences 
of the concept of apostolicity, Harnack also points out the positive gain 
which was achieved through it, namely the welding together of the 
Christian communities into one solid church which was protected from 
extravagances and arbitrary interpretations and was self-confident, as the 
body of Christ, to undertake its world mission CHD II pp. 771. 
c. The accommodation to and use of secular hellenistic philosophy and 
culture: Though to some extent inevitable in any event in a Gentile 
setting, it was consciously encouraged, up to a point, for apologetic 
reasons. The clearest case of this was that of the doctrine of the Logos,---
which did much to make Christianity intelligible in the Greek world but at 
the cost of the real, historical Jesus CHD I pp.293-294, 357-361; HD II pp. 
245-247, 262f, 318-333, 338, 342, 348, 357; HD III pp.l-5, 41-48, 72f; see 
ch. 41. 
d. The waning of chiliasm. enthusiasm and moral vigour: As the proofs of 
'the Spirit and of power' subsided after the beginning of the third 
century, the extraordinary moral tension of the first Christian centuries 
also became relaxed, paving the way for a morality adapted to worldly life 
and no longer equal to the strain of persecution [HD II pp.1,4J. Harnack 
writes: 
o;The depotentiation to which Christianity was here subjected appears 
still more plainly in the facts that the Christian hopes were 
deadened, that the secularising of the Christian life was tolerated 
and even legitimised, and that the manifestations of an unconditional 
devotion to the heavenly excited suspicion or were compelled to 
confine themselves to very narrow limitst;l (JID II p.6J. 
-137-
The forgiveness of post-baptismal sin-not the practice of the earliest 
communities-began to be allowed, first of gross bodily sins and later of 
idolatry UID II pp. 108fl. From rigorist communities the Christian 
fellowships changed into societies based on unlimited forgiveness, 
available only through the ecclesiastical authorities CHD II p.112J. 
Christian moral standards were thus eroded, while at the same time the 
estimate of the worth of the church <as the sole medium of salvation) and 
of the ecclesiastical authorities <as the only ones to forgive sin, and as 
able to forgive all sins> increased: "In this concept ion the nature of the 
Church is depotentiated, but her powers are extended" CHD II p.113l. Along 
with baptism a second sacrament arose for the forgiveness of sins, the 
sacrament of penance. Usually Harnack describes this process in negative 
terms, but affirms that the moral loss did involve an apologetic gain: ''The 
point is that now for the first time the attractive power of Christianity 
as a religion of pardon came fully into play" CM&E I pp.213-215 J. There 
was a decline in the communities, over time, into lukewarm religion and 
average morality which led, as it always does, to a search for religious 
authorities external to the person CHD II pp. 124-1251. Harnack did not 
place this growing moral laxity on the same level, as a causal factor, as 
the struggle against heresy, the concept of apostolicity, or the influence 
of secular thought, but it remains a recurring theme in his historical 
writings, indicating an underlying vulnerability within the Christian 
communities which enabled the other, more positive forces to take hold. 
e. Political ambition: Harnack devotes much less space to this factor than 
to the others, but does not underestimate its significance at crucial 
points in Christian history. He maintains, for instance, its importance 
with regard to the formulation of a dogmatic~ legal claim to the Roman 
primacy [HD II pp.150fl. He also indicates that politics played a key role 
in the adoption of Logos christology in the western church. 
Certainly in the Nicene period political power became a decisive factor in 
shaping both church order and church doctrine.- Constantine was attracted-
to the church in the first place, Harnack insists, because of its potential 
in terms of political control: 
~ ... This was the church on which he conferred privileges, this church 
with its enormous authority over the masses! These were the 
Christians whom he declared to be the support of the throne, people 
who clung to the bishops with submissive faith and who would not 
resist their divinely appointed authority! The Christianity that 
triumphed was the Christianity of blind faith which Celsus has 
depicted. When would a State have ever shown any practical interest 
in any other kind of religion?" CM&E I pp.223-224l. 
Through Constantine's patronage, the church was 'born into the world'. He 
was attracted by its political potential, and he gave it still more 
coercive authority: 
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" ... Now, it was in the world; now, it was in possession and power. It 
took possession of the world, and it exercised its power, by 
proclaiming a spiritual authority which had hitherto been undreamt 
of, and at the same time by promulgating monasticism. Such were the 
standards under which it led the nations forward into the Middle 
Ages" [M&E II p.337l. 
Harnack's detailed account of the events surrounding the councils of Nicaea 
and Chalcedon paints a shocking, sordid and demoralising portrait [e.g. HD 
III p.58J. If his cynicism is justified, then the authority of tradition and 
the prestige of the 'church fathers' involved loses much of its lustre. 
Harnack insists that political power was the single most determining 
factor in the early councils and associated controversies, as in the case 
of Arius and· the council of Nicaea [HD IV pp. 51-59, 1061, the council of 
Chalcedon [HD IV pp. 196, 229, 2401, Nestorianism [HO IV p.189J and 
Pelagianism [HD IV pp.168-188l. Harnack later underlines the role of 
politics, both secular and ecclesiastical, in the course of the Reformation 
[HD V p.ll J. 
iii. Protest and reaction against the transpotentiation of Christianity 
Harnack, of course, did not limit his church-historical study to orthodoxy, 
but included the heretical and schismatic movements which grew up within, 
alongside and often in response to the Great Church. He refused to see 
them simply as errors and deviations, but did not go to the opposite 
extreme of blindly championing them because they were the historical 
underdogs. In most cases he conceded that the defeat of the particular 
heresy was historically necessary and brought real gain [e.g. HD II pp.122-
125J, but at the same time he mourns the losses entailed. It is 
interesting to see how Harnack incorporates the heretical and schismatic 
movements into his scheme of factors in the process of transpotentiation. 
Gnosticism, as we have seen, is given a directly causal role. Harnack also 
· - emphasises the role played by the opposition to Marcion in the 
establishing of the New Testament as a canon of scripture and an external 
authority [Marcion, pp. 242-2441. In many of these movements, despite 
their differences, he traces a common theme. He sees them as protests on 
behalf of the spiritual power of early Christianity, against its 
depotentiation in catholicism and its subordination to speculative 
intellectualism and ecclesiastical authority. He writes: 
"Among Christians, first the Encratites and Marcionites, next the 
adherents of the new prophecy, and lastly the Novatians had by turns 
opposed the naturalisation of their religion in the world and the 
transformation of the Church into a political commonwealth ... " CHD II 
p.122 n.ll. 
Harnack's interpretation of Marcion shows this clearly, both in 
Dogmengeschichte [HD I p.267-286J and in his later. book. He presents 
Marcion's work as the first attempt at a thoroughgoing reformation of 
Christianity on the basis of Paul [Marcion, pp. 230-2351. Harnack maintains 
that at a doctrinal level Christianity had become a complexio oppositorum, 
a massive syncretism, largely as a result of having taken over the Old 
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Testament, with its diverse sources and strata, as part and parcel of its 
dogmatic. This 'catholicism', Harnack insists, was not in the spirit of the 
Founder, for to him all traditions, doctrines and forms were a matter of 
indifference, so long as God was known, God's will followed, and the 
Kingdom given room. Only a corporate body, the Zwischengrosse which was 
the church, with its professional theologians, could 'carry' the entirety of 
this complex tradition-individuals could only incorporate port ions of it 
into their inner lives, and offer the whole respect and obedience. 
Marcion's biblical criticism, which eventually led him on to his rejection 
by the authorities and the foundation of an alternative church, 
represented, in Harnack's view, the attempts of many who wanted to make 
Christianity their own, who wanted to teach a unified <eindeutig) 
Christianity and adhere to it as personal faith without contradictions or 
stumbling-blocks. Already, Harnack observes, the catholic church named 
such people heretics [Marcion, pp.6-10J. 
Montanism is presented similarly as a protest movement [HD II pp.2, 94f, 
104f, 106-1081. Harnack maintains that Montanism was not only a struggle 
to re-establish a stricter lifestyle, but also to retain a more independent 
religious attitude. In the victory of the Great Church the individuality 
of outstanding personalities was sacrificed in order that the majority 
might not become unmanageable or apostate, and religious life was bound 
still more firmly to the official institution: 
" ... Only after the Montanist conflict did the church ... attain the climax 
of its development: henceforth it became an object of desire coveted 
by everyone who was on the look-out for power inasmuch as it had 
extraordinary forces as its disposal. It now bound the individual 
closely to itselfi it held him, bridled him, and dominated his 
religious life in all directions ... " [M&E I p. 4371. 
The Novatian schism [HD II pp.11lf, 118-119, 1211 and, although it managed 
to remain within the Great Church, the monastic movement, are presented in 
a similar manner [HD III pp.3f, 127,131i HD VI p.8, 95i see also Das 
M5nchtum. seine !deale und seine Geschichte, Giessen, Ricker, 1881: Eng.- tr. 
Monasticism .. ., London, Williams & Norgate, 19011. 
The methods of the church which emerged from these conflicts would 
characterise catholicism down the centuries, namely, the suppression of 
individual religious fervour, freedom and responsibility or its canalisation 
into monastic mysticism, and the domination of an apostolic 'tradition• 
which was supplemented with, and increasingly superseded by, an apostolic 
clerical caste which possessed the all-important right to interpret the 
tradition and which claimed the powers of eternal life and death over the 
laity. The laity in Harnack's view suffered great loss in the power 
changes which occurred in the evolution towards catholicism. Where the 
church as a whole could be said to have been transpotentiated, the laity 
were merely depotentiated. The differences in power and status between 
clergy and laity became gradually more pronounced. When the Logos 
doctrine, incomprehensible as it was to all but the philosophically trained, 
triumphed in the church, it meant for the lay person that, "the mysterious 
creed, being no longer in a position practically to control life, was 
superseded by the authority of the Church, the cultus, and prescribed 
duties" UID III p.3J. After the Novatian schism the church made clear and 
-140-
firm its claim to the power of the keys. It cancelled the traditional, if 
anarchic, right of confessors and other 'spiritual' persons to forgive sins, 
and reserved the power of absolution to the bishop and his 
representatives. This, Harnack argues, gave to the distinction between 
clergy and laity, which had begun simply as a matter of function, a 
religious significance [HD II p.1151. Obviously the cleric's right to grant 
or withhold membership of the catholic church, which was the necessary 
prerequisite for salvation, transformed power relations between them. The 
false claim to divine/spiritual power, that is, to the ability to bestow 
upon or withold from another that which is necessary for eternal life, 
produced for the clergy an immense amount of objective, coercive power, 
and produced for the laity an absolute dependency (HD II pp.122f; III 
pp.l22-123l. Paradoxically, however, the laity's total exclusion from the 
new socio-political powers of the church lent it a measure of spiritual 
freedom which the clergy could never know. Harnack writes, in a 
description of the church at the end of the third century, that: 
" ... a Church had been created within which the pious layman could find 
a holy place of peace and edification. With priestly strife he had 
nothing to do, nor had he any concern in the profound and subtle 
dogmatic system whose foundation was now being laid. We may say 
that the religion of the laity attained freedom in proportion as 1t 
became impossible for them to take part in the establishment and 
guardianship of the official Church system. It is the professional 
guardians of this ecclesiastical edifice who are the real martyrs of 
religion, and it is they who have to bear the consequences of the 
worldliness and lack of genuineness pertaining to the system ... " [HO II 
p.l25f]. 
iv. Transpotentiation after Nicaea 
Though in Harnack's view the major shifts of power in the church were 
virtually c~mplete before ~Nicaea, the process continued throughout the 
period of Nicaea and Chalcedon and in the succeeding centuries. From the 
foundation laid by Tertullian the tendency to see spiritual things in terms 
of externals, -in terms of of legality, authority, demands and rewards 
passed into the western church [HD V pp.l6-17l. An external view of 
sanctity, of objective grace, of rites with a power of their own apart from 
the heart of the believer, gained the ascendancy [see ch.5l. 
Divine/spiritual power was thus transferred from persons to institutions. 
Such a shift was necessary, Harnack holds, because the spiritual and moral 
state of individual Christians was now so low that only thus could they be 
saved from despair of the Christian character of the contemporary church 
[HD V p. 40; also HD III pp.273fl. Donatism joined the earlier movements as 
the protest of the old Christianity against 'secularisation', that is, the 
removal of the attribute of holiness from persons to institutions such as 
the clerical office and the ritual. The church began to see itself as 
primarily: 
~'~ .. ,an institution whose holiness and truth were inalienable, however 
melancholy the state of its members. In this thought Catholicism was 
first complete' [HD V pp.41-42l. 
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Post-Nicene theology contributed str·ongly to the tnmct towar·ds locotinK 
sp1r:l.tus.J. poww in externals. Theology proved, in Harnack's tencs, 
'str-ong0.r than l''0.Ug:l.on', chang:lng from l:h0 fonnwla.tlon of an oxpc6ct1cc 
f:trst into a phiJ.osophica.J. proposHion and 0ventuaJ.J.y :l.nto a Jeg&l r;tc;tu·~e 
n~qu).rlng obecUenc0.. The '~;piLl.tual things' which are the sum mld 
substance of theology became vehicles of compuJ.s1.on CHD nr p.131; HD ;.v 
p.137l, and the church's quasi··politlcaJ. power became virtui:l:lly 
indisting-uishable from the world's CHD VI p.2.n.2.L 
v. 'Pleas in mitigation' 
Harnack's description of the process of transpotentiation in the Christian 
church is not that of a neutral bystander. He is ~ and in hts 
judgment there is no doubt that the process, taken as a whole, was a 
negative one entailing much loss to Christianity. In the first instance 
the 'right' kind of power was replaced by the 'wrong' sort, that is, 
empowering of an interior, nutrient and persuasive kind, diffuse and 
'democratic' in terms of its scope of operation and appropriate to 
'religion', was replaced by empowering of an external and coercive kind, 
concentrated and 'oligarchic' in terms of its scope of operation and 
appropriate perhaps to politics or social organisation but not to 
'religion'. But Harnack's sense of offence and outrage is not located in 
this fact alone: an even greater offence to him is the fact that the 
church came to claim that, when exercised by it, the second kind of power 
was in fact identical with the first and shared its divine origin. It is 
the disguising of the second kind of power, and its legitimation by 
claiming id~ntity with the first kind that Harnack finds so offensive. He 
cannot accept the church's claim that its temporal organisation and 
institutions have intrinsic religious value and constitute in fact a 
spiritual power, and an indispensible spiritual power at that, standing as 
a middle term between God and the believer. In his view this is simply a 
crime against the truth. 
Harnack cannot approve of the process of transpotentiation, and his 
disapproval is frequently impassioned, but nevertheless he recognises that 
much of the process was historically necessary, perhaps inevitable. We 
therefore find in his writing, frequently in conjunction with strong 
denunciations, numerous 'pleas in mitigation' for the 'crime'. Harnack 
rarely indulged in the bitter anti-catholic polemic which characterised the 
protestantism of his time. He argues that the early church did what it 
did more as a necessary response to historical exigencies than out of 
greed for temporal power. He reminds us that while comparison of the 
church at the end of the third century with primitive Christianity will 
always be disheartening, a truer comparison is that between the Christian 
and the non-Christian social organisations of that time, between church and 
empire, clergy and magistrates [HD III p.1251. He further maintains that 
while the church was wrong to in effect trade its divine/spiritual pot-::~er 
for socio-political powers, it did in fact use the latter largely for good. 
He writes: 
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"Amidst the general disorganisation of all relationships, and from 
amongst the ruins of a shattered fabric, a new structure, founded on 
the belief in one God, in a sure revelation, and in eternal life Bas 
being laboriously raised. It gathered Bithin it more and more all 
the elements still capable of continued existence; it readmitted the 
old world, cleansed of its grossest impurities, and raised holy 
barriers to secure its conquests against all attacks. Within this 
edifice justice and civic virtue shone with no greater brightness 
than they did upon the earth generally; but within it burned two 
mighty flames-the assurance of eternal life, guaranteed by Christ, 
and the practice of mercy. He who knows history is aware that the 
influence of epoch-making personages is not to be sought in its 
direct consequences alone, as these speedily disappear: that structure 
which prolonged the life of a dying world, and brought strength from 
the Holy One to another struggling into existence, was also partly 
founded on the Gospel, and but for this would neither have arisen nor 
attained solidarity ... " [HD II pp.125fl. 
Here Harnack sees the church as a vehicle, despite its faults, through 
which God gave strength and direction to a world in the process of violent 
transformation. He is able to accept the very limited excellence of the 
church at the end of the third century because it needed to be the shape 
it was in order to smooth the transition of western civilisation from 
antiquity to the middle ages. This provides a good example of Harnack's 
conviction that the church is never an end in itself, that the supreme task 
of the Spirit of God has not to do with the church, but with the world, 
and embraces all of history and culture and not just that which is 
labelled as religion. Harnack is thus the more easily able to accept even 
temporary setbacks to the gospel because they often appear to him as part 
of the longer-term strategy of the Lord of history. He can point out to 
us the positive and lasting achievements of the catholic settlement for 
civilisation, the human spirit and religion as well, and speak with 
admiration of the creation which broke up the external forces assailing 
Christianity and in which the highest blessings of the gospel have 
continued to be accessible [e.g. HD II pp. 4, 14, 77f; see also M&E I pp.205, 
234-2371. The legalism of the catholic church was a barrier to true 
religion, but not in Harnack's view an insurmountable one: if Jesus could 
have the gospel and be a Jew, one can adhere to the gospel within the 
catholic church [HD II p.4l. Harnack's confidence in the ability of the 
gospel, and of the soul which truly seeks God, to triumph despite outward 
circumstances affords him the ability to judge counter-movements with 
moderation [see WC'? pp.266, 2981, and his estimate of the darkness imposed 
upon the gospel by catholicism is inevitably affected by the light which 
he sees dawning with Luther. 
vi. The root cause of transpotentiation 
As we have seen, many factors were involved in the process of 
transpotentiation in early Christianity. If one is, at a theoretical level, 
to at tempt to ascertain the causes, in Harnack's view, of this 
transpotentiation, the historical and historically-conditioned ideological 
factors mentioned above play a major part. But in Harnack0s understanding 
transpotentiation was 
contingencies--it also 
which is the equivalent 
never improve with age: 
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not just an ad hoc response to historical 
represents the wor·king-out of 1:1n historical 'law' 
of the lahl of entropy. Religions in Harnack's view 
" ... No religion gains anything through time; it only loses. If a 
hurricane does not pass over it and purify it again and again, it 
gets stifled in its own withered foliage ... " [liD IV pp. 310-3111. 
Harnack held that the original conception of faith, which Luther eventually 
renewed, was in the course of history transformed according to a law of 
history: 
11Es ist der Gang der Dinge, der sich in der Religionsgeschichte immer 
Wiederholt: von Glaubensgedanken zum philosophisch-theologischen 
Lehrsatz, und vom Lehrsatz, der Erkenntnis verlangt, zum Rechtssatz, 
der Gehorsam fordert, oder zur heiligen Reliquie" [Dog. 4 II p.314; 
quoted in Meijering <1978> p.52l. 
Kaltenborn reiterates the theme, noting that Harnack maintained that thP. 
flow of history always rationalises, levels and corrupts <rationalisierend, 
nivellierend, verschlechternd> [Kaltenborn p.30l. 
This idea of a law which indictates the inevitable downhill course of 
religion over time is paralleled by Wrong's description of 'tendential 
laws'. He asserts that each of the forms of power has a built-in tendency 
to metamorphose over time into a different form when the power relation 
recurs often enough, usually in the direction of greater permanence and 
coerciveness [Wrong pp.75fJ. Rieff suggests that the inevitability is to be 
explained by reference to the power-hunger of the western psyche: 
"To Harnack it was not an astonishing development-this movement of 
western religious energy from faith to institution. He understood 
that the entire movement was inevitable; the power-hunger of the 
western psyche remains always at work ... " [intra. to Outlines, 
<unnumbered> p. 101. 
The most obvious sociological parallel to Harnack's 'law of history' is, of 
course, Weber's routinisation of charisma, in which charismatic authority, 
based upon the attractive and exceptional qualities of a person, becomes, 
over time, institutionalised, based on office-holding rather than 
personality, and legitimated in terms of tradition. Weber viewed this 
shift as essential, if power was to be maintained, in order to counteract 
the inherent instability of charismatic authority and resolve the problem 
of succession [see Wrong p.63J. 
Harnack's descriptions of the gradual diminution of pneumatic and 
chiliastic phenomena and the decline in moral rigour fit this model well, 
as does the increasing interest in external authorities with which he 
associates this spiritual laxity. Harnack also insists that an 
institutional conception of the church made headway in both east and west 
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'because H was inevitable' [HD V p.421. The sociological concept of 
institutionalisation was one with which Harnack was familiar, though he 
would probably not have used the word. For all his insistence on 
personality, he acknowledged that the effects of great personalities are 
not to be found in them alone, but also in the institutions to which they 
give rise. Irmscher, as we noted in chapter one, credits Harnack with 
playing a decisive role in shifting the emphasis in the study of history 
away from an exclusive preoccupation with personality towards a deeper 
awareness of the historical importance of institutions. Given that for 
Harnack there was no wall of division between sacred and secular history, 
and religion, whatever else it might be, was a human pursuit subject to 
the same laws of development and decay as other human pursuits, the 
institutionalisation of the gospel would be, however regrettable, deemed to 
be inevitable. 
The striking similarities of Harnack's view to Weber's routinisation should 
not, however, blind us to the differences. In Weber's scheme the exchange 
of powers is from a precarious, ephemeral type of power based on emotion 
to a more stable, durable and 'real' kind of power, and may be judged, in 
its own terms, to be a movement from an inferior to a superior type of 
power. To Harnack the exchange of powers is from the ultimately real and 
supremely valuable type of power to one of only temporal reality and 
strictly limited worth, and is judged to be a movement from the superior 
to the inferior. The difference, of course, is rooted in a different 
attitude towards transcendence. 
Another way in which Harnack differs from Weber is that for him the 
institutionalisation of Christianity and the concomitant loss of access to 
divine/spiritual power is not the end of the story. Religions can and do 
become corrupt and decline, but they can also be purified and reformed. 
One religion in particular, unique in its status and its power, is also 
unique in its ability to be recast and reformed, and to resurface with 
vigour after periods of torpor. So, in the case of Christianity, the 
pessimism of Harnack's 'law of history' is limited and provisional. It is 
qualified by his observations of the reformations of Christian history and 
by his teleology-his conviction that the course of history is and shall 
continue to be determined by the Spirit of God. 
Emphasis upon the inevitability of transpotentiation in Harnack may 
mitigate but does not absolve the actors in the process of responsibility 
for their actions, as his sometimes strident tone manages to communicate. 
Thus the causes of transpotentiation must both be sought, in Harnack's 
view, in the inevitable historical process of decay and also in the 
pressures of Christianity's particular history, the culpable laziness and 
mediocrity of the majority of believers, and the equally culpable power-
seeking of the few. 
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6.c. Authority 
Wrong maintains that authority is a special case of power [Wrong, p.231. 
As was established in chapter two, it constitutes the chief form of power 
exercised in religion, and because of this merits specific attention in 
this investigation. What Harnack had to say about authority illuminates 
his thinking about all types of power and is vital to his theory of 
transpotentiation. 
For Harnack the creation of authority constitutes the first and decisive 
step in the transpotentiation process. It comes into effect at the moment 
when divine/spiritual power, operative within the individual and 
communicated to the individual through ideas and persons, becomes 
externalised, in that it becomes imputed, on a permanent basis, to the 
persons and/or ideas through which it has reached the individual. Before 
this moment divine/spiritual power is diffuse and egalitarian, and many 
persons and many expressions of thought are potentially channels of the 
grace of God: after this moment, 'some are more equal than others', and 
divine/spiritual power becomes channelled through specific holy doctrines 
and holy persons. The process is a gradual one, but the channels become 
increasingly narrow, and eventually the holy persons declare the doctrines, 
and their own mediation, to be indispensible for access to divine/spiritual 
power. 
As we established in 6.a., Harnack accepts that the creation of external 
authorities in religion, like transpotentiation itself, is human and 
inevitable. He still insists, however, that it occurs for negative reasons. 
In an ideal world, and an ideal church, there would be no need for any 
religious authority other than the authority of God expressing itself in 
the consciousness of each believer. Harnack suggests that this was fairly 
nearly the case in the earliest church, but that in response to the 
pressing historical need for unity and to the natural processes of decay 
resulting in spiritual mediocrity, the situation changed. It is the half-
religious person, Harnack insists, who creates authorities [HD II pp.l24-
1251. 
In Mission and Expansion Harnack describes both the psychology and the 
evolution of authority within the church. He notes that already by the 
time of Celsus and Lucian Christianity was being accused of being 
doctrinaire, unquestioning and discouraging of thought. Preaching of this 
kind, he notes, is only possible if at the same time some powerful 
authority is set up, and such authority did indeed exist in Christianity. 
First and foremost, as a result of Paul, there was the authority of the 
revealed will of God as disclosed in the mission of the Son. Here, says 
Harnack, external and internal authority <by which he appears to mean 
objective and subjective authority> blended and coincided, for while Paul 
held that the divine will is certainly capable of making itself felt as 
such without humanity understanding its purposes or right <Romans 90, he 
was equally convinced that God's gracious will makes itself intelligible to 
the inner person CM&E I pp.219-221 1. But even in Paul the external and 
internal authority vested in the cross of Christ was accompanied by other 
authorities which claimed the absolute obedience of faith--i.e. the writ ten 
word of the sacred documents and the sayings of Jesus [ibid.J. 
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For all the emphasis on obedience, Paul tried to legitimate his authorities 
by reason rather than demanding a sacrifice of the intellect. But other 
teachers were very different: 
They simply erected their authority wherever they went; it was the 
letter of Scripture more and more, but ere long it became the rule of 
faith, together with the church ... True, they endeavoured to but tress 
the authority of these two magnitudes, the Bible and the church, by 
means of rational arguments ... In so doing they certainly did not 
demand an absolutely blind belief. But, first of all, it was 
assuredly not every missionary or teacher who was competent to lead 
such proofs. They were adduced only by the educated apostles and 
controversialists. And in the second place, no inner authority can 
ever be secured for the Bible and the church by means of external 
proofs. The latter really remained a sort of alien element. At 
bottom the faith required was blind faith ... " CM&E I pp. 221-2221. 
Harnack continues, unfolding his view of the psychology of external 
authority: 
"Still, it would be a grave error to suppose that for the majority of 
people the curt demand that authorities must be simply believed and 
reason repudiated, acted as a serious obstacle to their acceptance of 
the Christian religion. In reality, it was the very opposite. The 
more peremptory and exclusive is the claim of faith which any 
religion makes, the more trustworthy and secure does that religion 
seem to the majority; the more it relieves them of the difficulty and 
responsibility of reflecting upon its truth, the more welcome it is. 
Any firmly established authority thus acts as a sedative. Nay more. 
The most welcome articles of faith are just the most paradoxical, 
which are a mockery of all experience and rational reflection; the 
reason for this being that they appear to guarantee the disclosure of 
divine wisdom and not of something which is merely human and 
therefore unreliable. 'Miracle is the favourite child of faith'. That 
is true of more than miracles; it applies also to the miraculous 
doctrines which cannot be appropriated by a man unless he is 
prepared to believe and obey them blindly. 
But so long as the authorities consisted of books and doctrines, the 
coveted haven of rest was still unreached. The meaning of these 
doctrines always lies open to some doubt. Their scope, too, is never 
quite fixed. And, above all, their application to present-day 
questions is often a serious difficulty, which leads to painful and 
disturbing controversies. 'Blind faith' never gains its final haven 
until its authority is living, until questions can be put to it, and 
answers promptly received from it. During the first generations of 
Christendom no such authority existed; but in the course of the 
second century and down to the middle of the third, it was gradually 
taking shape--! mean, the authority of the church as represented in 
the episcopate. It did not dislodge the other authorities of God's 
saving purpose and the holy Scripture, but by stepping to their side 
it pushed them into the background. The auctorftas interprettva is 
invariably the supreme and real authorftj' [M&E I pp.222-223l. 
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As distance <both in time and in praxis) from Christ and the first 
believers increased, the question of the exercise of legitimated human 
leadership within the church became more and more pressing [see HD III 
pp.214-228J. All conceptions of the tradition were agreed that the church 
was invested with authority by its connexion with the Holy Spirit. But by 
whom and when did the church speak? Who had the final authority to 
interpret dogma? In the post-Nicene period there were several contenders 
for this position, now that the charismatic 'offices' of apostle, prophet 
and teacher had vanished. First, of course, there was the episcopate, from 
the third century onwards, though a strict conception of it like Cyprian's 
was not universally held for a long time. Then there were the provincial 
synods, which were accorded a certain inspiration. There were also the 
ecumenical councils, which were originally an idea of Constantine's. The 
idea grew up in the fourth century that the council of Nicaea was 
infallible; later this was transferred to ecumenical councils generally, and 
in the east from the seventh century onwards it was a settled proposition 
that the Holy Scriptures and the seven ecumenical councils were the 
sources of Christian truth. To answer the problem of how to handle 
doctrinal disputes on which a council had not pronounced, reference was 
made to the bishops of major chairs, among whom Rome was pre-eminent, 
even in the east [HD III p.224l. But it was never made clear how far the 
patriarchs really constituted an authority in dogma, or their relationship 
to the ecumenical councils. 
As a logical extension of the concept of apostolicity, the principles of 
antiquity, unanimous attestation and catholicity also functioned as an 
authority and were held to decide an issue. This idea too, Harnack 
maintains, was not without its difficulties, and he notes that the church 
gradually extended the length of time seen as 'antiquity': in the fourth 
century everything before Origen was 'ancient', where in the fifth century 
everything up to and including Athanasius was included. The question of 
the relative weight of the councils and the 'consensus patrum' <which 
hardly existed anyway) remained unresolved. Of the many contenders for 
authority, Harnack concludes that: 
" ... The Church, as it is, with its graduated orders, crowned by the 
Patriarchs, constituted the tradition and the authority. But the 
authority of no factor in this system possessed, when isolated, any 
significance whatever. It might not assert itself at the expense of 
the rest. Its dignity was founded on its being a part of antiquity' 
[HD III p.2281. 
The authority of the church was, then, rooted in antiquity, in its 
preservation of the legacy of the apostles. But antiquity, Harnack insists, 
was an elastic and chaotic concept. It also raised the further difficulty 
of how to explain novelties in the church, especially in the sphere of 
doctrine, such as the use of the unbiblical term 'homoousios'. In the west, 
the power of councils to 'unfold' doctrine was established, but it was 
never clearly spelt out in the east. Excuses were sometimes made for the 
older Fathers as having written at a time when dogma was not yet 
explained or sharply formulated, or in terms of their writing lacking the 
necessary exactness [HD III pp.228-2291. 
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Harnack is at pains to demonstrate the insufficiency of this pluriform 
external authority structure, and the artificiality of its construction of 
antiquity and tradition. The results are well-argued and persuasive, but 
by no means problem-free. His most sympathetic and sensitive critics have 
pinpointed the issue of authority as one of considerable difficulty in 
Harnack's work. 
Neufeld maintains that Harnack thought in only a very preliminary way 
about such presuppositions as how the authority of tradition and its 
Verbindlichkeit could be explained [Neufeld <1977> pp.287fl. He defends him 
against the oft-repeated charge of religious anarchy <Schwarmgeisterei> 
[ibid. p.351l, but criticises his reductionism in a now-familiar way [ibid. 
p.352l. He is also critical and somewhat sceptical of Harnack's emphasis 
on freedom and liberation, suggesting firstly that it owed more to the 
rallying-cries <Schlagworten) of the nineteenth century than to the gospel, 
and secondly that it is unrealistic to conceive of a power <Kraft) in which 
freedom is not at the expense of the other but found in the 
Zusammenwirken of all, and which overcomes dialectic. Harnack failed, in 
Neufeld's eyes, to ascertain any dogmatically effective power of conviction 
Cdurchschlagend Uberzeugungskraft ). Now, he asks, that what the church 
teaches about Jesus Christ can no longer simply be equated with the 
historical Jesus, what binding force can that teaching have? In other 
words, what can fill the vacuum left behind by the loss of historicity as 
a legitimacy-claim on the part of ecclesiastical authority? 
Meijering's attention is focussed more directly on the tension in Harnack 
between external and internal authority. He rightly perceives that 
Harnack's deepest conviction was that for faith no external authority 
should be required, but only the inner authority which is Christ himself 
[Meijering <1978) pp.57-58J. However, Meijering continues, Harnack was an 
historian and a realist. He quotes his statement that no strong religious 
faith in the world has existed which has not at a decisive point called 
upon an external authority and been convinced of that authority's absolute 
power <Macht>. The human heart, Harnack continued, longs for it, and while 
the spiritual Christian experiences the Spirit of God immediately as Lord, 
the unspiritual always needs a mediating authority--person, book or 
church--and even the most 'spiritual' seldom gets beyond it (ibid.p.58-591. 
Thus in Harnack's scheme of things external authority becomes 'necessary' 
as a concession to human weakness. Meijering holds that Harnack set out 
to undermine the external authority of dogma, but, sceptical of his own 
scepticism, he also felt the need of an external authority to cling to 
[ibid. p.56J. Dogma could not and did not become for Harnack a legitimate 
external authority, but Meijering suggests that Harnack's fascination with 
dogma finds its explanation here [ibid. p.61-62l. This of course begs the 
question as to what for Harnack could possibly constitute a legitimate 
external authority. Meijering has no suggestion to make on this point. 
Kaltenborn also fastens upon this problem in Harnack, and maintains that it 
exemplifies the chief dilemma of his entire theology: he clearly saw the 
necessity of an external authority for the existence of faith, but 
despaired of discovering the reason for it [Kaltenborn, p.641. While 
Kaltenborn sees this attitude as a flaw in Harnack's thought, he perceives 
and endorses in Harnack's ideas and example a new and salutary relation to 
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human/political/social power <Macht>, rooted both in his positive attitude 
towards the world and his insistence that the church should serve and not 
dominate. It is an attitude in which there is no striving for power in 
order to rule humanity in the interests of the church, but in which the 
opppo$1te tendency-the identification of power with evil and the complete 
renunciation of power in favour of an inwardness which is a flight from 
responsibility for our world into metaphysics-is equally abjured (ibid. 
pp.16, 149]. Kaltenborn sees Harnack's own relations with Kaiser Wilhelm as 
illustrative of this attitude. The unjust slurs of Prince von BUlow to the 
contrary, Kaltenborn states that the Babel-Bibel controversy proves that 
Harnack never sought royal favour for its own sake, but so that the ideas 
which he held might have the largest possible radius of action. Power for 
him was not evil in itself, so long as one continually sought to employ it 
for positive goals [ibid. p.16J. This perhaps characterises Harnack's 
attitude towards external human powers generally, but I do not think that 
Harnack's attitude towards such powers when employed in the church is so 
straightforwardly positive. There also appears to be at least some 
contradiction between the attitudes to power which Harnack demonstrated in 
his own life and those which he espoused in his writings (see 6.e. and ch. 7 
below]. 
6.d. The reformation solution to the problem of transpotentiation 
We find insights into Harnack's positive alternatives, both for authority 
and for the problem of transpotentiation in general, in his portrait of the 
reformation. Curialism represented to him an extreme form of 
ecclesiasticism, of human power arrogating to itself the title of divine. 
It: " ... treated Church and religion simply as an outward form of domination, 
and sought to maintain and extend them by means of force, officialism, and 
an oppressive system of dues" (HD VII p.5l. In it one witnessed 'the 
complete secularising of religion by politics' UID VII pp.7-8J. Curialism 
aroused a reaction based on Augustine, <Wycliffe, Huss, Wesel, Wessel> 
which led on to the Reformation (HD VII p.16l. Power politics, 
ecclesiastical and secular, played a major part in this revolution, but at 
its heart lay another struggle, that to restore to its rightful place the 
divine/spiritual power of the gospel. 
The reformation had, in Harnack's terms, three 'issues'--Tridentine 
catholicism, socinianism, and protestantism. In the counter-reformation 
curialism triumphed [HD VII pp. 38f, 55, 631. In its intellectualism, 
socinianism missed the heart of the matter, i.e. religion as a relationship 
between persons and as the power of the living God [HD VII pp. 120, 127, 
1671. Tridentine catholicism and socinianism were in Harnack's view both 
essentially further outworkings of medieval Christianity. In protestantism, 
however, Harnack saw 'the restoration of Pauline Christianity in the spirit 
of a new age [HD VII p.168l, and in this a significant, if still only 
partial, reversal of the transpotentiation of the catholic settlement. 
Harnack represents the reformation as the completion of the work of 
Augustine. Augustine had begun the breaking dowm and recasting of dogma, 
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but: " ... the sceptic stopped short before the formal authorities of 
Catholicism". The neoplatonic influence played its part as well, and: 
10 
... besides, Augustine knew not yet how to enter into sure possession of 
the power given through faith in God as the Father of Jesus Christ II nm 
VII p.228l. Lack of a steady and sure possession of the spiritual pouer 
available through the gospel handicapped Augustine, as did his continued 
acceptance of the impressive power claims of the 'authorities' of the 
church. Harnack's implication is that Luther was able to finish Augustine's 
work because he clearly understood where the real and legitimate power of 
Christianity is to be found. 
For Luther there was only one authority, the Christ of history as preached, 
the Word of God. All external infallibilities were rejected, including the 
infallibility of scripture, though Harnack admits that Luther did not 
always hold to this CHD VII pp.223 fl. All human powers in the church were 
challenged, relativised and divested of their <pseudo-)sacred nature-the 
political powers of the church hierarchy,. the authority of tradition and of 
ancient dogma, even the authority of a written canon-in the interests of 
giving expression to the one truly spiritual power. The reformation: 
" ... set up the evangelical faith in place of dogma, this being done by 
its cancelling the dualism of dogmatic Christianity and practical 
Christian self-criticism and life-conduct. But what it placed at the 
centre of practical Christian self-criticism and life-conduct was just 
faith itself and its certainty" CHD VII pp.228-229J. 
Harnack is at pains to point out the error of the belief that the 
cancelling of dogmatic Christianity by Luther was equivalent to a 
neutralising of all 'faith that is believed' (fides quae creditur) and that 
all that was required was pious subjective feeling. The truth is that 
Luther's reformation: 
01 
... only restored its sovereign right to faith, and thereby to the 
doctrine of faitlr-in the sense of its being nothing but the doctrine 
of Christ-after the uncertainties of the Middle Ages ... and ... set up 
theology, i.e., the true theology of the cross (theologia crucis), as 
the decisive power in the Churctl' CHD VII p.229l. 
Thus Harnack, while repudiating dogma, still reserves a place in reformed 
and restored Christianity for theology, and he does not accept Sabatier's 
view that the intellectual or theoretical element in dogma is merely the 
symbolic expression of the individual's spiritual experience or of the 
religious spirit of the church. On the contrary, Harnack holds that while 
the intellectual element is partly the attempt to express religious 
feeling, and is therefore symbolical: 
" ... within the Christ ian religion it belongs to the essence of the 
thing itself, inasmuch as this not only awakens feeling, but has a 
quite definite content which determines and should determine the 
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feeling. In this sense Christianity without dogma, that is, without a 
clear expression of its content is inconceivable. But that does not 
justify the unchangeable permanent significance of that dogma which 
has once been formed under definite historical conditions" [HD I p.22J. 
The manner in which Harnack continues to assert the 'rights' of theology 
within Christianity give rise to speculation as to whether it might not be 
part of his answer to the problem of a legitimate external authority, and 
this in turn raises many questions (see ch.7 below]. 
Luther's work, however, represented only a good beginning. Harnack 
criticises him for not being thoroughgoing enough in ending the bondage of 
Christianity to powers and authorities other than the gospel, i.e. for 
allowing the continuing sway of the early ecumenical councils, the formulae 
of ancient dogma, medieval biblical exegesis, something still of the 
medieval view of sacrament, and remnants of nominalism. This was combined 
with a deep distrust of reason and a revelling in absurdity and paradox 
(l-ID VII pp. 229-230, 233-236]. In Harnack's eyes, Luther's biggest 
deficiency, which led him into most of the others, lay in his inadequate 
grasp of history (l-ID VII, p.2341. 
6.e. Summary and further observations 
Harnack's answer to the fourth quest ion of this investigation, in brief, is 
that in response to the exigencies of history and human weakness, and in 
obedience to a general law of religion, external powers of a social and 
political type gradually encroached upon, struggled with, and eventually 
usurped the original supremacy of inner, divine/spiritual power in 
Christianity, causing the latter to diminish in terms of accessibility and 
effectiveness. In Harnack' theory, which I have termed 'transpotentiation', 
divine/spiritual power was contained, supplemented and virtually replaced 
in the Christian communities by the external human powers of 
catholicism-the 'objective' authority of an 'apostolic' creed and canon, 
and of an 'apostolic' succession of clergy whose mediation became 
indispensable to the laity and whose bishops possessed the supreme 
authority, the right to interpret the tradition. Over time these 
authorities became more coercive and overtly political. The chief crime of 
these external human powers in Harnack's eyes was their false claim to be 
religious powers and to be absolutely necessary as the middle term 
between the individual and divine/spiritual power. External, social power 
in Harnack's view is legitimate in its own sphere and is even, in some 
form, necessary within the church, but it becomes unacceptable when it 
encroaches upon the free territory of the spirit. The divine force of the 
gospel, however, has never been extinguished: it breaks out afresh 
throughout Christian history and especially at the reformation. 
Many factors led to the transpotentiation of Christianity, the conflict 
with gnosticism, the rise of the concept of apostolicity, the rapprochement 
with secular philosophy and culture, the waning of chiliasm, enthusiasm and 
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moral vigour, the pressure of politics. Underlying them all, was the 
'natural law', similar to Weber's routinisation of charisma, which dictates 
that religious movements are at their best in their beginnings and decline 
thereafter unless vigorously and repeatedly reformed. The 'heretical' 
movements of early church history Harnack represents largely as protests, 
on behalf of what still remained of original Christianity, against its 
further transpotentiation. Despite his essentially negative judgment of 
the transpotentiation process Harnack offers many pleas in mitigation, 
including the pressure brought to bear upon Christianity by historical 
events and the resulting paramount need for unity, plus the fact that the 
church, at least at the beginning, used its new powers for good. He can 
go even beyond historical necessity to enumerate the benefits of the 
change for religion and culture. Several factors enable his 
mitigation-his own moderate and generous temperament, his ultimate 
concern with the larger purposes of history to which the Lord of history 
subordinates even the church, his high estimate of the gospel's ability to 
triumph eventually regardless of obstacles, and perhaps a concern to 
justify his own efforts at a rapprochement between Christianity and 
secular culture. 
Harnack sees the development of external authorities as the first step in 
Christianity's transpotentiation, and describes the psychological state 
which reaches out for such authorities. While acknowledging its 
inevitability, Harnack judges external authority in religion to be a 
disempowering sedative. He praises Luther's reformation for substantially 
reversing the transpotentiation process and for correcting the balance 
between internal and external powers in Christianity, though he insists 
that Luther did not go far enough to curtail the influence within 
protestantism of the pseudo-religious catholic external authorities. 
Harnack's transpotentiation theme is satisfying in many ways and while 
representing a definite point of view, it is sophisticated and nuanced in 
terms of his theories of causality. It does, however, have its 
difficulties. 
We observe in his treatment of the transpotentiation theme once again that 
Harnack maintains an uncompromising dualism, a separation of 
divine/spiritual power from what he terms human powers--social and 
political forces, but also ideological constructs such as 
tradition--operative in church history. We still need to ask whether such 
a dualism is workable. 
We also note the considerable tension which this dualism creates for the 
possibility of any external human authority or power in the church. 
Frequently Harnack appears to suggest that divine/spiritual power is the 
sole legitimate power in Christianity, which raises the question as to how 
a church, being an ·external and social entity, is either possible or 
permissable. The theme of transpotentiation typifies Harnack's view of the 
involvement of 'human' power in religion as negative, but he does in the 
end concede the necessity of involvement with human powers if one wishes 
to establish a spiritual power on earth, and says in terms that in 
Christianity human authority is needed as well as the authority of the 
gospel. It is, Harnack says, the inner ~mpulses of a faith which 
constitute the force by which it exists and is preserved, but conditions 
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are necessary under which this force can become operative. All faiths 
appeal at some point to an external authority, he adds. The only point is 
to determine the right external authority, and the just relationship 
between the internal and the external [HD V pp.82 fl. 
We further observe that Harnack's interpretation is a version of the 'fall' 
theory of the transformation of early Christianity, and we need to ask 
about the terms on which he is able to integrate this fact with his 
conviction. that the Spirit of God is Lord of history. 
Harnack's insistence that the catholic settlement involved a blasphemy-the 
imputation to the earthly structures of the church of a religious, that is, 
a spiritual, significance to which they had no claim-leaves us wondering 
what, if any, religious significance his system can accord to the church. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HARNACK'S CONTRIBUTION TO A THEOLOGY OF POWER 
7 .a. Introduction: Harnack's power theology 
Intrinsic to Christianity's self-definition from the beginning has been the 
missionary calling, and if that is the case, then apologetics need to be at 
the centre of the theological task. And because of the state of the world 
and of human consciousness at this time, the apologetic task in the 
twentieth century needs to be conducted in terms of power. The truth of 
the teachings, fundamental to Christianity, of the providence of an 
almighty God, that is, the power of a good and loving God to control 
history, and of the accessibility of that power to human beings who are 
willing to yield to it, is not obvious to twentieth-century minds. As, 
presumably, in all 'bad times' of human history, the problem of theodicy, of 
affirming at one and the same time the unlimited power and the 
unparalleled goodness of God, acquires a special sharpness. For some 
reason, probably having to do with the influence of the character of Jesus, 
it is easier for twentieth-century people to believe in the goodness of 
God than in God's 'almighty' power. 
It is therefore primarily on the issue of divine power that the Christian 
apologetic needs to focus at this time. To do so creatively and 
effectively it needs to learn from any examples in the past that have 
addressed the issue. Harnack is particularly valuable because he grasped 
with absolute clarity the nature of the apologetic task which stood before 
him, and which stands before theology still. 
Harnack addresses the problem of affirming divine power despite its 
apparent absence in the first instance by employing several dualisms. The 
first of these involves acknowledging the distance that exists between God 
and the world which is built into the very structure of reality, as the 
metaphor of the iron ring infers, and the antipathy of the world to God. 
Harnack's life-long at tact ion to Marcion makes sense at this point. This 
state of things of course is not, as in Marcion, the original condition: 
Harnack held that it came about through a 'fall' which happened 'we know 
not how'. Without attempting via a myth or any other route to offer an 
explanation, Harnack simply affirms the state of alienation which exists 
betwe'en God and fallen 'nature'. 
The second dualism pertains to the realm of human experience. It could be 
expressed as a spirit/nature dualism, but perhaps more accurately as a 
division of human reality into an interior and an external world. The 
theodicy takes place when God is 'excused' from exercising direct influence 
in the external world. both on the basis of the structure of reality and 
on the basis of the fallenness of 'nature'. and when God's power over the 
interior world of human consciousness is affirmed. Through influencing 
human behaviour in the external world by means of transforming human 
interior consciousness, God then achieves a 'back door' into 'nature' and an 
indirect, but nonetheless effective, power there. 
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This alternative or subversive strategy, this portrait of an apparently 
weak God engaging in guerilla warfare, does not, however, completely fill 
up the claims of the Christian tradition of God's absolute power. Harnack 
is able to complete the satisfaction of this tradition with a this-worldly 
variant of the time-honoured means of eschatology, by taking the long vie~ 
of history and affirming that despite appearances in the short term, God 
remains, as one looks down the millenia, the creator spiritus and Lord of 
history. Harnack indeed also possesses a more traditional eschatological 
expectation of the Kingdom, that is, 'the realised dominion of the good', 
but this remains a shadowy, far-off event, functionally irrelevant to 
existence now. Possession of this belief completes the theodicy in a 
formal manner, but Harnack's centre of gravity remains with the h-Jo 
dualisms of our present existence, supplemented by the 'long view' of 
history. 
The virtue of this method of theodicy is that is is believable within the 
iron ring. It ackowledges the reality of the human experience of evil, 
futility and suffering. It also acknowledges the human experience of inner 
transformation, renewal and empowering, and the human experience, related 
to this transformation, of contact with an utterly benign ultimate 
presence. It is refreshingly honest in admitting what cannot be known, i.e. 
how it was that the world which a good God created now exists in 
alienation from and opposition to its creator. The biggest problem with 
Harnack's method, as we shall discuss below [see 7 .c.l, remains the 
sharpness of his dualism. 
7.b. Analysis of Harnack's system 
Harnack's language where spiritual power is concerned is, as we have noted, 
a source of confusion. When discussing what for him is the real and 
ultimate power, the inner power of the gospel, it is emotive and reified, 
the language of a pietistic supernaturalism, and one could be excused for 
assuming that he viewed spiritual power simply in supernaturalist terms. 
This, as we have seen, is not the case, but his use of language is not 
without its significance. It indicates the ambivalence remaining in his 
own thought about the subject, and it plays an important role in his 
mediatorial strategy. 
In his treatment of divine/spiritual power Harnack plays not only an 
apologetic role to the unchurched, but also serves as a mediator between 
different styles of theology. He is a bridge figure between the 
declamatory supernaturalism often characteristic of orthodox theological 
treatments and the strict limitation to immanence characteristic of a 
modernising theology which was heavily influenced by the norms and 
methodology of the social sciences. With regard to divine/spiritual power, 
Harnack appears to embrace both sides of the dichotomy of 'thing-in-itself 
versus instrumental relation', and of 'event within the human sphere versus 
event of supernatural origin'. 
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We have seen that for Mann power is an umbrella term for various modes of 
organisationj it is not in any way a thing in itself. Similarly Wrong 
stresses that power is not a property but a relation. Harnack is willing 
to journey a considerable way down this road. He recognises that the 
power of the gospel operates through describable psychological and social 
mechanisms, and he is prepared to explain in these terms how the interior 
powers enkindled by the gospel work. While he retains the use of 'power' 
as a noun, it is clear that what he indicates by it has the dynamic 
quality of a verb, better expressed by 'empowering'. In Dogmengeschichte 
and Mission und Ausbreitung he devotes considerable space to debunking the 
pretensions to supernatural origin of many so-called religious powers-the 
canon of scripture and the canonised creeds, dogma and ecclesiastical 
office. However, the influences of traditional Christianity and of his 
idealism were strong enough to ensure that for him divine/spiritual power 
retains both its transcei;ldent origin and something of a reified, self-
existent quality, like mana or Bergson's tHan vital though less free-
floating, for Harnack always locates it within persons, and it has its 
origin ultimately in the personality of God. 
Social science has taught us much that Harnack did not appear to know. He 
had only a limited grasp of the tremendous formative power of 
socialisation, and of the effects upon thought and behaviour of impersonal 
organisations. However, his conviction that the highest forms of power 
were engendered within the individual and then had interpersonal and group 
effects may perhaps stand as a corrective to the mechanistic determinism 
which dominates much sociological theory. 
Wrong's categories of authority are particularly helpful in illuminating 
the types of religious power which concerned Harnack <though we must bear 
in mind the exclusion from Wrong's work of intrapersonal power). The type 
of personal authority, and its sub-set of charismatic authority, 'fits' the 
figure of Jesus, though Wrong and Harnack would disagree as to the 
referent for this authority. Sociologically speaking, charismatic authority 
exists because it is attributed to the charismatic figure by followers, 
where from a theological point of view Jesus possessed an authority 
independent of such human attribution. Sociologists could not, for 
example, identify the betrayal and isolation of Jesus upon the cross as 
evidence of charismatic authority, where theologians, from their different 
point of view, unhesitatingly make the claim. 
Wrong's types, and continuum, are also useful in providing a frame of 
reference for Harnack's view of what happened over time to the kinds of 
social power exercised by the church. It was the charismatic authority of 
Jesus which gave Christianity its initial impetus, and this, according to 
Harnack, was the type of power which characterised the 'apostles', i.e., the 
organisers and establishers of the first church communities. However, over 
time and in reaction to external and internal conflicts, the authority of 
church leadership moved up the scale of coercion, through the authority of 
competence to legitimate authority with the inducement of divine blessing 
<e.g. I Clement>, and finally, from the development of the constantinian 
church <and according to Harnack, even before>, to a fully-blown coercive 
authority, maintaining its claims to legitimacy but capable also of many 
forms of coercion, from excommunication to execution for heresy. And as 
one would expect from Wrong's typology, the increase in coercion was 
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concomitant with a decrease in cooperation and reciprocity between power 
actors and power subjects. The distinction between clergy and laity, 
originally only one of function, developed apace and acquired a religious 
significance, leaving the laity in a permanent state of religious 
dependence and immaturity in which the freedom and integrity of the 
individual was curtailed or destroyed. 
Wrong's theories also suggest an explanation as to why the church allowed 
itself to go in this direction. He disagrees with Freud about the 
existence of an inherent will to be dominated, but holds that in many 
circumstances submission is a price worth paying for security and 
stability [Wrong, pp.l20-121l. He also disagrees with theorists who hold 
that there is an innate will to power over others: power is usually a 
means to other ends, such as the material and prestige rewards it 
engenders, or a position of security in a hostile world [ibid. pp.218fl. 
This accords with Harnack's explanation that the increase in coercive 
social power which took place in the early Christian centuries was largely 
a self-protective response in the face of the insecurity engendered by 
gnosticism, by persecution and by other schisms. Other sources of 
insecurity included what Weber and Wrong describe as the need to solve the 
problem of succession [ibid. p.63l-how to replace the charismatic 
authority of Christ and the apostles--and the general waning of enthusiam. 
But in addition to being a response to the pressures of historical events, 
Wrong's 'tendential laws' concerning the mutations of power over time 
parallel Harnack's convictions about a 'law of history' which indicates that 
religions decline rather than improve with age. We can conclude from 
Wrong that power changed within the church because that is what power 
does: and he especially emphasises the instability of personal authority 
[ibid. pp. 75-82fl. 
Harnack's transpotentiation theme is but one version of the 'fall'. theory 
for the explanation of the changes which came over Christianity in its 
first three centuries. We must bear in mind, however, that this is by no 
means the only explanation. Opposed to it, and fitting more comfortably 
into an optimistic view of providence, is the evolutionary or 'development' 
theory favoured by Newman and Loisy and defenders of the ecclesiastical 
status quo. If Harnack sticks to his position that the changes involved in 
early catholicism, however historically necessary, represented a fall for 
the gospel, he can only square it with his conviction that the Spirit of 
God guides and controls history by taking the very long view, and seeing 
the sad story of transpotentiation in the light of its happy ending <or at 
least the beginning of a happy ending) in the reformation. The 
inevitability of the process in Harnack's view also seems to war somewhat 
with his portrayal of it as a culpable fall. 
In a Christian delineation of the working of divine/spiritual power, the 
treatment of redemption through Christ is of central significance. Harnack 
argues, as we saw in 'Christus als Erl6ser', that the longing · for 
redemption is the longing for freedom from 'nature' and for purity, peace 
and a holy life; that this longing is essentially universal; that redemption 
consists in the power to attain this freedom and this purity, and that the 
most drastic sacrifice is worthwhile in pursuit of this goal. Though such 
a sketch of the human need for redemption may ring a little strangely in 
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the ears, it differs from traditional presentations primarily in its shift 
from a description of objective states to a description of the subjective 
feelings which are, within the iron ring, the only evidence we have of 
these states. Where traditional theology speaks of original sin, Harnack 
speaks of the feelings of sin, bondage to the Lauf des Lebens, guilt, 
slavery to transitory things. Where traditional theology speaks of the 
longing for the state of righteousness before God, Harnack speaks of the 
feelings such a state would bring, the feelings of purity and peace. 
Similarly he looks at the whole question of redemption not so much from 
the perspective of the process, as does traditional theology, but rather in 
terms of the goal, which is the achievement of the moral life, the life 
with God, the Kingdom of God. 
One wonders whether Harnack believed that there were actually objective 
states behind the subjective feelings. Harnack is certainly concerned not 
only for achieving the subjective feelings of purity and peace but also 
believes wholeheartedly in the objective existence of righteousness, of the 
ethical life, of life with God. With regard to redemption, however, this is 
somehow to put the question in the wrong way. Redemption, to Harnack, 
does not consist in a change of objective state or status, because 
objectively, that is, from God's point of view, no change is necessary. 
Harnack did not accept the idea of a God who classified some human beings 
as 'in sin' and others as 'justified'. God loves all and forgives all: 
redemption happens when human beings fully realise, understand, believe 
and accept that in spite of their sins, this is the case. Yet sin for 
Harnack remains a great and terrible reality, as is guilt, but he insists 
that it is from the human side only that the alienation from God proceeds, 
and it is a change in the subjective experience of the individual which can 
change this situation. This change is effected by witnessing the innocent, 
suffering love of the Holy One. Even the most objective-sounding 
categories of 'wrath' and the need for 'penalty' are interpreted in terms 
of the feelings and needs of human beings. Such an emphasis on the human 
and subjective has been objected to as anthropocentric arrogance, but in 
Harnack it is the product of his striving for epistemological honesty. 
The heart of Harnack's atonement theory is the power paradox we have 
termed 'strength made perfect in weakness'. But does Harnack unpack this 
paradox which is so central to his concept of redemption? Aside from 
hints and pointers, the answer seems to be no: once again we are in the 
realm of holy mystery. In discussing the Greek reticence on this subject, 
he quotes Goethe, obviously with approval: 
" ... Goethe said towards the close of his life, 'We draw a veil over the 
sufferings of Christ simply because we revere them so deeply; we hold 
it to be reprehensible presumption to play and trifle with and 
embellish those profound mysteries in which the divine depths of 
suffering lie hidden, never to rest until even the noblest seems mean 
and tasteless' ... It was reserved for the Middle Ages and our modern 
times to cast off all modesty and reverence here" [HD III p.306l. 
Harnack does offer us, however, some hints and pointers. We see some of 
the clearest in a passage in praise of Augustine. Harnack says of his 
christological thought that despite its limitations: 
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" ... the true nature of Jesus Christ was really known: 'strength is 
made perfect in weakness' ... That lowliness, suffering, shame, misery, 
and death are means of sanctification: nay, that selflessness and 
therefore ever suffering love is the only means of 
sanctification ... that what is great and good always appears in a lowly 
state, and by the power of the contrast triumphs over pride; that 
humility alone has an eye wherewith to see the divine; that every 
feeling in the good is accompanied by the sense of being 
pardoned-that was the very core of Augustine's Christology" 
UID V pp.132-133J. 
Great significance attaches to the phrase 'and by the power of the 
contrast triumphs over pride'. The power of the contrast appears to be an 
ideological power, engendering change in the emotions and will. 
7.c. Difficulties in Harnack's approach 
1. Problems with the inductive strategy 
As Berger notes, the inductive model occupies the middle ground and is a 
position of compromise which is vulnerable and often transitory. Even if 
legitimate, its success may be precarious. Harnack recognised this, at 
least where the work of others was concerned. In a passage on the 
achievement of Paul, he maintains that. in making the decisive break with 
Judaism Paul did what had to be done to safeguard Christianity from a 
persistent tendency in religion: 
" ... How often and often in the history of religion has there been a 
tendency to do away with some traditional form of doctrine or ritual 
which has ceased to satisfy inwardly, but to do away with it by 
giving it a new interpretation. The endeavour seems to be 
succeeding; the temper and the knowledge prevailing at the moment 
are favourable to it--when, lo and behold! the old meaning suddenly 
comes back again. The actual words of ritual, of the liturgy, of the 
official doctrine, prove stronger than anything else. If a new 
religious idea cannot manage to make a radical breach with the past 
at the critical point...and procure itself a new 'body', it cannot 
last ... There is no tougher or more conservative fabric than a properly 
constituted religion; it can only yield to a higher phase by being 
abolished" [WC? p.l75J. 
Harnack's theological work was largely taken up with offering a new 
interpretation of the traditional forms of Christian doctrine. He declined, 
however, to make a radical breach with the past, and the words quoted 
above could easily apply to the resurgence of the tradition in nee-
orthodoxy which eclipsed his efforts. 
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One can, then, begin with an inductive approach and have it collapse back 
into a reaffirmation of tradition. Or the strategy's vulnerability can 
express itself in the other direction: one can start with induction and end 
up with reductionism. Berger offers as an example of this the strong 
tendency of nineteenth-century protestant liberals to identify the essence 
of Christianity with ethics or with the cultural achievements of western 
civilisation [Berger, pp.139-140J. He does, however, clear those he 
identifies as the greatest representatives of liberal 
protestantism--Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Harnack--of this accusation. He 
holds that while they all emphasise ethics as well as cultural 
achievements among the merits of Christianity, none of the three identified 
Christianity with ethics or culture [ibid. p.1401. 
Nevertheless it would appear that behind specific aspects of Harnack's 
thought there lies the tacit assumption, shared with the reductionist 
strategy, of the superiority of modern consciousness [see Berger pp.lll-
1121. Only such a conviction can explain the strenuous efforts of Harnack 
to make theology intellectually respectable in the universities, his 
insistence that he was a purely objective historian, and his extensive 
work, typified by What is Christianity?, to make the gospel accessible, 
intelligible and attractive to 'modern man' [see l.d.]. 
Harnack's treatment of miraculous and supernatural phenomena certainly 
appears in danger of crossing the divide between induction and reduction, 
for the transcendent here is largely translated into phenomena of 
immanence. This translation is necessitated by Harnack's understanding of 
divine/spiritual power: miracles and eschatology are highly suspect because 
they can claim a sort of objectivity and thus threaten its pure inwardness. 
Berger warns us of where Harnack's approach in this matter, if taken to 
extremes, can lead. He insists that one cannot dispense with mythological 
language in religion, for without it one could not speak of the 
transcendent at all. To deny the ability of another reality to impinge 
upon ordinary human life is to invalidate all religious experience, and if 
this is done, one must completely cease to use religious language [Berger 
pp. 117-1181. Harnack does not, of course, deny that ability, but, with 
regard to the miraculous, he severely contains it. Harnack's dismissal of 
the obviously transcendent in favour of a carefully qualified inner 
transcendence could function as a staging-post towards dismissal of 
transcendence altogether. 
In the end it is Harnack's christocentrism and his high doctrine of 
personality which save him from a 'nothing-but' reductionism. Jesus is at 
one and the same time objective and subjective, immanent and transcendent. 
His christocentrism also saves Harnack from one of what Berger terms the 
abiding problems of the inductive strategy, namely, the problem of 
certainty. Because in Christianity religious experiences may be validated 
by reference to an historical person, present to us not only in the Spirit 
<subjective experience) but also in the historical record <Harnack holds 
that the biblical witness to Jesus is in the main reliable as history>, 
Christianity has a sort of permanent access to the wellsprings of 
religious experience. 
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ii. The dualism of internal and external power 
A key question which arises from Harnack's power analysis of history is 
how the divine/spiritual power he describes is related to ordinary human 
human powers. The ambivalence on this subject in Harnack is exemplified 
in his two metaphors of the kernel and the husk, and the bark and the sap. 
The first is Harnack's well-known expression for the distinction between 
what in the early Christian preaching was zeitgeschichtlich and what ~as 
eternally valid. At many points, as we have seen, he appears to believe in 
the possibility of extracting the pure gospel from all of its earthly 
integuments, and hence in the possibility of experiencing pure 
divine/spiritual power. But repeatedly in Historv of Dogma he makes the 
opposing point that religion can never reach us except through historically 
conditioned forms. An example of this can be found in his comments about 
the growth of liturgical ritual and the clericalisation of the early church. 
He says of these developments that: 
" ... it was perhaps a misfortune that the forms of contemporary 
religion were assumed. But the misfortune was by no means 
irreparable. Like every living plant, religion only grows inside a 
bark. Distilled religion is not religion at all" [M&E I p.234l. 
It would be reasonable to assume, on the basis of such a statement, that 
Harnack's position would be that divine/spiritual power was both 
experienced and communicated via the medium of ordinary human powers, yet 
often Harnack appears to insist on a 'pure spirituality' approach. 
Harnack did not, it seems, intend to be a theoretical dualist. He states in 
Marcion that the human mind is so predisposed that as thinkers we can 
easily be either monists or pluralists, but that we cannot think as 
dualists without the risk of becoming mythological [Marcion, p.265J, a risk 
from which his work was not immune. 
At first glance one sees in Harnack's work a simple binary opposition 
between the divine/spiritual power of the gospel and human, worldly, 
powers of coercion, tradition, etc. One could represent it by the following 
diagram: 
2. However, the dichotomy in Harnack is not actually so simple. The line 
of demarcation in fact runs right through the individual human being, and 
diagramatically would look like this: 
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Harnack seeks to minimise the distance and difference between divL~e 
Spirit and human spirit. He sees them as related and as having t::.e 
potential for deep communion, despite the 'fall', in contrast to t::.e 
fundamental difference in kind and 'post-fall' alienation between God a.:1d 
nature. This view is clearly conditioned by Harnack's conception of nature, 
discussed above. Along with Ritschl, he used the term in a highly 
specialised sense to indicate the negative elements of finitude a~d 
futility, and thus quite rightly contrasted 'nature' in that sense to things 
spiritual. However, even when speaking of nature in the more conventior.al 
sense of the word, Harnack preserves a dualism in the interests of t:.e 
'higher', that is the inner, life, saying in terms that holiness canr,:)t 
reveal itself in nature ['Christus als ErH:Sser, pp.88; see also ch. 4 above:. 
Drawing the line of demarcation in this manner protects Harnack's theodicy: 
God is no longer responsible for rebellious, corrupt nature, and Goc's 
absence from the world finds an explanation, while at the same time t:-.e 
human religious experience of God's presence is affirmed. And because t ~e 
barrier between Geist and Natur is something of a semi-permeab:e 
membrane, God is in fact allowed influence in nature and the world via the 
human Geist. 
The problem with this division is that it is based on the assumption of a 
strongly-marked dichotomy of nature and spirit within the human being, a 
dualism recognisable as far back as Plato but usually associated with t :-1e 
name of Decartes. Such a view of the composition of the human being W3S 
virtually self-evident to German idealism, and to Harnack standing in the 
idealist tradition 1 • 
This dualism is not, however, self-evident to us today, and it is ironic 
from our vantage-point that one who was so strongly critical of t=:.e 
importation into Christianity of hellenistic philosophy should so 
wholeheartedly embrace one of its central tenets. The standard objections 
to Cartesian dualism seem to apply in Harnack's case. A princip.al 
objection must be that however useful it is for Harnack's apologetic, there 
is little evidence for such a neat compartmentalisation of the human betng 
or of human powers into 'internal' and 'external' powers. Too ma.~y 
phenomena of human experience straddle the so-called boundary. To offer 
an example related to our subject, let us suppose that an individual has a 
transforming religious experience, an immediate and empowering sense :>f 
the presence and the love of God. This individual then vividly descrit.es 
that experience to another person, who subsequently undergoes a similarly 
transforming experience of the love of God. We might wish to ask, in the 
terms of this investigation, what kind of power is operative in this 
transaction. On the one hand one could say that divine/spiritual po1::1er 
passed from the first individual to the second, like fire kindling fire. On 
the other hand one could equally say that the first person exercised a 
quite human charismatic authority and power of persuasion over the second. 
On Harnack's model, with its firm division of the spiritual from the 
worldly, one would have to choose one description and reject the other. I 
question whether this is necessary, whether the two options are in fact 
mutually exclusive. Certainly Peter and Paul, representatives in Harnack 
of the activity of divine/spiritual power to a high degree, were not above 
argument and vigorous persuasion as tools for the preaching of the gospel. 
The dualism perhaps creates as many problems as it solves. 
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Harnack's christology indeed at tempts to break down the traditional, simple, 
dualism implied in the doctrine of the Incarnation, but his high doctrine 
of the human Geist over against a very negatively-conceived 'nature' 
actually reintroduces it by the back door. And from another point of view, 
we need to question Harnack's editing of the historical tradition about 
Jesus, in line with his dualism, to exclude Jesus' direct influence on the 
natural world. 
This kind of dualism in Harnack explains why he viewed the 
transpotentiation of Christianity in such a strongly negative light. It is 
not only that it entailed the exchange of personal liberty for bondage, 
though that would be bad enough: it also represents a decline from the 
spirit into the flesh. This is why it is impossible for Harnack to 
conceive of a legitimate external authority in the church, even though he 
perceived the utility of having one. Similarly on this view sacraments can 
only be seen as a debasing of spiritual truth, or rather the false 
exaltation to spiritual realms of that which is merely natural. 
Harnack's theological or metaphysical negativity towards human, worldly 
power seems uncharacteristic of his normal response to 'worldly' things. 
As his consistent rejection of asceticism demonstrates, he stood opposed to 
flight from the things of this world in favour of combatting sin and 
selfishness within the world. A view of human/social power which 
corresponded to this would, while maintaining its subordination to 
spiritual power, advocate its careful and responsible use both within the 
individual life and the life of the church. This theme does appear in 
Harnack [e.g.HD V pp.82fJ, but not wholeheartedly, and the force of his 
criticism in the opposite direction is such that a serious tension is 
created within his work. One result of this tension is the ambivalence in 
Harnack's handling of the very important question of the legitimate place 
of human power and authority within the life of the church. 
iii. The possibility of a legitimate external authority for Christianity 
Harnack's view of the legitimate place of external authority within the 
life of the church contains considerable tension. This is nicely 
encapsulated in a statement Harnack makes in Dogmengeschichte, and the 
footnote he appends to it. He writes: 
"It is not a false view of religion that the restless quest of the 
soul only ceases when there has dawned upon it an authority whose 
validity is independent of the degree of strength with which its 
justification is felt within the breast" [liD V pp.82fl. 
However, the footnote qualifies this statement considerably by making the 
'external authority', at least for spiritual persons, their own 
consciousness of the Divine Spirit. Harnack ends the qualification with a 
statement which further undermines the definitiveness of the external 
authority: 
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" ... personal religion is not shown to be valueless by its being proved 
that its authorities are not sound ... The important point is what the 
pious man has derived from his authorities1' CHD V p.83 n.1 J. 
While Harnack openly laments the passing-away of the demonstrations of 
abundant divine/spiritual power in the early Christian communities, his own 
opinions and actions with regard to church and power are much more in line 
with the state of affairs that took its place. His ethical and penitential 
views incline more towards the corpus permixtum than the exclusive 
community of saints, his eschatology towards the later doctrine of 
immortality and deification than chiliasm, and his scholarship towards 
learned exegesis and theological science rather than charismatic prophecy 
(see HD I pp.45-46J. Similarly his spirited indictments of the increasing 
worldliness of Christianity and his delineation of the costs of its growing 
rapport with secular learning in the first three centuries stand in glaring 
contrast to his own behaviour with regard to the relationship of church 
and world. A glance through his biography is sufficient to show that 
seldom has anyone done more to give the central teachings of Christianity 
influence ir1 the world or to reconcile it with secular learning. The 
moderation of his judgment upon the third century, the 'pleas in 
mitigation', may stem from his conviction, apparent both from his academic 
and political activities and from his apologetic commitment to presenting 
Christianity in a way which was accessible to the modern mind, that some 
compromise <~ith the world was vital for Christianity. 
One feels a sense of contradiction. On the one hand he clearly deplored 
the church's transpotentiation-the enhancement and often complete 
replacement of divine/spiritual power by human forces such as tradition, 
authority, dogma, law and coercion [WC? pp. 213, 2161. His ideal is the 
purely spiritual religion, but he from time to time acknowledges that this 
can never appear on earth: yet by the tone of his enthusiastic descriptions 
of the earliest church he virtually identifies his ideal, as does Sohm, with 
the 'good old days' of the Urgemeinde. He does not, it is true, see this 
time as paradigmatic in every respect for Christianity, especially with 
regard to eschatology and the miraculous, stating in terms that 
Christianity has no classical period, not even the first. But it is clear 
that he does hold the Urgemeinde up in this light as regards a proper 
balance between inner/spiritual and external/human powers in the church. 
Harnack views protestantism as, since that time, the closest approximation 
to this ideal, rejoicing in the fact that in it at last the world possesses 
a purely spiritual religion, without externals in the form of priests, 
sacrifices or ceremonies. He at tacks the 'political church' which wants to 
rule bodies, souls, consciences and goods, and which has adulterated its 
legitimate spiritual powers with those of the earth [WC? p. 103; see also 
WC? p.256/DtJ p.159J. 
One is keenly aware, however, that the author of these words remained 
throughout his life a member of the established state church. The 
colourful, impassioned language of his denunciations of the 
transpotentiation of the early church would lead one to believe that this 
would be an intolerable position for Harnack, even though he stops well 
short of Sohm or Tolstoy in the strength of his protests. But while 
strongly opposing the alliance of the church with any particular political 
party, with the catholic Centre Party in mind ('Protestantismus und 
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Katholizismus in Deutschland' R&A nf.1,p.247J, he argued against the strict 
separation of church and state on the grounds that it would result in a 
moral loss to the nation and to the isolation of the churches from each 
other and from the wider community. He seems to be arguing for tho 
educative function of the church within the nation in the same way that he 
found value in catholicism for training up the barbarian and semi-
barbarian pagans into higher ways, that is, as a preparation for and a 
safeguarding of the gospel rHD VI p.6J. 
But Harnack goes beyond allowing the church a legitimate role in educating 
and influencing the secular world to admit that human powers have a 
legitimate role within the church. As we have seen, he maintained, despite 
his negative attitude to any continuing influence for dogma, that the 
living gospel nowhere appears nor can appear without a protective 'bark' of 
form and organisation [see WC? 11, 176, 2201. 
Given his admission that some kind of external authority is necessary in 
religion, and having rejected the authoritativeness of all the external 
authorities of the catholic settlement, what does he propose by way of an 
alternative? Beyond the broadest outlines, he was either unwilling or 
unable to suggest an appropriate alternative authority, form or 
organisation for evangelical faith. Once again we experience the sense of 
closure involved in his statement 'Ich bin kein Reformator'. 
His work does, however, offer us hints and an indication of a general way 
of proceeding, which suggest the following direct ions. In the first place, 
and it is the thing we can be most sure of, Harnack would want to redress 
the balance between internal and external authority. All external 
authority for him is contingent. Whatever objective authorities imposed 
themselves or seemed necessary in the course of time, could, in Harnack's 
view, only supplement and never substitute for the inner authority of the 
gospel. Divine/spiritual power, when experienced personally, is self-
authenticating and needs no props. Were Christians to cultivate their 
receptivity to this power, they would become free of the psychological 
state of half-doubt and half-religion which seeks a resting-place in 
external authority. Thus the psychological drive which creates authority 
would diminish, and Christian communities would be in a better position to 
resist the pressures of institutionalisation and to function either without 
recourse to external authority or with that external authority held firmly 
in check. 
Harnack's writings themselves can take us this far, and we can, perhaps, 
find a few more clues in his life. His own attitude to the authority of 
the church, when it conflicted with the subjective authority of his 
conscience, was to obey the latter: he quite clearly subordinated external 
to internal authority. So far as he could be within the constraints of the 
'mandarin' tradition, he was a defender of academic freedom. And as 
recorded in the biography, the reasons for his support of his 
Landeskirche's proposed Spruchkollegium, which surprised many, also 
illuminate our subject. He supported the idea of a committee of experts 
which would investigate cases of doctrinal aberration among the clergy 
because he believed that a clear expression of the Christian faith was 
indeed important, but also that the matter should be separated from 
disciplinary proceedings and handled on the basis of the issues in a 
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moderate and respectful manner [AZH pp.391-395l. In all of this we can 
see his moving away in practice from an 'authoritarian' style of 
ecclesiastical authority to one which, while concerned to safeguard the 
clarity and purity of the teaching of the church, allowed the widest 
possible latitude to conscience. 
We are also, perhaps, entitled to make some deductions on the subject from 
Harnack's work which he himself did not make. It could be argued, for 
instance, that Harnack does already possess an external authority in his 
conception of history, and that history ends up replacing dogma in 
Harnack's scheme as the definitive criterion of truth. Tacitly he puts 
forward history, in the particularly evaluative form which he felt was its 
highest expression, and theology, insofar as it was a true theologia 
crucis, as appropriate external author! ties for evangelical faith, and in 
the process, as we shall discuss, accords to historical theologians 
considerable power. One need attribute to him, however, no particularly 
sinister motives for this. It appears that his primary motive was once 
again to place the historical Jesus in control of theology and church. 
Jesus in the end is the only external authority Harnack can recognise as 
legitimate. He is not only the chief vehicle for inner, divine/spiritual 
power: as a concrete historical figure who taught, acted and influenced, he 
was the original external authority for the Christian community, from whom 
all other external authorities in the church felt or claimed themselves to 
be derived. Harnack's desire, however impossible of fulfillment in 
practice, was to see him in that position once again, and he viewed 
historically-conditioned theology as the means for attaining that goal. 
iv. The authority of the historical theologian 
We have noted how in the eyes of many critics Harnack appears to be 
caught between his conviction that the divine/spiritual power available 
through the gospel is self-authenticating and requires no additional 
bolstering by external authority, and his historical observation and 
nagging personal instinct that some external authority in religion--even 
in Christianity-is necessary. The passage in which Harnack expresses his 
opinion concerning Luther's inadequate grasp of history reveals much to us 
about Harnack's own high estimate of it, and the functional role history 
played in his constructive theology as a legitimate external authority. He 
writes of Luther that: 
"' ... he had altogether as little understanding of history as the 
majority of his contemporaries had. History in the highest sense of 
the word was for him a closed book. He showed no perception either 
of the relativity of the historical or of the growth and progress of 
knowledge within history. How could it be possible under such 
circumstances to ascertain accurately what Scripture contains as a 
historical record? But how can a pure form of expression for the 
essence of Christianity be expected if this condition is not 
fulfilled?" CHD VII p.234l. 
This is a revealing passage in many ways. It shows us once again 
Harnack's desire to go much further than Luther's good beginning in 
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reversing transpotentiation, in clearing away the external authorities 
handed down from the catholic settlement by relativising their authority 
and nullifying its claim to be a religious power, and in restoring priority 
to the divine/spiritual power released through the gospel [see HD VII 
p.238l. In it we also discover Harnack tacitly laying the foundations for 
the authority of history--a history which is sophisticated enough to 
discriminate within the source documents and discern what in them 
constitutes an 'accurate historical record'. Harnack's emphasis on the 
'growth and progress of knowledge' constitutes a broad hint that a taking 
on board of his epistemology would also improve on Luther's beginnings. 
Yet, as we shall see below, the charge of oblivion to historical relativity 
would soon be laid at Harnack's own door. 
Furthermore, in accordance with his conviction that external authority to 
be maximally effective must be vested in persons rather that books or 
dogmas, Harnack at points seems to infer that the traditional authority of 
the bishop to interpret dogma finds a parallel in the authority of the 
historical theologian to interpret history. He acknowledges that the 
position of church historian is one which involves the exercise of 
external, 'political' power in the article '0ber die jUngsten Entdeckungen 
auf dem Gebiete der Altesten Kirchengeschichte' quoted in l.d., reminding 
us that church historians end up, by virtue of the results of their work, 
becoming church politicians whether they wish to or not [R&A bd. I pp. 315-
3161. Harnack always insisted that we study history in order to intervene 
in history. His desire was to use for good the power which he thus 
admitted to possessing--to fulfill his vocation of the laying of the 
groundwork for the completion of the reformation. 
Wrong's descriptions of the legitimations of authority shed light on the 
methodological strategy of Harnack's own quiet claim to power. This is 
based on the authority of competence, his position being that historical 
theologians have the right to determine what original Christianity was and 
what the essence of Christianity is because they alone are competent to 
handle and evaluate the source materials. At the same time Harnack's 
historical work undercuts the claims to legitimacy of all the traditional 
external authorities in Christianity, such as canon, creed, cultus and 
episcopacy, leaving the field clear, in Harnack's terms, for the integrity 
of the individual in the first instance, but also for the authority of the 
expert. 
Thus Harnack, though certainly not, in his generation, Harnack alone, makes 
the claim for critical history as a legitimate external authority for 
Christianity, and equally for a theology which is a 'true theologia crucis'. 
The replacement of the authority of a rather murky 'apostolic' tradition 
with the authority of historically-conditioned theology may constitute an 
advance for truth, though perhaps a very vulnerable and precarious one. 
But with regard to the position for theology which he is here supporting, 
Harnack does not go into sufficient detail to answer the many questions to 
which it gives rise, such as how theology can be 'the decisive power' in 
the church without becoming dogmatic and authoritarian, and of what, 
precisely, does the true theologia crucis consist. The one safeguard whi~h 
he does impose is his insistence on the contingency and fallibility of any 
theological productions, and the necessity for the central theological task 
of expressing the gospel to be continuously redone. But in the midst of 
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the paean to inner freedom which is Harnack's description of the 
reformation, we see the danger, in his elevation of theology--allied 81th 
'history in the highest sense of the word'-of a new bondage to externals 
and a new dependence upon professionals, though of a characteristically 
protestant kind, and a new human power seeking the hallowing of religion. 
This was far from Harnack's intention, but so highly did he esteem the 
task of theology that he may have been somewhat blind to its dangers. 
v. Harnack's concept of history 
It is also worth remembering that while Harnack placed history L, a 
position of great authority for Christianity, his own view of history ldas 
characterised by several questionable assumptions. The principle 
weaknesses in Harnack's attitude to history are well known. Chief among 
them is his assertion of the possibility of objectivity on the part of the 
historian, while at the same time insisting on the right and duty of 
historians to exercise a 'royal judging function' with regard to the 
selection and weighting of what history to present. Though Harnack was 
far from simplistic in this matter, we have become still more sceptical 
about the possibility of extracting from the source documents an 'accurate 
historical record', and even about the possibility, given our distance 
historically and epistemologically from the texts, of truly understanding 
the accurate historical record if we could arrive at it. Yet to Harnack, 
possession of a clear grasp of history 'in the highest sense of the word' 
was the essential tool by which his generation was competent to continue 
the theological work which the reformation began. Harnack also seemed 
unaware that his convictions concerning the unchangingness of the core of 
Christianity, and of the overall purpose and order of the historical 
process, were not historical observations but statements of faith. His 
choice, when assessing the significance of historical persons or events, to 
stress what was unique in them rather than what was characteristic of the 
time, also is open to object ion. 
Harnack has always earned criticism for his championing of an approach to 
historical phenomena which attempts to isolate and present the essence of 
the matter. Kaltenborn notes that towards the end of his life Harnack had 
at least some second thoughts about the use of the term 'essence', and 
mentioned in a letter to a former pupil that he saw now that he should 
simply have called Das Wesen 'Introduction to Christianity' [Kaltenborn, 
p.58l. Loisy, Cremer, Troeltsch and many others have pointed out the 
difficulty, when assessing Christianity, of determining legitimate criteria 
for making such a selection. Troeltsch was able to face more squarely the 
inescapable subjectivism of any treatment of history. In the end, though, 
all theological presentations, however committed to presenting 'the whole 
gospel', represent a selection from the tradition according to personally-
chosen criteria, so in some sense an essencing procedure, however 
regrettable, is inevitable. If Harnack is at fault in this matter it is in 
his misplaced self-confidence in practising openly what all theologians do 
covertly, and in the naivete of seeing a necessity as a virtue. 
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vi. Harnack's treatment of miracles. eschatology and sacraments 
Harnack's treatment of these subjects forms one of the most ambivalent and 
least satisfactory parts of his theology. He appears to be in a state of 
some contradiction over the enthusiastic nature of the earliest Christians, 
with their miracles and chiliastic expectations. He strongly desires to 
endorse the spiritual force, freshness and moral energy which were 
demonstrated by the early church, empowered as it was by 'the Spirit': he 
openly and strongly regrets the passing of that time and the decay into 
something much more tame and mediocre. But on the other hand he cannot 
see the supernatural phenomena which characterised the early church as 
being what they claimed to be, or as being intrinsically valuable. He 
clearly believes that it is possible to possess the joy in God, the vigour 
and utter confidence which the early Christians knew without possessing, 
or being possessed by, these phenomena, and he divides the former from the 
latter with his idea of a dual conception of 'the Spirit' in the New 
Testament. 
All of this has consequences for his portrayal of divine/spiritual power. 
Most understandings of Christianity include both the 'quiet peaceful 
element' and the 'supernatural' in their notion of divine/spiritual power, 
whereas Harnack makes both a distinction and a clear choice. Yet as an 
historian he must have observed how frequently, particularly at the 
inception of a new religious movement, the two things are found together. 
How did he explain that? Possibly only by reference to the consistent 
inability of a flawed humanity to think about spiritual things except in 
the language of metaphor. Other explanations are possible, however. 
Harnack admits that a supernatural or miraculous mode of understanding 
divine power is likely to persist as long as religion itself. In view of 
its perennial nature, his consignment of all miraculous and supernatural 
phenomena to the realms of legend, psychology or natural forces may 
arguably do less than justice to this persistent aspect of religious 
experience. 
We also find in Harnack now and then hints of an unwillingness or 
inability, despite his epistemological convictions, completely to let go of 
the supernatural interpretation of Christianity. He can still occasionally 
speak of God's power to compel nature and our ability to move that power 
by prayer, and he can claim that there has seldom been a strong faith 
which has not drawn from history the conclusion that Jesus possessed 
supernatural power. We also bear in mind his consistent affirmation that 
God is the Lord of history, that is, the ultimate determiner of the 
external world. Is God's method of operation in this world strictly 
confined to the inspiration and empowerment of human personalities? The 
confidence with which Harnack usually answers in the affirmative seems 
unfounded. 
We also need to examine the manner in which Harnack addresses the 
question of the boundaries of what is known and what is possible. One 
way in which Harnack handles the problem of the supernatural offers a 
parallel to his category of holy mystery. We see him in this context 
asserting the incompleteness of our knowledge of the forces pertaining to 
matter and the even greater incompleteness of our knowledge of 'psychic" 
forces, which means that we cannot in the end set a sure boundary between 
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the possible and the impossible. He similarly maintains that many of the 
phenomena associated with demonic possession are inexplicable. This 
admission of incomplete knowledge enables Harnack to judge at least some 
of the miraculous events reported in scripture and other early Christian 
texts to be genuine--not miraculous in the sense of violating the laws of 
nature, but certainly wonderful and, at the moment, inexplicable in their 
obedience to natural and psychological laws as yet unknown. In this 
manner, as Kaltenborn reports Franz Mehring to have said, Harnack leaves, 
if not actual doors for miracles, at least a few mouseholes [Kaltenborn 
p.42J. 
Kaltenborn himself is impatient with Harnack's 'mouseholes'. He labels as 
pre-Christian Harnack's fundamental assumption that the Naturzusammenhang 
cannot be broken into CKaltenborn p.42J. In his view one should either, on 
the basis of a 'strong' christology, speak unashamedly of miracles, or 
reject them altogether. Certainly Kaltenborn's higher christology means 
that he has no difficulty with the miraculous, but it seems more than a 
little subjective to write off Harnack's differing conclusions as pre-
Christian. He also insists that the job of determining the boundaries of 
what is possible belongs not to theology at all, but to the sciences 
[ibid.]. In any event, Harnack's emphasis on our ignorance of the 
boundaries of what is possible sits rather oddly and uncomfortably with 
the self-confidence and consistency with which he applies the 
epistemologicaql principle of the iron ring. The compromise hypothesis of 
explaining the ostensibly miraculous via still-unknown laws of nature has 
the rather unsatisfying effect of interspersing the iron with elastic. 
Harnack certainly appears to have no feeling for the sacramental as such, 
as Neufeld and other critics have remarked, though he is quick to grasp 
the external, social power consequences for the laity of the catholic 
development of the sacraments. To him this development represents the 
materialising of the spiritual and the objectifying of the relational. It 
is a perversion of the original symbolic activities, and a continuing 
hindrance to the church. Neufeld connects Harnack's negative attitude 
toward the sacraments with his understanding of 'nature', without 
appreciating that Harnack's negative pronouncements about 'nature' are not 
reflections on the goodness or otherwise of created things. Harnack was 
an unabashed lover of the material creation, but in its own sphere: he 
could not see in it a vehicle for the divine, the only possible vehicle for 
the divine within the iron ring was the human personality. Harnack's 
distaste for sacraments, conceived as means of objective grace, is rooted 
in his conviction that grace is personal and relational. His treatment of 
the sacramental feels simplistic, very black and white and either/or, and 
for that reason unsatisfying: more recent work on the meaning of symbol 
offers more adequate perspectives for assessment. 
Harnack's spirituality was strongly conditioned by the Lutheran doctrine of 
vocation in the world, and he disliked and distrusted anything which proved 
a distraction from the Christian's task, in the world, of love and service. 
Eschatology and mysticism alike are, in his eyes, distractions from this 
simple but profound vocation. Mysticism is particularly reprehensible to 
Harnack because it attempts at a far subtler level than eschatology or 
sacrament to . materialise and sensualise the spiritual, and has the 
character of hubris in its attempts to escape from the iron ring. We were 
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not, in Harnack's view, meant to storm heaven, but to live on earth in 
patient trust and loving activity. His criticism, no doubt in some cases 
justified, that mysticism seeks proximity to the divine without moral 
regeneration, is, however, unjust to the great majority of mystical writers 
for whom a holy life rather than any visionary experience is the criterion 
of authenticity. 
Harnack writing on mysticism and 'superstition' is not Harnack at his best. 
One feels too much the weight of the anti-Orthodox and anti-Catholic 
outlook which was inevitable for a protestant theologian of his time, even 
though Harnack held it in a distinctly moderate form when compared to 
others. It renders him incapable of reading the texts with sympathy, and 
prevents him from discerning the not inconsiderable similarities between 
his own piety and that of the mystic. Both were individualist, and both 
placed a premium upon a living experience of the living God. Both were 
seeking escapes, and escapes which were similar--mysticism, from the 
limitations of normal human perception in order to find reassurance of the 
truth of the realities proclaimed in the Christian faith; Harnack, from the 
enslaving chains of 'nature' and finitude, in order to dwell in the 
assurance of meaning and eternal divine reality which Jesus preached. 
Harnack rightly noted that tendency in mysticism which would make religion 
a substitute for and diversion from morality rather than the source of its 
energy. But the opposition he draws between mysticism's seeking 
experience as a way to faith, and his insistence that faith comes first and 
is the ground of experience, feels overdrawn and part of a rather stock 
protestant response to anything catholic. Meijering suggests that 
Harnack's is a typically reformed view of mysticism, adding that if one, in 
contrast to this view, allows for the grace of God outside of the 
historical revelation in Christ, one can take a more positive view of it 
[Meijering <1978> pp.84fl. 
These 'supernatural' phenomena have proved very persistent in human 
rel~ious history. They recur in the life of Christ and of the church, and 
are clearly power events of some kind. They do not accord well with 
Harnack's conviction that divine/spiritual power is an inner matter, and 
they pose a threat to his understanding of Christianity and to his 
apologetic theodicy. He at tempts to dispose of them by explaining them to 
be non-supernatural occurances and by downplaying their significance, 
asserting that as they have. to do only with the transient material world 
they are of only secondary value in any event. I would hold that they may 
be matters of more than marginal theological significance, and if there is 
a chance of their being what they claim to be, then Harnack's power 
theology and theodicy, despite its considerable virtues of consistency and 
plausibility, would require alteration. 
vii. Integrating the historical Jesus with absolute religion 
One question which remains unresolved in Harnack's christology is whether 
Jesus' revelation and action are definitive of reality in a causal sense, as 
orthodox tradition would hold, or whether they are rather the supreme 
illustration of universal truth. Kaltenborn claims that universal religion 
is Harnack's starting-point, with Jesus as its highest expression 
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(Kaltenborn, pp.44, 125-1261, and offers as an example Harnack's description 
of the cross as an expression of the fact that the suffering of the 
righteous is salvation in history [!{altenborn pp.44-45l. He contrasts ~his 
with Bonhoeffer's approach in which Jesus, not universal religion, is the 
starting-point, and where he is not so much 'die Wirklichkeit' as 'der 
Wirklichen'[ibid. pp.125-126l. Kaltenborn blames Harnack's idealism for his 
stance, but could not the cause also lie in his faithfulness to his 
understanding of history? On historical grounds Harnack could not accept 
the orthodox understanding of pre-existence, and on that basis, because of 
his relatively late arrival on the stage of history, Jesus would have to be 
seen as illustrative rather than causal or definitive of reality. Harnack 
is clearly influenced by idealism and uses the phrase 'universal religion' 
frequently, as one would expect of an apologetically orientated theologian 
of his time. But he also assented to the fundamental bibilical notion of 
God the Father, who rules history and who can do genuinely new things in 
history. Harnack swings back and forth between these two notions, as is 
illustrated by his doctrine of redemption, which now is the revelation to 
alienated human beings of their true and eternal condition as the children 
of God, and now is a 'real' change in situation, effected by the penal 
suffering of Christ. 
Harnack frequently states that Christianity is not one positive religion 
among many or even the highest religion, but is in fact religion itself, 
yet he is forced by his christology to qualify this statement. He affirms 
that the peculiar character of the Christian religion is that every 
reference to God is at the same time a reference to Jesus Christ and vice 
versa, and in this sense the person of Christ is the central point of the 
religion and inseparably united with the substance of piety as a sure 
reliance on God. Harnack denies that this is to intrude a foreign, 
'positive' element into the pure essence of religion, and he quotes Wilhelm 
Herrmann in stating that the reverence for persons, the inner bowing 
before the manifestations of moral power and goodness is the root of all 
true religion [HD I p.72l. It is true, though, that Christianity knows only 
one name before which it bows: "In this rests its positive character; in 
all else, as piety, it is by its strictly spiritual and inward attitude, not 
a positive religion alongside of others, but religion itself" [HD I p.721. 
Harnack resolves Lessing's dilemma, with regard to Jesus, by asserting that 
in him what appear to be the accidental truths of history turn out in fact 
to be the necessary truths of reason [Rumscheidt, pp.69fJ. 
The weakness in Harnack's argument for Jesus' uniqueness in 'Christus als 
ErH:lser' lies firstly in his claim that the assertions he makes in this 
direction are historical facts. It is true that Christianity has always 
judged Jesus to be unique, but that there is indisputable evidence that his 
claim is justified cannot be simply stated as fact. The assertion that 
Jesus was the last prophet is also problematic: the judgment as to who is 
a true and who a false prophet is hardly a question of historical fact, 
unless one pushes the 'royal judging function' to its very limit. And if it 
is a limitation on their uniqueness that most prophetic figures since 
Jesus have been indebted to him, how does Harnack evaluate the fact that 
Jesus was dependent upon earlier prophets? The third assertion-that 
where other prophets appealed to only a limited circle at a specific time, 
Jesus is the prophet for a vast number and for endless generations-is 
also problematic. The popularity of Mohammed, who fulfils most of the 
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criteria for a prophet, demonstrates that Jesus is not unique in 
possessing widespread appeal. While it is true that Jesus has out lasted 
most prophets in influence over time, it is simply impossible to ascertain 
whether or not he is the prophet for an 'endless epoch'. These are 
perhaps legitimate arguments of faith, but certainly not historical facts. 
The fourth assertion in 'Christus als ErH~ser', that Jesus brought the 
perfect consciousness of God, over against the partial and contradictory 
God-consciousness of previous prophets, similarly cannot be proven in any 
historical or objective sense, but does appear to be true from the 
standpoint of a Christian theology. The fifth assertion, that in Jesus, 
unlike previous prophets, there was no contradiction between his 
perceptions and his actions, does appear plausible from the evidence we 
possess. These five assertions, together with Harnack's delineation of 
Jesus' role as redeemer, form the core of his argument for the uniqueness 
of Jesus. What is clear to us is that it remains an argument, and is not, 
as Harnack would have us believe, a demonstration. 
The answer which it suggests to the question of how the historical Jesus 
fits into 'absolute religion' is to grant him uniqueness in the sense of 
having reached the pinnacle of development of a human religious role <i.e. 
prophet and redeemer) which already existed before his time. Jesus in 
Harnack's view represents a 'quantum leap' for religion, but in directions 
consonant with and already determined by absolute, universal religion. Yet 
there are elements in his atonement theory which pull in the opposite 
direction, arguing for the utter novelty of Jesus' saving work. 
viii. The place of the cross in Harnack's system 
On the basis of 'Christus als Erltlser' it appears that Harnack has not 
managed, in spite of his attempts to do so, to integrate the cross into his 
system. He holds staunchly to the importance of Christ's suffering and 
death and to the idea that they were effective for the forgiveness of 
sins--he has too much respect for Christian history and for what he terms 
the religious experience of the most mature Christians to do otherwise. 
But his treatment of the cross hangs on the end of 'Christus als Erltlser' 
like an afterthought, veiled by a curtain of mystery. His treatment in 
other books, with its assertion of the redemptive value of penal suffering, 
certainly goes much further towards affording the cross an integral place, 
but it is still somewhat unsatisfactory. Harnack's emphasis on a 'real' 
redemption and on penal suffering does not fit seamlessly into his usual 
psychological mode of thought. It is certainly in keeping that he does not 
see this suffering as a satisfaction of God's honour, but as the awesome 
price God was prepared to pay to liberate us from the destructive powers 
of sin and guilt, but Harnack's continuing use of terms like 'wrath' and 
'penalty' indicates that he has not totally dismissed the first conception. 
Furthermore, the interpretations of wrath and penalty. which he advances 
are rather impersonal, with sin and guilt as destructive forces, virtually 
outside of any particular person and independent of God, on a par with the 
laws of physics. This does not harmonise with a mode of theological 
thought which is intentionally personal and relational rather than 
'objective'. It has a rather mythological feel, which is surely not what 
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Harnack intended. What goes a long way, however, towards saving the 
integrity of his thought is the psychological manner in which he perceives 
penalty. We see this when he criticises Abelard: 
" ... he has not clearly perceived that that love is the highest, is 
indeed alone effectual, which, by taking the penalty upon itself, 
reveals at the same time the greatness of the absolution and the 
greatness of the cancelled guilt. He did not perceive that the 
sinner cannot be otherwise delivered from guilt than by experiencing 
and seeing the penalty of guilt" [HD VI p.79J. 
Harnack seems in the end undecided as to whether the cross of Christ was 
something absolutely unique in human history or whether it stood, as a 
superlative example, 'like all crosses which stand in the service of the 
brother', but he appears to incline toward the latter view. Harnack's 
inductive strategy and his apologetic interest combine to lead him to seek 
analogies and parallels for the events of Jesus' experience in the common 
experiences and history of humanity. His 'high' anthropology causes him, in 
any event, to minimise any sense of radical disjunction between the human 
and the divine. Thus recognising the points of similarity and contact 
between Jesus' work and that of others is not, in Harnack, to minimise or 
denigrate the work of Jesus, but to elevate and ennoble the human 
strivings in the same direction-not to bring Christ down, but to raise 
humanity up. The danger of this approach is that of compromising both 
Jesus' uniqueness, and, by extension, his centrality to the faith that bears 
his name, both of which are fundamental to the tradition. 
ix. The category of holy mystery 
A further difficulty with Harnack's christology concerns the evaluation of 
his category of 'holy mystery', which crops up in various forms throughout 
his work. As we have seen in chapter six, he refuses to speculate upon 
the 'how' of the resurrection and the indwelling of Christ in the believer, 
and he just as firmly refuses to try to explain how it can be that 
Christ's death on the cross could be 'for sinners', beyond the assertion 
that the death of the Holy One, along with his word, life and continuing 
presence, is singularly effective in convincing sinners of the fact of 
forgiving love. We have seen also his distaste for inquisitiveness into 
the sufferings of Christ. 
On the one hand it cannot but be a virtue to remain silent where one has 
no information, and Harnack as an historian of dogma knew only too well 
the knots and difficulties into which speculation about the resurrection 
and the atonement has led the churches through the centuries. Often 
theologians, when confronted with contradictory or insufficient evidence, 
have been tempted to stretch the evidence and make more positive 
statements than are warranted. It is refreshing that in such 
circumstances Harnack usually acknowledges the state of the evidence in a 
strightforward manner before, perhaps, tendering what is clearly stated to 
be an opinion. This characterises his academic work as a whole, and one 
can see that his treatment of 'holy mysteries' is consistent with it. It 
is, however, frustrating that Harnack, with . his insistence on the 
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importance of clear thought and expression, should thus decline to push 
this thought and expression into very sensitive areas, and one cannot help 
the suspicion that the strategy is useful for getting him out of tight 
spots. It does seem inconsistent that someone who was publicly commit ted 
to a liberal spirit of free enquiry in theology should hedge round 
particularly important theological questions with impenetrable barriers. 
x. Unchallenged assumptions in Harnack's work 
If it is a crime to make a priori assumptions, then all must plead guilty. 
But when evaluating intellectual work, it is necessary to expose the 
unchallenged assumptions inherent in it as clearly as possible. Perhaps 
Harnack's most famous unchallenged assumption was that he was doing 
objective history--that it was possible for anyone to do objective 
history-followed by his assumption that the historical process had both 
meaning and a goal. He also declines, or more probably could imagine no 
need to explain, one of the truisms of his view of religion, which was that 
in religious matters it is what is simplest which is most powerful [see 
ch. 3.b.l. 
Harnack's view concerning 'holy mysteries' affords another example. Similar 
to this is his conviction that how Jesus reached the consciousness of his 
unique power and vocation is his secret, which no psychology will ever 
fathom [WC? p.128l. And again we see that while Harnack based his belief 
in the resurrection not on the veracity of stories about the empty tomb 
but upon the overwhelming conviction of the earliest disciples, he does not 
explain how it was that they reached that conviction [see ch. 5.b.J. 
xi. The causal roles of idea and personality 
A summary of Harnack's theory of divine/spiritual power, but employing 
sociological terminology, would be that divine/spiritual power empowers 
human beings via the operation of charismatic and competent authority 
predicated upon what Rollo May terms nutrient power, which is attributed 
to <Feuerbach and Durkheim would say, projected upon) the character of God. 
The effect of coming to accept the legitimacy claims of this 
authority-that is, the charismatic and competent authority of the 
personality of Christ-and concomitantly its estimate of the character of 
God, is the empowering of the individual, i.e. the production of marked 
beneficial effects upon that person's emotional and ethical states, giving 
rise to beneficial activity. Inbuilt, as we can see, into this analysis of 
how divine/spiritual power works is a very high estimate of the empowering 
possiblities of ideas, and the empowering influence of personalities. 
What the world will no longer accept uncritically is the conviction that 
ideas, and the personalities shaped by ideas, have that primary causal 
role. Mann's point that ideological power could only become dominant when 
certain infrastructures <literacy and long-distance communications) and 
certain attitudes <the unity of humankind) had been generated by economic, 
political and military circumstances <such as the long-distance trade and 
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cultural intermingling which were the result of large empires) suggests 
that powerful ideas, though truly powerful, are as much effects as 
causes. Sociologists would argue that the same is true of great 
personalities. Harnack himself, as Irmscher points out, was instrumental, 
in spite of his 'great man' theory, in shifting the emphasis away from the 
individual and focussing on the role of institutions in the shaping of 
history [lrmscher p.13 l. The balance indeed may now have swung too far: 
if Harnack's view of the causality of ideas and personalities in history 
was one-sided and simplistic, so is any theory which strictly subordinates 
ideological power and the role of outstanding individuals to economic, 
political, or social power and the role of non-personal institutions. This 
is perhaps especially true when the subject under discussion is religion. 
Kii. The possibility of a religious significance for the church 
A further question which must be put to Harnack concerning the theory of 
transpotentiation is what, for him, the church, as an institution dedicated 
to the promulgation of divine/spiritual power but existing in the external 
world, can possibly mean. Ideological power for Harnack was individual and 
rooted in true transcendence. In contrast, ideological power for Mann is 
corporate and rooted in social transcendence. Both can appreciate that the 
ecumene has value; for Harnack it is a band of individual believers and its 
value lies in supporting them as individuals, where for Mann it is the 
essence of religion, the 'social home' within the universe for which all 
people long. Neither writer has, however, managed to reach an 
understanding of religious corporateness which can accord it any religious, 
or true-transcendent, significance. As we noted in l.d. above, Harnack did 
possess a practical and pragmatic interest in ecclesiology, a vision, 
though not perhaps very clear or specific, of what the church should be 
doing. This included even the formulation of a plan of first steps 
towards reconciliation and possible reunification between the protestant 
and catholic churches ['Protestantismus und Katholizismus in Deutschland' 
R&A nf.l. pp.225f1. But what he lacked was a theological estimate of what 
the church is. The church as 'the body of Christ' hardly figures in 
Harnack's writings, and remained for him an ideological construct, the 
societas fidei, with no direct relation to any concrete ecclesiastical body 
or bodies. In an attitude which he identified as typically protestant, he 
recognised the practical necessity of visible ecclesial communities, but 
insisted that they were practical contingencies only: " ... we do not hang our 
hearts upon them" CWC? p.276l. 
Harnack seems unable to accord the church any religious significance at 
all, for the basic religious unit to him is the individual-'God and the 
soul; the soul and its God'. Because of his understanding of power, any 
human collectivity assembled in the name of religion must be at least 
slightly suspect, for it will inevitably generate and utilise external, 
social power and, because of its eternal goal, unless it is extremely 
careful, it will end up legitimating and absolutising that power by 
claiming divine sanction for it. Harnack has a clear vision of the task of 
Christianity in the modern world, but can offer little in the way of 
guidance for the formation, or reformation, of the corporate vehicle of 
that mission. To say this is not merely to take issue with Neufeld and 
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insist that Harnack did not possess anything remotely well enough 
organised to be called a Kirchenprogramm. It is also to insist that 
Harnack was unwilling or unable to offer future generations any meaning 
for 'church' beyond that of a sociological collectivity with a common 
ideological goal. It would seem that he did, after all, hold firmly to his 
understanding of his vocation, that is, the renewal of theology, and left 
the renewal of the church, even at a theoretical level, to succeeding 
generations. 
7 .d. The merits of Harnack's system 
Too often in the past, assessments of Harnack's work have focussed 
exclusively on its deficiencies and ignored or taken for granted its 
merits. DBbertin, however, as we noted in l.d., affirms Harnack's continuing 
significance for the fields of education, politics and theology. Harnack's 
particular contributions to theology he summarises as establishing the 
validity of the quest for meaning, the centrality of Jesus, the contingency 
and alterability of all historical relations, and the value, for social and 
political activity, of a sense of allegiance and responsibility to 
transcendent reality. Something of my own estimation of Harnack's merits 
has been indicated in the introduction to this chapter. One would further 
wish to augment DBbertin's conclusions by indicating that Harnack's 'system' 
is more coherent and less reductionist that previous studies have 
indicated. As Harnack is widely held to be the representative figure of 
liberal protestantism, it follows that a reassessment of Harnack must lead 
also to a reassessment of liberalism, aknowledging its continued strong 
allegiance to the transcendent and cancelling or mitigating the charge that 
it reduces Christianity to ethics and aesthetics. 
This will serve as a general survey of Harnack's achievements, but it is 
necessary to express more specifically the value of Harnack's constructive 
theology, especially as it relates to the theme of power. 
While Harnack's dualism of internal and external power may be seen as a 
simplistic overschematisation, the same should not be said of his theory of 
the transpotentiation of Christianity. It is true that the basic thesis is 
simple, i.e., the observation that as the inner, spiritual energy of 
Christianity diminished, the external, temporal power of the church 
increased. But Harnack demonstrates great sophistication in the way he 
links the two facts. Though some causality is implied, he does not draw a 
straightforward causal connexion between the decline of divine/spiritual 
power and the rise of ecclesiastical might, but rather describes the 
complex interplay of factors which led to this result. His clearheadedness 
and evenhandedness in the analysis of something about which he had very 
strong convictions can indeed serve as a model for the future. 
Regardless of whether or not one agrees with his analysis completely, 
Harnack's well-documented critique of the growth and misuse of 
ecclesiastical power still stands, and still needs to be addressed. The 
critique itself, in its broad outlines, is not new-anabaptists and other 
sectarians have been making it at least since the reformation. What is 
new is the formidable scholarship with which it is substantiated, the fact 
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that is is being made by a member of an established state church, and that 
its critique of ecclesiasticism is not aimed exclusively at Roman 
Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. The critique functions as a lasting 
warning against the dangers of idolatry, of investing, however innocently, 
the contingent human structures of ecclesiastical power with the lustre of 
the divine. 
But it is not exclusively, or even primarily, with regard to ecclesiastical 
power that Harnack makes his greatest contribution. This lies in his 
courageous attempt to articulate the meaning and method of 
divine/spiritual power in terms of inductive human experience. The use of 
the inductive strategy, and the concentration on the power, or more 
correctly, on the empowering quality, of the gospel in relational and 
psychological terms constituted and still constitutes an extremely 
plausible, accessible and attractive apologetic. Harnack, unlike many 
others, is speaking 'in a language understanded of the people'. While, and 
in some cases regrettably, jettisoning as excess baggage much which has 
been prized by orthodox Christianity, he performs an important service in 
focussing on the central doctrinal tenets of the faith and making them 
comprehensible in existential terms. This existential emphasis acts as a 
valuable corrective to the overemphasis on intellectualised dogmatism 
which is perhaps the besetting sin of European protestants. Harnack again 
and again serves to remind us that Christianity is simple, and to remind 
us of the magnitude and profundity of the simple truths it proclaims--God 
as the loving Father of humanity, who is both Judge and Redeemer in and 
through Jesus Christ. True religion, he says, is as simple and transparent 
as it is alien and absolutely paradoxical [Marcion, p.17J. He calls upon 
Christians not to allow any complexificat ions, any collect! ve syncretisms 
which the centuries might throw up, to distract them from the simple, 
sublime, and neglected truth of the character of God. In doing this he 
turns our attention to what is, after all, the centre of theo-logy. 
His theory of divine/spiritual power serves to safeguard the goodness of 
that character, though at the price of limiting God's power in the external 
world or channelling it in through the 'back door' of interior human 
consciousness. In doing this, however, he is only giving coherent and open 
expression to the change in the understanding of divine power which modern 
consciousness requires and which has actually occurred widely within 
Christian circles. 
7.e. Harnack as a starting-point for a contemporary theology of power 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to suggest a comprehensive list of 
'improvements' to Harnack's constructive theology. I do wish, however, to 
suggest that there is much in his thought which could serve as a 
starting-point for anyone wishing to approach Christian theology from the 
point of view of power, and to indicate some possible directions which 
such a theology might take. 
Any theology which wished to learn from Harnack would attempt to 
encourage the reintegration of theology into the broader world of human 
intellectual culture not only as a prophetic critic, but also as a 
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constructive partner. It would want to stay close to and profit from the 
fruits of church-historical research, from developments in our 
understanding of Christian origins, as well as being versed in the 
contributions of contemporary psychology and social science. It would 
further remain perpetually self-critical-here we learn from what Harnack 
was unable to do as much as from his example!-as well as critical of the 
Christian tradition and the Christian churches. It would perhaps at tempt 
to improve on Harnack by incorporating into its system a rel~ious 
understanding of the church. This might include a power analysis which 
stressed the kind of cooperative power by which the power of one 
individual can be used to empower rather than dominate another, creating a 
synergistic rather than a competitive effect. Any theology of the church 
which desired to be faithful to Harnack's memory would, however, need to 
stress the fallibility and contingency of ecclesiastical institutions, to 
limit strictly the scope of their authority, and guard against according 
that authority any intrinsic religious value or necessary mediatorial role 
between the individual and the divine. 
Harnack's dualism of inner and external power must be considered a flaw, 
and a serious one, in his system, and some,thing which, if one wishes to 
draw insights from Harnack for the doing of theology in the future, must 
be radically rexamined or reinterpreted. It was typical of Harnack's time 
to think in dichotomies, where today perhaps an arrangement of 'inner' and 
'external' powers as opposite ends of a unified continuum would be deemed 
more adequate. The distinction may still be useful, however, as a working 
theoretical tool. Just as Wrong sets out various parameters with which to 
describe different types of powers, such as extensiveness, 
comprehensiveness and intensity [Wrong pp. 14-161, so it may be useful, in 
creating a theological typology of power, to add to these parameters and 
analyse types of power also in terms of their inwardness or externality. 
What cannot be supported is the attribution to this, as in Harnack, of a 
virtually ontological significance. Yet the problem, for Harnack's system, 
of not making such an attribution is that the theodicy is then threatened. 
If God is not thus epistemologically or ontologically 'locked out' of the 
external, physical world, it becomes more difficult to explain why God's 
activity in that world is not more noticeable. 
Starting out 'from Harnack's analysis of the role of 'external' human power 
in the life of the church one could go in several directions. One route 
would be to develop his idealistic side and attempt to formulate a theory 
of Christian anarchism, of a church which severely minimised or entirely 
eliminated its institutional structures and in which neither coercive power 
nor even the mildest legitimated authority were given priority over 
individual conscience. Alternatively one could follow the example of 
Harnack's attitude to external human power in the church as demonstrated 
in his own life. Here effectively the dualism of inner and external power 
breaks down in favour of a continuum, and external human power is 
accepted as an inevitable and even welcome, though expressly junior, 
partner in the prosecution of the church's mission. A third direction, 
following on from Harnack in only a very limited sense, would be to accept 
Harnack's historical documentation of the transpotentiation process but to 
reject his negative judgment of it-to see it as a legitimate and 
providential development within the Christian tradition. 
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In a future theology of power, it would be necessary to continue to take 
the apologetic task very seriously indeed, and if possible to continue and 
develop Harnack's directions in theodicy. In doing this one would wish to 
take account of changes since Harnack's time in the assessment of th~ 
intrinsic superiority of modern consciousness. One would also need to 
take more seriously than Harnack did the phenomenology of the miraculous 
and para-normal, and make room in the system for the reality of these 
things. The possiblity of God's direct action in the external world does, 
as indicated aleady, complicate the question of theodicy, but need not make 
it impossible, or necessarily lead to a collapse back into an old-fashioned 
supernaturalism. 
Harnack's theology of power would prove a particularly valuable starting-
point for the development of a contemporary theology of the inner life. 
The existential emphasis of Harnack's theology could be developed further. 
But while a delineation of meaninglessness, death and futility as 'the 
enemy' in Christianity would continue to be helpful, it would be necessary 
to rehabilitate the word 'nature' by clarifying what Harnack intended when 
he used the term and separating this meaning very clearly from any 
estimate of the natural world. Though as a result of a greater awareness 
of the impact of social groups and institutions on human behaviour we are 
less 'personalist' today than Harnack was, each of us still, in our inner 
life, exists in some sense alone, and it is 1n that personal aloneness that 
the gospel must take root if it is to have any significant impact on us at 
all. To that extent Harnack is still relevant, and his attempts to explain 
how divine/spritual power works can help us to appropriate it. 
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Postscript: Directions for further Harnack research 
In addition to the suggestions for a theology of power based on Harnack's 
work which are discussed above, this investigation has brought to light 
several areas of Harnack scholarship which require more work. One obvious 
area, in the interests of those who do not read German, is that of 
translation. To offer the example of English, all of the extant 
translations of Harnack's works are elderly and could profit from updating, 
and several important works, including Marcion, the final edition of 
Dogmengeschichte. and the Reden und AufslHze. have never been translated 
at all. This holds true as well for the Harnack biography. Presumably a 
similar situation exists in other languages. 
Irmscher suggests that there is a need for a further biography of Harnack, 
one which is more wissenschaftlich and more objective than his daughter's 
was able to be. Such a project would do well to take Dtlbertin's advice 
that in order to understand Harnack's religious upbringing it would be 
necessary, as well as reading Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, to investigate 
Theodosius Harnack's Katechetik [ l.c.J. Irmscher also calls for a revision 
of the Smend bibliography on the grounds that it is incomplete [ l.c. n.l2l. 
Dummer argues that in view of the fact that a sizeable chunk of his 
published works deal with New Testament subjects, Harnack's contributions 
as a New Testament scholar are worthy of more attention than they have 
received [l.c. n.13l. Dummer himself has provided, in his 1980 edition of 
Harnack's publications for the Berlin Academy, one tool to enable such 
research to be undertaken, and the collection will also be of use in 
obtaining more attention generally for these most neglected of Harnack's 
publications. In connexion with Harnack's biblical work, a fuller 
examination of his controversial call, on historical, theological and 
apologetic grounds, for the demotion from canonical status of the Old 
Testament within protestantism would prove both necessary and enlightening 
(Marcion, pp. 249-254). 
An avenue of Harnack research which has borne fruit in the past is that of 
investigating his relationship to other theologians, and this could well 
prove fruitful again. A fuller comparison than we yet possess of his 
thought with Troeltsch's would be valuable, and, as mentioned earlier, the 
work on his relationship to Barth needs to be redone from a more 
dispassionate perspective. Another promising figure for such a comparison 
would be Bultmann. 
-182-
Notes to cha9ter seven <Harnack's contribution to a theology of power> 
7 .c. Difficulties in Harnack's approach 
!.Harnack's strong dualism of internal and external powers is read back, if 
not into Jesus himself, into the earliest Christian communities with his 
contentious idea of a dual leadership divided between charismatics 
<apostles, prophets, teachers) and local administrative officers <episkopoi, 
diakonoi> [HD I 214--2161. The charismatics ostensibly represent 
divine/spiritual power and the administrators external, social power, but, 
assuming that there was this duality of church leadership, the two sorts 
of power were doubt less mixed in each. 
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